version 1.13, 2017/11/03 02:32:19 |
version 1.18, 2021/06/04 04:02:21 |
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acceptance of certified host keys, by adding a similar ability to |
acceptance of certified host keys, by adding a similar ability to |
specify CA keys in ~/.ssh/known_hosts. |
specify CA keys in ~/.ssh/known_hosts. |
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All certificate types include certification information along with the |
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public key that is used to sign challenges. In OpenSSH, ssh-keygen |
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performs the CA signing operation. |
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Certified keys are represented using new key types: |
Certified keys are represented using new key types: |
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ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com |
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com |
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ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com |
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com |
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com |
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com |
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com |
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com |
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ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com |
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These include certification information along with the public key |
Two additional types exist for RSA certificates to force use of |
that is used to sign challenges. ssh-keygen performs the CA signing |
SHA-2 signatures (SHA-256 and SHA-512 respectively): |
operation. |
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rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com |
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rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com |
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These RSA/SHA-2 types should not appear in keys at rest or transmitted |
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on their wire, but do appear in a SSH_MSG_KEXINIT's host-key algorithms |
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field or in the "public key algorithm name" field of a "publickey" |
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SSH_USERAUTH_REQUEST to indicate that the signature will use the |
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specified algorithm. |
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Protocol extensions |
Protocol extensions |
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valid after <= current time < valid before |
valid after <= current time < valid before |
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criticial options is a set of zero or more key options encoded as |
critical options is a set of zero or more key options encoded as |
below. All such options are "critical" in the sense that an implementation |
below. All such options are "critical" in the sense that an implementation |
must refuse to authorise a key that has an unrecognised option. |
must refuse to authorise a key that has an unrecognised option. |
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certificates may be presented from any |
certificates may be presented from any |
source address. |
source address. |
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verify-required empty Flag indicating that signatures made |
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with this certificate must assert FIDO |
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user verification (e.g. PIN or |
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biometric). This option only make sense |
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for the U2F/FIDO security key types that |
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support this feature in their signature |
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formats. |
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Extensions |
Extensions |
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---------- |
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Name Format Description |
Name Format Description |
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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no-touch-required empty Flag indicating that signatures made |
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with this certificate need not assert |
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FIDO user presence. This option only |
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make sense for the U2F/FIDO security |
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key types that support this feature in |
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their signature formats. |
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permit-X11-forwarding empty Flag indicating that X11 forwarding |
permit-X11-forwarding empty Flag indicating that X11 forwarding |
should be permitted. X11 forwarding will |
should be permitted. X11 forwarding will |
be refused if this option is absent. |
be refused if this option is absent. |