Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/auth.c, Revision 1.111
1.111 ! djm 1: /* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.110 2015/02/25 17:29:38 djm Exp $ */
1.1 markus 2: /*
1.19 deraadt 3: * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
1.9 deraadt 4: *
5: * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
6: * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
7: * are met:
8: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
9: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
10: * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
11: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
12: * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
13: *
14: * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
15: * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
16: * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
17: * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
18: * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
19: * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
20: * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
21: * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
22: * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
23: * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
1.1 markus 24: */
25:
1.62 stevesk 26: #include <sys/types.h>
27: #include <sys/stat.h>
1.22 markus 28:
1.70 stevesk 29: #include <errno.h>
1.79 dtucker 30: #include <fcntl.h>
1.22 markus 31: #include <libgen.h>
1.77 djm 32: #include <login_cap.h>
1.61 stevesk 33: #include <paths.h>
1.68 stevesk 34: #include <pwd.h>
1.69 stevesk 35: #include <stdarg.h>
1.74 stevesk 36: #include <stdio.h>
1.72 stevesk 37: #include <string.h>
1.80 djm 38: #include <unistd.h>
1.109 deraadt 39: #include <limits.h>
1.1 markus 40:
41: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.13 markus 42: #include "match.h"
1.14 markus 43: #include "groupaccess.h"
44: #include "log.h"
1.75 deraadt 45: #include "buffer.h"
1.106 millert 46: #include "misc.h"
1.1 markus 47: #include "servconf.h"
1.75 deraadt 48: #include "key.h"
49: #include "hostfile.h"
1.2 markus 50: #include "auth.h"
1.13 markus 51: #include "auth-options.h"
1.14 markus 52: #include "canohost.h"
1.24 markus 53: #include "uidswap.h"
1.42 markus 54: #include "packet.h"
1.75 deraadt 55: #ifdef GSSAPI
56: #include "ssh-gss.h"
57: #endif
1.85 djm 58: #include "authfile.h"
1.67 dtucker 59: #include "monitor_wrap.h"
1.107 djm 60: #include "authfile.h"
61: #include "ssherr.h"
1.103 djm 62: #include "compat.h"
1.2 markus 63:
1.1 markus 64: /* import */
65: extern ServerOptions options;
1.67 dtucker 66: extern int use_privsep;
1.1 markus 67:
1.42 markus 68: /* Debugging messages */
69: Buffer auth_debug;
70: int auth_debug_init;
71:
1.1 markus 72: /*
1.12 markus 73: * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
74: * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
75: * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
76: * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
77: * listed there, false will be returned.
1.1 markus 78: * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
1.4 markus 79: * Otherwise true is returned.
1.1 markus 80: */
1.5 markus 81: int
1.1 markus 82: allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
83: {
84: struct stat st;
1.35 markus 85: const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL;
1.60 djm 86: u_int i;
1.1 markus 87:
88: /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
1.12 markus 89: if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
1.1 markus 90: return 0;
91:
1.7 deraadt 92: /*
1.84 djm 93: * Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we
94: * are chrooting.
1.7 deraadt 95: */
1.84 djm 96: if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
97: strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
98: char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ?
99: _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */
100:
101: if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
102: logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
103: "does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell);
1.102 djm 104: free(shell);
1.84 djm 105: return 0;
106: }
107: if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
108: (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
109: logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
110: "is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell);
1.102 djm 111: free(shell);
1.84 djm 112: return 0;
113: }
1.102 djm 114: free(shell);
1.34 stevesk 115: }
1.1 markus 116:
1.58 dtucker 117: if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
118: options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
1.48 markus 119: hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
1.35 markus 120: ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
121: }
122:
1.1 markus 123: /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
124: if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
125: for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
1.39 markus 126: if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
1.34 stevesk 127: options.deny_users[i])) {
1.57 dtucker 128: logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
129: "because listed in DenyUsers",
130: pw->pw_name, hostname);
1.1 markus 131: return 0;
1.34 stevesk 132: }
1.1 markus 133: }
134: /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
135: if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
136: for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
1.39 markus 137: if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
1.26 markus 138: options.allow_users[i]))
1.1 markus 139: break;
140: /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
1.34 stevesk 141: if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
1.57 dtucker 142: logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
143: "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
1.1 markus 144: return 0;
1.34 stevesk 145: }
1.1 markus 146: }
147: if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
1.12 markus 148: /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
1.34 stevesk 149: if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
1.57 dtucker 150: logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
151: "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
1.1 markus 152: return 0;
1.34 stevesk 153: }
1.1 markus 154:
1.12 markus 155: /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
156: if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
157: if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
158: options.num_deny_groups)) {
159: ga_free();
1.57 dtucker 160: logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
161: "because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
162: pw->pw_name, hostname);
1.1 markus 163: return 0;
1.12 markus 164: }
1.1 markus 165: /*
1.12 markus 166: * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
1.1 markus 167: * isn't listed there
168: */
1.12 markus 169: if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
170: if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
171: options.num_allow_groups)) {
172: ga_free();
1.57 dtucker 173: logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
174: "because none of user's groups are listed "
175: "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
1.1 markus 176: return 0;
1.12 markus 177: }
178: ga_free();
1.1 markus 179: }
180: /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
181: return 1;
1.13 markus 182: }
183:
184: void
1.103 djm 185: auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *fmt, ...)
186: {
187: va_list ap;
188: int i;
189:
190: free(authctxt->info);
191: authctxt->info = NULL;
192:
193: va_start(ap, fmt);
194: i = vasprintf(&authctxt->info, fmt, ap);
195: va_end(ap);
196:
197: if (i < 0 || authctxt->info == NULL)
198: fatal("vasprintf failed");
199: }
200:
201: void
1.98 djm 202: auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
1.103 djm 203: const char *method, const char *submethod)
1.13 markus 204: {
205: void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
206: char *authmsg;
1.67 dtucker 207:
208: if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
209: return;
1.13 markus 210:
211: /* Raise logging level */
212: if (authenticated == 1 ||
213: !authctxt->valid ||
1.54 dtucker 214: authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
1.13 markus 215: strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
1.47 itojun 216: authlog = logit;
1.13 markus 217:
218: if (authctxt->postponed)
219: authmsg = "Postponed";
1.98 djm 220: else if (partial)
221: authmsg = "Partial";
1.13 markus 222: else
223: authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
224:
1.103 djm 225: authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s%s%s",
1.13 markus 226: authmsg,
227: method,
1.98 djm 228: submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
1.56 markus 229: authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
1.29 markus 230: authctxt->user,
1.13 markus 231: get_remote_ipaddr(),
232: get_remote_port(),
1.103 djm 233: compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1",
234: authctxt->info != NULL ? ": " : "",
235: authctxt->info != NULL ? authctxt->info : "");
236: free(authctxt->info);
237: authctxt->info = NULL;
1.105 djm 238: }
239:
240: void
241: auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *authctxt)
242: {
1.110 djm 243: error("maximum authentication attempts exceeded for "
1.105 djm 244: "%s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s",
245: authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
246: authctxt->user,
247: get_remote_ipaddr(),
248: get_remote_port(),
249: compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1");
1.110 djm 250: packet_disconnect("Too many authentication failures");
1.105 djm 251: /* NOTREACHED */
1.13 markus 252: }
253:
254: /*
1.17 markus 255: * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
1.13 markus 256: */
257: int
1.98 djm 258: auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
1.13 markus 259: {
1.17 markus 260: switch (options.permit_root_login) {
261: case PERMIT_YES:
1.13 markus 262: return 1;
1.17 markus 263: case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
264: if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
265: return 1;
266: break;
267: case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
268: if (forced_command) {
1.47 itojun 269: logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
1.17 markus 270: return 1;
271: }
272: break;
1.13 markus 273: }
1.47 itojun 274: logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
1.22 markus 275: return 0;
276: }
277:
278:
279: /*
280: * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
281: * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
282: * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
283: *
284: * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
285: */
1.93 djm 286: char *
1.59 djm 287: expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
1.22 markus 288: {
1.109 deraadt 289: char *file, ret[PATH_MAX];
1.65 djm 290: int i;
1.22 markus 291:
1.59 djm 292: file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
293: "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
1.22 markus 294:
295: /*
296: * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
297: * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
298: */
1.59 djm 299: if (*file == '/')
300: return (file);
301:
1.65 djm 302: i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
303: if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
1.59 djm 304: fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
1.102 djm 305: free(file);
1.65 djm 306: return (xstrdup(ret));
1.22 markus 307: }
1.24 markus 308:
1.87 djm 309: char *
310: authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw)
311: {
1.111 ! djm 312: if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL)
1.87 djm 313: return NULL;
314: return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw);
315: }
316:
1.24 markus 317: /* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
318: HostStatus
319: check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
320: const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
321: {
322: char *user_hostfile;
323: struct stat st;
1.30 stevesk 324: HostStatus host_status;
1.91 djm 325: struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
326: const struct hostkey_entry *found;
1.24 markus 327:
1.91 djm 328: hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
329: load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile);
330: if (userfile != NULL) {
1.24 markus 331: user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
332: if (options.strict_modes &&
333: (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
334: ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
1.31 deraadt 335: (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
1.47 itojun 336: logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
1.24 markus 337: "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
338: pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
1.88 djm 339: auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes",
340: user_hostfile);
1.24 markus 341: } else {
342: temporarily_use_uid(pw);
1.91 djm 343: load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile);
1.24 markus 344: restore_uid();
345: }
1.102 djm 346: free(user_hostfile);
1.24 markus 347: }
1.91 djm 348: host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found);
349: if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED)
350: error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication",
351: found->host);
352: else if (host_status == HOST_OK)
353: debug("%s: key for %s found at %s:%ld", __func__,
354: found->host, found->file, found->line);
355: else
356: debug("%s: key for host %s not found", __func__, host);
357:
358: free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
1.24 markus 359:
360: return host_status;
361: }
362:
1.22 markus 363: /*
1.97 djm 364: * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components
1.44 stevesk 365: * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
1.23 markus 366: * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
1.22 markus 367: *
368: * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
369: *
1.101 dtucker 370: * Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to
1.97 djm 371: * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an
1.22 markus 372: * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
373: *
374: * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
375: */
1.97 djm 376: int
377: auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
378: uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
1.22 markus 379: {
1.109 deraadt 380: char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX];
1.22 markus 381: char *cp;
1.46 markus 382: int comparehome = 0;
1.22 markus 383: struct stat st;
384:
1.97 djm 385: if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
386: snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
1.22 markus 387: strerror(errno));
388: return -1;
389: }
1.97 djm 390: if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
1.46 markus 391: comparehome = 1;
1.22 markus 392:
1.97 djm 393: if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) {
394: snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
395: return -1;
396: }
397: if ((stp->st_uid != 0 && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
398: (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
1.22 markus 399: snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
400: buf);
401: return -1;
402: }
403:
404: /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
405: for (;;) {
406: if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
407: snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
408: return -1;
409: }
410: strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
1.25 provos 411:
1.22 markus 412: if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
413: (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
414: (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
1.31 deraadt 415: snprintf(err, errlen,
1.22 markus 416: "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
417: return -1;
418: }
419:
1.82 dtucker 420: /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
1.94 djm 421: if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0)
1.27 markus 422: break;
1.94 djm 423:
1.22 markus 424: /*
425: * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
426: * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
427: */
428: if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
429: break;
430: }
1.17 markus 431: return 0;
1.97 djm 432: }
433:
434: /*
435: * Version of secure_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to
436: * avoid races.
437: *
438: * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
439: */
440: static int
441: secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
442: char *err, size_t errlen)
443: {
444: struct stat st;
445:
446: /* check the open file to avoid races */
447: if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) {
448: snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s",
1.99 dtucker 449: file, strerror(errno));
1.97 djm 450: return -1;
451: }
452: return auth_secure_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen);
1.79 dtucker 453: }
454:
1.87 djm 455: static FILE *
456: auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
457: int log_missing, char *file_type)
1.79 dtucker 458: {
459: char line[1024];
460: struct stat st;
461: int fd;
462: FILE *f;
463:
1.81 dtucker 464: if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
1.87 djm 465: if (log_missing || errno != ENOENT)
466: debug("Could not open %s '%s': %s", file_type, file,
1.81 dtucker 467: strerror(errno));
1.79 dtucker 468: return NULL;
1.81 dtucker 469: }
1.79 dtucker 470:
471: if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
472: close(fd);
473: return NULL;
474: }
475: if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
1.87 djm 476: logit("User %s %s %s is not a regular file",
477: pw->pw_name, file_type, file);
1.79 dtucker 478: close(fd);
479: return NULL;
480: }
481: unset_nonblock(fd);
482: if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
483: close(fd);
484: return NULL;
485: }
1.90 djm 486: if (strict_modes &&
1.79 dtucker 487: secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
488: fclose(f);
489: logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
1.88 djm 490: auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line);
1.79 dtucker 491: return NULL;
492: }
493:
494: return f;
1.87 djm 495: }
496:
497:
498: FILE *
499: auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
500: {
501: return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys");
502: }
503:
504: FILE *
505: auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
506: {
507: return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0,
508: "authorized principals");
1.37 provos 509: }
510:
511: struct passwd *
512: getpwnamallow(const char *user)
513: {
1.38 provos 514: extern login_cap_t *lc;
515: auth_session_t *as;
1.37 provos 516: struct passwd *pw;
1.96 dtucker 517: struct connection_info *ci = get_connection_info(1, options.use_dns);
1.71 dtucker 518:
1.96 dtucker 519: ci->user = user;
520: parse_server_match_config(&options, ci);
1.37 provos 521:
522: pw = getpwnam(user);
1.45 stevesk 523: if (pw == NULL) {
1.55 markus 524: logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",
1.45 stevesk 525: user, get_remote_ipaddr());
526: return (NULL);
527: }
528: if (!allowed_user(pw))
1.38 provos 529: return (NULL);
530: if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
531: debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
532: return (NULL);
533: }
534: if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
1.43 millert 535: auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
1.38 provos 536: debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
1.37 provos 537: pw = NULL;
1.38 provos 538: }
539: if (as != NULL)
540: auth_close(as);
1.41 markus 541: if (pw != NULL)
542: return (pwcopy(pw));
543: return (NULL);
1.85 djm 544: }
545:
546: /* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */
547: int
548: auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
549: {
1.107 djm 550: char *fp = NULL;
551: int r;
1.85 djm 552:
553: if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL)
554: return 0;
1.108 djm 555: if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
556: SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
1.107 djm 557: r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
558: error("%s: fingerprint key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
559: goto out;
560: }
561:
562: r = sshkey_check_revoked(key, options.revoked_keys_file);
563: switch (r) {
1.100 djm 564: case 0:
1.107 djm 565: break; /* not revoked */
566: case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED:
567: error("Authentication key %s %s revoked by file %s",
568: sshkey_type(key), fp, options.revoked_keys_file);
569: goto out;
1.100 djm 570: default:
1.107 djm 571: error("Error checking authentication key %s %s in "
572: "revoked keys file %s: %s", sshkey_type(key), fp,
573: options.revoked_keys_file, ssh_err(r));
574: goto out;
1.100 djm 575: }
1.107 djm 576:
577: /* Success */
578: r = 0;
579:
580: out:
581: free(fp);
582: return r == 0 ? 0 : 1;
1.42 markus 583: }
584:
585: void
586: auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
587: {
588: char buf[1024];
589: va_list args;
590:
591: if (!auth_debug_init)
592: return;
593:
594: va_start(args, fmt);
595: vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
596: va_end(args);
597: buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf);
598: }
599:
600: void
601: auth_debug_send(void)
602: {
603: char *msg;
604:
605: if (!auth_debug_init)
606: return;
607: while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
608: msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL);
609: packet_send_debug("%s", msg);
1.102 djm 610: free(msg);
1.42 markus 611: }
612: }
613:
614: void
615: auth_debug_reset(void)
616: {
617: if (auth_debug_init)
618: buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
619: else {
620: buffer_init(&auth_debug);
621: auth_debug_init = 1;
622: }
1.49 markus 623: }
624:
625: struct passwd *
626: fakepw(void)
627: {
628: static struct passwd fake;
629:
630: memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
631: fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
632: fake.pw_passwd =
1.51 djm 633: "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK";
1.49 markus 634: fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
1.53 deraadt 635: fake.pw_uid = (uid_t)-1;
636: fake.pw_gid = (gid_t)-1;
1.49 markus 637: fake.pw_class = "";
638: fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
639: fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
640:
641: return (&fake);
1.1 markus 642: }
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