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Drop policy printing from openssl

Nothing really uses the policy tree. It's desgined with built-in DoS
capabilities directly from the RFC. It will be removed from the attack
surface and replaced with something equivalent that doesn't grow
exponentially with the depth.

This removes the only reason the policy tree itself ever leaked out of
the library.

ok jsing

/* $OpenBSD: verify.c,v 1.17 2023/04/14 15:27:13 tb Exp $ */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
 * All rights reserved.
 *
 * This package is an SSL implementation written
 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
 *
 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
 * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 *
 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
 * the code are not to be removed.
 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
 *    must display the following acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
 *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
 *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
 *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
 *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 * SUCH DAMAGE.
 *
 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
 * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
 * copied and put under another distribution licence
 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
 */

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>

#include "apps.h"

#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>

static int cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, char *file, STACK_OF(X509) *uchain,
    STACK_OF(X509) *tchain, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
static int vflags = 0;

static struct {
	char *CAfile;
	char *CApath;
	char *crlfile;
	char *trustfile;
	char *untfile;
	int verbose;
	X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm;
} cfg;

static int
verify_opt_args(int argc, char **argv, int *argsused)
{
	int oargc = argc;
	int badarg = 0;

	if (!args_verify(&argv, &argc, &badarg, bio_err, &cfg.vpm))
		return (1);
	if (badarg)
		return (1);

	*argsused = oargc - argc;

	return (0);
}

static const struct option verify_options[] = {
	{
		.name = "CAfile",
		.argname = "file",
		.desc = "Certificate Authority file",
		.type = OPTION_ARG,
		.opt.arg = &cfg.CAfile,
	},
	{
		.name = "CApath",
		.argname = "path",
		.desc = "Certificate Authority path",
		.type = OPTION_ARG,
		.opt.arg = &cfg.CApath,
	},
	{
		.name = "CRLfile",
		.argname = "file",
		.desc = "Certificate Revocation List file",
		.type = OPTION_ARG,
		.opt.arg = &cfg.crlfile,
	},
	{
		.name = "trusted",
		.argname = "file",
		.desc = "Trusted certificates file",
		.type = OPTION_ARG,
		.opt.arg = &cfg.trustfile,
	},
	{
		.name = "untrusted",
		.argname = "file",
		.desc = "Untrusted certificates file",
		.type = OPTION_ARG,
		.opt.arg = &cfg.untfile,
	},
	{
		.name = "verbose",
		.desc = "Verbose",
		.type = OPTION_FLAG,
		.opt.flag = &cfg.verbose,
	},
	{
		.name = NULL,
		.desc = "",
		.type = OPTION_ARGV_FUNC,
		.opt.argvfunc = verify_opt_args,
	},
	{ NULL },
};

static const struct option verify_shared_options[] = {
	{
		.name = "attime",
		.argname = "epoch",
		.desc = "Use epoch as the verification time",
	},
	{
		.name = "check_ss_sig",
		.desc = "Check the root CA self-signed certificate signature",
	},
	{
		.name = "crl_check",
		.desc = "Enable CRL checking for the leaf certificate",
	},
	{
		.name = "crl_check_all",
		.desc = "Enable CRL checking for the entire certificate chain",
	},
	{
		.name = "explicit_policy",
		.desc = "Require explicit policy (per RFC 3280)",
	},
	{
		.name = "extended_crl",
		.desc = "Enable extended CRL support",
	},
	{
		.name = "ignore_critical",
		.desc = "Disable critical extension checking",
	},
	{
		.name = "inhibit_any",
		.desc = "Inhibit any policy (per RFC 3280)",
	},
	{
		.name = "inhibit_map",
		.desc = "Inhibit policy mapping (per RFC 3280)",
	},
	{
		.name = "issuer_checks",
		.desc = "Enable debugging of certificate issuer checks",
	},
	{
		.name = "legacy_verify",
		.desc = "Use legacy certificate chain verification",
	},
	{
		.name = "policy",
		.argname = "name",
		.desc = "Add given policy to the acceptable set",
	},
	{
		.name = "policy_check",
		.desc = "Enable certificate policy checking",
	},
	{
		.name = "policy_print",
		.desc = "Print policy",
	},
	{
		.name = "purpose",
		.argname = "name",
		.desc = "Verify for the given purpose",
	},
	{
		.name = "use_deltas",
		.desc = "Use delta CRLS (if present)",
	},
	{
		.name = "verify_depth",
		.argname = "num",
		.desc = "Limit verification to the given depth",
	},
	{
		.name = "x509_strict",
		.desc = "Use strict X.509 rules (disables workarounds)",
	},
	{ NULL },
};

static void
verify_usage(void)
{
	int i;

	fprintf(stderr,
	    "usage: verify [-CAfile file] [-CApath directory] [-check_ss_sig]\n"
	    "    [-CRLfile file] [-crl_check] [-crl_check_all]\n"
	    "    [-explicit_policy] [-extended_crl]\n"
	    "    [-ignore_critical] [-inhibit_any] [-inhibit_map]\n"
	    "    [-issuer_checks] [-policy_check] [-purpose purpose]\n"
	    "    [-trusted file] [-untrusted file] [-verbose]\n"
	    "    [-x509_strict] [certificates]\n\n");

	options_usage(verify_options);

	fprintf(stderr, "\nVerification options:\n\n");
	options_usage(verify_shared_options);

	fprintf(stderr, "\nValid purposes:\n\n");
	for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
		X509_PURPOSE *ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
		fprintf(stderr, "  %-18s%s\n", X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(ptmp),
		    X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(ptmp));
	}
}

int
verify_main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL, *trusted = NULL;
	STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL;
	X509_STORE *cert_ctx = NULL;
	X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL;
	char **cert_files = NULL;
	int argsused;
	int ret = 1;

	if (pledge("stdio rpath", NULL) == -1) {
		perror("pledge");
		exit(1);
	}

	memset(&cfg, 0, sizeof(cfg));

	if (options_parse(argc, argv, verify_options, NULL, &argsused) != 0) {
		verify_usage();
		goto end;
	}

	if (argsused < argc)
		cert_files = &argv[argsused];

	cert_ctx = X509_STORE_new();
	if (cert_ctx == NULL)
		goto end;
	X509_STORE_set_verify_cb(cert_ctx, cb);

	if (cfg.vpm)
		X509_STORE_set1_param(cert_ctx, cfg.vpm);

	lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(cert_ctx, X509_LOOKUP_file());
	if (lookup == NULL)
		abort(); /* XXX */
	if (cfg.CAfile) {
		if (!X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, cfg.CAfile,
		    X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
			BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading file %s\n",
			    cfg.CAfile);
			ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
			goto end;
		}
	} else
		X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT);

	lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(cert_ctx, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir());
	if (lookup == NULL)
		abort(); /* XXX */
	if (cfg.CApath) {
		if (!X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, cfg.CApath,
		    X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) {
			BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading directory %s\n",
			    cfg.CApath);
			ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
			goto end;
		}
	} else
		X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT);

	ERR_clear_error();

	if (cfg.untfile) {
		untrusted = load_certs(bio_err, cfg.untfile,
		    FORMAT_PEM, NULL, "untrusted certificates");
		if (!untrusted)
			goto end;
	}
	if (cfg.trustfile) {
		trusted = load_certs(bio_err, cfg.trustfile,
		    FORMAT_PEM, NULL, "trusted certificates");
		if (!trusted)
			goto end;
	}
	if (cfg.crlfile) {
		crls = load_crls(bio_err, cfg.crlfile, FORMAT_PEM,
		    NULL, "other CRLs");
		if (!crls)
			goto end;
	}
	ret = 0;
	if (cert_files == NULL) {
		if (1 != check(cert_ctx, NULL, untrusted, trusted, crls))
			ret = -1;
	} else {
		do {
			if (1 != check(cert_ctx, *cert_files++, untrusted,
			    trusted, crls))
				ret = -1;
		} while (*cert_files != NULL);
	}

 end:
	if (cfg.vpm)
		X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(cfg.vpm);
	if (cert_ctx != NULL)
		X509_STORE_free(cert_ctx);
	sk_X509_pop_free(untrusted, X509_free);
	sk_X509_pop_free(trusted, X509_free);
	sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free);

	return (ret < 0 ? 2 : ret);
}

static int
check(X509_STORE *ctx, char *file, STACK_OF(X509) *uchain,
    STACK_OF(X509) *tchain, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
{
	X509 *x = NULL;
	X509_STORE_CTX *csc = NULL;
	const char *certfile = (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file;
	int verify_err;
	int i = 0, ret = 0;

	x = load_cert(bio_err, file, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, "certificate file");
	if (x == NULL)
		goto end;

	if ((csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new()) == NULL)
		goto end;
	X509_STORE_set_flags(ctx, vflags);
	if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, ctx, x, uchain))
		goto end;
	if (tchain)
		X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(csc, tchain);
	if (crls)
		X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(csc, crls);

	i = X509_verify_cert(csc);
	verify_err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(csc);

	if (i > 0 && verify_err == X509_V_OK) {
		fprintf(stdout, "%s: OK\n", certfile);
		ret = 1;
	} else {
		fprintf(stdout, "%s: verification failed: %d (%s)\n", certfile,
		    verify_err, X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_err));
	}

 end:
	if (i <= 0)
		ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
	X509_free(x);
	X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);

	return (ret);
}

static int
cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
	int cert_error = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
	X509 *current_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);

	if (!ok) {
		if (current_cert) {
			X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(stdout,
			    X509_get_subject_name(current_cert),
			    0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
			printf("\n");
		}
		printf("%serror %d at %d depth lookup:%s\n",
		    X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(ctx) ? "[CRL path]" : "",
		    cert_error,
		    X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx),
		    X509_verify_cert_error_string(cert_error));
		switch (cert_error) {
		case X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY:
		case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:

			/*
			 * since we are just checking the certificates, it is
			 * ok if they are self signed. But we should still
			 * warn the user.
			 */

		case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
			/* Continue after extension errors too */
		case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
		case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA:
		case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
		case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
		case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
		case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
		case X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
			ok = 1;

		}

		return ok;

	}
	if (!cfg.verbose)
		ERR_clear_error();
	return (ok);
}