Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/auth2-pubkey.c, Revision 1.41
1.41 ! millert 1: /* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.40 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
1.1 markus 2: /*
3: * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
4: *
5: * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
6: * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
7: * are met:
8: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
9: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
10: * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
11: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
12: * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
13: *
14: * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
15: * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
16: * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
17: * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
18: * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
19: * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
20: * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
21: * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
22: * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
23: * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
24: */
25:
1.10 stevesk 26:
27: #include <sys/types.h>
28: #include <sys/stat.h>
1.31 djm 29: #include <sys/wait.h>
1.13 stevesk 30:
1.31 djm 31: #include <errno.h>
1.16 djm 32: #include <fcntl.h>
1.31 djm 33: #include <paths.h>
1.13 stevesk 34: #include <pwd.h>
1.31 djm 35: #include <signal.h>
1.14 stevesk 36: #include <stdio.h>
1.15 deraadt 37: #include <stdarg.h>
1.20 djm 38: #include <string.h>
39: #include <time.h>
1.17 dtucker 40: #include <unistd.h>
1.1 markus 41:
1.15 deraadt 42: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.8 dtucker 43: #include "ssh.h"
1.1 markus 44: #include "ssh2.h"
45: #include "packet.h"
46: #include "buffer.h"
47: #include "log.h"
1.41 ! millert 48: #include "misc.h"
1.1 markus 49: #include "servconf.h"
50: #include "compat.h"
1.15 deraadt 51: #include "key.h"
52: #include "hostfile.h"
1.1 markus 53: #include "auth.h"
54: #include "pathnames.h"
55: #include "uidswap.h"
56: #include "auth-options.h"
57: #include "canohost.h"
1.15 deraadt 58: #ifdef GSSAPI
59: #include "ssh-gss.h"
60: #endif
1.1 markus 61: #include "monitor_wrap.h"
1.21 djm 62: #include "authfile.h"
1.24 djm 63: #include "match.h"
1.1 markus 64:
65: /* import */
66: extern ServerOptions options;
67: extern u_char *session_id2;
1.4 markus 68: extern u_int session_id2_len;
1.1 markus 69:
1.2 markus 70: static int
1.1 markus 71: userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
72: {
73: Buffer b;
74: Key *key = NULL;
1.35 djm 75: char *pkalg, *userstyle;
1.1 markus 76: u_char *pkblob, *sig;
77: u_int alen, blen, slen;
78: int have_sig, pktype;
79: int authenticated = 0;
80:
81: if (!authctxt->valid) {
82: debug2("userauth_pubkey: disabled because of invalid user");
83: return 0;
84: }
85: have_sig = packet_get_char();
86: if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
87: debug2("userauth_pubkey: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH");
88: /* no explicit pkalg given */
89: pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
90: buffer_init(&b);
91: buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen);
92: /* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */
93: pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen);
94: buffer_free(&b);
95: } else {
96: pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
97: pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
98: }
99: pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
100: if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
101: /* this is perfectly legal */
1.3 itojun 102: logit("userauth_pubkey: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
1.1 markus 103: pkalg);
104: goto done;
105: }
106: key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
107: if (key == NULL) {
108: error("userauth_pubkey: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
109: goto done;
110: }
111: if (key->type != pktype) {
112: error("userauth_pubkey: type mismatch for decoded key "
113: "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
1.39 djm 114: goto done;
115: }
116: if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
117: (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
118: logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe "
119: "signature scheme");
1.1 markus 120: goto done;
121: }
122: if (have_sig) {
123: sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
124: packet_check_eom();
125: buffer_init(&b);
126: if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
127: buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
128: } else {
129: buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
130: }
131: /* reconstruct packet */
132: buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
1.35 djm 133: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
134: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
135: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
136: buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle);
137: free(userstyle);
1.1 markus 138: buffer_put_cstring(&b,
139: datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
140: "ssh-userauth" :
141: authctxt->service);
142: if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
143: buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
144: } else {
145: buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
146: buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
147: buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
148: }
149: buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
150: #ifdef DEBUG_PK
151: buffer_dump(&b);
152: #endif
1.38 djm 153: pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
1.37 djm 154:
1.1 markus 155: /* test for correct signature */
156: authenticated = 0;
157: if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) &&
158: PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
1.6 markus 159: buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
1.1 markus 160: authenticated = 1;
1.6 markus 161: buffer_free(&b);
1.36 djm 162: free(sig);
1.1 markus 163: } else {
164: debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable");
165: packet_check_eom();
166:
167: /* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
168: /*
169: * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
170: * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
171: * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
172: * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
173: * issue? -markus
174: */
175: if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key))) {
176: packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK);
177: packet_put_string(pkalg, alen);
178: packet_put_string(pkblob, blen);
179: packet_send();
180: packet_write_wait();
181: authctxt->postponed = 1;
182: }
183: }
184: if (authenticated != 1)
185: auth_clear_options();
186: done:
187: debug2("userauth_pubkey: authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg);
188: if (key != NULL)
189: key_free(key);
1.36 djm 190: free(pkalg);
191: free(pkblob);
1.1 markus 192: return authenticated;
193: }
194:
1.37 djm 195: void
1.38 djm 196: pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...)
1.37 djm 197: {
1.38 djm 198: char *fp, *extra;
199: va_list ap;
200: int i;
201:
202: extra = NULL;
203: if (fmt != NULL) {
204: va_start(ap, fmt);
205: i = vasprintf(&extra, fmt, ap);
206: va_end(ap);
207: if (i < 0 || extra == NULL)
208: fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
209: }
1.37 djm 210:
211: if (key_is_cert(key)) {
212: fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
213: SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
1.38 djm 214: auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s",
1.37 djm 215: key_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
216: (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
1.38 djm 217: key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
218: extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
1.37 djm 219: free(fp);
220: } else {
221: fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
1.38 djm 222: auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key), fp,
223: extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
1.37 djm 224: free(fp);
225: }
1.38 djm 226: free(extra);
1.37 djm 227: }
228:
1.24 djm 229: static int
1.40 djm 230: match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
1.24 djm 231: {
232: char *result;
233: u_int i;
234:
235: /* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */
236:
237: for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
238: if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i],
239: principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) {
240: debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"",
241: result);
1.36 djm 242: free(result);
1.24 djm 243: return 1;
244: }
245: }
246: return 0;
247: }
248:
249: static int
1.40 djm 250: match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
1.24 djm 251: {
252: FILE *f;
1.26 djm 253: char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts;
1.24 djm 254: u_long linenum = 0;
255: u_int i;
256:
257: temporarily_use_uid(pw);
258: debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file);
259: if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) {
260: restore_uid();
261: return 0;
262: }
263: while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
1.26 djm 264: /* Skip leading whitespace. */
1.24 djm 265: for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
266: ;
1.26 djm 267: /* Skip blank and comment lines. */
268: if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL)
269: *ep = '\0';
270: if (!*cp || *cp == '\n')
1.24 djm 271: continue;
1.26 djm 272: /* Trim trailing whitespace. */
273: ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1;
274: while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'))
275: *ep-- = '\0';
276: /*
277: * If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has
278: * key options.
279: */
280: line_opts = NULL;
281: if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL ||
282: (ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) {
283: for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++)
1.27 deraadt 284: ;
1.26 djm 285: line_opts = cp;
286: cp = ep;
287: }
1.24 djm 288: for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
289: if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
1.30 djm 290: debug3("matched principal \"%.100s\" "
291: "from file \"%s\" on line %lu",
1.31 djm 292: cert->principals[i], file, linenum);
1.26 djm 293: if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts,
294: file, linenum) != 1)
295: continue;
1.24 djm 296: fclose(f);
297: restore_uid();
298: return 1;
299: }
300: }
301: }
302: fclose(f);
303: restore_uid();
304: return 0;
1.31 djm 305: }
1.24 djm 306:
1.31 djm 307: /*
308: * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
309: * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
310: */
1.1 markus 311: static int
1.31 djm 312: check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
1.1 markus 313: {
1.8 dtucker 314: char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
1.20 djm 315: const char *reason;
1.18 dtucker 316: int found_key = 0;
1.1 markus 317: u_long linenum = 0;
318: Key *found;
319: char *fp;
320:
321: found_key = 0;
322:
1.37 djm 323: found = NULL;
1.8 dtucker 324: while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
1.7 avsm 325: char *cp, *key_options = NULL;
1.37 djm 326: if (found != NULL)
327: key_free(found);
328: found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
1.20 djm 329: auth_clear_options();
330:
1.1 markus 331: /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
332: for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
333: ;
334: if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
335: continue;
336:
337: if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
338: /* no key? check if there are options for this key */
339: int quoted = 0;
340: debug2("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
1.7 avsm 341: key_options = cp;
1.1 markus 342: for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
343: if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
344: cp++; /* Skip both */
345: else if (*cp == '"')
346: quoted = !quoted;
347: }
348: /* Skip remaining whitespace. */
349: for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
350: ;
351: if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
352: debug2("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
353: /* still no key? advance to next line*/
354: continue;
355: }
356: }
1.23 djm 357: if (key_is_cert(key)) {
1.25 djm 358: if (!key_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key))
359: continue;
360: if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
361: linenum) != 1)
362: continue;
1.20 djm 363: if (!key_is_cert_authority)
364: continue;
365: fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5,
366: SSH_FP_HEX);
1.22 djm 367: debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
368: file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
1.24 djm 369: /*
370: * If the user has specified a list of principals as
371: * a key option, then prefer that list to matching
372: * their username in the certificate principals list.
373: */
374: if (authorized_principals != NULL &&
375: !match_principals_option(authorized_principals,
376: key->cert)) {
377: reason = "Certificate does not contain an "
378: "authorized principal";
379: fail_reason:
1.36 djm 380: free(fp);
1.20 djm 381: error("%s", reason);
382: auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
383: continue;
384: }
1.24 djm 385: if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0,
386: authorized_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL,
387: &reason) != 0)
388: goto fail_reason;
1.23 djm 389: if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0) {
1.36 djm 390: free(fp);
1.20 djm 391: continue;
1.22 djm 392: }
393: verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" "
394: "signed by %s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
395: key_type(found), fp, file);
1.36 djm 396: free(fp);
1.20 djm 397: found_key = 1;
398: break;
1.25 djm 399: } else if (key_equal(found, key)) {
400: if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
401: linenum) != 1)
402: continue;
403: if (key_is_cert_authority)
404: continue;
1.1 markus 405: found_key = 1;
406: fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
1.37 djm 407: debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
408: file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
1.36 djm 409: free(fp);
1.1 markus 410: break;
411: }
412: }
1.37 djm 413: if (found != NULL)
414: key_free(found);
1.1 markus 415: if (!found_key)
416: debug2("key not found");
417: return found_key;
418: }
419:
1.21 djm 420: /* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */
421: static int
422: user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
423: {
1.24 djm 424: char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
1.21 djm 425: const char *reason;
426: int ret = 0;
427:
428: if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
429: return 0;
430:
1.22 djm 431: ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
432: SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
1.21 djm 433:
434: if (key_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
435: options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1) != 1) {
436: debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
437: key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
438: options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
439: goto out;
440: }
1.24 djm 441: /*
442: * If AuthorizedPrincipals is in use, then compare the certificate
443: * principals against the names in that file rather than matching
444: * against the username.
445: */
446: if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) {
447: if (!match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert)) {
448: reason = "Certificate does not contain an "
449: "authorized principal";
450: fail_reason:
451: error("%s", reason);
452: auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
453: goto out;
454: }
1.21 djm 455: }
1.24 djm 456: if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
457: principals_file == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, &reason) != 0)
458: goto fail_reason;
1.23 djm 459: if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0)
1.21 djm 460: goto out;
461:
1.22 djm 462: verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by %s CA %s via %s",
463: key->cert->key_id, key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
464: options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
1.21 djm 465: ret = 1;
466:
467: out:
1.36 djm 468: free(principals_file);
469: free(ca_fp);
1.21 djm 470: return ret;
471: }
472:
1.31 djm 473: /*
474: * Checks whether key is allowed in file.
475: * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
476: */
477: static int
478: user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
479: {
480: FILE *f;
481: int found_key = 0;
482:
483: /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
484: temporarily_use_uid(pw);
485:
486: debug("trying public key file %s", file);
487: if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) {
488: found_key = check_authkeys_file(f, file, key, pw);
489: fclose(f);
490: }
491:
492: restore_uid();
493: return found_key;
494: }
495:
496: /*
497: * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command.
498: * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
499: */
500: static int
501: user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
502: {
503: FILE *f;
504: int ok, found_key = 0;
505: struct passwd *pw;
506: struct stat st;
507: int status, devnull, p[2], i;
508: pid_t pid;
1.32 djm 509: char *username, errmsg[512];
1.31 djm 510:
511: if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL ||
512: options.authorized_keys_command[0] != '/')
513: return 0;
514:
1.32 djm 515: if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
516: error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping");
517: return 0;
518: }
519:
520: username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user,
521: "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
522: pw = getpwnam(username);
523: if (pw == NULL) {
1.34 djm 524: error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
525: username, strerror(errno));
1.32 djm 526: free(username);
527: return 0;
1.31 djm 528: }
1.32 djm 529: free(username);
1.31 djm 530:
531: temporarily_use_uid(pw);
532:
533: if (stat(options.authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
534: error("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
535: options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
536: goto out;
537: }
538: if (auth_secure_path(options.authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0,
539: errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
540: error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
541: goto out;
542: }
543:
544: if (pipe(p) != 0) {
545: error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
546: goto out;
547: }
548:
1.33 djm 549: debug3("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s %s\" as \"%s\"",
550: options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, pw->pw_name);
1.31 djm 551:
552: /*
553: * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
554: * run cleanup_exit() code.
555: */
556: restore_uid();
557:
558: switch ((pid = fork())) {
559: case -1: /* error */
560: error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
561: close(p[0]);
562: close(p[1]);
563: return 0;
564: case 0: /* child */
565: for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
566: signal(i, SIG_DFL);
567:
1.33 djm 568: if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
569: error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
570: strerror(errno));
571: _exit(1);
572: }
573: /* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */
574: if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
575: dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
576: error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
577: _exit(1);
578: }
1.32 djm 579: closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
1.33 djm 580:
1.31 djm 581: /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
582: if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
583: error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
584: strerror(errno));
585: _exit(1);
586: }
587: if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
588: error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
589: strerror(errno));
590: _exit(1);
591: }
1.33 djm 592: /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
593: if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
1.31 djm 594: error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
595: _exit(1);
596: }
597:
598: execl(options.authorized_keys_command,
1.33 djm 599: options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, NULL);
1.31 djm 600:
601: error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
602: options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
603: _exit(127);
604: default: /* parent */
605: break;
606: }
607:
608: temporarily_use_uid(pw);
609:
610: close(p[1]);
611: if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
612: error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
613: close(p[0]);
614: /* Don't leave zombie child */
615: kill(pid, SIGTERM);
616: while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
617: ;
618: goto out;
619: }
620: ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);
621: fclose(f);
622:
623: while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
624: if (errno != EINTR) {
625: error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
626: goto out;
627: }
628: }
629: if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
630: error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
631: options.authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
632: goto out;
633: } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
634: error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
635: options.authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
636: goto out;
637: }
638: found_key = ok;
639: out:
640: restore_uid();
641: return found_key;
642: }
643:
644: /*
645: * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user.
646: */
1.1 markus 647: int
648: user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
649: {
1.29 djm 650: u_int success, i;
1.1 markus 651: char *file;
1.21 djm 652:
653: if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
654: return 0;
655: if (key_is_cert(key) && auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))
656: return 0;
657:
658: success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key);
659: if (success)
660: return success;
1.1 markus 661:
1.31 djm 662: success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key);
663: if (success > 0)
664: return success;
665:
1.29 djm 666: for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
1.31 djm 667:
668: if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
669: continue;
1.29 djm 670: file = expand_authorized_keys(
671: options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
1.31 djm 672:
1.29 djm 673: success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file);
1.36 djm 674: free(file);
1.29 djm 675: }
1.1 markus 676:
677: return success;
678: }
1.2 markus 679:
680: Authmethod method_pubkey = {
681: "publickey",
682: userauth_pubkey,
683: &options.pubkey_authentication
684: };
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