=================================================================== RCS file: /cvsrepo/anoncvs/cvs/src/usr.bin/ssh/README,v retrieving revision 1.3 retrieving revision 1.3.4.1 diff -u -r1.3 -r1.3.4.1 --- src/usr.bin/ssh/README 2000/03/23 22:03:33 1.3 +++ src/usr.bin/ssh/README 2001/05/07 21:09:25 1.3.4.1 @@ -1,567 +1,25 @@ +This release of OpenSSH is for OpenBSD systems only. -[ Please note that this file has not been updated for OpenSSH and - covers the ssh-1.2.12 release from Dec 1995 only. ] +Please read + http://www.openssh.com/portable.html +if you want to install OpenSSH on other operating systems. -Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program to log into another computer over a -network, to execute commands in a remote machine, and to move files -from one machine to another. It provides strong authentication and -secure communications over insecure channels. It is intended as a -replacement for rlogin, rsh, rcp, and rdist. +To extract and install this release on your OpenBSD system use: -See the file INSTALL for installation instructions. See COPYING for -license terms and other legal issues. See RFC for a description of -the protocol. There is a WWW page for ssh; see http://www.cs.hut.fi/ssh. + # cd /usr/src/usr.bin + # tar xvfz .../openssh-x.y.tgz + # cd ssh + # make obj + # make cleandir + # make depend + # make + # make install + # cp ssh_config sshd_config /etc -This file has been updated to match ssh-1.2.12. +OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release +by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels +Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer +features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support +for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. - -FEATURES - - o Strong authentication. Closes several security holes (e.g., IP, - routing, and DNS spoofing). New authentication methods: .rhosts - together with RSA based host authentication, and pure RSA - authentication. - - o Improved privacy. All communications are automatically and - transparently encrypted. RSA is used for key exchange, and a - conventional cipher (normally IDEA, DES, or triple-DES) for - encrypting the session. Encryption is started before - authentication, and no passwords or other information is - transmitted in the clear. Encryption is also used to protect - against spoofed packets. - - o Secure X11 sessions. The program automatically sets DISPLAY on - the server machine, and forwards any X11 connections over the - secure channel. Fake Xauthority information is automatically - generated and forwarded to the remote machine; the local client - automatically examines incoming X11 connections and replaces the - fake authorization data with the real data (never telling the - remote machine the real information). - - o Arbitrary TCP/IP ports can be redirected through the encrypted channel - in both directions (e.g., for e-cash transactions). - - o No retraining needed for normal users; everything happens - automatically, and old .rhosts files will work with strong - authentication if administration installs host key files. - - o Never trusts the network. Minimal trust on the remote side of - the connection. Minimal trust on domain name servers. Pure RSA - authentication never trusts anything but the private key. - - o Client RSA-authenticates the server machine in the beginning of - every connection to prevent trojan horses (by routing or DNS - spoofing) and man-in-the-middle attacks, and the server - RSA-authenticates the client machine before accepting .rhosts or - /etc/hosts.equiv authentication (to prevent DNS, routing, or - IP-spoofing). - - o Host authentication key distribution can be centrally by the - administration, automatically when the first connection is made - to a machine (the key obtained on the first connection will be - recorded and used for authentication in the future), or manually - by each user for his/her own use. The central and per-user host - key repositories are both used and complement each other. Host - keys can be generated centrally or automatically when the software - is installed. Host authentication keys are typically 1024 bits. - - o Any user can create any number of user authentication RSA keys for - his/her own use. Each user has a file which lists the RSA public - keys for which proof of possession of the corresponding private - key is accepted as authentication. User authentication keys are - typically 1024 bits. - - o The server program has its own server RSA key which is - automatically regenerated every hour. This key is never saved in - any file. Exchanged session keys are encrypted using both the - server key and the server host key. The purpose of the separate - server key is to make it impossible to decipher a captured session by - breaking into the server machine at a later time; one hour from - the connection even the server machine cannot decipher the session - key. The key regeneration interval is configurable. The server - key is normally 768 bits. - - o An authentication agent, running in the user's laptop or local - workstation, can be used to hold the user's RSA authentication - keys. Ssh automatically forwards the connection to the - authentication agent over any connections, and there is no need to - store the RSA authentication keys on any machine in the network - (except the user's own local machine). The authentication - protocols never reveal the keys; they can only be used to verify - that the user's agent has a certain key. Eventually the agent - could rely on a smart card to perform all authentication - computations. - - o The software can be installed and used (with restricted - functionality) even without root privileges. - - o The client is customizable in system-wide and per-user - configuration files. Most aspects of the client's operation can - be configured. Different options can be specified on a per-host basis. - - o Automatically executes conventional rsh (after displaying a - warning) if the server machine is not running sshd. - - o Optional compression of all data with gzip (including forwarded X11 - and TCP/IP port data), which may result in significant speedups on - slow connections. - - o Complete replacement for rlogin, rsh, and rcp. - - -WHY TO USE SECURE SHELL - -Currently, almost all communications in computer networks are done -without encryption. As a consequence, anyone who has access to any -machine connected to the network can listen in on any communication. -This is being done by hackers, curious administrators, employers, -criminals, industrial spies, and governments. Some networks leak off -enough electromagnetic radiation that data may be captured even from a -distance. - -When you log in, your password goes in the network in plain -text. Thus, any listener can then use your account to do any evil he -likes. Many incidents have been encountered worldwide where crackers -have started programs on workstations without the owners knowledge -just to listen to the network and collect passwords. Programs for -doing this are available on the Internet, or can be built by a -competent programmer in a few hours. - -Any information that you type or is printed on your screen can be -monitored, recorded, and analyzed. For example, an intruder who has -penetrated a host connected to a major network can start a program -that listens to all data flowing in the network, and whenever it -encounters a 16-digit string, it checks if it is a valid credit card -number (using the check digit), and saves the number plus any -surrounding text (to catch expiration date and holder) in a file. -When the intruder has collected a few thousand credit card numbers, he -makes smallish mail-order purchases from a few thousand stores around -the world, and disappears when the goods arrive but before anyone -suspects anything. - -Businesses have trade secrets, patent applications in preparation, -pricing information, subcontractor information, client data, personnel -data, financial information, etc. Currently, anyone with access to -the network (any machine on the network) can listen to anything that -goes in the network, without any regard to normal access restrictions. - -Many companies are not aware that information can so easily be -recovered from the network. They trust that their data is safe -since nobody is supposed to know that there is sensitive information -in the network, or because so much other data is transferred in the -network. This is not a safe policy. - -Individual persons also have confidential information, such as -diaries, love letters, health care documents, information about their -personal interests and habits, professional data, job applications, -tax reports, political documents, unpublished manuscripts, etc. - -One should also be aware that economical intelligence and industrial -espionage has recently become a major priority of the intelligence -agencies of major governments. President Clinton recently assigned -economical espionage as the primary task of the CIA, and the French -have repeatedly been publicly boasting about their achievements on -this field. - - -There is also another frightening aspect about the poor security of -communications. Computer storage and analysis capability has -increased so much that it is feasible for governments, major -companies, and criminal organizations to automatically analyze, -identify, classify, and file information about millions of people over -the years. Because most of the work can be automated, the cost of -collecting this information is getting very low. - -Government agencies may be able to monitor major communication -systems, telephones, fax, computer networks, etc., and passively -collect huge amounts of information about all people with any -significant position in the society. Most of this information is not -sensitive, and many people would say there is no harm in someone -getting that information. However, the information starts to get -sensitive when someone has enough of it. You may not mind someone -knowing what you bought from the shop one random day, but you might -not like someone knowing every small thing you have bought in the last -ten years. - -If the government some day starts to move into a more totalitarian -direction (one should remember that Nazi Germany was created by -democratic elections), there is considerable danger of an ultimate -totalitarian state. With enough information (the automatically -collected records of an individual can be manually analyzed when the -person becomes interesting), one can form a very detailed picture of -the individual's interests, opinions, beliefs, habits, friends, -lovers, weaknesses, etc. This information can be used to 1) locate -any persons who might oppose the new system 2) use deception to -disturb any organizations which might rise against the government 3) -eliminate difficult individuals without anyone understanding what -happened. Additionally, if the government can monitor communications -too effectively, it becomes too easy to locate and eliminate any -persons distributing information contrary to the official truth. - -Fighting crime and terrorism are often used as grounds for domestic -surveillance and restricting encryption. These are good goals, but -there is considerable danger that the surveillance data starts to get -used for questionable purposes. I find that it is better to tolerate -a small amount of crime in the society than to let the society become -fully controlled. I am in favor of a fairly strong state, but the -state must never get so strong that people become unable to spread -contra-offical information and unable to overturn the government if it -is bad. The danger is that when you notice that the government is -too powerful, it is too late. Also, the real power may not be where -the official government is. - -For these reasons (privacy, protecting trade secrets, and making it -more difficult to create a totalitarian state), I think that strong -cryptography should be integrated to the tools we use every day. -Using it causes no harm (except for those who wish to monitor -everything), but not using it can cause huge problems. If the society -changes in undesirable ways, then it will be to late to start -encrypting. - -Encryption has had a "military" or "classified" flavor to it. There -are no longer any grounds for this. The military can and will use its -own encryption; that is no excuse to prevent the civilians from -protecting their privacy and secrets. Information on strong -encryption is available in every major bookstore, scientific library, -and patent office around the world, and strong encryption software is -available in every country on the Internet. - -Some people would like to make it illegal to use encryption, or to -force people to use encryption that governments can break. This -approach offers no protection if the government turns bad. Also, the -"bad guys" will be using true strong encryption anyway. Good -encryption techniques are too widely known to make them disappear. -Thus, any "key escrow encryption" or other restrictions will only help -monitor ordinary people and petty criminals. It does not help against -powerful criminals, terrorists, or espionage, because they will know -how to use strong encryption anyway. (One source for internationally -available encryption software is http://www.cs.hut.fi/crypto.) - - -OVERVIEW OF SECURE SHELL - -The software consists of a number of programs. - - sshd Server program run on the server machine. This - listens for connections from client machines, and - whenever it receives a connection, it performs - authentication and starts serving the client. - - ssh This is the client program used to log into another - machine or to execute commands on the other machine. - "slogin" is another name for this program. - - scp Securely copies files from one machine to another. - - ssh-keygen Used to create RSA keys (host keys and user - authentication keys). - - ssh-agent Authentication agent. This can be used to hold RSA - keys for authentication. - - ssh-add Used to register new keys with the agent. - - make-ssh-known-hosts - Used to create the /etc/ssh_known_hosts file. - - -Ssh is the program users normally use. It is started as - - ssh host - -or - - ssh host command - -The first form opens a new shell on the remote machine (after -authentication). The latter form executes the command on the remote -machine. - -When started, the ssh connects sshd on the server machine, verifies -that the server machine really is the machine it wanted to connect, -exchanges encryption keys (in a manner which prevents an outside -listener from getting the keys), performs authentication using .rhosts -and /etc/hosts.equiv, RSA authentication, or conventional password -based authentication. The server then (normally) allocates a -pseudo-terminal and starts an interactive shell or user program. - -The TERM environment variable (describing the type of the user's -terminal) is passed from the client side to the remote side. Also, -terminal modes will be copied from the client side to the remote side -to preserve user preferences (e.g., the erase character). - -If the DISPLAY variable is set on the client side, the server will -create a dummy X server and set DISPLAY accordingly. Any connections -to the dummy X server will be forwarded through the secure channel, -and will be made to the real X server from the client side. An -arbitrary number of X programs can be started during the session, and -starting them does not require anything special from the user. (Note -that the user must not manually set DISPLAY, because then it would -connect directly to the real display instead of going through the -encrypted channel). This behavior can be disabled in the -configuration file or by giving the -x option to the client. - -Arbitrary IP ports can be forwarded over the secure channel. The -program then creates a port on one side, and whenever a connection is -opened to this port, it will be passed over the secure channel, and a -connection will be made from the other side to a specified host:port -pair. Arbitrary IP forwarding must always be explicitly requested, -and cannot be used to forward privileged ports (unless the user is -root). It is possible to specify automatic forwards in a per-user -configuration file, for example to make electronic cash systems work -securely. - -If there is an authentication agent on the client side, connection to -it will be automatically forwarded to the server side. - -For more infomation, see the manual pages ssh(1), sshd(8), scp(1), -ssh-keygen(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-add(1), and make-ssh-known-hosts(1) -included in this distribution. - - -X11 CONNECTION FORWARDING - -X11 forwarding serves two purposes: it is a convenience to the user -because there is no need to set the DISPLAY variable, and it provides -encrypted X11 connections. I cannot think of any other easy way to -make X11 connections encrypted; modifying the X server, clients or -libraries would require special work for each machine, vendor and -application. Widely used IP-level encryption does not seem likely for -several years. Thus what we have left is faking an X server on the -same machine where the clients are run, and forwarding the connections -to a real X server over the secure channel. - -X11 forwarding works as follows. The client extracts Xauthority -information for the server. It then creates random authorization -data, and sends the random data to the server. The server allocates -an X11 display number, and stores the (fake) Xauthority data for this -display. Whenever an X11 connection is opened, the server forwards -the connection over the secure channel to the client, and the client -parses the first packet of the X11 protocol, substitutes real -authentication data for the fake data (if the fake data matched), and -forwards the connection to the real X server. - -If the display does not have Xauthority data, the server will create a -unix domain socket in /tmp/.X11-unix, and use the unix domain socket -as the display. No authentication information is forwarded in this -case. X11 connections are again forwarded over the secure channel. -To the X server the connections appear to come from the client -machine, and the server must have connections allowed from the local -machine. Using authentication data is always recommended because not -using it makes the display insecure. If XDM is used, it automatically -generates the authentication data. - -One should be careful not to use "xin" or "xstart" or other similar -scripts that explicitly set DISPLAY to start X sessions in a remote -machine, because the connection will then not go over the secure -channel. The recommended way to start a shell in a remote machine is - - xterm -e ssh host & - -and the recommended way to execute an X11 application in a remote -machine is - - ssh -n host emacs & - -If you need to type a password/passphrase for the remote machine, - - ssh -f host emacs - -may be useful. - - - -RSA AUTHENTICATION - -RSA authentication is based on public key cryptograpy. The idea is -that there are two encryption keys, one for encryption and another for -decryption. It is not possible (on human timescale) to derive the -decryption key from the encryption key. The encryption key is called -the public key, because it can be given to anyone and it is not -secret. The decryption key, on the other hand, is secret, and is -called the private key. - -RSA authentication is based on the impossibility of deriving the -private key from the public key. The public key is stored on the -server machine in the user's $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys file. The -private key is only kept on the user's local machine, laptop, or other -secure storage. Then the user tries to log in, the client tells the -server the public key that the user wishes to use for authentication. -The server then checks if this public key is admissible. If so, it -generates a 256 bit random number, encrypts it with the public key, -and sends the value to the client. The client then decrypts the -number with its private key, computes a 128 bit MD5 checksum from the -resulting data, and sends the checksum back to the server. (Only a -checksum is sent to prevent chosen-plaintext attacks against RSA.) -The server checks computes a checksum from the correct data, -and compares the checksums. Authentication is accepted if the -checksums match. (Theoretically this indicates that the client -only probably knows the correct key, but for all practical purposes -there is no doubt.) - -The RSA private key can be protected with a passphrase. The -passphrase can be any string; it is hashed with MD5 to produce an -encryption key for IDEA, which is used to encrypt the private part of -the key file. With passphrase, authorization requires access to the key -file and the passphrase. Without passphrase, authorization only -depends on possession of the key file. - -RSA authentication is the most secure form of authentication supported -by this software. It does not rely on the network, routers, domain -name servers, or the client machine. The only thing that matters is -access to the private key. - -All this, of course, depends on the security of the RSA algorithm -itself. RSA has been widely known since about 1978, and no effective -methods for breaking it are known if it is used properly. Care has -been taken to avoid the well-known pitfalls. Breaking RSA is widely -believed to be equivalent to factoring, which is a very hard -mathematical problem that has received considerable public research. -So far, no effective methods are known for numbers bigger than about -512 bits. However, as computer speeds and factoring methods are -increasing, 512 bits can no longer be considered secure. The -factoring work is exponential, and 768 or 1024 bits are widely -considered to be secure in the near future. - - -RHOSTS AUTHENTICATION - -Conventional .rhosts and hosts.equiv based authentication mechanisms -are fundamentally insecure due to IP, DNS (domain name server) and -routing spoofing attacks. Additionally this authentication method -relies on the integrity of the client machine. These weaknesses is -tolerable, and been known and exploited for a long time. - -Ssh provides an improved version of these types of authentication, -because they are very convenient for the user (and allow easy -transition from rsh and rlogin). It permits these types of -authentication, but additionally requires that the client host be -authenticated using RSA. - -The server has a list of host keys stored in /etc/ssh_known_host, and -additionally each user has host keys in $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts. Ssh -uses the name servers to obtain the canonical name of the client host, -looks for its public key in its known host files, and requires the -client to prove that it knows the private host key. This prevents IP -and routing spoofing attacks (as long as the client machine private -host key has not been compromized), but is still vulnerable to DNS -attacks (to a limited extent), and relies on the integrity of the -client machine as to who is requesting to log in. This prevents -outsiders from attacking, but does not protect against very powerful -attackers. If maximal security is desired, only RSA authentication -should be used. - -It is possible to enable conventional .rhosts and /etc/hosts.equiv -authentication (without host authentication) at compile time by giving -the option --with-rhosts to configure. However, this is not -recommended, and is not done by default. - -These weaknesses are present in rsh and rlogin. No improvement in -security will be obtained unless rlogin and rsh are completely -disabled (commented out in /etc/inetd.conf). This is highly -recommended. - - -WEAKEST LINKS IN SECURITY - -One should understand that while this software may provide -cryptographically secure communications, it may be easy to -monitor the communications at their endpoints. - -Basically, anyone with root access on the local machine on which you -are running the software may be able to do anything. Anyone with root -access on the server machine may be able to monitor your -communications, and a very talented root user might even be able to -send his/her own requests to your authentication agent. - -One should also be aware that computers send out electromagnetic -radition that can sometimes be picked up hundreds of meters away. -Your keyboard is particularly easy to listen to. The image on your -monitor might also be seen on another monitor in a van parked behind -your house. - -Beware that unwanted visitors might come to your home or office and -use your machine while you are away. They might also make -modifications or install bugs in your hardware or software. - -Beware that the most effective way for someone to decrypt your data -may be with a rubber hose. - - -LEGAL ISSUES - -As far as I am concerned, anyone is permitted to use this software -freely. However, see the file COPYING for detailed copying, -licensing, and distribution information. - -In some countries, particularly France, Russia, Iraq, and Pakistan, -it may be illegal to use any encryption at all without a special -permit, and the rumor has it that you cannot get a permit for any -strong encryption. - -This software may be freely imported into the United States; however, -the United States Government may consider re-exporting it a criminal -offence. - -Note that any information and cryptographic algorithms used in this -software are publicly available on the Internet and at any major -bookstore, scientific library, or patent office worldwide. - -THERE IS NO WARRANTY FOR THIS PROGRAM. Please consult the file -COPYING for more information. - - -MAILING LISTS AND OTHER INFORMATION - -There is a mailing list for ossh. It is ossh@sics.se. If you would -like to join, send a message to majordomo@sics.se with "subscribe -ssh" in body. - -The WWW home page for ssh is http://www.cs.hut.fi/ssh. It contains an -archive of the mailing list, and detailed information about new -releases, mailing lists, and other relevant issues. - -Bug reports should be sent to ossh-bugs@sics.se. - - -ABOUT THE AUTHOR - -This software was written by Tatu Ylonen . I work as a -researcher at Helsinki University of Technology, Finland. For more -information, see http://www.cs.hut.fi/~ylo/. My PGP public key is -available via finger from ylo@cs.hut.fi and from the key servers. I -prefer PGP encrypted mail. - -The author can be contacted via ordinary mail at - Tatu Ylonen - Helsinki University of Technology - Otakaari 1 - FIN-02150 ESPOO - Finland - - Fax. +358-0-4513293 - - -ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS - -I thank Tero Kivinen, Timo Rinne, Janne Snabb, and Heikki Suonsivu for -their help and comments in the design, implementation and porting of -this software. I also thank numerous contributors, including but not -limited to Walker Aumann, Jurgen Botz, Hans-Werner Braun, Stephane -Bortzmeyer, Adrian Colley, Michael Cooper, David Dombek, Jerome -Etienne, Bill Fithen, Mark Fullmer, Bert Gijsbers, Andreas Gustafsson, -Michael Henits, Steve Johnson, Thomas Koenig, Felix Leitner, Gunnar -Lindberg, Andrew Macpherson, Marc Martinec, Paul Mauvais, Donald -McKillican, Leon Mlakar, Robert Muchsel, Mark Treacy, Bryan -O'Sullivan, Mikael Suokas, Ollivier Robert, Jakob Schlyter, Tomasz -Surmacz, Alvar Vinacua, Petri Virkkula, Michael Warfield, and -Cristophe Wolfhugel. - -Thanks also go to Philip Zimmermann, whose PGP software and the -associated legal battle provided inspiration, motivation, and many -useful techniques, and to Bruce Schneier whose book Applied -Cryptography has done a great service in widely distributing knowledge -about cryptographic methods. - - -Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen, Espoo, Finland. +See http://www.openssh.com/ for more information.