Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c, Revision 1.103
1.103 ! andreas 1: /* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.102 2009/05/25 06:48:01 andreas Exp $ */
1.1 provos 2: /*
3: * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
4: * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
5: * All rights reserved.
6: *
7: * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8: * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9: * are met:
10: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12: * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14: * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15: *
16: * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
17: * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
18: * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
19: * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
20: * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
21: * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
22: * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
23: * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
24: * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
25: * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
26: */
27:
1.67 stevesk 28: #include <sys/types.h>
29: #include <sys/wait.h>
1.79 stevesk 30: #include <sys/socket.h>
1.85 deraadt 31: #include <sys/tree.h>
1.83 stevesk 32: #include <sys/param.h>
1.95 djm 33: #include <sys/queue.h>
1.1 provos 34:
1.78 stevesk 35: #include <openssl/dh.h>
36:
1.81 stevesk 37: #include <errno.h>
1.80 stevesk 38: #include <fcntl.h>
1.65 stevesk 39: #include <paths.h>
1.78 stevesk 40: #include <pwd.h>
1.68 stevesk 41: #include <signal.h>
1.84 stevesk 42: #include <stdlib.h>
1.82 stevesk 43: #include <string.h>
1.1 provos 44:
45:
1.85 deraadt 46: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.1 provos 47: #include "ssh.h"
1.85 deraadt 48: #include "key.h"
49: #include "buffer.h"
50: #include "hostfile.h"
1.1 provos 51: #include "auth.h"
1.85 deraadt 52: #include "cipher.h"
1.1 provos 53: #include "kex.h"
54: #include "dh.h"
1.88 miod 55: #include <zlib.h>
1.1 provos 56: #include "packet.h"
57: #include "auth-options.h"
58: #include "sshpty.h"
59: #include "channels.h"
60: #include "session.h"
61: #include "sshlogin.h"
62: #include "canohost.h"
63: #include "log.h"
64: #include "servconf.h"
65: #include "monitor.h"
66: #include "monitor_mm.h"
1.85 deraadt 67: #ifdef GSSAPI
68: #include "ssh-gss.h"
69: #endif
1.1 provos 70: #include "monitor_wrap.h"
71: #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
72: #include "misc.h"
73: #include "compat.h"
74: #include "ssh2.h"
1.100 djm 75: #include "jpake.h"
1.1 provos 76:
1.46 markus 77: #ifdef GSSAPI
78: static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
79: #endif
80:
1.1 provos 81: /* Imports */
82: extern ServerOptions options;
83: extern u_int utmp_len;
84: extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
85: extern z_stream incoming_stream;
86: extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
87: extern u_char session_id[];
88: extern Buffer auth_debug;
89: extern int auth_debug_init;
1.61 dtucker 90: extern Buffer loginmsg;
1.1 provos 91:
92: /* State exported from the child */
93:
94: struct {
95: z_stream incoming;
96: z_stream outgoing;
97: u_char *keyin;
98: u_int keyinlen;
99: u_char *keyout;
100: u_int keyoutlen;
101: u_char *ivin;
102: u_int ivinlen;
103: u_char *ivout;
104: u_int ivoutlen;
1.15 markus 105: u_char *ssh1key;
106: u_int ssh1keylen;
1.1 provos 107: int ssh1cipher;
108: int ssh1protoflags;
109: u_char *input;
110: u_int ilen;
111: u_char *output;
112: u_int olen;
1.103 ! andreas 113: u_int64_t sent_bytes;
! 114: u_int64_t recv_bytes;
1.1 provos 115: } child_state;
116:
1.43 markus 117: /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
1.1 provos 118:
119: int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
120: int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
121: int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
1.10 djm 122: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
1.1 provos 123: int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
124: int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
125: int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
126: int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
127: int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
128: int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
129: int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
130: int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
131: int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
132: int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
133: int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
134: int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
135: int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
136: int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
137: int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
138: int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
1.100 djm 139: int mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int, Buffer *);
140: int mm_answer_jpake_step1(int, Buffer *);
141: int mm_answer_jpake_step2(int, Buffer *);
142: int mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int, Buffer *);
143: int mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int, Buffer *);
1.1 provos 144:
1.46 markus 145: #ifdef GSSAPI
146: int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
147: int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
148: int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
1.52 markus 149: int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
1.46 markus 150: #endif
1.25 itojun 151:
1.1 provos 152: static Authctxt *authctxt;
153: static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
154:
155: /* local state for key verify */
156: static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
157: static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
158: static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
1.26 markus 159: static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
160: static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
1.1 provos 161: static char *auth_method = "unknown";
1.44 markus 162: static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
1.13 markus 163: static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
1.40 markus 164: static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
1.1 provos 165:
166: struct mon_table {
167: enum monitor_reqtype type;
168: int flags;
169: int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
170: };
171:
172: #define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
173: #define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
174: #define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
1.77 dtucker 175: #define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
1.1 provos 176:
177: #define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
178:
179: #define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
180:
181: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
182: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
183: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
184: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
185: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
1.10 djm 186: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
1.1 provos 187: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
188: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 189: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.1 provos 190: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
191: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
1.46 markus 192: #ifdef GSSAPI
193: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
194: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
195: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
1.52 markus 196: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
1.46 markus 197: #endif
1.100 djm 198: #ifdef JPAKE
199: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata},
200: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_jpake_step1},
201: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_step2},
202: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm},
203: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm},
204: #endif
1.1 provos 205: {0, 0, NULL}
206: };
207:
208: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
209: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
210: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
211: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
212: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
213: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
214: {0, 0, NULL}
215: };
216:
217: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
218: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
219: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
220: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
221: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
1.77 dtucker 222: {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
223: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
1.1 provos 224: {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
225: {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
226: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 227: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.1 provos 228: {0, 0, NULL}
229: };
230:
231: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
232: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
233: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
234: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
235: {0, 0, NULL}
236: };
237:
238: struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
239:
240: /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
241:
242: static void
243: monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
244: {
245: while (ent->f != NULL) {
246: if (ent->type == type) {
247: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
248: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
249: return;
250: }
251: ent++;
252: }
253: }
254:
255: static void
256: monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
257: {
258: struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
259:
260: while (ent->f != NULL) {
261: if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
262: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
263: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
264: }
265: ent++;
266: }
267: }
268:
1.50 markus 269: void
270: monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 271: {
272: struct mon_table *ent;
273: int authenticated = 0;
274:
275: debug3("preauth child monitor started");
276:
1.50 markus 277: authctxt = _authctxt;
278: memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
279:
1.1 provos 280: if (compat20) {
281: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
282:
283: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
284: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
285: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
286: } else {
287: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
288:
289: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
290: }
291:
292: /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
293: while (!authenticated) {
1.77 dtucker 294: auth_method = "unknown";
1.89 markus 295: authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
1.1 provos 296: if (authenticated) {
297: if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
298: fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
1.14 markus 299: __func__, ent->type);
1.1 provos 300: if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
301: !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
302: authenticated = 0;
303: }
304:
1.77 dtucker 305: if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
1.1 provos 306: auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, auth_method,
307: compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
308: if (!authenticated)
309: authctxt->failures++;
310: }
1.100 djm 311: #ifdef JPAKE
312: /* Cleanup JPAKE context after authentication */
313: if (ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE) {
314: if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL) {
315: jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
316: authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
317: }
318: }
319: #endif
1.1 provos 320: }
321:
322: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 323: fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
1.77 dtucker 324: if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
325: fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
1.1 provos 326:
327: debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
1.14 markus 328: __func__, authctxt->user);
1.1 provos 329:
1.11 mouring 330: mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
1.1 provos 331: }
332:
1.40 markus 333: static void
334: monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
335: {
336: monitor_child_pid = pid;
337: }
338:
339: static void
1.59 avsm 340: monitor_child_handler(int sig)
1.40 markus 341: {
1.59 avsm 342: kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
1.40 markus 343: }
344:
1.1 provos 345: void
1.11 mouring 346: monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 347: {
1.40 markus 348: monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
349: signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
350: signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
1.91 djm 351: signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
1.40 markus 352:
1.1 provos 353: if (compat20) {
354: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
355:
356: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
357: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
358: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
359: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
360: } else {
361: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
362: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
363: }
364: if (!no_pty_flag) {
365: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
366: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
367: }
368:
369: for (;;)
1.11 mouring 370: monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
1.1 provos 371: }
372:
373: void
1.11 mouring 374: monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 375: {
1.16 djm 376: if (options.compression) {
377: /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
378: mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
379: }
1.1 provos 380: }
381:
382: int
1.11 mouring 383: monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
1.1 provos 384: struct mon_table **pent)
385: {
386: Buffer m;
387: int ret;
388: u_char type;
389:
390: buffer_init(&m);
391:
1.11 mouring 392: mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 393: type = buffer_get_char(&m);
394:
1.14 markus 395: debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 396:
397: while (ent->f != NULL) {
398: if (ent->type == type)
399: break;
400: ent++;
401: }
402:
403: if (ent->f != NULL) {
404: if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
1.14 markus 405: fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
1.1 provos 406: type);
1.11 mouring 407: ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 408: buffer_free(&m);
409:
410: /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
411: if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
1.14 markus 412: debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
1.1 provos 413: type);
414: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
415: }
416:
417: if (pent != NULL)
418: *pent = ent;
1.3 markus 419:
1.1 provos 420: return ret;
421: }
422:
1.14 markus 423: fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 424:
425: /* NOTREACHED */
426: return (-1);
427: }
428:
429: /* allowed key state */
430: static int
431: monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
432: {
433: /* make sure key is allowed */
434: if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
435: memcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
436: return (0);
437: return (1);
438: }
439:
440: static void
441: monitor_reset_key_state(void)
442: {
443: /* reset state */
444: if (key_blob != NULL)
445: xfree(key_blob);
446: if (hostbased_cuser != NULL)
447: xfree(hostbased_cuser);
448: if (hostbased_chost != NULL)
449: xfree(hostbased_chost);
450: key_blob = NULL;
451: key_bloblen = 0;
452: key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
453: hostbased_cuser = NULL;
454: hostbased_chost = NULL;
455: }
456:
457: int
1.59 avsm 458: mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 459: {
460: DH *dh;
461: int min, want, max;
462:
463: min = buffer_get_int(m);
464: want = buffer_get_int(m);
465: max = buffer_get_int(m);
466:
467: debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 468: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 469: /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
470: if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
471: fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 472: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 473:
474: buffer_clear(m);
475:
476: dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
477: if (dh == NULL) {
478: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
479: return (0);
480: } else {
481: /* Send first bignum */
482: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
483: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
484: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
1.3 markus 485:
1.1 provos 486: DH_free(dh);
487: }
1.59 avsm 488: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
1.1 provos 489: return (0);
490: }
491:
492: int
1.59 avsm 493: mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 494: {
495: Key *key;
496: u_char *p;
497: u_char *signature;
498: u_int siglen, datlen;
499: int keyid;
1.3 markus 500:
1.14 markus 501: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 502:
1.3 markus 503: keyid = buffer_get_int(m);
504: p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen);
1.1 provos 505:
1.69 djm 506: /*
1.71 deraadt 507: * Supported KEX types will only return SHA1 (20 byte) or
1.69 djm 508: * SHA256 (32 byte) hashes
509: */
510: if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32)
1.19 deraadt 511: fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %u", __func__, datlen);
1.1 provos 512:
1.13 markus 513: /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
514: if (session_id2_len == 0) {
515: session_id2_len = datlen;
516: session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
517: memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
518: }
519:
1.1 provos 520: if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 521: fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
1.1 provos 522: if (key_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen) < 0)
1.14 markus 523: fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 524:
1.19 deraadt 525: debug3("%s: signature %p(%u)", __func__, signature, siglen);
1.1 provos 526:
527: buffer_clear(m);
528: buffer_put_string(m, signature, siglen);
529:
530: xfree(p);
531: xfree(signature);
532:
1.59 avsm 533: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
1.1 provos 534:
535: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
536: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
537:
538: return (0);
539: }
540:
541: /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
542:
543: int
1.59 avsm 544: mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 545: {
1.60 dtucker 546: char *username;
1.1 provos 547: struct passwd *pwent;
548: int allowed = 0;
1.3 markus 549:
1.14 markus 550: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 551:
552: if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
1.14 markus 553: fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
1.1 provos 554:
1.60 dtucker 555: username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.1 provos 556:
1.60 dtucker 557: pwent = getpwnamallow(username);
1.1 provos 558:
1.60 dtucker 559: authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
560: setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
561: xfree(username);
1.1 provos 562:
563: buffer_clear(m);
564:
565: if (pwent == NULL) {
566: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
1.53 djm 567: authctxt->pw = fakepw();
1.1 provos 568: goto out;
569: }
570:
571: allowed = 1;
1.4 markus 572: authctxt->pw = pwent;
1.1 provos 573: authctxt->valid = 1;
574:
575: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
576: buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
577: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
578: buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
579: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
580: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
581: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
582: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
1.94 dtucker 583:
584: out:
1.90 dtucker 585: buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
586: if (options.banner != NULL)
587: buffer_put_cstring(m, options.banner);
1.14 markus 588: debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
1.59 avsm 589: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
1.1 provos 590:
591: /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
592: if (!compat20)
593: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
1.10 djm 594: else {
1.1 provos 595: /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
596: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
1.10 djm 597: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
598: }
599:
600:
601: return (0);
602: }
603:
1.59 avsm 604: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.10 djm 605: {
606: char *banner;
607:
608: buffer_clear(m);
609: banner = auth2_read_banner();
610: buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
1.59 avsm 611: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
1.1 provos 612:
1.10 djm 613: if (banner != NULL)
1.21 deraadt 614: xfree(banner);
1.1 provos 615:
616: return (0);
617: }
618:
619: int
1.59 avsm 620: mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 621: {
622: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
623:
624: authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
625: authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.6 stevesk 626: debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
1.14 markus 627: __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
1.6 stevesk 628:
1.1 provos 629: if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
630: xfree(authctxt->style);
631: authctxt->style = NULL;
632: }
633:
634: return (0);
635: }
636:
637: int
1.59 avsm 638: mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 639: {
640: static int call_count;
641: char *passwd;
1.22 stevesk 642: int authenticated;
643: u_int plen;
1.1 provos 644:
645: passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
646: /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
1.12 markus 647: authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
1.48 markus 648: auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
1.1 provos 649: memset(passwd, 0, strlen(passwd));
650: xfree(passwd);
651:
652: buffer_clear(m);
653: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
654:
1.14 markus 655: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 656: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
1.1 provos 657:
658: call_count++;
659: if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
660: auth_method = "none";
661: else
662: auth_method = "password";
663:
664: /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
665: return (authenticated);
666: }
667:
668: int
1.59 avsm 669: mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 670: {
671: char *name, *infotxt;
672: u_int numprompts;
673: u_int *echo_on;
674: char **prompts;
1.31 markus 675: u_int success;
1.1 provos 676:
1.31 markus 677: success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
678: &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
1.1 provos 679:
680: buffer_clear(m);
1.31 markus 681: buffer_put_int(m, success);
682: if (success)
1.1 provos 683: buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
684:
1.31 markus 685: debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
1.59 avsm 686: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
1.1 provos 687:
1.31 markus 688: if (success) {
1.1 provos 689: xfree(name);
690: xfree(infotxt);
691: xfree(prompts);
692: xfree(echo_on);
693: }
694:
695: return (0);
696: }
697:
698: int
1.59 avsm 699: mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 700: {
701: char *response;
702: int authok;
703:
704: if (authctxt->as == 0)
1.14 markus 705: fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
1.1 provos 706:
707: response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.12 markus 708: authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
709: auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
1.1 provos 710: authctxt->as = NULL;
1.14 markus 711: debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
1.1 provos 712: xfree(response);
713:
714: buffer_clear(m);
715: buffer_put_int(m, authok);
716:
1.14 markus 717: debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
1.59 avsm 718: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
1.1 provos 719:
720: auth_method = "bsdauth";
721:
722: return (authok != 0);
723: }
724:
725:
1.2 markus 726: static void
1.1 provos 727: mm_append_debug(Buffer *m)
728: {
729: if (auth_debug_init && buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
1.14 markus 730: debug3("%s: Appending debug messages for child", __func__);
1.1 provos 731: buffer_append(m, buffer_ptr(&auth_debug),
732: buffer_len(&auth_debug));
733: buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
734: }
735: }
736:
737: int
1.59 avsm 738: mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 739: {
740: Key *key;
1.26 markus 741: char *cuser, *chost;
742: u_char *blob;
1.1 provos 743: u_int bloblen;
744: enum mm_keytype type = 0;
745: int allowed = 0;
746:
1.14 markus 747: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.3 markus 748:
1.1 provos 749: type = buffer_get_int(m);
750: cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
751: chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
752: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
753:
754: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
755:
756: if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
757: (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
1.14 markus 758: fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 759:
1.14 markus 760: debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
1.1 provos 761:
1.51 djm 762: if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
1.63 deraadt 763: switch (type) {
1.1 provos 764: case MM_USERKEY:
1.12 markus 765: allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
766: user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
1.77 dtucker 767: auth_method = "publickey";
1.97 dtucker 768: if (options.pubkey_authentication && allowed != 1)
769: auth_clear_options();
1.1 provos 770: break;
771: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1.12 markus 772: allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
773: hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 774: cuser, chost, key);
1.77 dtucker 775: auth_method = "hostbased";
1.1 provos 776: break;
777: case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
778: key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
1.12 markus 779: allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
780: auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 781: cuser, chost, key);
1.97 dtucker 782: if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
783: auth_clear_options();
1.77 dtucker 784: auth_method = "rsa";
1.1 provos 785: break;
786: default:
1.14 markus 787: fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 788: break;
789: }
1.33 markus 790: }
791: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 792: key_free(key);
793:
794: /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
795: monitor_reset_key_state();
796:
797: if (allowed) {
798: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
799: key_blob = blob;
800: key_bloblen = bloblen;
801: key_blobtype = type;
802: hostbased_cuser = cuser;
803: hostbased_chost = chost;
1.72 djm 804: } else {
1.77 dtucker 805: /* Log failed attempt */
806: auth_log(authctxt, 0, auth_method, compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
1.72 djm 807: xfree(blob);
808: xfree(cuser);
809: xfree(chost);
1.1 provos 810: }
811:
812: debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
1.98 dtucker 813: __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
1.1 provos 814:
815: buffer_clear(m);
816: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 817: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 818:
819: mm_append_debug(m);
820:
1.59 avsm 821: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 822:
823: if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
824: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
825:
826: return (0);
827: }
828:
829: static int
830: monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
831: {
832: Buffer b;
1.26 markus 833: char *p;
1.1 provos 834: u_int len;
835: int fail = 0;
836:
837: buffer_init(&b);
838: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 839:
1.1 provos 840: if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
1.13 markus 841: p = buffer_ptr(&b);
842: len = buffer_len(&b);
843: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
844: (len < session_id2_len) ||
845: (memcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
846: fail++;
1.1 provos 847: buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
848: } else {
1.13 markus 849: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
850: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
851: (len != session_id2_len) ||
852: (memcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 853: fail++;
1.13 markus 854: xfree(p);
1.1 provos 855: }
856: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
857: fail++;
858: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
859: if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 860: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.1 provos 861: authctxt->user, p);
862: fail++;
863: }
864: xfree(p);
865: buffer_skip_string(&b);
866: if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
867: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
868: fail++;
869: } else {
870: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
871: if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
872: fail++;
873: xfree(p);
874: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
875: fail++;
876: buffer_skip_string(&b);
877: }
878: buffer_skip_string(&b);
879: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
880: fail++;
881: buffer_free(&b);
882: return (fail == 0);
883: }
884:
885: static int
1.26 markus 886: monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
887: char *chost)
1.1 provos 888: {
889: Buffer b;
1.26 markus 890: char *p;
1.1 provos 891: u_int len;
892: int fail = 0;
893:
894: buffer_init(&b);
895: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 896:
1.13 markus 897: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
898: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
899: (len != session_id2_len) ||
900: (memcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 901: fail++;
1.13 markus 902: xfree(p);
903:
1.1 provos 904: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
905: fail++;
906: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
907: if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 908: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.1 provos 909: authctxt->user, p);
910: fail++;
911: }
912: xfree(p);
913: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */
914: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
915: if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
916: fail++;
917: xfree(p);
918: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkalg */
919: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkblob */
920:
921: /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
922: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
923: if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
924: p[len - 1] = '\0';
925: if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
926: fail++;
927: xfree(p);
928:
929: /* verify client user */
930: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
931: if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
932: fail++;
933: xfree(p);
934:
935: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
936: fail++;
937: buffer_free(&b);
938: return (fail == 0);
939: }
940:
941: int
1.59 avsm 942: mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 943: {
944: Key *key;
945: u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
946: u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
947: int verified = 0;
948: int valid_data = 0;
949:
950: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
951: signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
952: data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
953:
954: if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
1.8 mouring 955: !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
1.14 markus 956: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 957:
958: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
959: if (key == NULL)
1.14 markus 960: fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 961:
962: switch (key_blobtype) {
963: case MM_USERKEY:
964: valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
965: break;
966: case MM_HOSTKEY:
967: valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
968: hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
969: break;
970: default:
971: valid_data = 0;
972: break;
973: }
974: if (!valid_data)
1.14 markus 975: fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 976:
977: verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
978: debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
1.89 markus 979: __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
1.1 provos 980:
981: key_free(key);
982: xfree(blob);
983: xfree(signature);
984: xfree(data);
985:
1.17 stevesk 986: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
987:
1.1 provos 988: monitor_reset_key_state();
1.3 markus 989:
1.1 provos 990: buffer_clear(m);
991: buffer_put_int(m, verified);
1.59 avsm 992: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
1.1 provos 993:
1.89 markus 994: return (verified == 1);
1.1 provos 995: }
996:
1.2 markus 997: static void
1.1 provos 998: mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
999: {
1000: socklen_t fromlen;
1001: struct sockaddr_storage from;
1002:
1003: /*
1004: * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
1005: * the address be 0.0.0.0.
1006: */
1007: memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
1.24 stevesk 1008: fromlen = sizeof(from);
1.1 provos 1009: if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
1010: if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
1.74 deraadt 1011: (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
1.1 provos 1012: debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1.50 markus 1013: cleanup_exit(255);
1.1 provos 1014: }
1015: }
1016: /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
1017: record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
1.42 markus 1018: get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
1.24 stevesk 1019: (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
1.1 provos 1020: }
1021:
1022: static void
1023: mm_session_close(Session *s)
1024: {
1.41 djm 1025: debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
1.1 provos 1026: if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1.86 stevesk 1027: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
1.1 provos 1028: session_pty_cleanup2(s);
1029: }
1.96 djm 1030: session_unused(s->self);
1.1 provos 1031: }
1032:
1033: int
1.59 avsm 1034: mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1035: {
1.11 mouring 1036: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1037: Session *s;
1038: int res, fd0;
1039:
1.14 markus 1040: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1041:
1042: buffer_clear(m);
1043: s = session_new();
1044: if (s == NULL)
1045: goto error;
1046: s->authctxt = authctxt;
1047: s->pw = authctxt->pw;
1.11 mouring 1048: s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
1.1 provos 1049: res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
1050: if (res == 0)
1051: goto error;
1052: pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
1053:
1054: buffer_put_int(m, 1);
1055: buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
1056:
1057: /* We need to trick ttyslot */
1058: if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
1.14 markus 1059: fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
1.1 provos 1060:
1061: mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
1062:
1063: /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
1064: close(0);
1.61 dtucker 1065:
1066: /* send messages generated by record_login */
1067: buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
1068: buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
1069:
1070: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1071:
1.92 djm 1072: if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
1073: mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
1074: fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1075:
1076: /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
1077: if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
1.14 markus 1078: fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1079: if (fd0 != 0)
1.14 markus 1080: error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
1.1 provos 1081:
1082: /* slave is not needed */
1083: close(s->ttyfd);
1084: s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
1085: /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
1086: s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
1087:
1.86 stevesk 1088: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
1.1 provos 1089:
1090: return (0);
1091:
1092: error:
1093: if (s != NULL)
1094: mm_session_close(s);
1095: buffer_put_int(m, 0);
1.59 avsm 1096: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1.1 provos 1097: return (0);
1098: }
1099:
1100: int
1.59 avsm 1101: mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1102: {
1103: Session *s;
1104: char *tty;
1105:
1.14 markus 1106: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1107:
1108: tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1109: if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
1110: mm_session_close(s);
1111: buffer_clear(m);
1112: xfree(tty);
1113: return (0);
1114: }
1115:
1116: int
1.59 avsm 1117: mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1118: {
1119: BIGNUM *p;
1120: int rsafail;
1121:
1122: /* Turn off permissions */
1.62 dtucker 1123: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
1.1 provos 1124:
1125: if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1126: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1127:
1128: buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
1129:
1130: rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
1131:
1132: buffer_clear(m);
1133: buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
1134: buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
1135:
1136: BN_clear_free(p);
1137:
1.59 avsm 1138: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
1.1 provos 1139:
1140: /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
1141: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
1142:
1143: return (0);
1144: }
1145:
1146: int
1.59 avsm 1147: mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1148: {
1149: int i;
1150:
1.14 markus 1151: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1152:
1153: if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
1.14 markus 1154: fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
1.1 provos 1155: for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1156: session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
1157:
1158: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
1159: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
1160:
1161: return (0);
1162: }
1163:
1164: int
1.59 avsm 1165: mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1166: {
1167: BIGNUM *client_n;
1168: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1169: u_char *blob = NULL;
1170: u_int blen = 0;
1.1 provos 1171: int allowed = 0;
1172:
1.14 markus 1173: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1174:
1.77 dtucker 1175: auth_method = "rsa";
1.12 markus 1176: if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
1.1 provos 1177: if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1178: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1179: buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
1180: allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
1181: BN_clear_free(client_n);
1182: }
1183: buffer_clear(m);
1184: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 1185: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 1186:
1187: /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
1188: monitor_reset_key_state();
1189:
1190: if (allowed && key != NULL) {
1191: key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */
1192: if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
1.14 markus 1193: fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1194: buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
1195:
1196: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1197: key_blob = blob;
1198: key_bloblen = blen;
1199: key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
1.33 markus 1200: }
1201: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 1202: key_free(key);
1203:
1204: mm_append_debug(m);
1205:
1.59 avsm 1206: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 1207:
1208: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
1209: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
1210: return (0);
1211: }
1212:
1213: int
1.59 avsm 1214: mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1215: {
1216: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1217: u_char *blob;
1218: u_int blen;
1.1 provos 1219:
1.14 markus 1220: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1221:
1222: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1223: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1224: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1225: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1226: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1227: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1228: fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 1229: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1230: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.101 djm 1231: if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
1232: fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
1233: key->type = KEY_RSA1;
1.1 provos 1234: if (ssh1_challenge)
1235: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1236: ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
1237:
1238: buffer_clear(m);
1239: buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
1240:
1.14 markus 1241: debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
1.59 avsm 1242: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
1.1 provos 1243:
1244: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
1.33 markus 1245:
1246: xfree(blob);
1247: key_free(key);
1.1 provos 1248: return (0);
1249: }
1250:
1251: int
1.59 avsm 1252: mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1253: {
1254: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1255: u_char *blob, *response;
1256: u_int blen, len;
1257: int success;
1.1 provos 1258:
1.14 markus 1259: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1260:
1261: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1262: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1263: if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
1.14 markus 1264: fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1265:
1266: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1267: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1268: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1269: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1270: fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
1.1 provos 1271: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1272: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.1 provos 1273: response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1274: if (len != 16)
1.14 markus 1275: fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1276: success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
1277:
1.33 markus 1278: xfree(blob);
1.1 provos 1279: key_free(key);
1280: xfree(response);
1281:
1282: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
1283:
1284: /* reset state */
1285: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1286: ssh1_challenge = NULL;
1287: monitor_reset_key_state();
1288:
1289: buffer_clear(m);
1290: buffer_put_int(m, success);
1.59 avsm 1291: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
1.1 provos 1292:
1293: return (success);
1294: }
1295:
1296: int
1.59 avsm 1297: mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
1.1 provos 1298: {
1.11 mouring 1299: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1300: int res, status;
1301:
1.14 markus 1302: debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
1.1 provos 1303:
1304: /* The child is terminating */
1305: session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
1306:
1.11 mouring 1307: while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
1.9 markus 1308: if (errno != EINTR)
1309: exit(1);
1.1 provos 1310:
1311: res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
1312:
1313: /* Terminate process */
1.57 deraadt 1314: exit(res);
1.1 provos 1315: }
1316:
1317: void
1.11 mouring 1318: monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1319: {
1320: if (compat20) {
1321: set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
1322: set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
1323: } else {
1324: packet_set_protocol_flags(child_state.ssh1protoflags);
1.15 markus 1325: packet_set_encryption_key(child_state.ssh1key,
1326: child_state.ssh1keylen, child_state.ssh1cipher);
1327: xfree(child_state.ssh1key);
1.1 provos 1328: }
1329:
1.15 markus 1330: /* for rc4 and other stateful ciphers */
1.1 provos 1331: packet_set_keycontext(MODE_OUT, child_state.keyout);
1332: xfree(child_state.keyout);
1333: packet_set_keycontext(MODE_IN, child_state.keyin);
1334: xfree(child_state.keyin);
1335:
1336: if (!compat20) {
1337: packet_set_iv(MODE_OUT, child_state.ivout);
1338: xfree(child_state.ivout);
1339: packet_set_iv(MODE_IN, child_state.ivin);
1340: xfree(child_state.ivin);
1341: }
1342:
1343: memcpy(&incoming_stream, &child_state.incoming,
1344: sizeof(incoming_stream));
1345: memcpy(&outgoing_stream, &child_state.outgoing,
1346: sizeof(outgoing_stream));
1.3 markus 1347:
1.1 provos 1348: /* Update with new address */
1.16 djm 1349: if (options.compression)
1350: mm_init_compression(pmonitor->m_zlib);
1.1 provos 1351:
1352: /* Network I/O buffers */
1353: /* XXX inefficient for large buffers, need: buffer_init_from_string */
1.102 andreas 1354: buffer_clear(packet_get_input());
1355: buffer_append(packet_get_input(), child_state.input, child_state.ilen);
1.1 provos 1356: memset(child_state.input, 0, child_state.ilen);
1357: xfree(child_state.input);
1358:
1.102 andreas 1359: buffer_clear(packet_get_output());
1360: buffer_append(packet_get_output(), child_state.output,
1361: child_state.olen);
1.1 provos 1362: memset(child_state.output, 0, child_state.olen);
1363: xfree(child_state.output);
1.103 ! andreas 1364:
! 1365: /* Roaming */
! 1366: if (compat20)
! 1367: roam_set_bytes(child_state.sent_bytes, child_state.recv_bytes);
1.1 provos 1368: }
1369:
1.2 markus 1370: static Kex *
1.1 provos 1371: mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
1372: {
1373: Kex *kex;
1374: void *blob;
1375: u_int bloblen;
1376:
1.75 djm 1377: kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex));
1.1 provos 1378: kex->session_id = buffer_get_string(m, &kex->session_id_len);
1.13 markus 1379: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1380: (kex->session_id_len != session_id2_len) ||
1381: (memcmp(kex->session_id, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1382: fatal("mm_get_get: internal error: bad session id");
1.1 provos 1383: kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m);
1.34 markus 1384: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1.58 djm 1385: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1.34 markus 1386: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1.69 djm 1387: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
1.1 provos 1388: kex->server = 1;
1389: kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
1390: kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
1391: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1392: buffer_init(&kex->my);
1393: buffer_append(&kex->my, blob, bloblen);
1394: xfree(blob);
1395: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1396: buffer_init(&kex->peer);
1397: buffer_append(&kex->peer, blob, bloblen);
1398: xfree(blob);
1399: kex->done = 1;
1400: kex->flags = buffer_get_int(m);
1401: kex->client_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1402: kex->server_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1403: kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type;
1404: kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1405:
1406: return (kex);
1407: }
1408:
1409: /* This function requries careful sanity checking */
1410:
1411: void
1.11 mouring 1412: mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1413: {
1414: Buffer m;
1415: u_char *blob, *p;
1416: u_int bloblen, plen;
1.37 markus 1417: u_int32_t seqnr, packets;
1.99 markus 1418: u_int64_t blocks, bytes;
1.1 provos 1419:
1.14 markus 1420: debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
1.1 provos 1421:
1422: buffer_init(&m);
1.11 mouring 1423: mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
1.1 provos 1424: if (!compat20) {
1425: child_state.ssh1protoflags = buffer_get_int(&m);
1426: child_state.ssh1cipher = buffer_get_int(&m);
1.15 markus 1427: child_state.ssh1key = buffer_get_string(&m,
1428: &child_state.ssh1keylen);
1.1 provos 1429: child_state.ivout = buffer_get_string(&m,
1430: &child_state.ivoutlen);
1431: child_state.ivin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ivinlen);
1432: goto skip;
1433: } else {
1434: /* Get the Kex for rekeying */
1.11 mouring 1435: *pmonitor->m_pkex = mm_get_kex(&m);
1.1 provos 1436: }
1437:
1438: blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
1439: current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1440: xfree(blob);
1441:
1.14 markus 1442: debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
1.1 provos 1443: blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
1444: current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1445: xfree(blob);
1.3 markus 1446:
1.1 provos 1447: /* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
1.37 markus 1448: seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
1449: blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1450: packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
1.99 markus 1451: bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1452: packet_set_state(MODE_OUT, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
1.37 markus 1453: seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
1454: blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1455: packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
1.99 markus 1456: bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1457: packet_set_state(MODE_IN, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
1.1 provos 1458:
1459: skip:
1460: /* Get the key context */
1461: child_state.keyout = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyoutlen);
1462: child_state.keyin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyinlen);
1463:
1.14 markus 1464: debug3("%s: Getting compression state", __func__);
1.1 provos 1465: /* Get compression state */
1466: p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
1467: if (plen != sizeof(child_state.outgoing))
1.14 markus 1468: fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
1.1 provos 1469: memcpy(&child_state.outgoing, p, sizeof(child_state.outgoing));
1470: xfree(p);
1471:
1472: p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
1473: if (plen != sizeof(child_state.incoming))
1.14 markus 1474: fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
1.1 provos 1475: memcpy(&child_state.incoming, p, sizeof(child_state.incoming));
1476: xfree(p);
1477:
1478: /* Network I/O buffers */
1.14 markus 1479: debug3("%s: Getting Network I/O buffers", __func__);
1.1 provos 1480: child_state.input = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ilen);
1481: child_state.output = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.olen);
1.103 ! andreas 1482:
! 1483: /* Roaming */
! 1484: if (compat20) {
! 1485: child_state.sent_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
! 1486: child_state.recv_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
! 1487: }
1.1 provos 1488:
1489: buffer_free(&m);
1490: }
1491:
1492:
1493: /* Allocation functions for zlib */
1494: void *
1495: mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
1496: {
1.30 markus 1497: size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
1.1 provos 1498: void *address;
1499:
1.23 millert 1500: if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_T_MAX / size)
1.18 deraadt 1501: fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
1502:
1503: address = mm_malloc(mm, len);
1.1 provos 1504:
1505: return (address);
1506: }
1507:
1508: void
1509: mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
1510: {
1511: mm_free(mm, address);
1512: }
1513:
1514: void
1515: mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *mm)
1516: {
1517: outgoing_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
1518: outgoing_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
1519: outgoing_stream.opaque = mm;
1520:
1521: incoming_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
1522: incoming_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
1523: incoming_stream.opaque = mm;
1524: }
1525:
1526: /* XXX */
1527:
1528: #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
1529: if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) \
1530: fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
1531: } while (0)
1532:
1.2 markus 1533: static void
1.1 provos 1534: monitor_socketpair(int *pair)
1.3 markus 1535: {
1.1 provos 1536: if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
1.14 markus 1537: fatal("%s: socketpair", __func__);
1.1 provos 1538: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1539: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1540: }
1541:
1542: #define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
1543:
1544: struct monitor *
1545: monitor_init(void)
1546: {
1547: struct monitor *mon;
1548: int pair[2];
1549:
1.75 djm 1550: mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
1.1 provos 1551:
1552: monitor_socketpair(pair);
1553:
1554: mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1555: mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1556:
1557: /* Used to share zlib space across processes */
1.16 djm 1558: if (options.compression) {
1559: mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
1560: mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
1.1 provos 1561:
1.16 djm 1562: /* Compression needs to share state across borders */
1563: mm_init_compression(mon->m_zlib);
1564: }
1.1 provos 1565:
1566: return mon;
1567: }
1568:
1569: void
1570: monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
1571: {
1572: int pair[2];
1573:
1574: monitor_socketpair(pair);
1575:
1576: mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1577: mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1578: }
1.46 markus 1579:
1580: #ifdef GSSAPI
1581: int
1.59 avsm 1582: mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1583: {
1.59 avsm 1584: gss_OID_desc goid;
1.46 markus 1585: OM_uint32 major;
1586: u_int len;
1587:
1.59 avsm 1588: goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1589: goid.length = len;
1.46 markus 1590:
1.59 avsm 1591: major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
1.46 markus 1592:
1.59 avsm 1593: xfree(goid.elements);
1.46 markus 1594:
1595: buffer_clear(m);
1596: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1597:
1.64 stevesk 1598: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
1.46 markus 1599:
1600: /* Now we have a context, enable the step */
1601: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
1602:
1603: return (0);
1604: }
1605:
1606: int
1.59 avsm 1607: mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1608: {
1609: gss_buffer_desc in;
1610: gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1.64 stevesk 1611: OM_uint32 major, minor;
1.46 markus 1612: OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
1.47 deraadt 1613: u_int len;
1.46 markus 1614:
1.47 deraadt 1615: in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1616: in.length = len;
1.46 markus 1617: major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
1618: xfree(in.value);
1619:
1620: buffer_clear(m);
1621: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1622: buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
1623: buffer_put_int(m, flags);
1.59 avsm 1624: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
1.46 markus 1625:
1626: gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
1627:
1.64 stevesk 1628: if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1.46 markus 1629: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
1630: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.52 markus 1631: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
1.46 markus 1632: }
1633: return (0);
1634: }
1635:
1636: int
1.59 avsm 1637: mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.52 markus 1638: {
1639: gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
1640: OM_uint32 ret;
1641: u_int len;
1.54 djm 1642:
1.52 markus 1643: gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1644: gssbuf.length = len;
1645: mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1646: mic.length = len;
1.54 djm 1647:
1.52 markus 1648: ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
1.54 djm 1649:
1.52 markus 1650: xfree(gssbuf.value);
1651: xfree(mic.value);
1.54 djm 1652:
1.52 markus 1653: buffer_clear(m);
1654: buffer_put_int(m, ret);
1.54 djm 1655:
1.59 avsm 1656: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
1.54 djm 1657:
1.52 markus 1658: if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
1659: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.54 djm 1660:
1.52 markus 1661: return (0);
1662: }
1663:
1664: int
1.59 avsm 1665: mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1666: {
1667: int authenticated;
1668:
1669: authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
1670:
1671: buffer_clear(m);
1672: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
1673:
1674: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 1675: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
1.46 markus 1676:
1.64 stevesk 1677: auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
1.46 markus 1678:
1679: /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
1680: return (authenticated);
1681: }
1682: #endif /* GSSAPI */
1.100 djm 1683:
1684: #ifdef JPAKE
1685: int
1686: mm_answer_jpake_step1(int sock, Buffer *m)
1687: {
1688: struct jpake_ctx *pctx;
1689: u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof;
1690: u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len;
1691:
1692: if (!options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication)
1693: fatal("zero_knowledge_password_authentication disabled");
1694:
1695: if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL)
1696: fatal("%s: authctxt->jpake_ctx already set (%p)",
1697: __func__, authctxt->jpake_ctx);
1698: authctxt->jpake_ctx = pctx = jpake_new();
1699:
1700: jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
1701: &pctx->server_id, &pctx->server_id_len,
1702: &pctx->x3, &pctx->x4, &pctx->g_x3, &pctx->g_x4,
1703: &x3_proof, &x3_proof_len,
1704: &x4_proof, &x4_proof_len);
1705:
1706: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step1 done in %s", __func__));
1707:
1708: buffer_clear(m);
1709:
1710: buffer_put_string(m, pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
1711: buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x3);
1712: buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x4);
1713: buffer_put_string(m, x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
1714: buffer_put_string(m, x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
1715:
1716: debug3("%s: sending step1", __func__);
1717: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1, m);
1718:
1719: bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
1720: bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
1721: xfree(x3_proof);
1722: xfree(x4_proof);
1723:
1724: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, 1);
1725: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 0);
1726:
1727: return 0;
1728: }
1729:
1730: int
1731: mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int sock, Buffer *m)
1732: {
1733: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1734: char *hash_scheme, *salt;
1735:
1736: if (pctx == NULL)
1737: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1738:
1739: auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(authctxt, &pctx->s, &hash_scheme, &salt);
1740:
1741: buffer_clear(m);
1742: /* pctx->s is sensitive, not returned to slave */
1743: buffer_put_cstring(m, hash_scheme);
1744: buffer_put_cstring(m, salt);
1745:
1746: debug3("%s: sending pwdata", __func__);
1747: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, m);
1748:
1749: bzero(hash_scheme, strlen(hash_scheme));
1750: bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
1751: xfree(hash_scheme);
1752: xfree(salt);
1753:
1754: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, 1);
1755:
1756: return 0;
1757: }
1758:
1759: int
1760: mm_answer_jpake_step2(int sock, Buffer *m)
1761: {
1762: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1763: u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof, *x4_s_proof;
1764: u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len, x4_s_proof_len;
1765:
1766: if (pctx == NULL)
1767: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1768:
1769: if ((pctx->g_x1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
1770: (pctx->g_x2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
1771: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1772: buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x1);
1773: buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x2);
1774: pctx->client_id = buffer_get_string(m, &pctx->client_id_len);
1775: x1_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x1_proof_len);
1776: x2_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_proof_len);
1777:
1778: jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x3,
1779: pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->x4,
1780: pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
1781: pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
1782: x1_proof, x1_proof_len,
1783: x2_proof, x2_proof_len,
1784: &pctx->b,
1785: &x4_s_proof, &x4_s_proof_len);
1786:
1787: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step2 done in %s", __func__));
1788:
1789: bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
1790: bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
1791: xfree(x1_proof);
1792: xfree(x2_proof);
1793:
1794: buffer_clear(m);
1795:
1796: buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->b);
1797: buffer_put_string(m, x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
1798:
1799: debug3("%s: sending step2", __func__);
1800: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2, m);
1801:
1802: bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
1803: xfree(x4_s_proof);
1804:
1805: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, 1);
1806:
1807: return 0;
1808: }
1809:
1810: int
1811: mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
1812: {
1813: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1814: u_char *x2_s_proof;
1815: u_int x2_s_proof_len;
1816:
1817: if (pctx == NULL)
1818: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1819:
1820: if ((pctx->a = BN_new()) == NULL)
1821: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1822: buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->a);
1823: x2_s_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_s_proof_len);
1824:
1825: jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->a,
1826: pctx->x4, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2,
1827: pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
1828: pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
1829: session_id2, session_id2_len,
1830: x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len,
1831: &pctx->k,
1832: &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
1833:
1834: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "key_confirm done in %s", __func__));
1835:
1836: bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
1837: buffer_clear(m);
1838:
1839: /* pctx->k is sensitive, not sent */
1840: buffer_put_string(m, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
1841:
1842: debug3("%s: sending confirmation hash", __func__);
1843: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, m);
1844:
1845: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, 1);
1846:
1847: return 0;
1848: }
1849:
1850: int
1851: mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
1852: {
1853: int authenticated = 0;
1854: u_char *peer_confirm_hash;
1855: u_int peer_confirm_hash_len;
1856: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1857:
1858: if (pctx == NULL)
1859: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1860:
1861: peer_confirm_hash = buffer_get_string(m, &peer_confirm_hash_len);
1862:
1863: authenticated = jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
1864: pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
1865: session_id2, session_id2_len,
1866: peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len) && authctxt->valid;
1867:
1868: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "check_confirm done in %s", __func__));
1869:
1870: bzero(peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len);
1871: xfree(peer_confirm_hash);
1872:
1873: buffer_clear(m);
1874: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
1875:
1876: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1877: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, m);
1878:
1879: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 1);
1880:
1881: auth_method = "jpake-01@openssh.com";
1882: return authenticated;
1883: }
1884:
1885: #endif /* JPAKE */
![[BACK]](/icons/back.gif){kind=icon}
Return to monitor.c CVS log ![[TXT]](/icons/text.gif){kind=icon}
![[DIR]](/icons/dir.gif){kind=icon}
Up to [local] / src / usr.bin / ssh