Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c, Revision 1.115
1.115 ! djm 1: /* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.114 2011/06/17 21:44:30 djm Exp $ */
1.1 provos 2: /*
3: * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
4: * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
5: * All rights reserved.
6: *
7: * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8: * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9: * are met:
10: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12: * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14: * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15: *
16: * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
17: * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
18: * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
19: * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
20: * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
21: * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
22: * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
23: * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
24: * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
25: * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
26: */
27:
1.67 stevesk 28: #include <sys/types.h>
29: #include <sys/wait.h>
1.79 stevesk 30: #include <sys/socket.h>
1.85 deraadt 31: #include <sys/tree.h>
1.83 stevesk 32: #include <sys/param.h>
1.95 djm 33: #include <sys/queue.h>
1.1 provos 34:
1.78 stevesk 35: #include <openssl/dh.h>
36:
1.81 stevesk 37: #include <errno.h>
1.80 stevesk 38: #include <fcntl.h>
1.65 stevesk 39: #include <paths.h>
1.114 djm 40: #include <poll.h>
1.78 stevesk 41: #include <pwd.h>
1.68 stevesk 42: #include <signal.h>
1.84 stevesk 43: #include <stdlib.h>
1.82 stevesk 44: #include <string.h>
1.1 provos 45:
1.114 djm 46: #include "atomicio.h"
1.85 deraadt 47: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.1 provos 48: #include "ssh.h"
1.85 deraadt 49: #include "key.h"
50: #include "buffer.h"
51: #include "hostfile.h"
1.1 provos 52: #include "auth.h"
1.85 deraadt 53: #include "cipher.h"
1.1 provos 54: #include "kex.h"
55: #include "dh.h"
1.88 miod 56: #include <zlib.h>
1.1 provos 57: #include "packet.h"
58: #include "auth-options.h"
59: #include "sshpty.h"
60: #include "channels.h"
61: #include "session.h"
62: #include "sshlogin.h"
63: #include "canohost.h"
64: #include "log.h"
65: #include "servconf.h"
66: #include "monitor.h"
67: #include "monitor_mm.h"
1.85 deraadt 68: #ifdef GSSAPI
69: #include "ssh-gss.h"
70: #endif
1.1 provos 71: #include "monitor_wrap.h"
72: #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
73: #include "misc.h"
74: #include "compat.h"
75: #include "ssh2.h"
1.100 djm 76: #include "jpake.h"
1.104 andreas 77: #include "roaming.h"
1.1 provos 78:
1.46 markus 79: #ifdef GSSAPI
80: static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
81: #endif
82:
1.1 provos 83: /* Imports */
84: extern ServerOptions options;
85: extern u_int utmp_len;
86: extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
87: extern z_stream incoming_stream;
88: extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
89: extern u_char session_id[];
90: extern Buffer auth_debug;
91: extern int auth_debug_init;
1.61 dtucker 92: extern Buffer loginmsg;
1.1 provos 93:
94: /* State exported from the child */
95:
96: struct {
97: z_stream incoming;
98: z_stream outgoing;
99: u_char *keyin;
100: u_int keyinlen;
101: u_char *keyout;
102: u_int keyoutlen;
103: u_char *ivin;
104: u_int ivinlen;
105: u_char *ivout;
106: u_int ivoutlen;
1.15 markus 107: u_char *ssh1key;
108: u_int ssh1keylen;
1.1 provos 109: int ssh1cipher;
110: int ssh1protoflags;
111: u_char *input;
112: u_int ilen;
113: u_char *output;
114: u_int olen;
1.103 andreas 115: u_int64_t sent_bytes;
116: u_int64_t recv_bytes;
1.1 provos 117: } child_state;
118:
1.43 markus 119: /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
1.1 provos 120:
121: int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
122: int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
123: int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
1.10 djm 124: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
1.1 provos 125: int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
126: int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
127: int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
128: int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
129: int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
130: int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
131: int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
132: int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
133: int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
134: int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
135: int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
136: int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
137: int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
138: int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
139: int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
140: int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
1.100 djm 141: int mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int, Buffer *);
142: int mm_answer_jpake_step1(int, Buffer *);
143: int mm_answer_jpake_step2(int, Buffer *);
144: int mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int, Buffer *);
145: int mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int, Buffer *);
1.1 provos 146:
1.46 markus 147: #ifdef GSSAPI
148: int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
149: int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
150: int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
1.52 markus 151: int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
1.46 markus 152: #endif
1.25 itojun 153:
1.114 djm 154: static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
155:
1.1 provos 156: static Authctxt *authctxt;
157: static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
158:
159: /* local state for key verify */
160: static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
161: static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
162: static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
1.26 markus 163: static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
164: static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
1.1 provos 165: static char *auth_method = "unknown";
1.44 markus 166: static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
1.13 markus 167: static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
1.40 markus 168: static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
1.1 provos 169:
170: struct mon_table {
171: enum monitor_reqtype type;
172: int flags;
173: int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
174: };
175:
176: #define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
177: #define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
178: #define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
1.77 dtucker 179: #define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
1.1 provos 180:
181: #define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
182:
183: #define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
184:
185: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
186: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
187: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
188: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
189: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
1.10 djm 190: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
1.1 provos 191: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
192: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 193: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.1 provos 194: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
195: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
1.46 markus 196: #ifdef GSSAPI
197: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
198: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
199: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
1.52 markus 200: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
1.46 markus 201: #endif
1.100 djm 202: #ifdef JPAKE
203: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata},
204: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_jpake_step1},
205: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_step2},
206: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm},
207: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm},
208: #endif
1.1 provos 209: {0, 0, NULL}
210: };
211:
212: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
213: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
214: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
215: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
216: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
217: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
218: {0, 0, NULL}
219: };
220:
221: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
222: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
223: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
224: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
225: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
1.77 dtucker 226: {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
227: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
1.1 provos 228: {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
229: {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
230: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 231: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.1 provos 232: {0, 0, NULL}
233: };
234:
235: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
236: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
237: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
238: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
239: {0, 0, NULL}
240: };
241:
242: struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
243:
244: /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
245:
246: static void
247: monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
248: {
249: while (ent->f != NULL) {
250: if (ent->type == type) {
251: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
252: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
253: return;
254: }
255: ent++;
256: }
257: }
258:
259: static void
260: monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
261: {
262: struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
263:
264: while (ent->f != NULL) {
265: if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
266: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
267: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
268: }
269: ent++;
270: }
271: }
272:
1.50 markus 273: void
274: monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 275: {
276: struct mon_table *ent;
277: int authenticated = 0;
278:
279: debug3("preauth child monitor started");
280:
1.114 djm 281: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
282: close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
283: pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
284:
1.50 markus 285: authctxt = _authctxt;
286: memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
287:
1.1 provos 288: if (compat20) {
289: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
290:
291: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
292: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
293: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
294: } else {
295: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
296:
297: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
298: }
299:
300: /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
301: while (!authenticated) {
1.77 dtucker 302: auth_method = "unknown";
1.89 markus 303: authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
1.1 provos 304: if (authenticated) {
305: if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
306: fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
1.14 markus 307: __func__, ent->type);
1.1 provos 308: if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
309: !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
310: authenticated = 0;
311: }
312:
1.77 dtucker 313: if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
1.1 provos 314: auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, auth_method,
315: compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
316: if (!authenticated)
317: authctxt->failures++;
318: }
1.100 djm 319: #ifdef JPAKE
320: /* Cleanup JPAKE context after authentication */
321: if (ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE) {
322: if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL) {
323: jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
324: authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
325: }
326: }
327: #endif
1.1 provos 328: }
329:
1.114 djm 330: /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
331: while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
332: ;
333:
1.1 provos 334: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 335: fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
1.77 dtucker 336: if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
337: fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
1.1 provos 338:
339: debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
1.14 markus 340: __func__, authctxt->user);
1.1 provos 341:
1.11 mouring 342: mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
1.114 djm 343:
344: close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
345: close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
346: pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
1.1 provos 347: }
348:
1.40 markus 349: static void
350: monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
351: {
352: monitor_child_pid = pid;
353: }
354:
355: static void
1.59 avsm 356: monitor_child_handler(int sig)
1.40 markus 357: {
1.59 avsm 358: kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
1.40 markus 359: }
360:
1.1 provos 361: void
1.11 mouring 362: monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 363: {
1.114 djm 364: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
365: pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
366:
1.40 markus 367: monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
368: signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
369: signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
1.91 djm 370: signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
1.40 markus 371:
1.1 provos 372: if (compat20) {
373: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
374:
375: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
376: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
377: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
378: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
379: } else {
380: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
381: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
382: }
383: if (!no_pty_flag) {
384: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
385: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
386: }
387:
388: for (;;)
1.11 mouring 389: monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
1.114 djm 390:
391: close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
392: pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
1.1 provos 393: }
394:
395: void
1.11 mouring 396: monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 397: {
1.16 djm 398: if (options.compression) {
399: /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
400: mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
401: }
1.1 provos 402: }
403:
1.114 djm 404: static int
405: monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
406: {
407: Buffer logmsg;
408: u_int len, level;
409: char *msg;
410:
411: buffer_init(&logmsg);
412:
413: /* Read length */
414: buffer_append_space(&logmsg, 4);
415: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
416: buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) {
417: if (errno == EPIPE) {
418: debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
419: close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
420: pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
421: return -1;
422: }
423: fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
424: }
425: len = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
426: if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
427: fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len);
428:
429: /* Read severity, message */
430: buffer_clear(&logmsg);
431: buffer_append_space(&logmsg, len);
432: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
433: buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg))
434: fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
435:
436: /* Log it */
437: level = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
438: msg = buffer_get_string(&logmsg, NULL);
439: if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
440: fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
441: __func__, level);
442: do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
443:
444: buffer_free(&logmsg);
445: xfree(msg);
446:
447: return 0;
448: }
449:
1.1 provos 450: int
1.11 mouring 451: monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
1.1 provos 452: struct mon_table **pent)
453: {
454: Buffer m;
455: int ret;
456: u_char type;
1.114 djm 457: struct pollfd pfd[2];
458:
459: for (;;) {
460: bzero(&pfd, sizeof(pfd));
461: pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
462: pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
463: pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
464: pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
1.115 ! djm 465: if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
! 466: if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
! 467: continue;
1.114 djm 468: fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.115 ! djm 469: }
1.114 djm 470: if (pfd[1].revents) {
471: /*
472: * Drain all log messages before processing next
473: * monitor request.
474: */
475: monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
476: continue;
477: }
478: if (pfd[0].revents)
479: break; /* Continues below */
480: }
1.1 provos 481:
482: buffer_init(&m);
483:
1.11 mouring 484: mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 485: type = buffer_get_char(&m);
486:
1.14 markus 487: debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 488:
489: while (ent->f != NULL) {
490: if (ent->type == type)
491: break;
492: ent++;
493: }
494:
495: if (ent->f != NULL) {
496: if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
1.14 markus 497: fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
1.1 provos 498: type);
1.11 mouring 499: ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 500: buffer_free(&m);
501:
502: /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
503: if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
1.14 markus 504: debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
1.1 provos 505: type);
506: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
507: }
508:
509: if (pent != NULL)
510: *pent = ent;
1.3 markus 511:
1.1 provos 512: return ret;
513: }
514:
1.14 markus 515: fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 516:
517: /* NOTREACHED */
518: return (-1);
519: }
520:
521: /* allowed key state */
522: static int
523: monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
524: {
525: /* make sure key is allowed */
526: if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
1.108 djm 527: timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
1.1 provos 528: return (0);
529: return (1);
530: }
531:
532: static void
533: monitor_reset_key_state(void)
534: {
535: /* reset state */
536: if (key_blob != NULL)
537: xfree(key_blob);
538: if (hostbased_cuser != NULL)
539: xfree(hostbased_cuser);
540: if (hostbased_chost != NULL)
541: xfree(hostbased_chost);
542: key_blob = NULL;
543: key_bloblen = 0;
544: key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
545: hostbased_cuser = NULL;
546: hostbased_chost = NULL;
547: }
548:
549: int
1.59 avsm 550: mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 551: {
552: DH *dh;
553: int min, want, max;
554:
555: min = buffer_get_int(m);
556: want = buffer_get_int(m);
557: max = buffer_get_int(m);
558:
559: debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 560: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 561: /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
562: if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
563: fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 564: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 565:
566: buffer_clear(m);
567:
568: dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
569: if (dh == NULL) {
570: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
571: return (0);
572: } else {
573: /* Send first bignum */
574: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
575: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
576: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
1.3 markus 577:
1.1 provos 578: DH_free(dh);
579: }
1.59 avsm 580: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
1.1 provos 581: return (0);
582: }
583:
584: int
1.59 avsm 585: mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 586: {
587: Key *key;
588: u_char *p;
589: u_char *signature;
590: u_int siglen, datlen;
591: int keyid;
1.3 markus 592:
1.14 markus 593: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 594:
1.3 markus 595: keyid = buffer_get_int(m);
596: p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen);
1.1 provos 597:
1.69 djm 598: /*
1.110 djm 599: * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
600: * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
1.69 djm 601: */
1.110 djm 602: if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64)
1.19 deraadt 603: fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %u", __func__, datlen);
1.1 provos 604:
1.13 markus 605: /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
606: if (session_id2_len == 0) {
607: session_id2_len = datlen;
608: session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
609: memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
610: }
611:
1.1 provos 612: if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 613: fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
1.1 provos 614: if (key_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen) < 0)
1.14 markus 615: fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 616:
1.19 deraadt 617: debug3("%s: signature %p(%u)", __func__, signature, siglen);
1.1 provos 618:
619: buffer_clear(m);
620: buffer_put_string(m, signature, siglen);
621:
622: xfree(p);
623: xfree(signature);
624:
1.59 avsm 625: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
1.1 provos 626:
627: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
628: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
629:
630: return (0);
631: }
632:
633: /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
634:
635: int
1.59 avsm 636: mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 637: {
1.60 dtucker 638: char *username;
1.1 provos 639: struct passwd *pwent;
640: int allowed = 0;
1.113 djm 641: u_int i;
1.3 markus 642:
1.14 markus 643: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 644:
645: if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
1.14 markus 646: fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
1.1 provos 647:
1.60 dtucker 648: username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.1 provos 649:
1.60 dtucker 650: pwent = getpwnamallow(username);
1.1 provos 651:
1.60 dtucker 652: authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
653: setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
654: xfree(username);
1.1 provos 655:
656: buffer_clear(m);
657:
658: if (pwent == NULL) {
659: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
1.53 djm 660: authctxt->pw = fakepw();
1.1 provos 661: goto out;
662: }
663:
664: allowed = 1;
1.4 markus 665: authctxt->pw = pwent;
1.1 provos 666: authctxt->valid = 1;
667:
668: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
669: buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
670: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
671: buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
672: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
673: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
674: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
675: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
1.94 dtucker 676:
677: out:
1.90 dtucker 678: buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
1.112 djm 679:
680: #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
681: if (options.x != NULL) \
682: buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x); \
683: } while (0)
1.113 djm 684: #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
685: for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) \
686: buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x[i]); \
687: } while (0)
1.112 djm 688: /* See comment in servconf.h */
689: COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
690: #undef M_CP_STROPT
1.113 djm 691: #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
1.112 djm 692:
1.14 markus 693: debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
1.59 avsm 694: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
1.1 provos 695:
696: /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
697: if (!compat20)
698: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
1.10 djm 699: else {
1.1 provos 700: /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
701: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
1.10 djm 702: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
703: }
704:
705: return (0);
706: }
707:
1.59 avsm 708: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.10 djm 709: {
710: char *banner;
711:
712: buffer_clear(m);
713: banner = auth2_read_banner();
714: buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
1.59 avsm 715: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
1.1 provos 716:
1.10 djm 717: if (banner != NULL)
1.21 deraadt 718: xfree(banner);
1.1 provos 719:
720: return (0);
721: }
722:
723: int
1.59 avsm 724: mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 725: {
726: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
727:
728: authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
729: authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.6 stevesk 730: debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
1.14 markus 731: __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
1.6 stevesk 732:
1.1 provos 733: if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
734: xfree(authctxt->style);
735: authctxt->style = NULL;
736: }
737:
738: return (0);
739: }
740:
741: int
1.59 avsm 742: mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 743: {
744: static int call_count;
745: char *passwd;
1.22 stevesk 746: int authenticated;
747: u_int plen;
1.1 provos 748:
749: passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
750: /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
1.12 markus 751: authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
1.48 markus 752: auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
1.1 provos 753: memset(passwd, 0, strlen(passwd));
754: xfree(passwd);
755:
756: buffer_clear(m);
757: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
758:
1.14 markus 759: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 760: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
1.1 provos 761:
762: call_count++;
763: if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
764: auth_method = "none";
765: else
766: auth_method = "password";
767:
768: /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
769: return (authenticated);
770: }
771:
772: int
1.59 avsm 773: mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 774: {
775: char *name, *infotxt;
776: u_int numprompts;
777: u_int *echo_on;
778: char **prompts;
1.31 markus 779: u_int success;
1.1 provos 780:
1.31 markus 781: success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
782: &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
1.1 provos 783:
784: buffer_clear(m);
1.31 markus 785: buffer_put_int(m, success);
786: if (success)
1.1 provos 787: buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
788:
1.31 markus 789: debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
1.59 avsm 790: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
1.1 provos 791:
1.31 markus 792: if (success) {
1.1 provos 793: xfree(name);
794: xfree(infotxt);
795: xfree(prompts);
796: xfree(echo_on);
797: }
798:
799: return (0);
800: }
801:
802: int
1.59 avsm 803: mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 804: {
805: char *response;
806: int authok;
807:
808: if (authctxt->as == 0)
1.14 markus 809: fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
1.1 provos 810:
811: response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.12 markus 812: authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
813: auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
1.1 provos 814: authctxt->as = NULL;
1.14 markus 815: debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
1.1 provos 816: xfree(response);
817:
818: buffer_clear(m);
819: buffer_put_int(m, authok);
820:
1.14 markus 821: debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
1.59 avsm 822: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
1.1 provos 823:
824: auth_method = "bsdauth";
825:
826: return (authok != 0);
827: }
828:
829: int
1.59 avsm 830: mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 831: {
832: Key *key;
1.26 markus 833: char *cuser, *chost;
834: u_char *blob;
1.1 provos 835: u_int bloblen;
836: enum mm_keytype type = 0;
837: int allowed = 0;
838:
1.14 markus 839: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.3 markus 840:
1.1 provos 841: type = buffer_get_int(m);
842: cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
843: chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
844: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
845:
846: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
847:
848: if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
849: (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
1.14 markus 850: fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 851:
1.14 markus 852: debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
1.1 provos 853:
1.51 djm 854: if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
1.63 deraadt 855: switch (type) {
1.1 provos 856: case MM_USERKEY:
1.12 markus 857: allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
858: user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
1.77 dtucker 859: auth_method = "publickey";
1.97 dtucker 860: if (options.pubkey_authentication && allowed != 1)
861: auth_clear_options();
1.1 provos 862: break;
863: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1.12 markus 864: allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
865: hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 866: cuser, chost, key);
1.77 dtucker 867: auth_method = "hostbased";
1.1 provos 868: break;
869: case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
870: key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
1.12 markus 871: allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
872: auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 873: cuser, chost, key);
1.97 dtucker 874: if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
875: auth_clear_options();
1.77 dtucker 876: auth_method = "rsa";
1.1 provos 877: break;
878: default:
1.14 markus 879: fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 880: break;
881: }
1.33 markus 882: }
883: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 884: key_free(key);
885:
886: /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
887: monitor_reset_key_state();
888:
889: if (allowed) {
890: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
891: key_blob = blob;
892: key_bloblen = bloblen;
893: key_blobtype = type;
894: hostbased_cuser = cuser;
895: hostbased_chost = chost;
1.72 djm 896: } else {
1.77 dtucker 897: /* Log failed attempt */
898: auth_log(authctxt, 0, auth_method, compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
1.72 djm 899: xfree(blob);
900: xfree(cuser);
901: xfree(chost);
1.1 provos 902: }
903:
904: debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
1.98 dtucker 905: __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
1.1 provos 906:
907: buffer_clear(m);
908: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 909: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 910:
1.59 avsm 911: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 912:
913: if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
914: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
915:
916: return (0);
917: }
918:
919: static int
920: monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
921: {
922: Buffer b;
1.26 markus 923: char *p;
1.1 provos 924: u_int len;
925: int fail = 0;
926:
927: buffer_init(&b);
928: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 929:
1.1 provos 930: if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
1.13 markus 931: p = buffer_ptr(&b);
932: len = buffer_len(&b);
933: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
934: (len < session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 935: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.13 markus 936: fail++;
1.1 provos 937: buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
938: } else {
1.13 markus 939: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
940: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
941: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 942: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 943: fail++;
1.13 markus 944: xfree(p);
1.1 provos 945: }
946: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
947: fail++;
948: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
949: if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 950: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.1 provos 951: authctxt->user, p);
952: fail++;
953: }
954: xfree(p);
955: buffer_skip_string(&b);
956: if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
957: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
958: fail++;
959: } else {
960: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
961: if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
962: fail++;
963: xfree(p);
964: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
965: fail++;
966: buffer_skip_string(&b);
967: }
968: buffer_skip_string(&b);
969: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
970: fail++;
971: buffer_free(&b);
972: return (fail == 0);
973: }
974:
975: static int
1.26 markus 976: monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
977: char *chost)
1.1 provos 978: {
979: Buffer b;
1.26 markus 980: char *p;
1.1 provos 981: u_int len;
982: int fail = 0;
983:
984: buffer_init(&b);
985: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 986:
1.13 markus 987: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
988: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
989: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 990: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 991: fail++;
1.13 markus 992: xfree(p);
993:
1.1 provos 994: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
995: fail++;
996: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
997: if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 998: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.1 provos 999: authctxt->user, p);
1000: fail++;
1001: }
1002: xfree(p);
1003: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */
1004: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1005: if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
1006: fail++;
1007: xfree(p);
1008: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkalg */
1009: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkblob */
1010:
1011: /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
1012: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1013: if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
1014: p[len - 1] = '\0';
1015: if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
1016: fail++;
1017: xfree(p);
1018:
1019: /* verify client user */
1020: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1021: if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
1022: fail++;
1023: xfree(p);
1024:
1025: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1026: fail++;
1027: buffer_free(&b);
1028: return (fail == 0);
1029: }
1030:
1031: int
1.59 avsm 1032: mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1033: {
1034: Key *key;
1035: u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
1036: u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
1037: int verified = 0;
1038: int valid_data = 0;
1039:
1040: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1041: signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
1042: data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
1043:
1044: if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
1.8 mouring 1045: !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
1.14 markus 1046: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1047:
1048: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1049: if (key == NULL)
1.14 markus 1050: fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 1051:
1052: switch (key_blobtype) {
1053: case MM_USERKEY:
1054: valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
1055: break;
1056: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1057: valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
1058: hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
1059: break;
1060: default:
1061: valid_data = 0;
1062: break;
1063: }
1064: if (!valid_data)
1.14 markus 1065: fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 1066:
1067: verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
1068: debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
1.89 markus 1069: __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
1.1 provos 1070:
1071: key_free(key);
1072: xfree(blob);
1073: xfree(signature);
1074: xfree(data);
1075:
1.17 stevesk 1076: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
1077:
1.1 provos 1078: monitor_reset_key_state();
1.3 markus 1079:
1.1 provos 1080: buffer_clear(m);
1081: buffer_put_int(m, verified);
1.59 avsm 1082: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
1.1 provos 1083:
1.89 markus 1084: return (verified == 1);
1.1 provos 1085: }
1086:
1.2 markus 1087: static void
1.1 provos 1088: mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
1089: {
1090: socklen_t fromlen;
1091: struct sockaddr_storage from;
1092:
1093: /*
1094: * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
1095: * the address be 0.0.0.0.
1096: */
1097: memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
1.24 stevesk 1098: fromlen = sizeof(from);
1.1 provos 1099: if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
1100: if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
1.74 deraadt 1101: (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
1.1 provos 1102: debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1.50 markus 1103: cleanup_exit(255);
1.1 provos 1104: }
1105: }
1106: /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
1107: record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
1.42 markus 1108: get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
1.24 stevesk 1109: (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
1.1 provos 1110: }
1111:
1112: static void
1113: mm_session_close(Session *s)
1114: {
1.41 djm 1115: debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
1.1 provos 1116: if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1.86 stevesk 1117: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
1.1 provos 1118: session_pty_cleanup2(s);
1119: }
1.96 djm 1120: session_unused(s->self);
1.1 provos 1121: }
1122:
1123: int
1.59 avsm 1124: mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1125: {
1.11 mouring 1126: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1127: Session *s;
1128: int res, fd0;
1129:
1.14 markus 1130: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1131:
1132: buffer_clear(m);
1133: s = session_new();
1134: if (s == NULL)
1135: goto error;
1136: s->authctxt = authctxt;
1137: s->pw = authctxt->pw;
1.11 mouring 1138: s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
1.1 provos 1139: res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
1140: if (res == 0)
1141: goto error;
1142: pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
1143:
1144: buffer_put_int(m, 1);
1145: buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
1146:
1147: /* We need to trick ttyslot */
1148: if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
1.14 markus 1149: fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
1.1 provos 1150:
1151: mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
1152:
1153: /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
1154: close(0);
1.61 dtucker 1155:
1156: /* send messages generated by record_login */
1157: buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
1158: buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
1159:
1160: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1161:
1.92 djm 1162: if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
1163: mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
1164: fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1165:
1166: /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
1167: if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
1.14 markus 1168: fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1169: if (fd0 != 0)
1.14 markus 1170: error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
1.1 provos 1171:
1172: /* slave is not needed */
1173: close(s->ttyfd);
1174: s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
1175: /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
1176: s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
1177:
1.86 stevesk 1178: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
1.1 provos 1179:
1180: return (0);
1181:
1182: error:
1183: if (s != NULL)
1184: mm_session_close(s);
1185: buffer_put_int(m, 0);
1.59 avsm 1186: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1.1 provos 1187: return (0);
1188: }
1189:
1190: int
1.59 avsm 1191: mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1192: {
1193: Session *s;
1194: char *tty;
1195:
1.14 markus 1196: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1197:
1198: tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1199: if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
1200: mm_session_close(s);
1201: buffer_clear(m);
1202: xfree(tty);
1203: return (0);
1204: }
1205:
1206: int
1.59 avsm 1207: mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1208: {
1209: BIGNUM *p;
1210: int rsafail;
1211:
1212: /* Turn off permissions */
1.62 dtucker 1213: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
1.1 provos 1214:
1215: if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1216: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1217:
1218: buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
1219:
1220: rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
1221:
1222: buffer_clear(m);
1223: buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
1224: buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
1225:
1226: BN_clear_free(p);
1227:
1.59 avsm 1228: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
1.1 provos 1229:
1230: /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
1231: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
1232:
1233: return (0);
1234: }
1235:
1236: int
1.59 avsm 1237: mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1238: {
1239: int i;
1240:
1.14 markus 1241: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1242:
1243: if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
1.14 markus 1244: fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
1.1 provos 1245: for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1246: session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
1247:
1248: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
1249: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
1250:
1251: return (0);
1252: }
1253:
1254: int
1.59 avsm 1255: mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1256: {
1257: BIGNUM *client_n;
1258: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1259: u_char *blob = NULL;
1260: u_int blen = 0;
1.1 provos 1261: int allowed = 0;
1262:
1.14 markus 1263: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1264:
1.77 dtucker 1265: auth_method = "rsa";
1.12 markus 1266: if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
1.1 provos 1267: if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1268: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1269: buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
1270: allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
1271: BN_clear_free(client_n);
1272: }
1273: buffer_clear(m);
1274: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 1275: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 1276:
1277: /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
1278: monitor_reset_key_state();
1279:
1280: if (allowed && key != NULL) {
1281: key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */
1282: if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
1.14 markus 1283: fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1284: buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
1285:
1286: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1287: key_blob = blob;
1288: key_bloblen = blen;
1289: key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
1.33 markus 1290: }
1291: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 1292: key_free(key);
1293:
1.59 avsm 1294: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 1295:
1296: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
1297: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
1298: return (0);
1299: }
1300:
1301: int
1.59 avsm 1302: mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1303: {
1304: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1305: u_char *blob;
1306: u_int blen;
1.1 provos 1307:
1.14 markus 1308: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1309:
1310: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1311: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1312: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1313: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1314: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1315: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1316: fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 1317: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1318: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.101 djm 1319: if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
1320: fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
1321: key->type = KEY_RSA1;
1.1 provos 1322: if (ssh1_challenge)
1323: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1324: ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
1325:
1326: buffer_clear(m);
1327: buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
1328:
1.14 markus 1329: debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
1.59 avsm 1330: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
1.1 provos 1331:
1332: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
1.33 markus 1333:
1334: xfree(blob);
1335: key_free(key);
1.1 provos 1336: return (0);
1337: }
1338:
1339: int
1.59 avsm 1340: mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1341: {
1342: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1343: u_char *blob, *response;
1344: u_int blen, len;
1345: int success;
1.1 provos 1346:
1.14 markus 1347: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1348:
1349: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1350: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1351: if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
1.14 markus 1352: fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1353:
1354: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1355: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1356: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1357: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1358: fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
1.1 provos 1359: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1360: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.1 provos 1361: response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1362: if (len != 16)
1.14 markus 1363: fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1364: success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
1365:
1.33 markus 1366: xfree(blob);
1.1 provos 1367: key_free(key);
1368: xfree(response);
1369:
1370: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
1371:
1372: /* reset state */
1373: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1374: ssh1_challenge = NULL;
1375: monitor_reset_key_state();
1376:
1377: buffer_clear(m);
1378: buffer_put_int(m, success);
1.59 avsm 1379: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
1.1 provos 1380:
1381: return (success);
1382: }
1383:
1384: int
1.59 avsm 1385: mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
1.1 provos 1386: {
1.11 mouring 1387: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1388: int res, status;
1389:
1.14 markus 1390: debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
1.1 provos 1391:
1392: /* The child is terminating */
1393: session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
1394:
1.11 mouring 1395: while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
1.9 markus 1396: if (errno != EINTR)
1397: exit(1);
1.1 provos 1398:
1399: res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
1400:
1401: /* Terminate process */
1.57 deraadt 1402: exit(res);
1.1 provos 1403: }
1404:
1405: void
1.11 mouring 1406: monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1407: {
1408: if (compat20) {
1409: set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
1410: set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
1411: } else {
1412: packet_set_protocol_flags(child_state.ssh1protoflags);
1.15 markus 1413: packet_set_encryption_key(child_state.ssh1key,
1414: child_state.ssh1keylen, child_state.ssh1cipher);
1415: xfree(child_state.ssh1key);
1.1 provos 1416: }
1417:
1.15 markus 1418: /* for rc4 and other stateful ciphers */
1.1 provos 1419: packet_set_keycontext(MODE_OUT, child_state.keyout);
1420: xfree(child_state.keyout);
1421: packet_set_keycontext(MODE_IN, child_state.keyin);
1422: xfree(child_state.keyin);
1423:
1424: if (!compat20) {
1425: packet_set_iv(MODE_OUT, child_state.ivout);
1426: xfree(child_state.ivout);
1427: packet_set_iv(MODE_IN, child_state.ivin);
1428: xfree(child_state.ivin);
1429: }
1430:
1431: memcpy(&incoming_stream, &child_state.incoming,
1432: sizeof(incoming_stream));
1433: memcpy(&outgoing_stream, &child_state.outgoing,
1434: sizeof(outgoing_stream));
1.3 markus 1435:
1.1 provos 1436: /* Update with new address */
1.16 djm 1437: if (options.compression)
1438: mm_init_compression(pmonitor->m_zlib);
1.1 provos 1439:
1440: /* Network I/O buffers */
1441: /* XXX inefficient for large buffers, need: buffer_init_from_string */
1.102 andreas 1442: buffer_clear(packet_get_input());
1443: buffer_append(packet_get_input(), child_state.input, child_state.ilen);
1.1 provos 1444: memset(child_state.input, 0, child_state.ilen);
1445: xfree(child_state.input);
1446:
1.102 andreas 1447: buffer_clear(packet_get_output());
1448: buffer_append(packet_get_output(), child_state.output,
1449: child_state.olen);
1.1 provos 1450: memset(child_state.output, 0, child_state.olen);
1451: xfree(child_state.output);
1.103 andreas 1452:
1453: /* Roaming */
1454: if (compat20)
1455: roam_set_bytes(child_state.sent_bytes, child_state.recv_bytes);
1.1 provos 1456: }
1457:
1.2 markus 1458: static Kex *
1.1 provos 1459: mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
1460: {
1461: Kex *kex;
1462: void *blob;
1463: u_int bloblen;
1464:
1.75 djm 1465: kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex));
1.1 provos 1466: kex->session_id = buffer_get_string(m, &kex->session_id_len);
1.107 djm 1467: if (session_id2 == NULL ||
1468: kex->session_id_len != session_id2_len ||
1.108 djm 1469: timingsafe_bcmp(kex->session_id, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)
1.13 markus 1470: fatal("mm_get_get: internal error: bad session id");
1.1 provos 1471: kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m);
1.34 markus 1472: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1.58 djm 1473: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1.34 markus 1474: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1.69 djm 1475: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
1.109 djm 1476: kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
1.1 provos 1477: kex->server = 1;
1478: kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
1479: kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
1480: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1481: buffer_init(&kex->my);
1482: buffer_append(&kex->my, blob, bloblen);
1483: xfree(blob);
1484: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1485: buffer_init(&kex->peer);
1486: buffer_append(&kex->peer, blob, bloblen);
1487: xfree(blob);
1488: kex->done = 1;
1489: kex->flags = buffer_get_int(m);
1490: kex->client_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1491: kex->server_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.105 djm 1492: kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
1493: kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
1.1 provos 1494: kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1495:
1496: return (kex);
1497: }
1498:
1499: /* This function requries careful sanity checking */
1500:
1501: void
1.11 mouring 1502: mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1503: {
1504: Buffer m;
1505: u_char *blob, *p;
1506: u_int bloblen, plen;
1.37 markus 1507: u_int32_t seqnr, packets;
1.99 markus 1508: u_int64_t blocks, bytes;
1.1 provos 1509:
1.14 markus 1510: debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
1.1 provos 1511:
1512: buffer_init(&m);
1.11 mouring 1513: mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
1.1 provos 1514: if (!compat20) {
1515: child_state.ssh1protoflags = buffer_get_int(&m);
1516: child_state.ssh1cipher = buffer_get_int(&m);
1.15 markus 1517: child_state.ssh1key = buffer_get_string(&m,
1518: &child_state.ssh1keylen);
1.1 provos 1519: child_state.ivout = buffer_get_string(&m,
1520: &child_state.ivoutlen);
1521: child_state.ivin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ivinlen);
1522: goto skip;
1523: } else {
1524: /* Get the Kex for rekeying */
1.11 mouring 1525: *pmonitor->m_pkex = mm_get_kex(&m);
1.1 provos 1526: }
1527:
1528: blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
1529: current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1530: xfree(blob);
1531:
1.14 markus 1532: debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
1.1 provos 1533: blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
1534: current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1535: xfree(blob);
1.3 markus 1536:
1.1 provos 1537: /* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
1.37 markus 1538: seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
1539: blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1540: packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
1.99 markus 1541: bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1542: packet_set_state(MODE_OUT, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
1.37 markus 1543: seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
1544: blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1545: packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
1.99 markus 1546: bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1547: packet_set_state(MODE_IN, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
1.1 provos 1548:
1549: skip:
1550: /* Get the key context */
1551: child_state.keyout = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyoutlen);
1552: child_state.keyin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyinlen);
1553:
1.14 markus 1554: debug3("%s: Getting compression state", __func__);
1.1 provos 1555: /* Get compression state */
1556: p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
1557: if (plen != sizeof(child_state.outgoing))
1.14 markus 1558: fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
1.1 provos 1559: memcpy(&child_state.outgoing, p, sizeof(child_state.outgoing));
1560: xfree(p);
1561:
1562: p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
1563: if (plen != sizeof(child_state.incoming))
1.14 markus 1564: fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
1.1 provos 1565: memcpy(&child_state.incoming, p, sizeof(child_state.incoming));
1566: xfree(p);
1567:
1568: /* Network I/O buffers */
1.14 markus 1569: debug3("%s: Getting Network I/O buffers", __func__);
1.1 provos 1570: child_state.input = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ilen);
1571: child_state.output = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.olen);
1.103 andreas 1572:
1573: /* Roaming */
1574: if (compat20) {
1575: child_state.sent_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1576: child_state.recv_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1577: }
1.1 provos 1578:
1579: buffer_free(&m);
1580: }
1581:
1582:
1583: /* Allocation functions for zlib */
1584: void *
1585: mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
1586: {
1.30 markus 1587: size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
1.1 provos 1588: void *address;
1589:
1.23 millert 1590: if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_T_MAX / size)
1.18 deraadt 1591: fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
1592:
1593: address = mm_malloc(mm, len);
1.1 provos 1594:
1595: return (address);
1596: }
1597:
1598: void
1599: mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
1600: {
1601: mm_free(mm, address);
1602: }
1603:
1604: void
1605: mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *mm)
1606: {
1607: outgoing_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
1608: outgoing_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
1609: outgoing_stream.opaque = mm;
1610:
1611: incoming_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
1612: incoming_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
1613: incoming_stream.opaque = mm;
1614: }
1615:
1616: /* XXX */
1617:
1618: #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
1.111 djm 1619: if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
1.1 provos 1620: fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
1621: } while (0)
1622:
1.2 markus 1623: static void
1.114 djm 1624: monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
1.3 markus 1625: {
1.114 djm 1626: int pair[2];
1627:
1.1 provos 1628: if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
1.114 djm 1629: fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1630: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1631: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1.114 djm 1632: mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1633: mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1634:
1635: if (do_logfds) {
1636: if (pipe(pair) == -1)
1637: fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1638: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1639: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1640: mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
1641: mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
1642: } else
1643: mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
1.1 provos 1644: }
1645:
1646: #define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
1647:
1648: struct monitor *
1649: monitor_init(void)
1650: {
1651: struct monitor *mon;
1652:
1.75 djm 1653: mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
1.1 provos 1654:
1.114 djm 1655: monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
1.1 provos 1656:
1657: /* Used to share zlib space across processes */
1.16 djm 1658: if (options.compression) {
1659: mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
1660: mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
1.1 provos 1661:
1.16 djm 1662: /* Compression needs to share state across borders */
1663: mm_init_compression(mon->m_zlib);
1664: }
1.1 provos 1665:
1666: return mon;
1667: }
1668:
1669: void
1670: monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
1671: {
1.114 djm 1672: monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
1.1 provos 1673: }
1.46 markus 1674:
1675: #ifdef GSSAPI
1676: int
1.59 avsm 1677: mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1678: {
1.59 avsm 1679: gss_OID_desc goid;
1.46 markus 1680: OM_uint32 major;
1681: u_int len;
1682:
1.59 avsm 1683: goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1684: goid.length = len;
1.46 markus 1685:
1.59 avsm 1686: major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
1.46 markus 1687:
1.59 avsm 1688: xfree(goid.elements);
1.46 markus 1689:
1690: buffer_clear(m);
1691: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1692:
1.64 stevesk 1693: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
1.46 markus 1694:
1695: /* Now we have a context, enable the step */
1696: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
1697:
1698: return (0);
1699: }
1700:
1701: int
1.59 avsm 1702: mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1703: {
1704: gss_buffer_desc in;
1705: gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1.64 stevesk 1706: OM_uint32 major, minor;
1.46 markus 1707: OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
1.47 deraadt 1708: u_int len;
1.46 markus 1709:
1.47 deraadt 1710: in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1711: in.length = len;
1.46 markus 1712: major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
1713: xfree(in.value);
1714:
1715: buffer_clear(m);
1716: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1717: buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
1718: buffer_put_int(m, flags);
1.59 avsm 1719: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
1.46 markus 1720:
1721: gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
1722:
1.64 stevesk 1723: if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1.46 markus 1724: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
1725: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.52 markus 1726: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
1.46 markus 1727: }
1728: return (0);
1729: }
1730:
1731: int
1.59 avsm 1732: mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.52 markus 1733: {
1734: gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
1735: OM_uint32 ret;
1736: u_int len;
1.54 djm 1737:
1.52 markus 1738: gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1739: gssbuf.length = len;
1740: mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1741: mic.length = len;
1.54 djm 1742:
1.52 markus 1743: ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
1.54 djm 1744:
1.52 markus 1745: xfree(gssbuf.value);
1746: xfree(mic.value);
1.54 djm 1747:
1.52 markus 1748: buffer_clear(m);
1749: buffer_put_int(m, ret);
1.54 djm 1750:
1.59 avsm 1751: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
1.54 djm 1752:
1.52 markus 1753: if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
1754: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.54 djm 1755:
1.52 markus 1756: return (0);
1757: }
1758:
1759: int
1.59 avsm 1760: mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1761: {
1762: int authenticated;
1763:
1764: authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
1765:
1766: buffer_clear(m);
1767: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
1768:
1769: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 1770: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
1.46 markus 1771:
1.64 stevesk 1772: auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
1.46 markus 1773:
1774: /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
1775: return (authenticated);
1776: }
1777: #endif /* GSSAPI */
1.100 djm 1778:
1779: #ifdef JPAKE
1780: int
1781: mm_answer_jpake_step1(int sock, Buffer *m)
1782: {
1783: struct jpake_ctx *pctx;
1784: u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof;
1785: u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len;
1786:
1787: if (!options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication)
1788: fatal("zero_knowledge_password_authentication disabled");
1789:
1790: if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL)
1791: fatal("%s: authctxt->jpake_ctx already set (%p)",
1792: __func__, authctxt->jpake_ctx);
1793: authctxt->jpake_ctx = pctx = jpake_new();
1794:
1795: jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
1796: &pctx->server_id, &pctx->server_id_len,
1797: &pctx->x3, &pctx->x4, &pctx->g_x3, &pctx->g_x4,
1798: &x3_proof, &x3_proof_len,
1799: &x4_proof, &x4_proof_len);
1800:
1801: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step1 done in %s", __func__));
1802:
1803: buffer_clear(m);
1804:
1805: buffer_put_string(m, pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
1806: buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x3);
1807: buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x4);
1808: buffer_put_string(m, x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
1809: buffer_put_string(m, x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
1810:
1811: debug3("%s: sending step1", __func__);
1812: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1, m);
1813:
1814: bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
1815: bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
1816: xfree(x3_proof);
1817: xfree(x4_proof);
1818:
1819: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, 1);
1820: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 0);
1821:
1822: return 0;
1823: }
1824:
1825: int
1826: mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int sock, Buffer *m)
1827: {
1828: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1829: char *hash_scheme, *salt;
1830:
1831: if (pctx == NULL)
1832: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1833:
1834: auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(authctxt, &pctx->s, &hash_scheme, &salt);
1835:
1836: buffer_clear(m);
1837: /* pctx->s is sensitive, not returned to slave */
1838: buffer_put_cstring(m, hash_scheme);
1839: buffer_put_cstring(m, salt);
1840:
1841: debug3("%s: sending pwdata", __func__);
1842: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, m);
1843:
1844: bzero(hash_scheme, strlen(hash_scheme));
1845: bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
1846: xfree(hash_scheme);
1847: xfree(salt);
1848:
1849: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, 1);
1850:
1851: return 0;
1852: }
1853:
1854: int
1855: mm_answer_jpake_step2(int sock, Buffer *m)
1856: {
1857: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1858: u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof, *x4_s_proof;
1859: u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len, x4_s_proof_len;
1860:
1861: if (pctx == NULL)
1862: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1863:
1864: if ((pctx->g_x1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
1865: (pctx->g_x2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
1866: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1867: buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x1);
1868: buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x2);
1869: pctx->client_id = buffer_get_string(m, &pctx->client_id_len);
1870: x1_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x1_proof_len);
1871: x2_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_proof_len);
1872:
1873: jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x3,
1874: pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->x4,
1875: pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
1876: pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
1877: x1_proof, x1_proof_len,
1878: x2_proof, x2_proof_len,
1879: &pctx->b,
1880: &x4_s_proof, &x4_s_proof_len);
1881:
1882: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step2 done in %s", __func__));
1883:
1884: bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
1885: bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
1886: xfree(x1_proof);
1887: xfree(x2_proof);
1888:
1889: buffer_clear(m);
1890:
1891: buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->b);
1892: buffer_put_string(m, x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
1893:
1894: debug3("%s: sending step2", __func__);
1895: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2, m);
1896:
1897: bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
1898: xfree(x4_s_proof);
1899:
1900: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, 1);
1901:
1902: return 0;
1903: }
1904:
1905: int
1906: mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
1907: {
1908: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1909: u_char *x2_s_proof;
1910: u_int x2_s_proof_len;
1911:
1912: if (pctx == NULL)
1913: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1914:
1915: if ((pctx->a = BN_new()) == NULL)
1916: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1917: buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->a);
1918: x2_s_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_s_proof_len);
1919:
1920: jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->a,
1921: pctx->x4, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2,
1922: pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
1923: pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
1924: session_id2, session_id2_len,
1925: x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len,
1926: &pctx->k,
1927: &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
1928:
1929: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "key_confirm done in %s", __func__));
1930:
1931: bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
1932: buffer_clear(m);
1933:
1934: /* pctx->k is sensitive, not sent */
1935: buffer_put_string(m, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
1936:
1937: debug3("%s: sending confirmation hash", __func__);
1938: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, m);
1939:
1940: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, 1);
1941:
1942: return 0;
1943: }
1944:
1945: int
1946: mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
1947: {
1948: int authenticated = 0;
1949: u_char *peer_confirm_hash;
1950: u_int peer_confirm_hash_len;
1951: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1952:
1953: if (pctx == NULL)
1954: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1955:
1956: peer_confirm_hash = buffer_get_string(m, &peer_confirm_hash_len);
1957:
1958: authenticated = jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
1959: pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
1960: session_id2, session_id2_len,
1961: peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len) && authctxt->valid;
1962:
1963: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "check_confirm done in %s", __func__));
1964:
1965: bzero(peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len);
1966: xfree(peer_confirm_hash);
1967:
1968: buffer_clear(m);
1969: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
1970:
1971: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1972: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, m);
1973:
1974: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 1);
1975:
1976: auth_method = "jpake-01@openssh.com";
1977: return authenticated;
1978: }
1979:
1980: #endif /* JPAKE */
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