Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/auth-rsa.c, Revision 1.85
1.85 ! djm 1: /* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.84 2013/06/21 00:34:49 djm Exp $ */
1.1 provos 2: /*
1.13 deraadt 3: * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
4: * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
5: * All rights reserved
6: * RSA-based authentication. This code determines whether to admit a login
7: * based on RSA authentication. This file also contains functions to check
8: * validity of the host key.
1.21 markus 9: *
1.28 deraadt 10: * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
11: * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
12: * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
13: * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
14: * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
1.13 deraadt 15: */
1.1 provos 16:
1.64 stevesk 17: #include <sys/types.h>
18: #include <sys/stat.h>
1.38 markus 19:
20: #include <openssl/rsa.h>
21: #include <openssl/md5.h>
1.68 stevesk 22:
23: #include <pwd.h>
1.70 stevesk 24: #include <stdio.h>
1.69 stevesk 25: #include <string.h>
1.1 provos 26:
1.71 deraadt 27: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.1 provos 28: #include "rsa.h"
29: #include "packet.h"
1.35 markus 30: #include "ssh1.h"
1.1 provos 31: #include "uidswap.h"
1.19 markus 32: #include "match.h"
1.71 deraadt 33: #include "buffer.h"
1.35 markus 34: #include "pathnames.h"
1.38 markus 35: #include "log.h"
36: #include "servconf.h"
1.71 deraadt 37: #include "key.h"
1.75 djm 38: #include "auth-options.h"
1.71 deraadt 39: #include "hostfile.h"
1.38 markus 40: #include "auth.h"
1.71 deraadt 41: #ifdef GSSAPI
42: #include "ssh-gss.h"
43: #endif
1.52 provos 44: #include "monitor_wrap.h"
1.55 stevesk 45: #include "ssh.h"
1.62 dtucker 46: #include "misc.h"
1.30 markus 47:
48: /* import */
49: extern ServerOptions options;
50:
1.14 markus 51: /*
52: * Session identifier that is used to bind key exchange and authentication
53: * responses to a particular session.
54: */
1.34 markus 55: extern u_char session_id[16];
1.1 provos 56:
1.14 markus 57: /*
58: * The .ssh/authorized_keys file contains public keys, one per line, in the
59: * following format:
60: * options bits e n comment
61: * where bits, e and n are decimal numbers,
62: * and comment is any string of characters up to newline. The maximum
1.61 dtucker 63: * length of a line is SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES characters. See sshd(8) for a
1.14 markus 64: * description of the options.
65: */
66:
1.52 provos 67: BIGNUM *
1.51 markus 68: auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key)
69: {
70: BIGNUM *challenge;
71: BN_CTX *ctx;
72:
73: if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
74: fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_new() failed");
75: /* Generate a random challenge. */
1.72 markus 76: if (BN_rand(challenge, 256, 0, 0) == 0)
77: fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_rand failed");
1.51 markus 78: if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
1.72 markus 79: fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_CTX_new failed");
80: if (BN_mod(challenge, challenge, key->rsa->n, ctx) == 0)
81: fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_mod failed");
1.51 markus 82: BN_CTX_free(ctx);
83:
84: return challenge;
85: }
86:
1.52 provos 87: int
1.51 markus 88: auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16])
89: {
90: u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16];
91: MD5_CTX md;
92: int len;
1.74 djm 93:
1.54 markus 94: /* don't allow short keys */
1.55 stevesk 95: if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
1.56 stevesk 96: error("auth_rsa_verify_response: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
97: BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
1.54 markus 98: return (0);
99: }
1.51 markus 100:
101: /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
102: len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
103: if (len <= 0 || len > 32)
104: fatal("auth_rsa_verify_response: bad challenge length %d", len);
105: memset(buf, 0, 32);
106: BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len);
107: MD5_Init(&md);
108: MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32);
109: MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16);
110: MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);
111:
112: /* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
1.78 djm 113: if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
1.51 markus 114: /* Wrong answer. */
115: return (0);
116: }
117: /* Correct answer. */
118: return (1);
119: }
120:
1.14 markus 121: /*
122: * Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client,
123: * and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to
124: * our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer.
125: */
1.1 provos 126:
127: int
1.51 markus 128: auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *key)
1.1 provos 129: {
1.18 markus 130: BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge;
1.51 markus 131: u_char response[16];
132: int i, success;
1.12 markus 133:
1.47 markus 134: if ((encrypted_challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
135: fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: BN_new() failed");
1.12 markus 136:
1.52 provos 137: challenge = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key));
1.12 markus 138:
139: /* Encrypt the challenge with the public key. */
1.51 markus 140: rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge, challenge, key->rsa);
1.12 markus 141:
142: /* Send the encrypted challenge to the client. */
143: packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
144: packet_put_bignum(encrypted_challenge);
145: packet_send();
1.18 markus 146: BN_clear_free(encrypted_challenge);
1.12 markus 147: packet_write_wait();
148:
1.18 markus 149: /* Wait for a response. */
1.50 markus 150: packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
1.18 markus 151: for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1.67 deraadt 152: response[i] = (u_char)packet_get_char();
1.49 markus 153: packet_check_eom();
1.18 markus 154:
1.52 provos 155: success = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_verify_response(key, challenge, response));
1.12 markus 156: BN_clear_free(challenge);
1.51 markus 157: return (success);
1.1 provos 158: }
159:
1.80 djm 160: static int
161: rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
162: const BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
1.1 provos 163: {
1.83 djm 164: char *fp, line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
1.85 ! djm 165: int allowed = 0, bits;
1.12 markus 166: FILE *f;
1.34 markus 167: u_long linenum = 0;
1.46 jakob 168: Key *key;
1.12 markus 169:
1.41 markus 170: debug("trying public RSA key file %s", file);
1.80 djm 171: if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL)
172: return 0;
1.12 markus 173:
1.14 markus 174: /*
175: * Go though the accepted keys, looking for the current key. If
176: * found, perform a challenge-response dialog to verify that the
177: * user really has the corresponding private key.
178: */
1.80 djm 179: key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
1.61 dtucker 180: while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
1.12 markus 181: char *cp;
1.60 avsm 182: char *key_options;
1.63 djm 183: int keybits;
1.12 markus 184:
1.14 markus 185: /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
186: for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
187: ;
1.12 markus 188: if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
189: continue;
190:
1.14 markus 191: /*
192: * Check if there are options for this key, and if so,
193: * save their starting address and skip the option part
194: * for now. If there are no options, set the starting
195: * address to NULL.
196: */
1.12 markus 197: if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9') {
198: int quoted = 0;
1.60 avsm 199: key_options = cp;
1.12 markus 200: for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
201: if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
202: cp++; /* Skip both */
203: else if (*cp == '"')
204: quoted = !quoted;
205: }
206: } else
1.60 avsm 207: key_options = NULL;
1.1 provos 208:
1.12 markus 209: /* Parse the key from the line. */
1.46 jakob 210: if (hostfile_read_key(&cp, &bits, key) == 0) {
1.42 markus 211: debug("%.100s, line %lu: non ssh1 key syntax",
1.36 markus 212: file, linenum);
1.12 markus 213: continue;
1.1 provos 214: }
1.12 markus 215: /* cp now points to the comment part. */
216:
1.80 djm 217: /*
218: * Check if the we have found the desired key (identified
219: * by its modulus).
220: */
1.46 jakob 221: if (BN_cmp(key->rsa->n, client_n) != 0)
1.16 markus 222: continue;
223:
1.12 markus 224: /* check the real bits */
1.63 djm 225: keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
1.85 ! djm 226: if (keybits < 0 || bits != keybits)
1.57 itojun 227: logit("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch: "
1.15 markus 228: "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
1.46 jakob 229: file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
1.79 djm 230:
1.83 djm 231: fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
232: debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
233: file, linenum, key_type(key), fp);
234: free(fp);
235:
1.79 djm 236: /* Never accept a revoked key */
237: if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
238: break;
1.12 markus 239:
240: /* We have found the desired key. */
1.33 markus 241: /*
242: * If our options do not allow this key to be used,
243: * do not send challenge.
244: */
1.60 avsm 245: if (!auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum))
1.33 markus 246: continue;
1.76 djm 247: if (key_is_cert_authority)
248: continue;
1.51 markus 249: /* break out, this key is allowed */
250: allowed = 1;
1.32 markus 251: break;
1.1 provos 252: }
253:
1.12 markus 254: /* Close the file. */
255: fclose(f);
256:
1.51 markus 257: /* return key if allowed */
258: if (allowed && rkey != NULL)
259: *rkey = key;
260: else
261: key_free(key);
1.80 djm 262:
263: return allowed;
264: }
265:
266: /*
267: * check if there's user key matching client_n,
268: * return key if login is allowed, NULL otherwise
269: */
270:
271: int
272: auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
273: {
274: char *file;
275: u_int i, allowed = 0;
276:
277: temporarily_use_uid(pw);
278:
279: for (i = 0; !allowed && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
1.81 djm 280: if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
281: continue;
1.80 djm 282: file = expand_authorized_keys(
283: options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
284: allowed = rsa_key_allowed_in_file(pw, file, client_n, rkey);
1.82 djm 285: free(file);
1.80 djm 286: }
287:
288: restore_uid();
289:
290: return allowed;
1.51 markus 291: }
292:
293: /*
294: * Performs the RSA authentication dialog with the client. This returns
295: * 0 if the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was
296: * successful. This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation.
297: */
298: int
1.58 djm 299: auth_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM *client_n)
1.51 markus 300: {
301: Key *key;
1.58 djm 302: struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
1.51 markus 303:
304: /* no user given */
1.58 djm 305: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.51 markus 306: return 0;
1.1 provos 307:
1.52 provos 308: if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_key_allowed(pw, client_n, &key))) {
1.31 markus 309: auth_clear_options();
1.51 markus 310: return (0);
311: }
312:
313: /* Perform the challenge-response dialog for this key. */
314: if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(key)) {
315: /* Wrong response. */
316: verbose("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
317: packet_send_debug("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
318: /*
319: * Break out of the loop. Otherwise we might send
320: * another challenge and break the protocol.
321: */
322: key_free(key);
323: return (0);
324: }
325: /*
326: * Correct response. The client has been successfully
327: * authenticated. Note that we have not yet processed the
328: * options; this will be reset if the options cause the
329: * authentication to be rejected.
330: */
1.84 djm 331: pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
1.1 provos 332:
1.51 markus 333: packet_send_debug("RSA authentication accepted.");
334: return (1);
1.1 provos 335: }
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