Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c, Revision 1.100
1.100 ! djm 1: /* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.99 2008/07/10 18:08:11 markus Exp $ */
1.1 provos 2: /*
3: * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
4: * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
5: * All rights reserved.
6: *
7: * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8: * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9: * are met:
10: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12: * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14: * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15: *
16: * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
17: * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
18: * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
19: * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
20: * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
21: * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
22: * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
23: * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
24: * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
25: * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
26: */
27:
1.67 stevesk 28: #include <sys/types.h>
29: #include <sys/wait.h>
1.79 stevesk 30: #include <sys/socket.h>
1.85 deraadt 31: #include <sys/tree.h>
1.83 stevesk 32: #include <sys/param.h>
1.95 djm 33: #include <sys/queue.h>
1.1 provos 34:
1.78 stevesk 35: #include <openssl/dh.h>
36:
1.81 stevesk 37: #include <errno.h>
1.80 stevesk 38: #include <fcntl.h>
1.65 stevesk 39: #include <paths.h>
1.78 stevesk 40: #include <pwd.h>
1.68 stevesk 41: #include <signal.h>
1.84 stevesk 42: #include <stdlib.h>
1.82 stevesk 43: #include <string.h>
1.1 provos 44:
45:
1.85 deraadt 46: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.1 provos 47: #include "ssh.h"
1.85 deraadt 48: #include "key.h"
49: #include "buffer.h"
50: #include "hostfile.h"
1.1 provos 51: #include "auth.h"
1.85 deraadt 52: #include "cipher.h"
1.1 provos 53: #include "kex.h"
54: #include "dh.h"
1.88 miod 55: #include <zlib.h>
1.1 provos 56: #include "packet.h"
57: #include "auth-options.h"
58: #include "sshpty.h"
59: #include "channels.h"
60: #include "session.h"
61: #include "sshlogin.h"
62: #include "canohost.h"
63: #include "log.h"
64: #include "servconf.h"
65: #include "monitor.h"
66: #include "monitor_mm.h"
1.85 deraadt 67: #ifdef GSSAPI
68: #include "ssh-gss.h"
69: #endif
1.1 provos 70: #include "monitor_wrap.h"
71: #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
72: #include "misc.h"
73: #include "compat.h"
74: #include "ssh2.h"
1.100 ! djm 75: #include "jpake.h"
1.1 provos 76:
1.46 markus 77: #ifdef GSSAPI
78: static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
79: #endif
80:
1.1 provos 81: /* Imports */
82: extern ServerOptions options;
83: extern u_int utmp_len;
84: extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
85: extern z_stream incoming_stream;
86: extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
87: extern u_char session_id[];
88: extern Buffer input, output;
89: extern Buffer auth_debug;
90: extern int auth_debug_init;
1.61 dtucker 91: extern Buffer loginmsg;
1.1 provos 92:
93: /* State exported from the child */
94:
95: struct {
96: z_stream incoming;
97: z_stream outgoing;
98: u_char *keyin;
99: u_int keyinlen;
100: u_char *keyout;
101: u_int keyoutlen;
102: u_char *ivin;
103: u_int ivinlen;
104: u_char *ivout;
105: u_int ivoutlen;
1.15 markus 106: u_char *ssh1key;
107: u_int ssh1keylen;
1.1 provos 108: int ssh1cipher;
109: int ssh1protoflags;
110: u_char *input;
111: u_int ilen;
112: u_char *output;
113: u_int olen;
114: } child_state;
115:
1.43 markus 116: /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
1.1 provos 117:
118: int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
119: int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
120: int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
1.10 djm 121: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
1.1 provos 122: int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
123: int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
124: int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
125: int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
126: int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
127: int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
128: int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
129: int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
130: int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
131: int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
132: int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
133: int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
134: int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
135: int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
136: int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
137: int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
1.100 ! djm 138: int mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int, Buffer *);
! 139: int mm_answer_jpake_step1(int, Buffer *);
! 140: int mm_answer_jpake_step2(int, Buffer *);
! 141: int mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int, Buffer *);
! 142: int mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int, Buffer *);
1.1 provos 143:
1.46 markus 144: #ifdef GSSAPI
145: int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
146: int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
147: int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
1.52 markus 148: int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
1.46 markus 149: #endif
1.25 itojun 150:
1.1 provos 151: static Authctxt *authctxt;
152: static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
153:
154: /* local state for key verify */
155: static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
156: static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
157: static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
1.26 markus 158: static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
159: static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
1.1 provos 160: static char *auth_method = "unknown";
1.44 markus 161: static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
1.13 markus 162: static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
1.40 markus 163: static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
1.1 provos 164:
165: struct mon_table {
166: enum monitor_reqtype type;
167: int flags;
168: int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
169: };
170:
171: #define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
172: #define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
173: #define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
1.77 dtucker 174: #define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
1.1 provos 175:
176: #define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
177:
178: #define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
179:
180: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
181: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
182: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
183: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
184: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
1.10 djm 185: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
1.1 provos 186: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
187: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 188: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.1 provos 189: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
190: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
1.46 markus 191: #ifdef GSSAPI
192: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
193: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
194: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
1.52 markus 195: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
1.46 markus 196: #endif
1.100 ! djm 197: #ifdef JPAKE
! 198: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata},
! 199: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_jpake_step1},
! 200: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_step2},
! 201: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm},
! 202: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm},
! 203: #endif
1.1 provos 204: {0, 0, NULL}
205: };
206:
207: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
208: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
209: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
210: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
211: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
212: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
213: {0, 0, NULL}
214: };
215:
216: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
217: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
218: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
219: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
220: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
1.77 dtucker 221: {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
222: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
1.1 provos 223: {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
224: {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
225: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 226: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.1 provos 227: {0, 0, NULL}
228: };
229:
230: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
231: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
232: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
233: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
234: {0, 0, NULL}
235: };
236:
237: struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
238:
239: /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
240:
241: static void
242: monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
243: {
244: while (ent->f != NULL) {
245: if (ent->type == type) {
246: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
247: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
248: return;
249: }
250: ent++;
251: }
252: }
253:
254: static void
255: monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
256: {
257: struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
258:
259: while (ent->f != NULL) {
260: if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
261: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
262: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
263: }
264: ent++;
265: }
266: }
267:
1.50 markus 268: void
269: monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 270: {
271: struct mon_table *ent;
272: int authenticated = 0;
273:
274: debug3("preauth child monitor started");
275:
1.50 markus 276: authctxt = _authctxt;
277: memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
278:
1.1 provos 279: if (compat20) {
280: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
281:
282: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
283: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
284: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
285: } else {
286: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
287:
288: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
289: }
290:
291: /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
292: while (!authenticated) {
1.77 dtucker 293: auth_method = "unknown";
1.89 markus 294: authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
1.1 provos 295: if (authenticated) {
296: if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
297: fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
1.14 markus 298: __func__, ent->type);
1.1 provos 299: if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
300: !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
301: authenticated = 0;
302: }
303:
1.77 dtucker 304: if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
1.1 provos 305: auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, auth_method,
306: compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
307: if (!authenticated)
308: authctxt->failures++;
309: }
1.100 ! djm 310: #ifdef JPAKE
! 311: /* Cleanup JPAKE context after authentication */
! 312: if (ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE) {
! 313: if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL) {
! 314: jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
! 315: authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
! 316: }
! 317: }
! 318: #endif
1.1 provos 319: }
320:
321: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 322: fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
1.77 dtucker 323: if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
324: fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
1.1 provos 325:
326: debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
1.14 markus 327: __func__, authctxt->user);
1.1 provos 328:
1.11 mouring 329: mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
1.1 provos 330: }
331:
1.40 markus 332: static void
333: monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
334: {
335: monitor_child_pid = pid;
336: }
337:
338: static void
1.59 avsm 339: monitor_child_handler(int sig)
1.40 markus 340: {
1.59 avsm 341: kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
1.40 markus 342: }
343:
1.1 provos 344: void
1.11 mouring 345: monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 346: {
1.40 markus 347: monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
348: signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
349: signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
1.91 djm 350: signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
1.40 markus 351:
1.1 provos 352: if (compat20) {
353: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
354:
355: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
356: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
357: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
358: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
359: } else {
360: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
361: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
362: }
363: if (!no_pty_flag) {
364: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
365: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
366: }
367:
368: for (;;)
1.11 mouring 369: monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
1.1 provos 370: }
371:
372: void
1.11 mouring 373: monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 374: {
1.16 djm 375: if (options.compression) {
376: /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
377: mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
378: }
1.1 provos 379: }
380:
381: int
1.11 mouring 382: monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
1.1 provos 383: struct mon_table **pent)
384: {
385: Buffer m;
386: int ret;
387: u_char type;
388:
389: buffer_init(&m);
390:
1.11 mouring 391: mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 392: type = buffer_get_char(&m);
393:
1.14 markus 394: debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 395:
396: while (ent->f != NULL) {
397: if (ent->type == type)
398: break;
399: ent++;
400: }
401:
402: if (ent->f != NULL) {
403: if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
1.14 markus 404: fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
1.1 provos 405: type);
1.11 mouring 406: ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 407: buffer_free(&m);
408:
409: /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
410: if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
1.14 markus 411: debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
1.1 provos 412: type);
413: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
414: }
415:
416: if (pent != NULL)
417: *pent = ent;
1.3 markus 418:
1.1 provos 419: return ret;
420: }
421:
1.14 markus 422: fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 423:
424: /* NOTREACHED */
425: return (-1);
426: }
427:
428: /* allowed key state */
429: static int
430: monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
431: {
432: /* make sure key is allowed */
433: if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
434: memcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
435: return (0);
436: return (1);
437: }
438:
439: static void
440: monitor_reset_key_state(void)
441: {
442: /* reset state */
443: if (key_blob != NULL)
444: xfree(key_blob);
445: if (hostbased_cuser != NULL)
446: xfree(hostbased_cuser);
447: if (hostbased_chost != NULL)
448: xfree(hostbased_chost);
449: key_blob = NULL;
450: key_bloblen = 0;
451: key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
452: hostbased_cuser = NULL;
453: hostbased_chost = NULL;
454: }
455:
456: int
1.59 avsm 457: mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 458: {
459: DH *dh;
460: int min, want, max;
461:
462: min = buffer_get_int(m);
463: want = buffer_get_int(m);
464: max = buffer_get_int(m);
465:
466: debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 467: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 468: /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
469: if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
470: fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 471: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 472:
473: buffer_clear(m);
474:
475: dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
476: if (dh == NULL) {
477: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
478: return (0);
479: } else {
480: /* Send first bignum */
481: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
482: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
483: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
1.3 markus 484:
1.1 provos 485: DH_free(dh);
486: }
1.59 avsm 487: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
1.1 provos 488: return (0);
489: }
490:
491: int
1.59 avsm 492: mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 493: {
494: Key *key;
495: u_char *p;
496: u_char *signature;
497: u_int siglen, datlen;
498: int keyid;
1.3 markus 499:
1.14 markus 500: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 501:
1.3 markus 502: keyid = buffer_get_int(m);
503: p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen);
1.1 provos 504:
1.69 djm 505: /*
1.71 deraadt 506: * Supported KEX types will only return SHA1 (20 byte) or
1.69 djm 507: * SHA256 (32 byte) hashes
508: */
509: if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32)
1.19 deraadt 510: fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %u", __func__, datlen);
1.1 provos 511:
1.13 markus 512: /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
513: if (session_id2_len == 0) {
514: session_id2_len = datlen;
515: session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
516: memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
517: }
518:
1.1 provos 519: if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 520: fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
1.1 provos 521: if (key_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen) < 0)
1.14 markus 522: fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 523:
1.19 deraadt 524: debug3("%s: signature %p(%u)", __func__, signature, siglen);
1.1 provos 525:
526: buffer_clear(m);
527: buffer_put_string(m, signature, siglen);
528:
529: xfree(p);
530: xfree(signature);
531:
1.59 avsm 532: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
1.1 provos 533:
534: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
535: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
536:
537: return (0);
538: }
539:
540: /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
541:
542: int
1.59 avsm 543: mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 544: {
1.60 dtucker 545: char *username;
1.1 provos 546: struct passwd *pwent;
547: int allowed = 0;
1.3 markus 548:
1.14 markus 549: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 550:
551: if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
1.14 markus 552: fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
1.1 provos 553:
1.60 dtucker 554: username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.1 provos 555:
1.60 dtucker 556: pwent = getpwnamallow(username);
1.1 provos 557:
1.60 dtucker 558: authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
559: setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
560: xfree(username);
1.1 provos 561:
562: buffer_clear(m);
563:
564: if (pwent == NULL) {
565: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
1.53 djm 566: authctxt->pw = fakepw();
1.1 provos 567: goto out;
568: }
569:
570: allowed = 1;
1.4 markus 571: authctxt->pw = pwent;
1.1 provos 572: authctxt->valid = 1;
573:
574: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
575: buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
576: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
577: buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
578: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
579: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
580: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
581: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
1.94 dtucker 582:
583: out:
1.90 dtucker 584: buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
585: if (options.banner != NULL)
586: buffer_put_cstring(m, options.banner);
1.14 markus 587: debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
1.59 avsm 588: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
1.1 provos 589:
590: /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
591: if (!compat20)
592: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
1.10 djm 593: else {
1.1 provos 594: /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
595: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
1.10 djm 596: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
597: }
598:
599:
600: return (0);
601: }
602:
1.59 avsm 603: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.10 djm 604: {
605: char *banner;
606:
607: buffer_clear(m);
608: banner = auth2_read_banner();
609: buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
1.59 avsm 610: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
1.1 provos 611:
1.10 djm 612: if (banner != NULL)
1.21 deraadt 613: xfree(banner);
1.1 provos 614:
615: return (0);
616: }
617:
618: int
1.59 avsm 619: mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 620: {
621: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
622:
623: authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
624: authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.6 stevesk 625: debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
1.14 markus 626: __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
1.6 stevesk 627:
1.1 provos 628: if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
629: xfree(authctxt->style);
630: authctxt->style = NULL;
631: }
632:
633: return (0);
634: }
635:
636: int
1.59 avsm 637: mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 638: {
639: static int call_count;
640: char *passwd;
1.22 stevesk 641: int authenticated;
642: u_int plen;
1.1 provos 643:
644: passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
645: /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
1.12 markus 646: authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
1.48 markus 647: auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
1.1 provos 648: memset(passwd, 0, strlen(passwd));
649: xfree(passwd);
650:
651: buffer_clear(m);
652: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
653:
1.14 markus 654: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 655: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
1.1 provos 656:
657: call_count++;
658: if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
659: auth_method = "none";
660: else
661: auth_method = "password";
662:
663: /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
664: return (authenticated);
665: }
666:
667: int
1.59 avsm 668: mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 669: {
670: char *name, *infotxt;
671: u_int numprompts;
672: u_int *echo_on;
673: char **prompts;
1.31 markus 674: u_int success;
1.1 provos 675:
1.31 markus 676: success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
677: &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
1.1 provos 678:
679: buffer_clear(m);
1.31 markus 680: buffer_put_int(m, success);
681: if (success)
1.1 provos 682: buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
683:
1.31 markus 684: debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
1.59 avsm 685: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
1.1 provos 686:
1.31 markus 687: if (success) {
1.1 provos 688: xfree(name);
689: xfree(infotxt);
690: xfree(prompts);
691: xfree(echo_on);
692: }
693:
694: return (0);
695: }
696:
697: int
1.59 avsm 698: mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 699: {
700: char *response;
701: int authok;
702:
703: if (authctxt->as == 0)
1.14 markus 704: fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
1.1 provos 705:
706: response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.12 markus 707: authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
708: auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
1.1 provos 709: authctxt->as = NULL;
1.14 markus 710: debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
1.1 provos 711: xfree(response);
712:
713: buffer_clear(m);
714: buffer_put_int(m, authok);
715:
1.14 markus 716: debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
1.59 avsm 717: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
1.1 provos 718:
719: auth_method = "bsdauth";
720:
721: return (authok != 0);
722: }
723:
724:
1.2 markus 725: static void
1.1 provos 726: mm_append_debug(Buffer *m)
727: {
728: if (auth_debug_init && buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
1.14 markus 729: debug3("%s: Appending debug messages for child", __func__);
1.1 provos 730: buffer_append(m, buffer_ptr(&auth_debug),
731: buffer_len(&auth_debug));
732: buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
733: }
734: }
735:
736: int
1.59 avsm 737: mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 738: {
739: Key *key;
1.26 markus 740: char *cuser, *chost;
741: u_char *blob;
1.1 provos 742: u_int bloblen;
743: enum mm_keytype type = 0;
744: int allowed = 0;
745:
1.14 markus 746: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.3 markus 747:
1.1 provos 748: type = buffer_get_int(m);
749: cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
750: chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
751: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
752:
753: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
754:
755: if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
756: (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
1.14 markus 757: fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 758:
1.14 markus 759: debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
1.1 provos 760:
1.51 djm 761: if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
1.63 deraadt 762: switch (type) {
1.1 provos 763: case MM_USERKEY:
1.12 markus 764: allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
765: user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
1.77 dtucker 766: auth_method = "publickey";
1.97 dtucker 767: if (options.pubkey_authentication && allowed != 1)
768: auth_clear_options();
1.1 provos 769: break;
770: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1.12 markus 771: allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
772: hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 773: cuser, chost, key);
1.77 dtucker 774: auth_method = "hostbased";
1.1 provos 775: break;
776: case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
777: key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
1.12 markus 778: allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
779: auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 780: cuser, chost, key);
1.97 dtucker 781: if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
782: auth_clear_options();
1.77 dtucker 783: auth_method = "rsa";
1.1 provos 784: break;
785: default:
1.14 markus 786: fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 787: break;
788: }
1.33 markus 789: }
790: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 791: key_free(key);
792:
793: /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
794: monitor_reset_key_state();
795:
796: if (allowed) {
797: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
798: key_blob = blob;
799: key_bloblen = bloblen;
800: key_blobtype = type;
801: hostbased_cuser = cuser;
802: hostbased_chost = chost;
1.72 djm 803: } else {
1.77 dtucker 804: /* Log failed attempt */
805: auth_log(authctxt, 0, auth_method, compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
1.72 djm 806: xfree(blob);
807: xfree(cuser);
808: xfree(chost);
1.1 provos 809: }
810:
811: debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
1.98 dtucker 812: __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
1.1 provos 813:
814: buffer_clear(m);
815: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 816: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 817:
818: mm_append_debug(m);
819:
1.59 avsm 820: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 821:
822: if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
823: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
824:
825: return (0);
826: }
827:
828: static int
829: monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
830: {
831: Buffer b;
1.26 markus 832: char *p;
1.1 provos 833: u_int len;
834: int fail = 0;
835:
836: buffer_init(&b);
837: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 838:
1.1 provos 839: if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
1.13 markus 840: p = buffer_ptr(&b);
841: len = buffer_len(&b);
842: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
843: (len < session_id2_len) ||
844: (memcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
845: fail++;
1.1 provos 846: buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
847: } else {
1.13 markus 848: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
849: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
850: (len != session_id2_len) ||
851: (memcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 852: fail++;
1.13 markus 853: xfree(p);
1.1 provos 854: }
855: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
856: fail++;
857: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
858: if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 859: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.1 provos 860: authctxt->user, p);
861: fail++;
862: }
863: xfree(p);
864: buffer_skip_string(&b);
865: if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
866: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
867: fail++;
868: } else {
869: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
870: if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
871: fail++;
872: xfree(p);
873: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
874: fail++;
875: buffer_skip_string(&b);
876: }
877: buffer_skip_string(&b);
878: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
879: fail++;
880: buffer_free(&b);
881: return (fail == 0);
882: }
883:
884: static int
1.26 markus 885: monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
886: char *chost)
1.1 provos 887: {
888: Buffer b;
1.26 markus 889: char *p;
1.1 provos 890: u_int len;
891: int fail = 0;
892:
893: buffer_init(&b);
894: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 895:
1.13 markus 896: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
897: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
898: (len != session_id2_len) ||
899: (memcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 900: fail++;
1.13 markus 901: xfree(p);
902:
1.1 provos 903: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
904: fail++;
905: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
906: if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 907: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.1 provos 908: authctxt->user, p);
909: fail++;
910: }
911: xfree(p);
912: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */
913: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
914: if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
915: fail++;
916: xfree(p);
917: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkalg */
918: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkblob */
919:
920: /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
921: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
922: if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
923: p[len - 1] = '\0';
924: if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
925: fail++;
926: xfree(p);
927:
928: /* verify client user */
929: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
930: if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
931: fail++;
932: xfree(p);
933:
934: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
935: fail++;
936: buffer_free(&b);
937: return (fail == 0);
938: }
939:
940: int
1.59 avsm 941: mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 942: {
943: Key *key;
944: u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
945: u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
946: int verified = 0;
947: int valid_data = 0;
948:
949: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
950: signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
951: data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
952:
953: if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
1.8 mouring 954: !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
1.14 markus 955: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 956:
957: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
958: if (key == NULL)
1.14 markus 959: fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 960:
961: switch (key_blobtype) {
962: case MM_USERKEY:
963: valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
964: break;
965: case MM_HOSTKEY:
966: valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
967: hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
968: break;
969: default:
970: valid_data = 0;
971: break;
972: }
973: if (!valid_data)
1.14 markus 974: fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 975:
976: verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
977: debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
1.89 markus 978: __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
1.1 provos 979:
980: key_free(key);
981: xfree(blob);
982: xfree(signature);
983: xfree(data);
984:
1.17 stevesk 985: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
986:
1.1 provos 987: monitor_reset_key_state();
1.3 markus 988:
1.1 provos 989: buffer_clear(m);
990: buffer_put_int(m, verified);
1.59 avsm 991: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
1.1 provos 992:
1.89 markus 993: return (verified == 1);
1.1 provos 994: }
995:
1.2 markus 996: static void
1.1 provos 997: mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
998: {
999: socklen_t fromlen;
1000: struct sockaddr_storage from;
1001:
1002: /*
1003: * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
1004: * the address be 0.0.0.0.
1005: */
1006: memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
1.24 stevesk 1007: fromlen = sizeof(from);
1.1 provos 1008: if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
1009: if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
1.74 deraadt 1010: (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
1.1 provos 1011: debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1.50 markus 1012: cleanup_exit(255);
1.1 provos 1013: }
1014: }
1015: /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
1016: record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
1.42 markus 1017: get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
1.24 stevesk 1018: (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
1.1 provos 1019: }
1020:
1021: static void
1022: mm_session_close(Session *s)
1023: {
1.41 djm 1024: debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
1.1 provos 1025: if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1.86 stevesk 1026: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
1.1 provos 1027: session_pty_cleanup2(s);
1028: }
1.96 djm 1029: session_unused(s->self);
1.1 provos 1030: }
1031:
1032: int
1.59 avsm 1033: mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1034: {
1.11 mouring 1035: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1036: Session *s;
1037: int res, fd0;
1038:
1.14 markus 1039: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1040:
1041: buffer_clear(m);
1042: s = session_new();
1043: if (s == NULL)
1044: goto error;
1045: s->authctxt = authctxt;
1046: s->pw = authctxt->pw;
1.11 mouring 1047: s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
1.1 provos 1048: res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
1049: if (res == 0)
1050: goto error;
1051: pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
1052:
1053: buffer_put_int(m, 1);
1054: buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
1055:
1056: /* We need to trick ttyslot */
1057: if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
1.14 markus 1058: fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
1.1 provos 1059:
1060: mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
1061:
1062: /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
1063: close(0);
1.61 dtucker 1064:
1065: /* send messages generated by record_login */
1066: buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
1067: buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
1068:
1069: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1070:
1.92 djm 1071: if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
1072: mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
1073: fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1074:
1075: /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
1076: if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
1.14 markus 1077: fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1078: if (fd0 != 0)
1.14 markus 1079: error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
1.1 provos 1080:
1081: /* slave is not needed */
1082: close(s->ttyfd);
1083: s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
1084: /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
1085: s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
1086:
1.86 stevesk 1087: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
1.1 provos 1088:
1089: return (0);
1090:
1091: error:
1092: if (s != NULL)
1093: mm_session_close(s);
1094: buffer_put_int(m, 0);
1.59 avsm 1095: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1.1 provos 1096: return (0);
1097: }
1098:
1099: int
1.59 avsm 1100: mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1101: {
1102: Session *s;
1103: char *tty;
1104:
1.14 markus 1105: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1106:
1107: tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1108: if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
1109: mm_session_close(s);
1110: buffer_clear(m);
1111: xfree(tty);
1112: return (0);
1113: }
1114:
1115: int
1.59 avsm 1116: mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1117: {
1118: BIGNUM *p;
1119: int rsafail;
1120:
1121: /* Turn off permissions */
1.62 dtucker 1122: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
1.1 provos 1123:
1124: if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1125: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1126:
1127: buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
1128:
1129: rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
1130:
1131: buffer_clear(m);
1132: buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
1133: buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
1134:
1135: BN_clear_free(p);
1136:
1.59 avsm 1137: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
1.1 provos 1138:
1139: /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
1140: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
1141:
1142: return (0);
1143: }
1144:
1145: int
1.59 avsm 1146: mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1147: {
1148: int i;
1149:
1.14 markus 1150: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1151:
1152: if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
1.14 markus 1153: fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
1.1 provos 1154: for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1155: session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
1156:
1157: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
1158: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
1159:
1160: return (0);
1161: }
1162:
1163: int
1.59 avsm 1164: mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1165: {
1166: BIGNUM *client_n;
1167: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1168: u_char *blob = NULL;
1169: u_int blen = 0;
1.1 provos 1170: int allowed = 0;
1171:
1.14 markus 1172: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1173:
1.77 dtucker 1174: auth_method = "rsa";
1.12 markus 1175: if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
1.1 provos 1176: if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1177: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1178: buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
1179: allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
1180: BN_clear_free(client_n);
1181: }
1182: buffer_clear(m);
1183: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 1184: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 1185:
1186: /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
1187: monitor_reset_key_state();
1188:
1189: if (allowed && key != NULL) {
1190: key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */
1191: if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
1.14 markus 1192: fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1193: buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
1194:
1195: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1196: key_blob = blob;
1197: key_bloblen = blen;
1198: key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
1.33 markus 1199: }
1200: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 1201: key_free(key);
1202:
1203: mm_append_debug(m);
1204:
1.59 avsm 1205: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 1206:
1207: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
1208: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
1209: return (0);
1210: }
1211:
1212: int
1.59 avsm 1213: mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1214: {
1215: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1216: u_char *blob;
1217: u_int blen;
1.1 provos 1218:
1.14 markus 1219: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1220:
1221: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1222: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1223: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1224: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1225: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1226: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1227: fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 1228: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1229: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.1 provos 1230:
1231: if (ssh1_challenge)
1232: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1233: ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
1234:
1235: buffer_clear(m);
1236: buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
1237:
1.14 markus 1238: debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
1.59 avsm 1239: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
1.1 provos 1240:
1241: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
1.33 markus 1242:
1243: xfree(blob);
1244: key_free(key);
1.1 provos 1245: return (0);
1246: }
1247:
1248: int
1.59 avsm 1249: mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1250: {
1251: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1252: u_char *blob, *response;
1253: u_int blen, len;
1254: int success;
1.1 provos 1255:
1.14 markus 1256: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1257:
1258: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1259: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1260: if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
1.14 markus 1261: fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1262:
1263: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1264: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1265: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1266: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1267: fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
1.1 provos 1268: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1269: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.1 provos 1270: response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1271: if (len != 16)
1.14 markus 1272: fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1273: success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
1274:
1.33 markus 1275: xfree(blob);
1.1 provos 1276: key_free(key);
1277: xfree(response);
1278:
1279: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
1280:
1281: /* reset state */
1282: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1283: ssh1_challenge = NULL;
1284: monitor_reset_key_state();
1285:
1286: buffer_clear(m);
1287: buffer_put_int(m, success);
1.59 avsm 1288: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
1.1 provos 1289:
1290: return (success);
1291: }
1292:
1293: int
1.59 avsm 1294: mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
1.1 provos 1295: {
1.11 mouring 1296: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1297: int res, status;
1298:
1.14 markus 1299: debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
1.1 provos 1300:
1301: /* The child is terminating */
1302: session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
1303:
1.11 mouring 1304: while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
1.9 markus 1305: if (errno != EINTR)
1306: exit(1);
1.1 provos 1307:
1308: res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
1309:
1310: /* Terminate process */
1.57 deraadt 1311: exit(res);
1.1 provos 1312: }
1313:
1314: void
1.11 mouring 1315: monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1316: {
1317: if (compat20) {
1318: set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
1319: set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
1320: } else {
1321: packet_set_protocol_flags(child_state.ssh1protoflags);
1.15 markus 1322: packet_set_encryption_key(child_state.ssh1key,
1323: child_state.ssh1keylen, child_state.ssh1cipher);
1324: xfree(child_state.ssh1key);
1.1 provos 1325: }
1326:
1.15 markus 1327: /* for rc4 and other stateful ciphers */
1.1 provos 1328: packet_set_keycontext(MODE_OUT, child_state.keyout);
1329: xfree(child_state.keyout);
1330: packet_set_keycontext(MODE_IN, child_state.keyin);
1331: xfree(child_state.keyin);
1332:
1333: if (!compat20) {
1334: packet_set_iv(MODE_OUT, child_state.ivout);
1335: xfree(child_state.ivout);
1336: packet_set_iv(MODE_IN, child_state.ivin);
1337: xfree(child_state.ivin);
1338: }
1339:
1340: memcpy(&incoming_stream, &child_state.incoming,
1341: sizeof(incoming_stream));
1342: memcpy(&outgoing_stream, &child_state.outgoing,
1343: sizeof(outgoing_stream));
1.3 markus 1344:
1.1 provos 1345: /* Update with new address */
1.16 djm 1346: if (options.compression)
1347: mm_init_compression(pmonitor->m_zlib);
1.1 provos 1348:
1349: /* Network I/O buffers */
1350: /* XXX inefficient for large buffers, need: buffer_init_from_string */
1351: buffer_clear(&input);
1352: buffer_append(&input, child_state.input, child_state.ilen);
1353: memset(child_state.input, 0, child_state.ilen);
1354: xfree(child_state.input);
1355:
1356: buffer_clear(&output);
1357: buffer_append(&output, child_state.output, child_state.olen);
1358: memset(child_state.output, 0, child_state.olen);
1359: xfree(child_state.output);
1360: }
1361:
1.2 markus 1362: static Kex *
1.1 provos 1363: mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
1364: {
1365: Kex *kex;
1366: void *blob;
1367: u_int bloblen;
1368:
1.75 djm 1369: kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex));
1.1 provos 1370: kex->session_id = buffer_get_string(m, &kex->session_id_len);
1.13 markus 1371: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1372: (kex->session_id_len != session_id2_len) ||
1373: (memcmp(kex->session_id, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1374: fatal("mm_get_get: internal error: bad session id");
1.1 provos 1375: kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m);
1.34 markus 1376: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1.58 djm 1377: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1.34 markus 1378: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1.69 djm 1379: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
1.1 provos 1380: kex->server = 1;
1381: kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
1382: kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
1383: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1384: buffer_init(&kex->my);
1385: buffer_append(&kex->my, blob, bloblen);
1386: xfree(blob);
1387: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1388: buffer_init(&kex->peer);
1389: buffer_append(&kex->peer, blob, bloblen);
1390: xfree(blob);
1391: kex->done = 1;
1392: kex->flags = buffer_get_int(m);
1393: kex->client_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1394: kex->server_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1395: kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type;
1396: kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1397:
1398: return (kex);
1399: }
1400:
1401: /* This function requries careful sanity checking */
1402:
1403: void
1.11 mouring 1404: mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1405: {
1406: Buffer m;
1407: u_char *blob, *p;
1408: u_int bloblen, plen;
1.37 markus 1409: u_int32_t seqnr, packets;
1.99 markus 1410: u_int64_t blocks, bytes;
1.1 provos 1411:
1.14 markus 1412: debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
1.1 provos 1413:
1414: buffer_init(&m);
1.11 mouring 1415: mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
1.1 provos 1416: if (!compat20) {
1417: child_state.ssh1protoflags = buffer_get_int(&m);
1418: child_state.ssh1cipher = buffer_get_int(&m);
1.15 markus 1419: child_state.ssh1key = buffer_get_string(&m,
1420: &child_state.ssh1keylen);
1.1 provos 1421: child_state.ivout = buffer_get_string(&m,
1422: &child_state.ivoutlen);
1423: child_state.ivin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ivinlen);
1424: goto skip;
1425: } else {
1426: /* Get the Kex for rekeying */
1.11 mouring 1427: *pmonitor->m_pkex = mm_get_kex(&m);
1.1 provos 1428: }
1429:
1430: blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
1431: current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1432: xfree(blob);
1433:
1.14 markus 1434: debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
1.1 provos 1435: blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
1436: current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1437: xfree(blob);
1.3 markus 1438:
1.1 provos 1439: /* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
1.37 markus 1440: seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
1441: blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1442: packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
1.99 markus 1443: bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1444: packet_set_state(MODE_OUT, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
1.37 markus 1445: seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
1446: blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1447: packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
1.99 markus 1448: bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1449: packet_set_state(MODE_IN, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
1.1 provos 1450:
1451: skip:
1452: /* Get the key context */
1453: child_state.keyout = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyoutlen);
1454: child_state.keyin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyinlen);
1455:
1.14 markus 1456: debug3("%s: Getting compression state", __func__);
1.1 provos 1457: /* Get compression state */
1458: p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
1459: if (plen != sizeof(child_state.outgoing))
1.14 markus 1460: fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
1.1 provos 1461: memcpy(&child_state.outgoing, p, sizeof(child_state.outgoing));
1462: xfree(p);
1463:
1464: p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
1465: if (plen != sizeof(child_state.incoming))
1.14 markus 1466: fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
1.1 provos 1467: memcpy(&child_state.incoming, p, sizeof(child_state.incoming));
1468: xfree(p);
1469:
1470: /* Network I/O buffers */
1.14 markus 1471: debug3("%s: Getting Network I/O buffers", __func__);
1.1 provos 1472: child_state.input = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ilen);
1473: child_state.output = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.olen);
1474:
1475: buffer_free(&m);
1476: }
1477:
1478:
1479: /* Allocation functions for zlib */
1480: void *
1481: mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
1482: {
1.30 markus 1483: size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
1.1 provos 1484: void *address;
1485:
1.23 millert 1486: if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_T_MAX / size)
1.18 deraadt 1487: fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
1488:
1489: address = mm_malloc(mm, len);
1.1 provos 1490:
1491: return (address);
1492: }
1493:
1494: void
1495: mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
1496: {
1497: mm_free(mm, address);
1498: }
1499:
1500: void
1501: mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *mm)
1502: {
1503: outgoing_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
1504: outgoing_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
1505: outgoing_stream.opaque = mm;
1506:
1507: incoming_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
1508: incoming_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
1509: incoming_stream.opaque = mm;
1510: }
1511:
1512: /* XXX */
1513:
1514: #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
1515: if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) \
1516: fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
1517: } while (0)
1518:
1.2 markus 1519: static void
1.1 provos 1520: monitor_socketpair(int *pair)
1.3 markus 1521: {
1.1 provos 1522: if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
1.14 markus 1523: fatal("%s: socketpair", __func__);
1.1 provos 1524: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1525: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1526: }
1527:
1528: #define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
1529:
1530: struct monitor *
1531: monitor_init(void)
1532: {
1533: struct monitor *mon;
1534: int pair[2];
1535:
1.75 djm 1536: mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
1.1 provos 1537:
1538: monitor_socketpair(pair);
1539:
1540: mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1541: mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1542:
1543: /* Used to share zlib space across processes */
1.16 djm 1544: if (options.compression) {
1545: mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
1546: mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
1.1 provos 1547:
1.16 djm 1548: /* Compression needs to share state across borders */
1549: mm_init_compression(mon->m_zlib);
1550: }
1.1 provos 1551:
1552: return mon;
1553: }
1554:
1555: void
1556: monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
1557: {
1558: int pair[2];
1559:
1560: monitor_socketpair(pair);
1561:
1562: mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1563: mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1564: }
1.46 markus 1565:
1566: #ifdef GSSAPI
1567: int
1.59 avsm 1568: mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1569: {
1.59 avsm 1570: gss_OID_desc goid;
1.46 markus 1571: OM_uint32 major;
1572: u_int len;
1573:
1.59 avsm 1574: goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1575: goid.length = len;
1.46 markus 1576:
1.59 avsm 1577: major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
1.46 markus 1578:
1.59 avsm 1579: xfree(goid.elements);
1.46 markus 1580:
1581: buffer_clear(m);
1582: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1583:
1.64 stevesk 1584: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
1.46 markus 1585:
1586: /* Now we have a context, enable the step */
1587: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
1588:
1589: return (0);
1590: }
1591:
1592: int
1.59 avsm 1593: mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1594: {
1595: gss_buffer_desc in;
1596: gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1.64 stevesk 1597: OM_uint32 major, minor;
1.46 markus 1598: OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
1.47 deraadt 1599: u_int len;
1.46 markus 1600:
1.47 deraadt 1601: in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1602: in.length = len;
1.46 markus 1603: major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
1604: xfree(in.value);
1605:
1606: buffer_clear(m);
1607: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1608: buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
1609: buffer_put_int(m, flags);
1.59 avsm 1610: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
1.46 markus 1611:
1612: gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
1613:
1.64 stevesk 1614: if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1.46 markus 1615: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
1616: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.52 markus 1617: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
1.46 markus 1618: }
1619: return (0);
1620: }
1621:
1622: int
1.59 avsm 1623: mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.52 markus 1624: {
1625: gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
1626: OM_uint32 ret;
1627: u_int len;
1.54 djm 1628:
1.52 markus 1629: gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1630: gssbuf.length = len;
1631: mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1632: mic.length = len;
1.54 djm 1633:
1.52 markus 1634: ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
1.54 djm 1635:
1.52 markus 1636: xfree(gssbuf.value);
1637: xfree(mic.value);
1.54 djm 1638:
1.52 markus 1639: buffer_clear(m);
1640: buffer_put_int(m, ret);
1.54 djm 1641:
1.59 avsm 1642: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
1.54 djm 1643:
1.52 markus 1644: if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
1645: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.54 djm 1646:
1.52 markus 1647: return (0);
1648: }
1649:
1650: int
1.59 avsm 1651: mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1652: {
1653: int authenticated;
1654:
1655: authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
1656:
1657: buffer_clear(m);
1658: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
1659:
1660: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 1661: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
1.46 markus 1662:
1.64 stevesk 1663: auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
1.46 markus 1664:
1665: /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
1666: return (authenticated);
1667: }
1668: #endif /* GSSAPI */
1.100 ! djm 1669:
! 1670: #ifdef JPAKE
! 1671: int
! 1672: mm_answer_jpake_step1(int sock, Buffer *m)
! 1673: {
! 1674: struct jpake_ctx *pctx;
! 1675: u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof;
! 1676: u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len;
! 1677:
! 1678: if (!options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication)
! 1679: fatal("zero_knowledge_password_authentication disabled");
! 1680:
! 1681: if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL)
! 1682: fatal("%s: authctxt->jpake_ctx already set (%p)",
! 1683: __func__, authctxt->jpake_ctx);
! 1684: authctxt->jpake_ctx = pctx = jpake_new();
! 1685:
! 1686: jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
! 1687: &pctx->server_id, &pctx->server_id_len,
! 1688: &pctx->x3, &pctx->x4, &pctx->g_x3, &pctx->g_x4,
! 1689: &x3_proof, &x3_proof_len,
! 1690: &x4_proof, &x4_proof_len);
! 1691:
! 1692: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step1 done in %s", __func__));
! 1693:
! 1694: buffer_clear(m);
! 1695:
! 1696: buffer_put_string(m, pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
! 1697: buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x3);
! 1698: buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x4);
! 1699: buffer_put_string(m, x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
! 1700: buffer_put_string(m, x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
! 1701:
! 1702: debug3("%s: sending step1", __func__);
! 1703: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1, m);
! 1704:
! 1705: bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
! 1706: bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
! 1707: xfree(x3_proof);
! 1708: xfree(x4_proof);
! 1709:
! 1710: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, 1);
! 1711: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 0);
! 1712:
! 1713: return 0;
! 1714: }
! 1715:
! 1716: int
! 1717: mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int sock, Buffer *m)
! 1718: {
! 1719: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
! 1720: char *hash_scheme, *salt;
! 1721:
! 1722: if (pctx == NULL)
! 1723: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
! 1724:
! 1725: auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(authctxt, &pctx->s, &hash_scheme, &salt);
! 1726:
! 1727: buffer_clear(m);
! 1728: /* pctx->s is sensitive, not returned to slave */
! 1729: buffer_put_cstring(m, hash_scheme);
! 1730: buffer_put_cstring(m, salt);
! 1731:
! 1732: debug3("%s: sending pwdata", __func__);
! 1733: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, m);
! 1734:
! 1735: bzero(hash_scheme, strlen(hash_scheme));
! 1736: bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
! 1737: xfree(hash_scheme);
! 1738: xfree(salt);
! 1739:
! 1740: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, 1);
! 1741:
! 1742: return 0;
! 1743: }
! 1744:
! 1745: int
! 1746: mm_answer_jpake_step2(int sock, Buffer *m)
! 1747: {
! 1748: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
! 1749: u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof, *x4_s_proof;
! 1750: u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len, x4_s_proof_len;
! 1751:
! 1752: if (pctx == NULL)
! 1753: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
! 1754:
! 1755: if ((pctx->g_x1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
! 1756: (pctx->g_x2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
! 1757: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
! 1758: buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x1);
! 1759: buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x2);
! 1760: pctx->client_id = buffer_get_string(m, &pctx->client_id_len);
! 1761: x1_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x1_proof_len);
! 1762: x2_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_proof_len);
! 1763:
! 1764: jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x3,
! 1765: pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->x4,
! 1766: pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
! 1767: pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
! 1768: x1_proof, x1_proof_len,
! 1769: x2_proof, x2_proof_len,
! 1770: &pctx->b,
! 1771: &x4_s_proof, &x4_s_proof_len);
! 1772:
! 1773: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step2 done in %s", __func__));
! 1774:
! 1775: bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
! 1776: bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
! 1777: xfree(x1_proof);
! 1778: xfree(x2_proof);
! 1779:
! 1780: buffer_clear(m);
! 1781:
! 1782: buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->b);
! 1783: buffer_put_string(m, x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
! 1784:
! 1785: debug3("%s: sending step2", __func__);
! 1786: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2, m);
! 1787:
! 1788: bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
! 1789: xfree(x4_s_proof);
! 1790:
! 1791: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, 1);
! 1792:
! 1793: return 0;
! 1794: }
! 1795:
! 1796: int
! 1797: mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
! 1798: {
! 1799: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
! 1800: u_char *x2_s_proof;
! 1801: u_int x2_s_proof_len;
! 1802:
! 1803: if (pctx == NULL)
! 1804: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
! 1805:
! 1806: if ((pctx->a = BN_new()) == NULL)
! 1807: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
! 1808: buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->a);
! 1809: x2_s_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_s_proof_len);
! 1810:
! 1811: jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->a,
! 1812: pctx->x4, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2,
! 1813: pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
! 1814: pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
! 1815: session_id2, session_id2_len,
! 1816: x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len,
! 1817: &pctx->k,
! 1818: &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
! 1819:
! 1820: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "key_confirm done in %s", __func__));
! 1821:
! 1822: bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
! 1823: buffer_clear(m);
! 1824:
! 1825: /* pctx->k is sensitive, not sent */
! 1826: buffer_put_string(m, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
! 1827:
! 1828: debug3("%s: sending confirmation hash", __func__);
! 1829: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, m);
! 1830:
! 1831: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, 1);
! 1832:
! 1833: return 0;
! 1834: }
! 1835:
! 1836: int
! 1837: mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
! 1838: {
! 1839: int authenticated = 0;
! 1840: u_char *peer_confirm_hash;
! 1841: u_int peer_confirm_hash_len;
! 1842: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
! 1843:
! 1844: if (pctx == NULL)
! 1845: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
! 1846:
! 1847: peer_confirm_hash = buffer_get_string(m, &peer_confirm_hash_len);
! 1848:
! 1849: authenticated = jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
! 1850: pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
! 1851: session_id2, session_id2_len,
! 1852: peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len) && authctxt->valid;
! 1853:
! 1854: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "check_confirm done in %s", __func__));
! 1855:
! 1856: bzero(peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len);
! 1857: xfree(peer_confirm_hash);
! 1858:
! 1859: buffer_clear(m);
! 1860: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
! 1861:
! 1862: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
! 1863: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, m);
! 1864:
! 1865: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 1);
! 1866:
! 1867: auth_method = "jpake-01@openssh.com";
! 1868: return authenticated;
! 1869: }
! 1870:
! 1871: #endif /* JPAKE */
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