Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/auth.c, Revision 1.103
1.103 ! djm 1: /* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.102 2013/05/17 00:13:13 djm Exp $ */
1.1 markus 2: /*
1.19 deraadt 3: * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
1.9 deraadt 4: *
5: * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
6: * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
7: * are met:
8: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
9: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
10: * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
11: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
12: * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
13: *
14: * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
15: * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
16: * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
17: * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
18: * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
19: * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
20: * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
21: * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
22: * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
23: * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
1.1 markus 24: */
25:
1.62 stevesk 26: #include <sys/types.h>
27: #include <sys/stat.h>
1.73 stevesk 28: #include <sys/param.h>
1.22 markus 29:
1.70 stevesk 30: #include <errno.h>
1.79 dtucker 31: #include <fcntl.h>
1.22 markus 32: #include <libgen.h>
1.77 djm 33: #include <login_cap.h>
1.61 stevesk 34: #include <paths.h>
1.68 stevesk 35: #include <pwd.h>
1.69 stevesk 36: #include <stdarg.h>
1.74 stevesk 37: #include <stdio.h>
1.72 stevesk 38: #include <string.h>
1.80 djm 39: #include <unistd.h>
1.1 markus 40:
41: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.13 markus 42: #include "match.h"
1.14 markus 43: #include "groupaccess.h"
44: #include "log.h"
1.75 deraadt 45: #include "buffer.h"
1.1 markus 46: #include "servconf.h"
1.75 deraadt 47: #include "key.h"
48: #include "hostfile.h"
1.2 markus 49: #include "auth.h"
1.13 markus 50: #include "auth-options.h"
1.14 markus 51: #include "canohost.h"
1.24 markus 52: #include "uidswap.h"
1.40 markus 53: #include "misc.h"
1.42 markus 54: #include "packet.h"
1.75 deraadt 55: #ifdef GSSAPI
56: #include "ssh-gss.h"
57: #endif
1.85 djm 58: #include "authfile.h"
1.67 dtucker 59: #include "monitor_wrap.h"
1.100 djm 60: #include "krl.h"
1.103 ! djm 61: #include "compat.h"
1.2 markus 62:
1.1 markus 63: /* import */
64: extern ServerOptions options;
1.67 dtucker 65: extern int use_privsep;
1.1 markus 66:
1.42 markus 67: /* Debugging messages */
68: Buffer auth_debug;
69: int auth_debug_init;
70:
1.1 markus 71: /*
1.12 markus 72: * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
73: * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
74: * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
75: * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
76: * listed there, false will be returned.
1.1 markus 77: * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
1.4 markus 78: * Otherwise true is returned.
1.1 markus 79: */
1.5 markus 80: int
1.1 markus 81: allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
82: {
83: struct stat st;
1.35 markus 84: const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL;
1.60 djm 85: u_int i;
1.1 markus 86:
87: /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
1.12 markus 88: if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
1.1 markus 89: return 0;
90:
1.7 deraadt 91: /*
1.84 djm 92: * Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we
93: * are chrooting.
1.7 deraadt 94: */
1.84 djm 95: if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
96: strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
97: char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ?
98: _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */
99:
100: if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
101: logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
102: "does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell);
1.102 djm 103: free(shell);
1.84 djm 104: return 0;
105: }
106: if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
107: (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
108: logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
109: "is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell);
1.102 djm 110: free(shell);
1.84 djm 111: return 0;
112: }
1.102 djm 113: free(shell);
1.34 stevesk 114: }
1.1 markus 115:
1.58 dtucker 116: if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
117: options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
1.48 markus 118: hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
1.35 markus 119: ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
120: }
121:
1.1 markus 122: /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
123: if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
124: for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
1.39 markus 125: if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
1.34 stevesk 126: options.deny_users[i])) {
1.57 dtucker 127: logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
128: "because listed in DenyUsers",
129: pw->pw_name, hostname);
1.1 markus 130: return 0;
1.34 stevesk 131: }
1.1 markus 132: }
133: /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
134: if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
135: for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
1.39 markus 136: if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
1.26 markus 137: options.allow_users[i]))
1.1 markus 138: break;
139: /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
1.34 stevesk 140: if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
1.57 dtucker 141: logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
142: "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
1.1 markus 143: return 0;
1.34 stevesk 144: }
1.1 markus 145: }
146: if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
1.12 markus 147: /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
1.34 stevesk 148: if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
1.57 dtucker 149: logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
150: "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
1.1 markus 151: return 0;
1.34 stevesk 152: }
1.1 markus 153:
1.12 markus 154: /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
155: if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
156: if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
157: options.num_deny_groups)) {
158: ga_free();
1.57 dtucker 159: logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
160: "because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
161: pw->pw_name, hostname);
1.1 markus 162: return 0;
1.12 markus 163: }
1.1 markus 164: /*
1.12 markus 165: * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
1.1 markus 166: * isn't listed there
167: */
1.12 markus 168: if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
169: if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
170: options.num_allow_groups)) {
171: ga_free();
1.57 dtucker 172: logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
173: "because none of user's groups are listed "
174: "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
1.1 markus 175: return 0;
1.12 markus 176: }
177: ga_free();
1.1 markus 178: }
179: /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
180: return 1;
1.13 markus 181: }
182:
183: void
1.103 ! djm 184: auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *fmt, ...)
! 185: {
! 186: va_list ap;
! 187: int i;
! 188:
! 189: free(authctxt->info);
! 190: authctxt->info = NULL;
! 191:
! 192: va_start(ap, fmt);
! 193: i = vasprintf(&authctxt->info, fmt, ap);
! 194: va_end(ap);
! 195:
! 196: if (i < 0 || authctxt->info == NULL)
! 197: fatal("vasprintf failed");
! 198: }
! 199:
! 200: void
1.98 djm 201: auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
1.103 ! djm 202: const char *method, const char *submethod)
1.13 markus 203: {
204: void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
205: char *authmsg;
1.67 dtucker 206:
207: if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
208: return;
1.13 markus 209:
210: /* Raise logging level */
211: if (authenticated == 1 ||
212: !authctxt->valid ||
1.54 dtucker 213: authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
1.13 markus 214: strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
1.47 itojun 215: authlog = logit;
1.13 markus 216:
217: if (authctxt->postponed)
218: authmsg = "Postponed";
1.98 djm 219: else if (partial)
220: authmsg = "Partial";
1.13 markus 221: else
222: authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
223:
1.103 ! djm 224: authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s%s%s",
1.13 markus 225: authmsg,
226: method,
1.98 djm 227: submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
1.56 markus 228: authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
1.29 markus 229: authctxt->user,
1.13 markus 230: get_remote_ipaddr(),
231: get_remote_port(),
1.103 ! djm 232: compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1",
! 233: authctxt->info != NULL ? ": " : "",
! 234: authctxt->info != NULL ? authctxt->info : "");
! 235: free(authctxt->info);
! 236: authctxt->info = NULL;
1.13 markus 237: }
238:
239: /*
1.17 markus 240: * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
1.13 markus 241: */
242: int
1.98 djm 243: auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
1.13 markus 244: {
1.17 markus 245: switch (options.permit_root_login) {
246: case PERMIT_YES:
1.13 markus 247: return 1;
1.17 markus 248: case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
249: if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
250: return 1;
251: break;
252: case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
253: if (forced_command) {
1.47 itojun 254: logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
1.17 markus 255: return 1;
256: }
257: break;
1.13 markus 258: }
1.47 itojun 259: logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
1.22 markus 260: return 0;
261: }
262:
263:
264: /*
265: * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
266: * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
267: * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
268: *
269: * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
270: */
1.93 djm 271: char *
1.59 djm 272: expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
1.22 markus 273: {
1.65 djm 274: char *file, ret[MAXPATHLEN];
275: int i;
1.22 markus 276:
1.59 djm 277: file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
278: "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
1.22 markus 279:
280: /*
281: * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
282: * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
283: */
1.59 djm 284: if (*file == '/')
285: return (file);
286:
1.65 djm 287: i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
288: if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
1.59 djm 289: fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
1.102 djm 290: free(file);
1.65 djm 291: return (xstrdup(ret));
1.22 markus 292: }
1.24 markus 293:
1.87 djm 294: char *
295: authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw)
296: {
1.95 djm 297: if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL ||
298: strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_file, "none") == 0)
1.87 djm 299: return NULL;
300: return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw);
301: }
302:
1.24 markus 303: /* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
304: HostStatus
305: check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
306: const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
307: {
308: char *user_hostfile;
309: struct stat st;
1.30 stevesk 310: HostStatus host_status;
1.91 djm 311: struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
312: const struct hostkey_entry *found;
1.24 markus 313:
1.91 djm 314: hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
315: load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile);
316: if (userfile != NULL) {
1.24 markus 317: user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
318: if (options.strict_modes &&
319: (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
320: ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
1.31 deraadt 321: (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
1.47 itojun 322: logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
1.24 markus 323: "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
324: pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
1.88 djm 325: auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes",
326: user_hostfile);
1.24 markus 327: } else {
328: temporarily_use_uid(pw);
1.91 djm 329: load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile);
1.24 markus 330: restore_uid();
331: }
1.102 djm 332: free(user_hostfile);
1.24 markus 333: }
1.91 djm 334: host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found);
335: if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED)
336: error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication",
337: found->host);
338: else if (host_status == HOST_OK)
339: debug("%s: key for %s found at %s:%ld", __func__,
340: found->host, found->file, found->line);
341: else
342: debug("%s: key for host %s not found", __func__, host);
343:
344: free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
1.24 markus 345:
346: return host_status;
347: }
348:
1.22 markus 349: /*
1.97 djm 350: * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components
1.44 stevesk 351: * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
1.23 markus 352: * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
1.22 markus 353: *
354: * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
355: *
1.101 dtucker 356: * Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to
1.97 djm 357: * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an
1.22 markus 358: * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
359: *
360: * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
361: */
1.97 djm 362: int
363: auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
364: uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
1.22 markus 365: {
1.28 markus 366: char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
1.22 markus 367: char *cp;
1.46 markus 368: int comparehome = 0;
1.22 markus 369: struct stat st;
370:
1.97 djm 371: if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
372: snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
1.22 markus 373: strerror(errno));
374: return -1;
375: }
1.97 djm 376: if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
1.46 markus 377: comparehome = 1;
1.22 markus 378:
1.97 djm 379: if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) {
380: snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
381: return -1;
382: }
383: if ((stp->st_uid != 0 && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
384: (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
1.22 markus 385: snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
386: buf);
387: return -1;
388: }
389:
390: /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
391: for (;;) {
392: if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
393: snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
394: return -1;
395: }
396: strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
1.25 provos 397:
1.22 markus 398: if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
399: (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
400: (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
1.31 deraadt 401: snprintf(err, errlen,
1.22 markus 402: "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
403: return -1;
404: }
405:
1.82 dtucker 406: /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
1.94 djm 407: if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0)
1.27 markus 408: break;
1.94 djm 409:
1.22 markus 410: /*
411: * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
412: * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
413: */
414: if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
415: break;
416: }
1.17 markus 417: return 0;
1.97 djm 418: }
419:
420: /*
421: * Version of secure_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to
422: * avoid races.
423: *
424: * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
425: */
426: static int
427: secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
428: char *err, size_t errlen)
429: {
430: struct stat st;
431:
432: /* check the open file to avoid races */
433: if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) {
434: snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s",
1.99 dtucker 435: file, strerror(errno));
1.97 djm 436: return -1;
437: }
438: return auth_secure_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen);
1.79 dtucker 439: }
440:
1.87 djm 441: static FILE *
442: auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
443: int log_missing, char *file_type)
1.79 dtucker 444: {
445: char line[1024];
446: struct stat st;
447: int fd;
448: FILE *f;
449:
1.81 dtucker 450: if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
1.87 djm 451: if (log_missing || errno != ENOENT)
452: debug("Could not open %s '%s': %s", file_type, file,
1.81 dtucker 453: strerror(errno));
1.79 dtucker 454: return NULL;
1.81 dtucker 455: }
1.79 dtucker 456:
457: if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
458: close(fd);
459: return NULL;
460: }
461: if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
1.87 djm 462: logit("User %s %s %s is not a regular file",
463: pw->pw_name, file_type, file);
1.79 dtucker 464: close(fd);
465: return NULL;
466: }
467: unset_nonblock(fd);
468: if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
469: close(fd);
470: return NULL;
471: }
1.90 djm 472: if (strict_modes &&
1.79 dtucker 473: secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
474: fclose(f);
475: logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
1.88 djm 476: auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line);
1.79 dtucker 477: return NULL;
478: }
479:
480: return f;
1.87 djm 481: }
482:
483:
484: FILE *
485: auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
486: {
487: return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys");
488: }
489:
490: FILE *
491: auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
492: {
493: return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0,
494: "authorized principals");
1.37 provos 495: }
496:
497: struct passwd *
498: getpwnamallow(const char *user)
499: {
1.38 provos 500: extern login_cap_t *lc;
501: auth_session_t *as;
1.37 provos 502: struct passwd *pw;
1.96 dtucker 503: struct connection_info *ci = get_connection_info(1, options.use_dns);
1.71 dtucker 504:
1.96 dtucker 505: ci->user = user;
506: parse_server_match_config(&options, ci);
1.37 provos 507:
508: pw = getpwnam(user);
1.45 stevesk 509: if (pw == NULL) {
1.55 markus 510: logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",
1.45 stevesk 511: user, get_remote_ipaddr());
512: return (NULL);
513: }
514: if (!allowed_user(pw))
1.38 provos 515: return (NULL);
516: if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
517: debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
518: return (NULL);
519: }
520: if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
1.43 millert 521: auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
1.38 provos 522: debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
1.37 provos 523: pw = NULL;
1.38 provos 524: }
525: if (as != NULL)
526: auth_close(as);
1.41 markus 527: if (pw != NULL)
528: return (pwcopy(pw));
529: return (NULL);
1.85 djm 530: }
531:
532: /* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */
533: int
534: auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
535: {
536: char *key_fp;
537:
538: if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL)
539: return 0;
1.100 djm 540: switch (ssh_krl_file_contains_key(options.revoked_keys_file, key)) {
541: case 0:
542: return 0; /* Not revoked */
543: case -2:
544: break; /* Not a KRL */
545: default:
546: goto revoked;
547: }
548: debug3("%s: treating %s as a key list", __func__,
549: options.revoked_keys_file);
1.85 djm 550: switch (key_in_file(key, options.revoked_keys_file, 0)) {
551: case 0:
552: /* key not revoked */
553: return 0;
554: case -1:
555: /* Error opening revoked_keys_file: refuse all keys */
556: error("Revoked keys file is unreadable: refusing public key "
557: "authentication");
558: return 1;
559: case 1:
1.100 djm 560: revoked:
1.85 djm 561: /* Key revoked */
562: key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
1.86 djm 563: error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked "
564: "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp);
1.102 djm 565: free(key_fp);
1.85 djm 566: return 1;
567: }
568: fatal("key_in_file returned junk");
1.42 markus 569: }
570:
571: void
572: auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
573: {
574: char buf[1024];
575: va_list args;
576:
577: if (!auth_debug_init)
578: return;
579:
580: va_start(args, fmt);
581: vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
582: va_end(args);
583: buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf);
584: }
585:
586: void
587: auth_debug_send(void)
588: {
589: char *msg;
590:
591: if (!auth_debug_init)
592: return;
593: while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
594: msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL);
595: packet_send_debug("%s", msg);
1.102 djm 596: free(msg);
1.42 markus 597: }
598: }
599:
600: void
601: auth_debug_reset(void)
602: {
603: if (auth_debug_init)
604: buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
605: else {
606: buffer_init(&auth_debug);
607: auth_debug_init = 1;
608: }
1.49 markus 609: }
610:
611: struct passwd *
612: fakepw(void)
613: {
614: static struct passwd fake;
615:
616: memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
617: fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
618: fake.pw_passwd =
1.51 djm 619: "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK";
1.49 markus 620: fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
1.53 deraadt 621: fake.pw_uid = (uid_t)-1;
622: fake.pw_gid = (gid_t)-1;
1.49 markus 623: fake.pw_class = "";
624: fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
625: fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
626:
627: return (&fake);
1.1 markus 628: }
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