Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/auth2-pubkey.c, Revision 1.38
1.38 ! djm 1: /* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.37 2013/05/19 02:38:28 djm Exp $ */
1.1 markus 2: /*
3: * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
4: *
5: * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
6: * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
7: * are met:
8: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
9: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
10: * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
11: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
12: * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
13: *
14: * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
15: * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
16: * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
17: * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
18: * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
19: * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
20: * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
21: * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
22: * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
23: * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
24: */
25:
1.10 stevesk 26:
27: #include <sys/types.h>
28: #include <sys/stat.h>
1.31 djm 29: #include <sys/wait.h>
1.13 stevesk 30:
1.31 djm 31: #include <errno.h>
1.16 djm 32: #include <fcntl.h>
1.31 djm 33: #include <paths.h>
1.13 stevesk 34: #include <pwd.h>
1.31 djm 35: #include <signal.h>
1.14 stevesk 36: #include <stdio.h>
1.15 deraadt 37: #include <stdarg.h>
1.20 djm 38: #include <string.h>
39: #include <time.h>
1.17 dtucker 40: #include <unistd.h>
1.1 markus 41:
1.15 deraadt 42: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.8 dtucker 43: #include "ssh.h"
1.1 markus 44: #include "ssh2.h"
45: #include "packet.h"
46: #include "buffer.h"
47: #include "log.h"
48: #include "servconf.h"
49: #include "compat.h"
1.15 deraadt 50: #include "key.h"
51: #include "hostfile.h"
1.1 markus 52: #include "auth.h"
53: #include "pathnames.h"
54: #include "uidswap.h"
55: #include "auth-options.h"
56: #include "canohost.h"
1.15 deraadt 57: #ifdef GSSAPI
58: #include "ssh-gss.h"
59: #endif
1.1 markus 60: #include "monitor_wrap.h"
1.9 dtucker 61: #include "misc.h"
1.21 djm 62: #include "authfile.h"
1.24 djm 63: #include "match.h"
1.1 markus 64:
65: /* import */
66: extern ServerOptions options;
67: extern u_char *session_id2;
1.4 markus 68: extern u_int session_id2_len;
1.1 markus 69:
1.2 markus 70: static int
1.1 markus 71: userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
72: {
73: Buffer b;
74: Key *key = NULL;
1.35 djm 75: char *pkalg, *userstyle;
1.1 markus 76: u_char *pkblob, *sig;
77: u_int alen, blen, slen;
78: int have_sig, pktype;
79: int authenticated = 0;
80:
81: if (!authctxt->valid) {
82: debug2("userauth_pubkey: disabled because of invalid user");
83: return 0;
84: }
85: have_sig = packet_get_char();
86: if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
87: debug2("userauth_pubkey: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH");
88: /* no explicit pkalg given */
89: pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
90: buffer_init(&b);
91: buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen);
92: /* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */
93: pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen);
94: buffer_free(&b);
95: } else {
96: pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
97: pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
98: }
99: pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
100: if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
101: /* this is perfectly legal */
1.3 itojun 102: logit("userauth_pubkey: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
1.1 markus 103: pkalg);
104: goto done;
105: }
106: key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
107: if (key == NULL) {
108: error("userauth_pubkey: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
109: goto done;
110: }
111: if (key->type != pktype) {
112: error("userauth_pubkey: type mismatch for decoded key "
113: "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
114: goto done;
115: }
116: if (have_sig) {
117: sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
118: packet_check_eom();
119: buffer_init(&b);
120: if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
121: buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
122: } else {
123: buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
124: }
125: /* reconstruct packet */
126: buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
1.35 djm 127: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
128: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
129: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
130: buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle);
131: free(userstyle);
1.1 markus 132: buffer_put_cstring(&b,
133: datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
134: "ssh-userauth" :
135: authctxt->service);
136: if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
137: buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
138: } else {
139: buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
140: buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
141: buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
142: }
143: buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
144: #ifdef DEBUG_PK
145: buffer_dump(&b);
146: #endif
1.38 ! djm 147: pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
1.37 djm 148:
1.1 markus 149: /* test for correct signature */
150: authenticated = 0;
151: if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) &&
152: PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
1.6 markus 153: buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
1.1 markus 154: authenticated = 1;
1.6 markus 155: buffer_free(&b);
1.36 djm 156: free(sig);
1.1 markus 157: } else {
158: debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable");
159: packet_check_eom();
160:
161: /* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
162: /*
163: * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
164: * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
165: * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
166: * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
167: * issue? -markus
168: */
169: if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key))) {
170: packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK);
171: packet_put_string(pkalg, alen);
172: packet_put_string(pkblob, blen);
173: packet_send();
174: packet_write_wait();
175: authctxt->postponed = 1;
176: }
177: }
178: if (authenticated != 1)
179: auth_clear_options();
180: done:
181: debug2("userauth_pubkey: authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg);
182: if (key != NULL)
183: key_free(key);
1.36 djm 184: free(pkalg);
185: free(pkblob);
1.1 markus 186: return authenticated;
187: }
188:
1.37 djm 189: void
1.38 ! djm 190: pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...)
1.37 djm 191: {
1.38 ! djm 192: char *fp, *extra;
! 193: va_list ap;
! 194: int i;
! 195:
! 196: extra = NULL;
! 197: if (fmt != NULL) {
! 198: va_start(ap, fmt);
! 199: i = vasprintf(&extra, fmt, ap);
! 200: va_end(ap);
! 201: if (i < 0 || extra == NULL)
! 202: fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
! 203: }
1.37 djm 204:
205: if (key_is_cert(key)) {
206: fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
207: SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
1.38 ! djm 208: auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s",
1.37 djm 209: key_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
210: (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
1.38 ! djm 211: key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
! 212: extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
1.37 djm 213: free(fp);
214: } else {
215: fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
1.38 ! djm 216: auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key), fp,
! 217: extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
1.37 djm 218: free(fp);
219: }
1.38 ! djm 220: free(extra);
1.37 djm 221: }
222:
1.24 djm 223: static int
224: match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct KeyCert *cert)
225: {
226: char *result;
227: u_int i;
228:
229: /* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */
230:
231: for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
232: if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i],
233: principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) {
234: debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"",
235: result);
1.36 djm 236: free(result);
1.24 djm 237: return 1;
238: }
239: }
240: return 0;
241: }
242:
243: static int
1.26 djm 244: match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct KeyCert *cert)
1.24 djm 245: {
246: FILE *f;
1.26 djm 247: char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts;
1.24 djm 248: u_long linenum = 0;
249: u_int i;
250:
251: temporarily_use_uid(pw);
252: debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file);
253: if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) {
254: restore_uid();
255: return 0;
256: }
257: while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
1.26 djm 258: /* Skip leading whitespace. */
1.24 djm 259: for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
260: ;
1.26 djm 261: /* Skip blank and comment lines. */
262: if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL)
263: *ep = '\0';
264: if (!*cp || *cp == '\n')
1.24 djm 265: continue;
1.26 djm 266: /* Trim trailing whitespace. */
267: ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1;
268: while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'))
269: *ep-- = '\0';
270: /*
271: * If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has
272: * key options.
273: */
274: line_opts = NULL;
275: if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL ||
276: (ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) {
277: for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++)
1.27 deraadt 278: ;
1.26 djm 279: line_opts = cp;
280: cp = ep;
281: }
1.24 djm 282: for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
283: if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
1.30 djm 284: debug3("matched principal \"%.100s\" "
285: "from file \"%s\" on line %lu",
1.31 djm 286: cert->principals[i], file, linenum);
1.26 djm 287: if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts,
288: file, linenum) != 1)
289: continue;
1.24 djm 290: fclose(f);
291: restore_uid();
292: return 1;
293: }
294: }
295: }
296: fclose(f);
297: restore_uid();
298: return 0;
1.31 djm 299: }
1.24 djm 300:
1.31 djm 301: /*
302: * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
303: * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
304: */
1.1 markus 305: static int
1.31 djm 306: check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
1.1 markus 307: {
1.8 dtucker 308: char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
1.20 djm 309: const char *reason;
1.18 dtucker 310: int found_key = 0;
1.1 markus 311: u_long linenum = 0;
312: Key *found;
313: char *fp;
314:
315: found_key = 0;
316:
1.37 djm 317: found = NULL;
1.8 dtucker 318: while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
1.7 avsm 319: char *cp, *key_options = NULL;
1.37 djm 320: if (found != NULL)
321: key_free(found);
322: found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
1.20 djm 323: auth_clear_options();
324:
1.1 markus 325: /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
326: for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
327: ;
328: if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
329: continue;
330:
331: if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
332: /* no key? check if there are options for this key */
333: int quoted = 0;
334: debug2("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
1.7 avsm 335: key_options = cp;
1.1 markus 336: for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
337: if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
338: cp++; /* Skip both */
339: else if (*cp == '"')
340: quoted = !quoted;
341: }
342: /* Skip remaining whitespace. */
343: for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
344: ;
345: if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
346: debug2("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
347: /* still no key? advance to next line*/
348: continue;
349: }
350: }
1.23 djm 351: if (key_is_cert(key)) {
1.25 djm 352: if (!key_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key))
353: continue;
354: if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
355: linenum) != 1)
356: continue;
1.20 djm 357: if (!key_is_cert_authority)
358: continue;
359: fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5,
360: SSH_FP_HEX);
1.22 djm 361: debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
362: file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
1.24 djm 363: /*
364: * If the user has specified a list of principals as
365: * a key option, then prefer that list to matching
366: * their username in the certificate principals list.
367: */
368: if (authorized_principals != NULL &&
369: !match_principals_option(authorized_principals,
370: key->cert)) {
371: reason = "Certificate does not contain an "
372: "authorized principal";
373: fail_reason:
1.36 djm 374: free(fp);
1.20 djm 375: error("%s", reason);
376: auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
377: continue;
378: }
1.24 djm 379: if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0,
380: authorized_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL,
381: &reason) != 0)
382: goto fail_reason;
1.23 djm 383: if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0) {
1.36 djm 384: free(fp);
1.20 djm 385: continue;
1.22 djm 386: }
387: verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" "
388: "signed by %s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
389: key_type(found), fp, file);
1.36 djm 390: free(fp);
1.20 djm 391: found_key = 1;
392: break;
1.25 djm 393: } else if (key_equal(found, key)) {
394: if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
395: linenum) != 1)
396: continue;
397: if (key_is_cert_authority)
398: continue;
1.1 markus 399: found_key = 1;
400: fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
1.37 djm 401: debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
402: file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
1.36 djm 403: free(fp);
1.1 markus 404: break;
405: }
406: }
1.37 djm 407: if (found != NULL)
408: key_free(found);
1.1 markus 409: if (!found_key)
410: debug2("key not found");
411: return found_key;
412: }
413:
1.21 djm 414: /* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */
415: static int
416: user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
417: {
1.24 djm 418: char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
1.21 djm 419: const char *reason;
420: int ret = 0;
421:
422: if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
423: return 0;
424:
1.22 djm 425: ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
426: SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
1.21 djm 427:
428: if (key_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
429: options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1) != 1) {
430: debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
431: key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
432: options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
433: goto out;
434: }
1.24 djm 435: /*
436: * If AuthorizedPrincipals is in use, then compare the certificate
437: * principals against the names in that file rather than matching
438: * against the username.
439: */
440: if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) {
441: if (!match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert)) {
442: reason = "Certificate does not contain an "
443: "authorized principal";
444: fail_reason:
445: error("%s", reason);
446: auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
447: goto out;
448: }
1.21 djm 449: }
1.24 djm 450: if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
451: principals_file == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, &reason) != 0)
452: goto fail_reason;
1.23 djm 453: if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0)
1.21 djm 454: goto out;
455:
1.22 djm 456: verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by %s CA %s via %s",
457: key->cert->key_id, key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
458: options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
1.21 djm 459: ret = 1;
460:
461: out:
1.36 djm 462: free(principals_file);
463: free(ca_fp);
1.21 djm 464: return ret;
465: }
466:
1.31 djm 467: /*
468: * Checks whether key is allowed in file.
469: * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
470: */
471: static int
472: user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
473: {
474: FILE *f;
475: int found_key = 0;
476:
477: /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
478: temporarily_use_uid(pw);
479:
480: debug("trying public key file %s", file);
481: if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) {
482: found_key = check_authkeys_file(f, file, key, pw);
483: fclose(f);
484: }
485:
486: restore_uid();
487: return found_key;
488: }
489:
490: /*
491: * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command.
492: * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
493: */
494: static int
495: user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
496: {
497: FILE *f;
498: int ok, found_key = 0;
499: struct passwd *pw;
500: struct stat st;
501: int status, devnull, p[2], i;
502: pid_t pid;
1.32 djm 503: char *username, errmsg[512];
1.31 djm 504:
505: if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL ||
506: options.authorized_keys_command[0] != '/')
507: return 0;
508:
1.32 djm 509: if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
510: error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping");
511: return 0;
512: }
513:
514: username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user,
515: "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
516: pw = getpwnam(username);
517: if (pw == NULL) {
1.34 djm 518: error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
519: username, strerror(errno));
1.32 djm 520: free(username);
521: return 0;
1.31 djm 522: }
1.32 djm 523: free(username);
1.31 djm 524:
525: temporarily_use_uid(pw);
526:
527: if (stat(options.authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
528: error("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
529: options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
530: goto out;
531: }
532: if (auth_secure_path(options.authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0,
533: errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
534: error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
535: goto out;
536: }
537:
538: if (pipe(p) != 0) {
539: error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
540: goto out;
541: }
542:
1.33 djm 543: debug3("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s %s\" as \"%s\"",
544: options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, pw->pw_name);
1.31 djm 545:
546: /*
547: * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
548: * run cleanup_exit() code.
549: */
550: restore_uid();
551:
552: switch ((pid = fork())) {
553: case -1: /* error */
554: error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
555: close(p[0]);
556: close(p[1]);
557: return 0;
558: case 0: /* child */
559: for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
560: signal(i, SIG_DFL);
561:
1.33 djm 562: if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
563: error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
564: strerror(errno));
565: _exit(1);
566: }
567: /* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */
568: if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
569: dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
570: error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
571: _exit(1);
572: }
1.32 djm 573: closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
1.33 djm 574:
1.31 djm 575: /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
576: if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
577: error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
578: strerror(errno));
579: _exit(1);
580: }
581: if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
582: error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
583: strerror(errno));
584: _exit(1);
585: }
1.33 djm 586: /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
587: if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
1.31 djm 588: error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
589: _exit(1);
590: }
591:
592: execl(options.authorized_keys_command,
1.33 djm 593: options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, NULL);
1.31 djm 594:
595: error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
596: options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
597: _exit(127);
598: default: /* parent */
599: break;
600: }
601:
602: temporarily_use_uid(pw);
603:
604: close(p[1]);
605: if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
606: error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
607: close(p[0]);
608: /* Don't leave zombie child */
609: kill(pid, SIGTERM);
610: while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
611: ;
612: goto out;
613: }
614: ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);
615: fclose(f);
616:
617: while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
618: if (errno != EINTR) {
619: error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
620: goto out;
621: }
622: }
623: if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
624: error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
625: options.authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
626: goto out;
627: } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
628: error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
629: options.authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
630: goto out;
631: }
632: found_key = ok;
633: out:
634: restore_uid();
635: return found_key;
636: }
637:
638: /*
639: * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user.
640: */
1.1 markus 641: int
642: user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
643: {
1.29 djm 644: u_int success, i;
1.1 markus 645: char *file;
1.21 djm 646:
647: if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
648: return 0;
649: if (key_is_cert(key) && auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))
650: return 0;
651:
652: success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key);
653: if (success)
654: return success;
1.1 markus 655:
1.31 djm 656: success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key);
657: if (success > 0)
658: return success;
659:
1.29 djm 660: for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
1.31 djm 661:
662: if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
663: continue;
1.29 djm 664: file = expand_authorized_keys(
665: options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
1.31 djm 666:
1.29 djm 667: success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file);
1.36 djm 668: free(file);
1.29 djm 669: }
1.1 markus 670:
671: return success;
672: }
1.2 markus 673:
674: Authmethod method_pubkey = {
675: "publickey",
676: userauth_pubkey,
677: &options.pubkey_authentication
678: };
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