Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/auth.c, Revision 1.102
1.102 ! djm 1: /* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.101 2013/02/06 00:22:21 dtucker Exp $ */
1.1 markus 2: /*
1.19 deraadt 3: * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
1.9 deraadt 4: *
5: * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
6: * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
7: * are met:
8: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
9: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
10: * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
11: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
12: * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
13: *
14: * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
15: * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
16: * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
17: * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
18: * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
19: * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
20: * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
21: * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
22: * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
23: * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
1.1 markus 24: */
25:
1.62 stevesk 26: #include <sys/types.h>
27: #include <sys/stat.h>
1.73 stevesk 28: #include <sys/param.h>
1.22 markus 29:
1.70 stevesk 30: #include <errno.h>
1.79 dtucker 31: #include <fcntl.h>
1.22 markus 32: #include <libgen.h>
1.77 djm 33: #include <login_cap.h>
1.61 stevesk 34: #include <paths.h>
1.68 stevesk 35: #include <pwd.h>
1.69 stevesk 36: #include <stdarg.h>
1.74 stevesk 37: #include <stdio.h>
1.72 stevesk 38: #include <string.h>
1.80 djm 39: #include <unistd.h>
1.1 markus 40:
41: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.13 markus 42: #include "match.h"
1.14 markus 43: #include "groupaccess.h"
44: #include "log.h"
1.75 deraadt 45: #include "buffer.h"
1.1 markus 46: #include "servconf.h"
1.75 deraadt 47: #include "key.h"
48: #include "hostfile.h"
1.2 markus 49: #include "auth.h"
1.13 markus 50: #include "auth-options.h"
1.14 markus 51: #include "canohost.h"
1.24 markus 52: #include "uidswap.h"
1.40 markus 53: #include "misc.h"
1.42 markus 54: #include "packet.h"
1.75 deraadt 55: #ifdef GSSAPI
56: #include "ssh-gss.h"
57: #endif
1.85 djm 58: #include "authfile.h"
1.67 dtucker 59: #include "monitor_wrap.h"
1.100 djm 60: #include "krl.h"
1.2 markus 61:
1.1 markus 62: /* import */
63: extern ServerOptions options;
1.67 dtucker 64: extern int use_privsep;
1.1 markus 65:
1.42 markus 66: /* Debugging messages */
67: Buffer auth_debug;
68: int auth_debug_init;
69:
1.1 markus 70: /*
1.12 markus 71: * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
72: * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
73: * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
74: * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
75: * listed there, false will be returned.
1.1 markus 76: * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
1.4 markus 77: * Otherwise true is returned.
1.1 markus 78: */
1.5 markus 79: int
1.1 markus 80: allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
81: {
82: struct stat st;
1.35 markus 83: const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL;
1.60 djm 84: u_int i;
1.1 markus 85:
86: /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
1.12 markus 87: if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
1.1 markus 88: return 0;
89:
1.7 deraadt 90: /*
1.84 djm 91: * Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we
92: * are chrooting.
1.7 deraadt 93: */
1.84 djm 94: if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
95: strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
96: char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ?
97: _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */
98:
99: if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
100: logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
101: "does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell);
1.102 ! djm 102: free(shell);
1.84 djm 103: return 0;
104: }
105: if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
106: (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
107: logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
108: "is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell);
1.102 ! djm 109: free(shell);
1.84 djm 110: return 0;
111: }
1.102 ! djm 112: free(shell);
1.34 stevesk 113: }
1.1 markus 114:
1.58 dtucker 115: if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
116: options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
1.48 markus 117: hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
1.35 markus 118: ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
119: }
120:
1.1 markus 121: /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
122: if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
123: for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
1.39 markus 124: if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
1.34 stevesk 125: options.deny_users[i])) {
1.57 dtucker 126: logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
127: "because listed in DenyUsers",
128: pw->pw_name, hostname);
1.1 markus 129: return 0;
1.34 stevesk 130: }
1.1 markus 131: }
132: /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
133: if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
134: for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
1.39 markus 135: if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
1.26 markus 136: options.allow_users[i]))
1.1 markus 137: break;
138: /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
1.34 stevesk 139: if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
1.57 dtucker 140: logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
141: "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
1.1 markus 142: return 0;
1.34 stevesk 143: }
1.1 markus 144: }
145: if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
1.12 markus 146: /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
1.34 stevesk 147: if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
1.57 dtucker 148: logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
149: "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
1.1 markus 150: return 0;
1.34 stevesk 151: }
1.1 markus 152:
1.12 markus 153: /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
154: if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
155: if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
156: options.num_deny_groups)) {
157: ga_free();
1.57 dtucker 158: logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
159: "because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
160: pw->pw_name, hostname);
1.1 markus 161: return 0;
1.12 markus 162: }
1.1 markus 163: /*
1.12 markus 164: * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
1.1 markus 165: * isn't listed there
166: */
1.12 markus 167: if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
168: if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
169: options.num_allow_groups)) {
170: ga_free();
1.57 dtucker 171: logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
172: "because none of user's groups are listed "
173: "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
1.1 markus 174: return 0;
1.12 markus 175: }
176: ga_free();
1.1 markus 177: }
178: /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
179: return 1;
1.13 markus 180: }
181:
182: void
1.98 djm 183: auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
184: const char *method, const char *submethod, const char *info)
1.13 markus 185: {
186: void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
187: char *authmsg;
1.67 dtucker 188:
189: if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
190: return;
1.13 markus 191:
192: /* Raise logging level */
193: if (authenticated == 1 ||
194: !authctxt->valid ||
1.54 dtucker 195: authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
1.13 markus 196: strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
1.47 itojun 197: authlog = logit;
1.13 markus 198:
199: if (authctxt->postponed)
200: authmsg = "Postponed";
1.98 djm 201: else if (partial)
202: authmsg = "Partial";
1.13 markus 203: else
204: authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
205:
1.98 djm 206: authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
1.13 markus 207: authmsg,
208: method,
1.98 djm 209: submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
1.56 markus 210: authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
1.29 markus 211: authctxt->user,
1.13 markus 212: get_remote_ipaddr(),
213: get_remote_port(),
214: info);
215: }
216:
217: /*
1.17 markus 218: * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
1.13 markus 219: */
220: int
1.98 djm 221: auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
1.13 markus 222: {
1.17 markus 223: switch (options.permit_root_login) {
224: case PERMIT_YES:
1.13 markus 225: return 1;
1.17 markus 226: case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
227: if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
228: return 1;
229: break;
230: case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
231: if (forced_command) {
1.47 itojun 232: logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
1.17 markus 233: return 1;
234: }
235: break;
1.13 markus 236: }
1.47 itojun 237: logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
1.22 markus 238: return 0;
239: }
240:
241:
242: /*
243: * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
244: * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
245: * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
246: *
247: * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
248: */
1.93 djm 249: char *
1.59 djm 250: expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
1.22 markus 251: {
1.65 djm 252: char *file, ret[MAXPATHLEN];
253: int i;
1.22 markus 254:
1.59 djm 255: file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
256: "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
1.22 markus 257:
258: /*
259: * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
260: * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
261: */
1.59 djm 262: if (*file == '/')
263: return (file);
264:
1.65 djm 265: i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
266: if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
1.59 djm 267: fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
1.102 ! djm 268: free(file);
1.65 djm 269: return (xstrdup(ret));
1.22 markus 270: }
1.24 markus 271:
1.87 djm 272: char *
273: authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw)
274: {
1.95 djm 275: if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL ||
276: strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_file, "none") == 0)
1.87 djm 277: return NULL;
278: return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw);
279: }
280:
1.24 markus 281: /* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
282: HostStatus
283: check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
284: const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
285: {
286: char *user_hostfile;
287: struct stat st;
1.30 stevesk 288: HostStatus host_status;
1.91 djm 289: struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
290: const struct hostkey_entry *found;
1.24 markus 291:
1.91 djm 292: hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
293: load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile);
294: if (userfile != NULL) {
1.24 markus 295: user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
296: if (options.strict_modes &&
297: (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
298: ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
1.31 deraadt 299: (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
1.47 itojun 300: logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
1.24 markus 301: "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
302: pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
1.88 djm 303: auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes",
304: user_hostfile);
1.24 markus 305: } else {
306: temporarily_use_uid(pw);
1.91 djm 307: load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile);
1.24 markus 308: restore_uid();
309: }
1.102 ! djm 310: free(user_hostfile);
1.24 markus 311: }
1.91 djm 312: host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found);
313: if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED)
314: error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication",
315: found->host);
316: else if (host_status == HOST_OK)
317: debug("%s: key for %s found at %s:%ld", __func__,
318: found->host, found->file, found->line);
319: else
320: debug("%s: key for host %s not found", __func__, host);
321:
322: free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
1.24 markus 323:
324: return host_status;
325: }
326:
1.22 markus 327: /*
1.97 djm 328: * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components
1.44 stevesk 329: * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
1.23 markus 330: * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
1.22 markus 331: *
332: * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
333: *
1.101 dtucker 334: * Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to
1.97 djm 335: * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an
1.22 markus 336: * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
337: *
338: * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
339: */
1.97 djm 340: int
341: auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
342: uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
1.22 markus 343: {
1.28 markus 344: char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
1.22 markus 345: char *cp;
1.46 markus 346: int comparehome = 0;
1.22 markus 347: struct stat st;
348:
1.97 djm 349: if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
350: snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
1.22 markus 351: strerror(errno));
352: return -1;
353: }
1.97 djm 354: if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
1.46 markus 355: comparehome = 1;
1.22 markus 356:
1.97 djm 357: if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) {
358: snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
359: return -1;
360: }
361: if ((stp->st_uid != 0 && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
362: (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
1.22 markus 363: snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
364: buf);
365: return -1;
366: }
367:
368: /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
369: for (;;) {
370: if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
371: snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
372: return -1;
373: }
374: strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
1.25 provos 375:
1.22 markus 376: if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
377: (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
378: (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
1.31 deraadt 379: snprintf(err, errlen,
1.22 markus 380: "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
381: return -1;
382: }
383:
1.82 dtucker 384: /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
1.94 djm 385: if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0)
1.27 markus 386: break;
1.94 djm 387:
1.22 markus 388: /*
389: * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
390: * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
391: */
392: if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
393: break;
394: }
1.17 markus 395: return 0;
1.97 djm 396: }
397:
398: /*
399: * Version of secure_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to
400: * avoid races.
401: *
402: * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
403: */
404: static int
405: secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
406: char *err, size_t errlen)
407: {
408: struct stat st;
409:
410: /* check the open file to avoid races */
411: if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) {
412: snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s",
1.99 dtucker 413: file, strerror(errno));
1.97 djm 414: return -1;
415: }
416: return auth_secure_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen);
1.79 dtucker 417: }
418:
1.87 djm 419: static FILE *
420: auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
421: int log_missing, char *file_type)
1.79 dtucker 422: {
423: char line[1024];
424: struct stat st;
425: int fd;
426: FILE *f;
427:
1.81 dtucker 428: if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
1.87 djm 429: if (log_missing || errno != ENOENT)
430: debug("Could not open %s '%s': %s", file_type, file,
1.81 dtucker 431: strerror(errno));
1.79 dtucker 432: return NULL;
1.81 dtucker 433: }
1.79 dtucker 434:
435: if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
436: close(fd);
437: return NULL;
438: }
439: if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
1.87 djm 440: logit("User %s %s %s is not a regular file",
441: pw->pw_name, file_type, file);
1.79 dtucker 442: close(fd);
443: return NULL;
444: }
445: unset_nonblock(fd);
446: if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
447: close(fd);
448: return NULL;
449: }
1.90 djm 450: if (strict_modes &&
1.79 dtucker 451: secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
452: fclose(f);
453: logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
1.88 djm 454: auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line);
1.79 dtucker 455: return NULL;
456: }
457:
458: return f;
1.87 djm 459: }
460:
461:
462: FILE *
463: auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
464: {
465: return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys");
466: }
467:
468: FILE *
469: auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
470: {
471: return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0,
472: "authorized principals");
1.37 provos 473: }
474:
475: struct passwd *
476: getpwnamallow(const char *user)
477: {
1.38 provos 478: extern login_cap_t *lc;
479: auth_session_t *as;
1.37 provos 480: struct passwd *pw;
1.96 dtucker 481: struct connection_info *ci = get_connection_info(1, options.use_dns);
1.71 dtucker 482:
1.96 dtucker 483: ci->user = user;
484: parse_server_match_config(&options, ci);
1.37 provos 485:
486: pw = getpwnam(user);
1.45 stevesk 487: if (pw == NULL) {
1.55 markus 488: logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",
1.45 stevesk 489: user, get_remote_ipaddr());
490: return (NULL);
491: }
492: if (!allowed_user(pw))
1.38 provos 493: return (NULL);
494: if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
495: debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
496: return (NULL);
497: }
498: if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
1.43 millert 499: auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
1.38 provos 500: debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
1.37 provos 501: pw = NULL;
1.38 provos 502: }
503: if (as != NULL)
504: auth_close(as);
1.41 markus 505: if (pw != NULL)
506: return (pwcopy(pw));
507: return (NULL);
1.85 djm 508: }
509:
510: /* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */
511: int
512: auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
513: {
514: char *key_fp;
515:
516: if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL)
517: return 0;
1.100 djm 518: switch (ssh_krl_file_contains_key(options.revoked_keys_file, key)) {
519: case 0:
520: return 0; /* Not revoked */
521: case -2:
522: break; /* Not a KRL */
523: default:
524: goto revoked;
525: }
526: debug3("%s: treating %s as a key list", __func__,
527: options.revoked_keys_file);
1.85 djm 528: switch (key_in_file(key, options.revoked_keys_file, 0)) {
529: case 0:
530: /* key not revoked */
531: return 0;
532: case -1:
533: /* Error opening revoked_keys_file: refuse all keys */
534: error("Revoked keys file is unreadable: refusing public key "
535: "authentication");
536: return 1;
537: case 1:
1.100 djm 538: revoked:
1.85 djm 539: /* Key revoked */
540: key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
1.86 djm 541: error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked "
542: "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp);
1.102 ! djm 543: free(key_fp);
1.85 djm 544: return 1;
545: }
546: fatal("key_in_file returned junk");
1.42 markus 547: }
548:
549: void
550: auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
551: {
552: char buf[1024];
553: va_list args;
554:
555: if (!auth_debug_init)
556: return;
557:
558: va_start(args, fmt);
559: vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
560: va_end(args);
561: buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf);
562: }
563:
564: void
565: auth_debug_send(void)
566: {
567: char *msg;
568:
569: if (!auth_debug_init)
570: return;
571: while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
572: msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL);
573: packet_send_debug("%s", msg);
1.102 ! djm 574: free(msg);
1.42 markus 575: }
576: }
577:
578: void
579: auth_debug_reset(void)
580: {
581: if (auth_debug_init)
582: buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
583: else {
584: buffer_init(&auth_debug);
585: auth_debug_init = 1;
586: }
1.49 markus 587: }
588:
589: struct passwd *
590: fakepw(void)
591: {
592: static struct passwd fake;
593:
594: memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
595: fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
596: fake.pw_passwd =
1.51 djm 597: "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK";
1.49 markus 598: fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
1.53 deraadt 599: fake.pw_uid = (uid_t)-1;
600: fake.pw_gid = (gid_t)-1;
1.49 markus 601: fake.pw_class = "";
602: fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
603: fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
604:
605: return (&fake);
1.1 markus 606: }
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