Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/auth2-pubkey.c, Revision 1.36
1.36 ! djm 1: /* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.35 2013/03/07 00:19:59 djm Exp $ */
1.1 markus 2: /*
3: * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
4: *
5: * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
6: * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
7: * are met:
8: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
9: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
10: * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
11: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
12: * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
13: *
14: * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
15: * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
16: * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
17: * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
18: * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
19: * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
20: * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
21: * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
22: * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
23: * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
24: */
25:
1.10 stevesk 26:
27: #include <sys/types.h>
28: #include <sys/stat.h>
1.31 djm 29: #include <sys/wait.h>
1.13 stevesk 30:
1.31 djm 31: #include <errno.h>
1.16 djm 32: #include <fcntl.h>
1.31 djm 33: #include <paths.h>
1.13 stevesk 34: #include <pwd.h>
1.31 djm 35: #include <signal.h>
1.14 stevesk 36: #include <stdio.h>
1.15 deraadt 37: #include <stdarg.h>
1.20 djm 38: #include <string.h>
39: #include <time.h>
1.17 dtucker 40: #include <unistd.h>
1.1 markus 41:
1.15 deraadt 42: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.8 dtucker 43: #include "ssh.h"
1.1 markus 44: #include "ssh2.h"
45: #include "packet.h"
46: #include "buffer.h"
47: #include "log.h"
48: #include "servconf.h"
49: #include "compat.h"
1.15 deraadt 50: #include "key.h"
51: #include "hostfile.h"
1.1 markus 52: #include "auth.h"
53: #include "pathnames.h"
54: #include "uidswap.h"
55: #include "auth-options.h"
56: #include "canohost.h"
1.15 deraadt 57: #ifdef GSSAPI
58: #include "ssh-gss.h"
59: #endif
1.1 markus 60: #include "monitor_wrap.h"
1.9 dtucker 61: #include "misc.h"
1.21 djm 62: #include "authfile.h"
1.24 djm 63: #include "match.h"
1.1 markus 64:
65: /* import */
66: extern ServerOptions options;
67: extern u_char *session_id2;
1.4 markus 68: extern u_int session_id2_len;
1.1 markus 69:
1.2 markus 70: static int
1.1 markus 71: userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
72: {
73: Buffer b;
74: Key *key = NULL;
1.35 djm 75: char *pkalg, *userstyle;
1.1 markus 76: u_char *pkblob, *sig;
77: u_int alen, blen, slen;
78: int have_sig, pktype;
79: int authenticated = 0;
80:
81: if (!authctxt->valid) {
82: debug2("userauth_pubkey: disabled because of invalid user");
83: return 0;
84: }
85: have_sig = packet_get_char();
86: if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
87: debug2("userauth_pubkey: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH");
88: /* no explicit pkalg given */
89: pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
90: buffer_init(&b);
91: buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen);
92: /* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */
93: pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen);
94: buffer_free(&b);
95: } else {
96: pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
97: pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
98: }
99: pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
100: if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
101: /* this is perfectly legal */
1.3 itojun 102: logit("userauth_pubkey: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
1.1 markus 103: pkalg);
104: goto done;
105: }
106: key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
107: if (key == NULL) {
108: error("userauth_pubkey: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
109: goto done;
110: }
111: if (key->type != pktype) {
112: error("userauth_pubkey: type mismatch for decoded key "
113: "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
114: goto done;
115: }
116: if (have_sig) {
117: sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
118: packet_check_eom();
119: buffer_init(&b);
120: if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
121: buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
122: } else {
123: buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
124: }
125: /* reconstruct packet */
126: buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
1.35 djm 127: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
128: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
129: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
130: buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle);
131: free(userstyle);
1.1 markus 132: buffer_put_cstring(&b,
133: datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
134: "ssh-userauth" :
135: authctxt->service);
136: if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
137: buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
138: } else {
139: buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
140: buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
141: buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
142: }
143: buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
144: #ifdef DEBUG_PK
145: buffer_dump(&b);
146: #endif
147: /* test for correct signature */
148: authenticated = 0;
149: if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) &&
150: PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
1.6 markus 151: buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
1.1 markus 152: authenticated = 1;
1.6 markus 153: buffer_free(&b);
1.36 ! djm 154: free(sig);
1.1 markus 155: } else {
156: debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable");
157: packet_check_eom();
158:
159: /* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
160: /*
161: * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
162: * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
163: * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
164: * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
165: * issue? -markus
166: */
167: if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key))) {
168: packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK);
169: packet_put_string(pkalg, alen);
170: packet_put_string(pkblob, blen);
171: packet_send();
172: packet_write_wait();
173: authctxt->postponed = 1;
174: }
175: }
176: if (authenticated != 1)
177: auth_clear_options();
178: done:
179: debug2("userauth_pubkey: authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg);
180: if (key != NULL)
181: key_free(key);
1.36 ! djm 182: free(pkalg);
! 183: free(pkblob);
1.1 markus 184: return authenticated;
185: }
186:
1.24 djm 187: static int
188: match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct KeyCert *cert)
189: {
190: char *result;
191: u_int i;
192:
193: /* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */
194:
195: for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
196: if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i],
197: principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) {
198: debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"",
199: result);
1.36 ! djm 200: free(result);
1.24 djm 201: return 1;
202: }
203: }
204: return 0;
205: }
206:
207: static int
1.26 djm 208: match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct KeyCert *cert)
1.24 djm 209: {
210: FILE *f;
1.26 djm 211: char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts;
1.24 djm 212: u_long linenum = 0;
213: u_int i;
214:
215: temporarily_use_uid(pw);
216: debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file);
217: if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) {
218: restore_uid();
219: return 0;
220: }
221: while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
1.26 djm 222: /* Skip leading whitespace. */
1.24 djm 223: for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
224: ;
1.26 djm 225: /* Skip blank and comment lines. */
226: if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL)
227: *ep = '\0';
228: if (!*cp || *cp == '\n')
1.24 djm 229: continue;
1.26 djm 230: /* Trim trailing whitespace. */
231: ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1;
232: while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'))
233: *ep-- = '\0';
234: /*
235: * If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has
236: * key options.
237: */
238: line_opts = NULL;
239: if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL ||
240: (ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) {
241: for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++)
1.27 deraadt 242: ;
1.26 djm 243: line_opts = cp;
244: cp = ep;
245: }
1.24 djm 246: for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
247: if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
1.30 djm 248: debug3("matched principal \"%.100s\" "
249: "from file \"%s\" on line %lu",
1.31 djm 250: cert->principals[i], file, linenum);
1.26 djm 251: if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts,
252: file, linenum) != 1)
253: continue;
1.24 djm 254: fclose(f);
255: restore_uid();
256: return 1;
257: }
258: }
259: }
260: fclose(f);
261: restore_uid();
262: return 0;
1.31 djm 263: }
1.24 djm 264:
1.31 djm 265: /*
266: * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
267: * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
268: */
1.1 markus 269: static int
1.31 djm 270: check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
1.1 markus 271: {
1.8 dtucker 272: char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
1.20 djm 273: const char *reason;
1.18 dtucker 274: int found_key = 0;
1.1 markus 275: u_long linenum = 0;
276: Key *found;
277: char *fp;
278:
279: found_key = 0;
1.20 djm 280: found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
1.1 markus 281:
1.8 dtucker 282: while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
1.7 avsm 283: char *cp, *key_options = NULL;
1.8 dtucker 284:
1.20 djm 285: auth_clear_options();
286:
1.1 markus 287: /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
288: for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
289: ;
290: if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
291: continue;
292:
293: if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
294: /* no key? check if there are options for this key */
295: int quoted = 0;
296: debug2("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
1.7 avsm 297: key_options = cp;
1.1 markus 298: for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
299: if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
300: cp++; /* Skip both */
301: else if (*cp == '"')
302: quoted = !quoted;
303: }
304: /* Skip remaining whitespace. */
305: for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
306: ;
307: if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
308: debug2("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
309: /* still no key? advance to next line*/
310: continue;
311: }
312: }
1.23 djm 313: if (key_is_cert(key)) {
1.25 djm 314: if (!key_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key))
315: continue;
316: if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
317: linenum) != 1)
318: continue;
1.20 djm 319: if (!key_is_cert_authority)
320: continue;
321: fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5,
322: SSH_FP_HEX);
1.22 djm 323: debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
324: file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
1.24 djm 325: /*
326: * If the user has specified a list of principals as
327: * a key option, then prefer that list to matching
328: * their username in the certificate principals list.
329: */
330: if (authorized_principals != NULL &&
331: !match_principals_option(authorized_principals,
332: key->cert)) {
333: reason = "Certificate does not contain an "
334: "authorized principal";
335: fail_reason:
1.36 ! djm 336: free(fp);
1.20 djm 337: error("%s", reason);
338: auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
339: continue;
340: }
1.24 djm 341: if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0,
342: authorized_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL,
343: &reason) != 0)
344: goto fail_reason;
1.23 djm 345: if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0) {
1.36 ! djm 346: free(fp);
1.20 djm 347: continue;
1.22 djm 348: }
349: verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" "
350: "signed by %s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
351: key_type(found), fp, file);
1.36 ! djm 352: free(fp);
1.20 djm 353: found_key = 1;
354: break;
1.25 djm 355: } else if (key_equal(found, key)) {
356: if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
357: linenum) != 1)
358: continue;
359: if (key_is_cert_authority)
360: continue;
1.1 markus 361: found_key = 1;
362: debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu",
363: file, linenum);
364: fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
365: verbose("Found matching %s key: %s",
366: key_type(found), fp);
1.36 ! djm 367: free(fp);
1.1 markus 368: break;
369: }
370: }
371: key_free(found);
372: if (!found_key)
373: debug2("key not found");
374: return found_key;
375: }
376:
1.21 djm 377: /* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */
378: static int
379: user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
380: {
1.24 djm 381: char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
1.21 djm 382: const char *reason;
383: int ret = 0;
384:
385: if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
386: return 0;
387:
1.22 djm 388: ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
389: SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
1.21 djm 390:
391: if (key_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
392: options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1) != 1) {
393: debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
394: key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
395: options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
396: goto out;
397: }
1.24 djm 398: /*
399: * If AuthorizedPrincipals is in use, then compare the certificate
400: * principals against the names in that file rather than matching
401: * against the username.
402: */
403: if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) {
404: if (!match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert)) {
405: reason = "Certificate does not contain an "
406: "authorized principal";
407: fail_reason:
408: error("%s", reason);
409: auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
410: goto out;
411: }
1.21 djm 412: }
1.24 djm 413: if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
414: principals_file == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, &reason) != 0)
415: goto fail_reason;
1.23 djm 416: if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0)
1.21 djm 417: goto out;
418:
1.22 djm 419: verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by %s CA %s via %s",
420: key->cert->key_id, key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
421: options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
1.21 djm 422: ret = 1;
423:
424: out:
1.36 ! djm 425: free(principals_file);
! 426: free(ca_fp);
1.21 djm 427: return ret;
428: }
429:
1.31 djm 430: /*
431: * Checks whether key is allowed in file.
432: * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
433: */
434: static int
435: user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
436: {
437: FILE *f;
438: int found_key = 0;
439:
440: /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
441: temporarily_use_uid(pw);
442:
443: debug("trying public key file %s", file);
444: if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) {
445: found_key = check_authkeys_file(f, file, key, pw);
446: fclose(f);
447: }
448:
449: restore_uid();
450: return found_key;
451: }
452:
453: /*
454: * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command.
455: * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
456: */
457: static int
458: user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
459: {
460: FILE *f;
461: int ok, found_key = 0;
462: struct passwd *pw;
463: struct stat st;
464: int status, devnull, p[2], i;
465: pid_t pid;
1.32 djm 466: char *username, errmsg[512];
1.31 djm 467:
468: if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL ||
469: options.authorized_keys_command[0] != '/')
470: return 0;
471:
1.32 djm 472: if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
473: error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping");
474: return 0;
475: }
476:
477: username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user,
478: "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
479: pw = getpwnam(username);
480: if (pw == NULL) {
1.34 djm 481: error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
482: username, strerror(errno));
1.32 djm 483: free(username);
484: return 0;
1.31 djm 485: }
1.32 djm 486: free(username);
1.31 djm 487:
488: temporarily_use_uid(pw);
489:
490: if (stat(options.authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
491: error("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
492: options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
493: goto out;
494: }
495: if (auth_secure_path(options.authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0,
496: errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
497: error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
498: goto out;
499: }
500:
501: if (pipe(p) != 0) {
502: error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
503: goto out;
504: }
505:
1.33 djm 506: debug3("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s %s\" as \"%s\"",
507: options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, pw->pw_name);
1.31 djm 508:
509: /*
510: * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
511: * run cleanup_exit() code.
512: */
513: restore_uid();
514:
515: switch ((pid = fork())) {
516: case -1: /* error */
517: error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
518: close(p[0]);
519: close(p[1]);
520: return 0;
521: case 0: /* child */
522: for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
523: signal(i, SIG_DFL);
524:
1.33 djm 525: if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
526: error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
527: strerror(errno));
528: _exit(1);
529: }
530: /* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */
531: if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
532: dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
533: error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
534: _exit(1);
535: }
1.32 djm 536: closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
1.33 djm 537:
1.31 djm 538: /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
539: if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
540: error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
541: strerror(errno));
542: _exit(1);
543: }
544: if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
545: error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
546: strerror(errno));
547: _exit(1);
548: }
1.33 djm 549: /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
550: if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
1.31 djm 551: error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
552: _exit(1);
553: }
554:
555: execl(options.authorized_keys_command,
1.33 djm 556: options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, NULL);
1.31 djm 557:
558: error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
559: options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
560: _exit(127);
561: default: /* parent */
562: break;
563: }
564:
565: temporarily_use_uid(pw);
566:
567: close(p[1]);
568: if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
569: error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
570: close(p[0]);
571: /* Don't leave zombie child */
572: kill(pid, SIGTERM);
573: while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
574: ;
575: goto out;
576: }
577: ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);
578: fclose(f);
579:
580: while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
581: if (errno != EINTR) {
582: error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
583: goto out;
584: }
585: }
586: if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
587: error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
588: options.authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
589: goto out;
590: } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
591: error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
592: options.authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
593: goto out;
594: }
595: found_key = ok;
596: out:
597: restore_uid();
598: return found_key;
599: }
600:
601: /*
602: * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user.
603: */
1.1 markus 604: int
605: user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
606: {
1.29 djm 607: u_int success, i;
1.1 markus 608: char *file;
1.21 djm 609:
610: if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
611: return 0;
612: if (key_is_cert(key) && auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))
613: return 0;
614:
615: success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key);
616: if (success)
617: return success;
1.1 markus 618:
1.31 djm 619: success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key);
620: if (success > 0)
621: return success;
622:
1.29 djm 623: for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
1.31 djm 624:
625: if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
626: continue;
1.29 djm 627: file = expand_authorized_keys(
628: options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
1.31 djm 629:
1.29 djm 630: success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file);
1.36 ! djm 631: free(file);
1.29 djm 632: }
1.1 markus 633:
634: return success;
635: }
1.2 markus 636:
637: Authmethod method_pubkey = {
638: "publickey",
639: userauth_pubkey,
640: &options.pubkey_authentication
641: };
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