Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/auth.c, Revision 1.105
1.105 ! djm 1: /* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.104 2014/04/29 18:01:49 markus Exp $ */
1.1 markus 2: /*
1.19 deraadt 3: * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
1.9 deraadt 4: *
5: * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
6: * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
7: * are met:
8: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
9: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
10: * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
11: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
12: * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
13: *
14: * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
15: * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
16: * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
17: * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
18: * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
19: * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
20: * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
21: * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
22: * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
23: * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
1.1 markus 24: */
25:
1.62 stevesk 26: #include <sys/types.h>
27: #include <sys/stat.h>
1.73 stevesk 28: #include <sys/param.h>
1.22 markus 29:
1.70 stevesk 30: #include <errno.h>
1.79 dtucker 31: #include <fcntl.h>
1.22 markus 32: #include <libgen.h>
1.77 djm 33: #include <login_cap.h>
1.61 stevesk 34: #include <paths.h>
1.68 stevesk 35: #include <pwd.h>
1.69 stevesk 36: #include <stdarg.h>
1.74 stevesk 37: #include <stdio.h>
1.72 stevesk 38: #include <string.h>
1.80 djm 39: #include <unistd.h>
1.1 markus 40:
41: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.13 markus 42: #include "match.h"
1.14 markus 43: #include "groupaccess.h"
44: #include "log.h"
1.75 deraadt 45: #include "buffer.h"
1.1 markus 46: #include "servconf.h"
1.75 deraadt 47: #include "key.h"
48: #include "hostfile.h"
1.2 markus 49: #include "auth.h"
1.13 markus 50: #include "auth-options.h"
1.14 markus 51: #include "canohost.h"
1.24 markus 52: #include "uidswap.h"
1.40 markus 53: #include "misc.h"
1.42 markus 54: #include "packet.h"
1.75 deraadt 55: #ifdef GSSAPI
56: #include "ssh-gss.h"
57: #endif
1.85 djm 58: #include "authfile.h"
1.67 dtucker 59: #include "monitor_wrap.h"
1.100 djm 60: #include "krl.h"
1.103 djm 61: #include "compat.h"
1.2 markus 62:
1.1 markus 63: /* import */
64: extern ServerOptions options;
1.67 dtucker 65: extern int use_privsep;
1.1 markus 66:
1.42 markus 67: /* Debugging messages */
68: Buffer auth_debug;
69: int auth_debug_init;
70:
1.1 markus 71: /*
1.12 markus 72: * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
73: * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
74: * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
75: * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
76: * listed there, false will be returned.
1.1 markus 77: * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
1.4 markus 78: * Otherwise true is returned.
1.1 markus 79: */
1.5 markus 80: int
1.1 markus 81: allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
82: {
83: struct stat st;
1.35 markus 84: const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL;
1.60 djm 85: u_int i;
1.1 markus 86:
87: /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
1.12 markus 88: if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
1.1 markus 89: return 0;
90:
1.7 deraadt 91: /*
1.84 djm 92: * Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we
93: * are chrooting.
1.7 deraadt 94: */
1.84 djm 95: if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
96: strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
97: char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ?
98: _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */
99:
100: if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
101: logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
102: "does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell);
1.102 djm 103: free(shell);
1.84 djm 104: return 0;
105: }
106: if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
107: (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
108: logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
109: "is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell);
1.102 djm 110: free(shell);
1.84 djm 111: return 0;
112: }
1.102 djm 113: free(shell);
1.34 stevesk 114: }
1.1 markus 115:
1.58 dtucker 116: if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
117: options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
1.48 markus 118: hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
1.35 markus 119: ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
120: }
121:
1.1 markus 122: /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
123: if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
124: for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
1.39 markus 125: if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
1.34 stevesk 126: options.deny_users[i])) {
1.57 dtucker 127: logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
128: "because listed in DenyUsers",
129: pw->pw_name, hostname);
1.1 markus 130: return 0;
1.34 stevesk 131: }
1.1 markus 132: }
133: /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
134: if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
135: for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
1.39 markus 136: if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
1.26 markus 137: options.allow_users[i]))
1.1 markus 138: break;
139: /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
1.34 stevesk 140: if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
1.57 dtucker 141: logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
142: "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
1.1 markus 143: return 0;
1.34 stevesk 144: }
1.1 markus 145: }
146: if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
1.12 markus 147: /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
1.34 stevesk 148: if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
1.57 dtucker 149: logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
150: "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
1.1 markus 151: return 0;
1.34 stevesk 152: }
1.1 markus 153:
1.12 markus 154: /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
155: if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
156: if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
157: options.num_deny_groups)) {
158: ga_free();
1.57 dtucker 159: logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
160: "because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
161: pw->pw_name, hostname);
1.1 markus 162: return 0;
1.12 markus 163: }
1.1 markus 164: /*
1.12 markus 165: * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
1.1 markus 166: * isn't listed there
167: */
1.12 markus 168: if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
169: if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
170: options.num_allow_groups)) {
171: ga_free();
1.57 dtucker 172: logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
173: "because none of user's groups are listed "
174: "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
1.1 markus 175: return 0;
1.12 markus 176: }
177: ga_free();
1.1 markus 178: }
179: /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
180: return 1;
1.13 markus 181: }
182:
183: void
1.103 djm 184: auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *fmt, ...)
185: {
186: va_list ap;
187: int i;
188:
189: free(authctxt->info);
190: authctxt->info = NULL;
191:
192: va_start(ap, fmt);
193: i = vasprintf(&authctxt->info, fmt, ap);
194: va_end(ap);
195:
196: if (i < 0 || authctxt->info == NULL)
197: fatal("vasprintf failed");
198: }
199:
200: void
1.98 djm 201: auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
1.103 djm 202: const char *method, const char *submethod)
1.13 markus 203: {
204: void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
205: char *authmsg;
1.67 dtucker 206:
207: if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
208: return;
1.13 markus 209:
210: /* Raise logging level */
211: if (authenticated == 1 ||
212: !authctxt->valid ||
1.54 dtucker 213: authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
1.13 markus 214: strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
1.47 itojun 215: authlog = logit;
1.13 markus 216:
217: if (authctxt->postponed)
218: authmsg = "Postponed";
1.98 djm 219: else if (partial)
220: authmsg = "Partial";
1.13 markus 221: else
222: authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
223:
1.103 djm 224: authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s%s%s",
1.13 markus 225: authmsg,
226: method,
1.98 djm 227: submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
1.56 markus 228: authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
1.29 markus 229: authctxt->user,
1.13 markus 230: get_remote_ipaddr(),
231: get_remote_port(),
1.103 djm 232: compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1",
233: authctxt->info != NULL ? ": " : "",
234: authctxt->info != NULL ? authctxt->info : "");
235: free(authctxt->info);
236: authctxt->info = NULL;
1.105 ! djm 237: }
! 238:
! 239: void
! 240: auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *authctxt)
! 241: {
! 242: packet_disconnect("Too many authentication failures for "
! 243: "%s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s",
! 244: authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
! 245: authctxt->user,
! 246: get_remote_ipaddr(),
! 247: get_remote_port(),
! 248: compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1");
! 249: /* NOTREACHED */
1.13 markus 250: }
251:
252: /*
1.17 markus 253: * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
1.13 markus 254: */
255: int
1.98 djm 256: auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
1.13 markus 257: {
1.17 markus 258: switch (options.permit_root_login) {
259: case PERMIT_YES:
1.13 markus 260: return 1;
1.17 markus 261: case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
262: if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
263: return 1;
264: break;
265: case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
266: if (forced_command) {
1.47 itojun 267: logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
1.17 markus 268: return 1;
269: }
270: break;
1.13 markus 271: }
1.47 itojun 272: logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
1.22 markus 273: return 0;
274: }
275:
276:
277: /*
278: * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
279: * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
280: * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
281: *
282: * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
283: */
1.93 djm 284: char *
1.59 djm 285: expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
1.22 markus 286: {
1.65 djm 287: char *file, ret[MAXPATHLEN];
288: int i;
1.22 markus 289:
1.59 djm 290: file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
291: "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
1.22 markus 292:
293: /*
294: * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
295: * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
296: */
1.59 djm 297: if (*file == '/')
298: return (file);
299:
1.65 djm 300: i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
301: if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
1.59 djm 302: fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
1.102 djm 303: free(file);
1.65 djm 304: return (xstrdup(ret));
1.22 markus 305: }
1.24 markus 306:
1.87 djm 307: char *
308: authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw)
309: {
1.95 djm 310: if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL ||
311: strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_file, "none") == 0)
1.87 djm 312: return NULL;
313: return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw);
314: }
315:
1.24 markus 316: /* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
317: HostStatus
318: check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
319: const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
320: {
321: char *user_hostfile;
322: struct stat st;
1.30 stevesk 323: HostStatus host_status;
1.91 djm 324: struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
325: const struct hostkey_entry *found;
1.24 markus 326:
1.91 djm 327: hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
328: load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile);
329: if (userfile != NULL) {
1.24 markus 330: user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
331: if (options.strict_modes &&
332: (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
333: ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
1.31 deraadt 334: (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
1.47 itojun 335: logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
1.24 markus 336: "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
337: pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
1.88 djm 338: auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes",
339: user_hostfile);
1.24 markus 340: } else {
341: temporarily_use_uid(pw);
1.91 djm 342: load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile);
1.24 markus 343: restore_uid();
344: }
1.102 djm 345: free(user_hostfile);
1.24 markus 346: }
1.91 djm 347: host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found);
348: if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED)
349: error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication",
350: found->host);
351: else if (host_status == HOST_OK)
352: debug("%s: key for %s found at %s:%ld", __func__,
353: found->host, found->file, found->line);
354: else
355: debug("%s: key for host %s not found", __func__, host);
356:
357: free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
1.24 markus 358:
359: return host_status;
360: }
361:
1.22 markus 362: /*
1.97 djm 363: * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components
1.44 stevesk 364: * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
1.23 markus 365: * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
1.22 markus 366: *
367: * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
368: *
1.101 dtucker 369: * Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to
1.97 djm 370: * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an
1.22 markus 371: * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
372: *
373: * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
374: */
1.97 djm 375: int
376: auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
377: uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
1.22 markus 378: {
1.28 markus 379: char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
1.22 markus 380: char *cp;
1.46 markus 381: int comparehome = 0;
1.22 markus 382: struct stat st;
383:
1.97 djm 384: if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
385: snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
1.22 markus 386: strerror(errno));
387: return -1;
388: }
1.97 djm 389: if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
1.46 markus 390: comparehome = 1;
1.22 markus 391:
1.97 djm 392: if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) {
393: snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
394: return -1;
395: }
396: if ((stp->st_uid != 0 && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
397: (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
1.22 markus 398: snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
399: buf);
400: return -1;
401: }
402:
403: /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
404: for (;;) {
405: if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
406: snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
407: return -1;
408: }
409: strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
1.25 provos 410:
1.22 markus 411: if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
412: (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
413: (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
1.31 deraadt 414: snprintf(err, errlen,
1.22 markus 415: "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
416: return -1;
417: }
418:
1.82 dtucker 419: /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
1.94 djm 420: if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0)
1.27 markus 421: break;
1.94 djm 422:
1.22 markus 423: /*
424: * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
425: * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
426: */
427: if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
428: break;
429: }
1.17 markus 430: return 0;
1.97 djm 431: }
432:
433: /*
434: * Version of secure_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to
435: * avoid races.
436: *
437: * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
438: */
439: static int
440: secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
441: char *err, size_t errlen)
442: {
443: struct stat st;
444:
445: /* check the open file to avoid races */
446: if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) {
447: snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s",
1.99 dtucker 448: file, strerror(errno));
1.97 djm 449: return -1;
450: }
451: return auth_secure_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen);
1.79 dtucker 452: }
453:
1.87 djm 454: static FILE *
455: auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
456: int log_missing, char *file_type)
1.79 dtucker 457: {
458: char line[1024];
459: struct stat st;
460: int fd;
461: FILE *f;
462:
1.81 dtucker 463: if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
1.87 djm 464: if (log_missing || errno != ENOENT)
465: debug("Could not open %s '%s': %s", file_type, file,
1.81 dtucker 466: strerror(errno));
1.79 dtucker 467: return NULL;
1.81 dtucker 468: }
1.79 dtucker 469:
470: if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
471: close(fd);
472: return NULL;
473: }
474: if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
1.87 djm 475: logit("User %s %s %s is not a regular file",
476: pw->pw_name, file_type, file);
1.79 dtucker 477: close(fd);
478: return NULL;
479: }
480: unset_nonblock(fd);
481: if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
482: close(fd);
483: return NULL;
484: }
1.90 djm 485: if (strict_modes &&
1.79 dtucker 486: secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
487: fclose(f);
488: logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
1.88 djm 489: auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line);
1.79 dtucker 490: return NULL;
491: }
492:
493: return f;
1.87 djm 494: }
495:
496:
497: FILE *
498: auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
499: {
500: return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys");
501: }
502:
503: FILE *
504: auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
505: {
506: return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0,
507: "authorized principals");
1.37 provos 508: }
509:
510: struct passwd *
511: getpwnamallow(const char *user)
512: {
1.38 provos 513: extern login_cap_t *lc;
514: auth_session_t *as;
1.37 provos 515: struct passwd *pw;
1.96 dtucker 516: struct connection_info *ci = get_connection_info(1, options.use_dns);
1.71 dtucker 517:
1.96 dtucker 518: ci->user = user;
519: parse_server_match_config(&options, ci);
1.37 provos 520:
521: pw = getpwnam(user);
1.45 stevesk 522: if (pw == NULL) {
1.55 markus 523: logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",
1.45 stevesk 524: user, get_remote_ipaddr());
525: return (NULL);
526: }
527: if (!allowed_user(pw))
1.38 provos 528: return (NULL);
529: if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
530: debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
531: return (NULL);
532: }
533: if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
1.43 millert 534: auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
1.38 provos 535: debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
1.37 provos 536: pw = NULL;
1.38 provos 537: }
538: if (as != NULL)
539: auth_close(as);
1.41 markus 540: if (pw != NULL)
541: return (pwcopy(pw));
542: return (NULL);
1.85 djm 543: }
544:
545: /* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */
546: int
547: auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
548: {
1.104 markus 549: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.85 djm 550: char *key_fp;
551:
552: if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL)
553: return 0;
1.100 djm 554: switch (ssh_krl_file_contains_key(options.revoked_keys_file, key)) {
555: case 0:
556: return 0; /* Not revoked */
557: case -2:
558: break; /* Not a KRL */
559: default:
560: goto revoked;
561: }
1.104 markus 562: #endif
1.100 djm 563: debug3("%s: treating %s as a key list", __func__,
564: options.revoked_keys_file);
1.85 djm 565: switch (key_in_file(key, options.revoked_keys_file, 0)) {
566: case 0:
567: /* key not revoked */
568: return 0;
569: case -1:
570: /* Error opening revoked_keys_file: refuse all keys */
571: error("Revoked keys file is unreadable: refusing public key "
572: "authentication");
573: return 1;
1.104 markus 574: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.85 djm 575: case 1:
1.100 djm 576: revoked:
1.85 djm 577: /* Key revoked */
578: key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
1.86 djm 579: error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked "
580: "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp);
1.102 djm 581: free(key_fp);
1.85 djm 582: return 1;
1.104 markus 583: #endif
1.85 djm 584: }
585: fatal("key_in_file returned junk");
1.42 markus 586: }
587:
588: void
589: auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
590: {
591: char buf[1024];
592: va_list args;
593:
594: if (!auth_debug_init)
595: return;
596:
597: va_start(args, fmt);
598: vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
599: va_end(args);
600: buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf);
601: }
602:
603: void
604: auth_debug_send(void)
605: {
606: char *msg;
607:
608: if (!auth_debug_init)
609: return;
610: while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
611: msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL);
612: packet_send_debug("%s", msg);
1.102 djm 613: free(msg);
1.42 markus 614: }
615: }
616:
617: void
618: auth_debug_reset(void)
619: {
620: if (auth_debug_init)
621: buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
622: else {
623: buffer_init(&auth_debug);
624: auth_debug_init = 1;
625: }
1.49 markus 626: }
627:
628: struct passwd *
629: fakepw(void)
630: {
631: static struct passwd fake;
632:
633: memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
634: fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
635: fake.pw_passwd =
1.51 djm 636: "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK";
1.49 markus 637: fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
1.53 deraadt 638: fake.pw_uid = (uid_t)-1;
639: fake.pw_gid = (gid_t)-1;
1.49 markus 640: fake.pw_class = "";
641: fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
642: fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
643:
644: return (&fake);
1.1 markus 645: }
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