=================================================================== RCS file: /cvsrepo/anoncvs/cvs/src/usr.bin/ssh/Attic/sshconnect1.c,v retrieving revision 1.53 retrieving revision 1.54 diff -u -r1.53 -r1.54 --- src/usr.bin/ssh/Attic/sshconnect1.c 2003/04/08 20:21:29 1.53 +++ src/usr.bin/ssh/Attic/sshconnect1.c 2003/07/22 13:35:22 1.54 @@ -13,21 +13,14 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.53 2003/04/08 20:21:29 itojun Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.54 2003/07/22 13:35:22 markus Exp $"); #include #include -#ifdef KRB4 -#include -#endif #ifdef KRB5 #include #endif -#ifdef AFS -#include -#include "radix.h" -#endif #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" @@ -377,128 +370,6 @@ return 0; } -#ifdef KRB4 -static int -try_krb4_authentication(void) -{ - KTEXT_ST auth; /* Kerberos data */ - char *reply; - char inst[INST_SZ]; - char *realm; - CREDENTIALS cred; - int r, type; - socklen_t slen; - Key_schedule schedule; - u_long checksum, cksum; - MSG_DAT msg_data; - struct sockaddr_in local, foreign; - struct stat st; - - /* Don't do anything if we don't have any tickets. */ - if (stat(tkt_string(), &st) < 0) - return 0; - - strlcpy(inst, (char *)krb_get_phost(get_canonical_hostname(1)), - INST_SZ); - - realm = (char *)krb_realmofhost(get_canonical_hostname(1)); - if (!realm) { - debug("Kerberos v4: no realm for %s", get_canonical_hostname(1)); - return 0; - } - /* This can really be anything. */ - checksum = (u_long)getpid(); - - r = krb_mk_req(&auth, KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, inst, realm, checksum); - if (r != KSUCCESS) { - debug("Kerberos v4 krb_mk_req failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]); - return 0; - } - /* Get session key to decrypt the server's reply with. */ - r = krb_get_cred(KRB4_SERVICE_NAME, inst, realm, &cred); - if (r != KSUCCESS) { - debug("get_cred failed: %s", krb_err_txt[r]); - return 0; - } - des_key_sched((des_cblock *) cred.session, schedule); - - /* Send authentication info to server. */ - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS); - packet_put_string((char *) auth.dat, auth.length); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - /* Zero the buffer. */ - (void) memset(auth.dat, 0, MAX_KTXT_LEN); - - slen = sizeof(local); - memset(&local, 0, sizeof(local)); - if (getsockname(packet_get_connection_in(), - (struct sockaddr *)&local, &slen) < 0) - debug("getsockname failed: %s", strerror(errno)); - - slen = sizeof(foreign); - memset(&foreign, 0, sizeof(foreign)); - if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), - (struct sockaddr *)&foreign, &slen) < 0) { - debug("getpeername failed: %s", strerror(errno)); - fatal_cleanup(); - } - /* Get server reply. */ - type = packet_read(); - switch (type) { - case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE: - /* Should really be SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_FAILURE */ - debug("Kerberos v4 authentication failed."); - return 0; - break; - - case SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_RESPONSE: - /* SSH_SMSG_AUTH_KERBEROS_SUCCESS */ - debug("Kerberos v4 authentication accepted."); - - /* Get server's response. */ - reply = packet_get_string((u_int *) &auth.length); - if (auth.length >= MAX_KTXT_LEN) - fatal("Kerberos v4: Malformed response from server"); - memcpy(auth.dat, reply, auth.length); - xfree(reply); - - packet_check_eom(); - - /* - * If his response isn't properly encrypted with the session - * key, and the decrypted checksum fails to match, he's - * bogus. Bail out. - */ - r = krb_rd_priv(auth.dat, auth.length, schedule, &cred.session, - &foreign, &local, &msg_data); - if (r != KSUCCESS) { - debug("Kerberos v4 krb_rd_priv failed: %s", - krb_err_txt[r]); - packet_disconnect("Kerberos v4 challenge failed!"); - } - /* Fetch the (incremented) checksum that we supplied in the request. */ - memcpy((char *)&cksum, (char *)msg_data.app_data, - sizeof(cksum)); - cksum = ntohl(cksum); - - /* If it matches, we're golden. */ - if (cksum == checksum + 1) { - debug("Kerberos v4 challenge successful."); - return 1; - } else - packet_disconnect("Kerberos v4 challenge failed!"); - break; - - default: - packet_disconnect("Protocol error on Kerberos v4 response: %d", type); - } - return 0; -} - -#endif /* KRB4 */ - #ifdef KRB5 static int try_krb5_authentication(krb5_context *context, krb5_auth_context *auth_context) @@ -683,129 +554,6 @@ } #endif /* KRB5 */ -#ifdef AFS -static void -send_krb4_tgt(void) -{ - CREDENTIALS *creds; - struct stat st; - char buffer[4096], pname[ANAME_SZ], pinst[INST_SZ], prealm[REALM_SZ]; - int problem, type; - - /* Don't do anything if we don't have any tickets. */ - if (stat(tkt_string(), &st) < 0) - return; - - creds = xmalloc(sizeof(*creds)); - - problem = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, pname, pinst, prealm); - if (problem) - goto out; - - problem = krb_get_cred("krbtgt", prealm, prealm, creds); - if (problem) - goto out; - - if (time(0) > krb_life_to_time(creds->issue_date, creds->lifetime)) { - problem = RD_AP_EXP; - goto out; - } - creds_to_radix(creds, (u_char *)buffer, sizeof(buffer)); - - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_HAVE_KERBEROS_TGT); - packet_put_cstring(buffer); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - type = packet_read(); - - if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) - debug("Kerberos v4 TGT forwarded (%s%s%s@%s).", - creds->pname, creds->pinst[0] ? "." : "", - creds->pinst, creds->realm); - else - debug("Kerberos v4 TGT rejected."); - - xfree(creds); - return; - - out: - debug("Kerberos v4 TGT passing failed: %s", krb_err_txt[problem]); - xfree(creds); -} - -static void -send_afs_tokens(void) -{ - CREDENTIALS creds; - struct ViceIoctl parms; - struct ClearToken ct; - int i, type, len; - char buf[2048], *p, *server_cell; - char buffer[8192]; - - /* Move over ktc_GetToken, here's something leaner. */ - for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) { /* just in case */ - parms.in = (char *) &i; - parms.in_size = sizeof(i); - parms.out = buf; - parms.out_size = sizeof(buf); - if (k_pioctl(0, VIOCGETTOK, &parms, 0) != 0) - break; - p = buf; - - /* Get secret token. */ - memcpy(&creds.ticket_st.length, p, sizeof(u_int)); - if (creds.ticket_st.length > MAX_KTXT_LEN) - break; - p += sizeof(u_int); - memcpy(creds.ticket_st.dat, p, creds.ticket_st.length); - p += creds.ticket_st.length; - - /* Get clear token. */ - memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len)); - if (len != sizeof(struct ClearToken)) - break; - p += sizeof(len); - memcpy(&ct, p, len); - p += len; - p += sizeof(len); /* primary flag */ - server_cell = p; - - /* Flesh out our credentials. */ - strlcpy(creds.service, "afs", sizeof(creds.service)); - creds.instance[0] = '\0'; - strlcpy(creds.realm, server_cell, REALM_SZ); - memcpy(creds.session, ct.HandShakeKey, DES_KEY_SZ); - creds.issue_date = ct.BeginTimestamp; - creds.lifetime = krb_time_to_life(creds.issue_date, - ct.EndTimestamp); - creds.kvno = ct.AuthHandle; - snprintf(creds.pname, sizeof(creds.pname), "AFS ID %d", ct.ViceId); - creds.pinst[0] = '\0'; - - /* Encode token, ship it off. */ - if (creds_to_radix(&creds, (u_char *)buffer, - sizeof(buffer)) <= 0) - break; - packet_start(SSH_CMSG_HAVE_AFS_TOKEN); - packet_put_cstring(buffer); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); - - /* Roger, Roger. Clearance, Clarence. What's your vector, - Victor? */ - type = packet_read(); - - if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) - debug("AFS token for cell %s rejected.", server_cell); - else if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error on AFS token response: %d", type); - } -} - -#endif /* AFS */ - /* * Tries to authenticate with any string-based challenge/response system. * Note that the client code is not tied to s/key or TIS. @@ -1137,21 +885,6 @@ } #endif /* KRB5 */ -#ifdef KRB4 - if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS)) && - options.kerberos_authentication) { - debug("Trying Kerberos v4 authentication."); - - if (try_krb4_authentication()) { - type = packet_read(); - if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) - goto success; - if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) - packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to Kerberos v4 auth", type); - } - } -#endif /* KRB4 */ - /* * Use rhosts authentication if running in privileged socket and we * do not wish to remain anonymous. @@ -1238,23 +971,5 @@ if (context) krb5_free_context(context); #endif - -#ifdef AFS - /* Try Kerberos v4 TGT passing if the server supports it. */ - if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT)) && - options.kerberos_tgt_passing) { - if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE) - logit("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Ticket will be transmitted in the clear!"); - send_krb4_tgt(); - } - /* Try AFS token passing if the server supports it. */ - if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN)) && - options.afs_token_passing && k_hasafs()) { - if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE) - logit("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Token will be transmitted in the clear!"); - send_afs_tokens(); - } -#endif /* AFS */ - return; /* need statement after label */ }