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Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/auth.c, Revision 1.23

1.1       markus      1: /*
1.19      deraadt     2:  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
1.9       deraadt     3:  *
                      4:  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
                      5:  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
                      6:  * are met:
                      7:  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
                      8:  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
                      9:  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
                     10:  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
                     11:  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
                     12:  *
                     13:  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
                     14:  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
                     15:  * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
                     16:  * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
                     17:  * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
                     18:  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
                     19:  * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
                     20:  * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
                     21:  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
                     22:  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
1.1       markus     23:  */
                     24:
                     25: #include "includes.h"
1.23    ! markus     26: RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.22 2001/05/20 17:20:35 markus Exp $");
1.22      markus     27:
                     28: #include <libgen.h>
1.1       markus     29:
                     30: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.13      markus     31: #include "match.h"
1.14      markus     32: #include "groupaccess.h"
                     33: #include "log.h"
1.1       markus     34: #include "servconf.h"
1.2       markus     35: #include "auth.h"
1.13      markus     36: #include "auth-options.h"
1.14      markus     37: #include "canohost.h"
1.22      markus     38: #include "buffer.h"
                     39: #include "bufaux.h"
1.2       markus     40:
1.1       markus     41: /* import */
                     42: extern ServerOptions options;
                     43:
                     44: /*
1.12      markus     45:  * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
                     46:  * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
                     47:  * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
                     48:  * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
                     49:  * listed there, false will be returned.
1.1       markus     50:  * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
1.4       markus     51:  * Otherwise true is returned.
1.1       markus     52:  */
1.5       markus     53: int
1.1       markus     54: allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
                     55: {
                     56:        struct stat st;
1.21      markus     57:        char *shell;
1.1       markus     58:        int i;
                     59:
                     60:        /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
1.12      markus     61:        if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
1.1       markus     62:                return 0;
                     63:
1.7       deraadt    64:        /*
                     65:         * Get the shell from the password data.  An empty shell field is
                     66:         * legal, and means /bin/sh.
                     67:         */
                     68:        shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
                     69:
1.1       markus     70:        /* deny if shell does not exists or is not executable */
1.7       deraadt    71:        if (stat(shell, &st) != 0)
1.1       markus     72:                return 0;
                     73:        if (!((st.st_mode & S_IFREG) && (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP))))
                     74:                return 0;
                     75:
                     76:        /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
                     77:        if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
                     78:                for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
                     79:                        if (match_pattern(pw->pw_name, options.deny_users[i]))
                     80:                                return 0;
                     81:        }
                     82:        /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
                     83:        if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
                     84:                for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
                     85:                        if (match_pattern(pw->pw_name, options.allow_users[i]))
                     86:                                break;
                     87:                /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
                     88:                if (i >= options.num_allow_users)
                     89:                        return 0;
                     90:        }
                     91:        if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
1.12      markus     92:                /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
                     93:                if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0)
1.1       markus     94:                        return 0;
                     95:
1.12      markus     96:                /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
                     97:                if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
                     98:                        if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
                     99:                            options.num_deny_groups)) {
                    100:                                ga_free();
1.1       markus    101:                                return 0;
1.12      markus    102:                        }
1.1       markus    103:                /*
1.12      markus    104:                 * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
1.1       markus    105:                 * isn't listed there
                    106:                 */
1.12      markus    107:                if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
                    108:                        if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
                    109:                            options.num_allow_groups)) {
                    110:                                ga_free();
1.1       markus    111:                                return 0;
1.12      markus    112:                        }
                    113:                ga_free();
1.1       markus    114:        }
                    115:        /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
                    116:        return 1;
1.13      markus    117: }
                    118:
                    119: Authctxt *
                    120: authctxt_new(void)
                    121: {
1.16      stevesk   122:        Authctxt *authctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(*authctxt));
                    123:        memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
                    124:        return authctxt;
1.13      markus    125: }
                    126:
                    127: void
                    128: auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
                    129: {
                    130:        void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
                    131:        char *authmsg;
                    132:
                    133:        /* Raise logging level */
                    134:        if (authenticated == 1 ||
                    135:            !authctxt->valid ||
                    136:            authctxt->failures >= AUTH_FAIL_LOG ||
                    137:            strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
                    138:                authlog = log;
                    139:
                    140:        if (authctxt->postponed)
                    141:                authmsg = "Postponed";
                    142:        else
                    143:                authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
                    144:
                    145:        authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
                    146:            authmsg,
                    147:            method,
                    148:            authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ",
                    149:            authctxt->valid && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 ? "ROOT" : authctxt->user,
                    150:            get_remote_ipaddr(),
                    151:            get_remote_port(),
                    152:            info);
                    153: }
                    154:
                    155: /*
1.17      markus    156:  * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
1.13      markus    157:  */
                    158: int
1.17      markus    159: auth_root_allowed(char *method)
1.13      markus    160: {
1.17      markus    161:        switch (options.permit_root_login) {
                    162:        case PERMIT_YES:
1.13      markus    163:                return 1;
1.17      markus    164:                break;
                    165:        case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
                    166:                if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
                    167:                        return 1;
                    168:                break;
                    169:        case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
                    170:                if (forced_command) {
                    171:                        log("Root login accepted for forced command.");
                    172:                        return 1;
                    173:                }
                    174:                break;
1.13      markus    175:        }
1.17      markus    176:        log("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
1.22      markus    177:        return 0;
                    178: }
                    179:
                    180:
                    181: /*
                    182:  * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
                    183:  * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
                    184:  * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
                    185:  *
                    186:  * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
                    187:  */
                    188: char *
                    189: expand_filename(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
                    190: {
                    191:        Buffer buffer;
                    192:        char *file;
                    193:        const char *cp;
                    194:
                    195:        /*
                    196:         * Build the filename string in the buffer by making the appropriate
                    197:         * substitutions to the given file name.
                    198:         */
                    199:        buffer_init(&buffer);
                    200:        for (cp = filename; *cp; cp++) {
                    201:                if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == '%') {
                    202:                        buffer_append(&buffer, "%", 1);
                    203:                        cp++;
                    204:                        continue;
                    205:                }
                    206:                if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'h') {
                    207:                        buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_dir, strlen(pw->pw_dir));
                    208:                        cp++;
                    209:                        continue;
                    210:                }
                    211:                if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'u') {
                    212:                        buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_name,
                    213:                             strlen(pw->pw_name));
                    214:                        cp++;
                    215:                        continue;
                    216:                }
                    217:                buffer_append(&buffer, cp, 1);
                    218:        }
                    219:        buffer_append(&buffer, "\0", 1);
                    220:
                    221:        /*
                    222:         * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
                    223:         * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
                    224:         */
                    225:        file = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
                    226:        cp = buffer_ptr(&buffer);
                    227:        if (*cp != '/')
                    228:                snprintf(file, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, cp);
                    229:        else
                    230:                strlcpy(file, cp, MAXPATHLEN);
                    231:
                    232:        buffer_free(&buffer);
                    233:        return file;
                    234: }
                    235:
                    236: char *
                    237: authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *pw)
                    238: {
                    239:        return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file, pw);
                    240: }
                    241:
                    242: char *
                    243: authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *pw)
                    244: {
                    245:        return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw);
                    246: }
                    247:
                    248: /*
                    249:  * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components
                    250:  * of the path to the file must either be owned by either the owner of
1.23    ! markus    251:  * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
1.22      markus    252:  *
                    253:  * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
                    254:  *
                    255:  * Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and
                    256:  * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
                    257:  *
                    258:  * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
                    259:  */
                    260: int
                    261: secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
                    262: {
                    263:        char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
                    264:        char *cp;
                    265:        struct stat st;
                    266:
                    267:        if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) {
                    268:                snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file,
                    269:                    strerror(errno));
                    270:                return -1;
                    271:        }
                    272:
                    273:        /* check the open file to avoid races */
                    274:        if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
                    275:            (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
                    276:            (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
                    277:                snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
                    278:                    buf);
                    279:                return -1;
                    280:        }
                    281:
                    282:        /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
                    283:        for (;;) {
                    284:                if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
                    285:                        snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
                    286:                        return -1;
                    287:                }
                    288:                strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
                    289:
                    290:                debug3("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
                    291:                if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
                    292:                    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
                    293:                    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
                    294:                        snprintf(err, errlen,
                    295:                            "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
                    296:                        return -1;
                    297:                }
                    298:
                    299:                /*
                    300:                 * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
                    301:                 * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
                    302:                 */
                    303:                if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
                    304:                        break;
                    305:        }
1.17      markus    306:        return 0;
1.1       markus    307: }