Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c, Revision 1.117
1.117 ! dtucker 1: /* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.116 2012/01/05 00:16:56 djm Exp $ */
1.1 provos 2: /*
3: * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
4: * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
5: * All rights reserved.
6: *
7: * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8: * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9: * are met:
10: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12: * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14: * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15: *
16: * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
17: * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
18: * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
19: * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
20: * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
21: * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
22: * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
23: * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
24: * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
25: * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
26: */
27:
1.67 stevesk 28: #include <sys/types.h>
29: #include <sys/wait.h>
1.79 stevesk 30: #include <sys/socket.h>
1.85 deraadt 31: #include <sys/tree.h>
1.83 stevesk 32: #include <sys/param.h>
1.95 djm 33: #include <sys/queue.h>
1.1 provos 34:
1.78 stevesk 35: #include <openssl/dh.h>
36:
1.81 stevesk 37: #include <errno.h>
1.80 stevesk 38: #include <fcntl.h>
1.65 stevesk 39: #include <paths.h>
1.114 djm 40: #include <poll.h>
1.78 stevesk 41: #include <pwd.h>
1.68 stevesk 42: #include <signal.h>
1.84 stevesk 43: #include <stdlib.h>
1.82 stevesk 44: #include <string.h>
1.1 provos 45:
1.114 djm 46: #include "atomicio.h"
1.85 deraadt 47: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.1 provos 48: #include "ssh.h"
1.85 deraadt 49: #include "key.h"
50: #include "buffer.h"
51: #include "hostfile.h"
1.1 provos 52: #include "auth.h"
1.85 deraadt 53: #include "cipher.h"
1.1 provos 54: #include "kex.h"
55: #include "dh.h"
1.88 miod 56: #include <zlib.h>
1.1 provos 57: #include "packet.h"
58: #include "auth-options.h"
59: #include "sshpty.h"
60: #include "channels.h"
61: #include "session.h"
62: #include "sshlogin.h"
63: #include "canohost.h"
64: #include "log.h"
65: #include "servconf.h"
66: #include "monitor.h"
67: #include "monitor_mm.h"
1.85 deraadt 68: #ifdef GSSAPI
69: #include "ssh-gss.h"
70: #endif
1.1 provos 71: #include "monitor_wrap.h"
72: #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
73: #include "misc.h"
74: #include "compat.h"
75: #include "ssh2.h"
1.100 djm 76: #include "jpake.h"
1.104 andreas 77: #include "roaming.h"
1.1 provos 78:
1.46 markus 79: #ifdef GSSAPI
80: static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
81: #endif
82:
1.1 provos 83: /* Imports */
84: extern ServerOptions options;
85: extern u_int utmp_len;
86: extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
87: extern z_stream incoming_stream;
88: extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
89: extern u_char session_id[];
90: extern Buffer auth_debug;
91: extern int auth_debug_init;
1.61 dtucker 92: extern Buffer loginmsg;
1.1 provos 93:
94: /* State exported from the child */
95:
96: struct {
97: z_stream incoming;
98: z_stream outgoing;
99: u_char *keyin;
100: u_int keyinlen;
101: u_char *keyout;
102: u_int keyoutlen;
103: u_char *ivin;
104: u_int ivinlen;
105: u_char *ivout;
106: u_int ivoutlen;
1.15 markus 107: u_char *ssh1key;
108: u_int ssh1keylen;
1.1 provos 109: int ssh1cipher;
110: int ssh1protoflags;
111: u_char *input;
112: u_int ilen;
113: u_char *output;
114: u_int olen;
1.103 andreas 115: u_int64_t sent_bytes;
116: u_int64_t recv_bytes;
1.1 provos 117: } child_state;
118:
1.43 markus 119: /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
1.1 provos 120:
121: int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
122: int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
123: int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
1.10 djm 124: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
1.1 provos 125: int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
126: int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
127: int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
128: int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
129: int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
130: int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
131: int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
132: int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
133: int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
134: int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
135: int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
136: int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
137: int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
138: int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
139: int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
140: int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
1.100 djm 141: int mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int, Buffer *);
142: int mm_answer_jpake_step1(int, Buffer *);
143: int mm_answer_jpake_step2(int, Buffer *);
144: int mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int, Buffer *);
145: int mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int, Buffer *);
1.1 provos 146:
1.46 markus 147: #ifdef GSSAPI
148: int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
149: int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
150: int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
1.52 markus 151: int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
1.46 markus 152: #endif
1.25 itojun 153:
1.114 djm 154: static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
155:
1.1 provos 156: static Authctxt *authctxt;
157: static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
158:
159: /* local state for key verify */
160: static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
161: static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
162: static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
1.26 markus 163: static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
164: static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
1.1 provos 165: static char *auth_method = "unknown";
1.44 markus 166: static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
1.13 markus 167: static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
1.40 markus 168: static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
1.1 provos 169:
170: struct mon_table {
171: enum monitor_reqtype type;
172: int flags;
173: int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
174: };
175:
176: #define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
177: #define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
178: #define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
1.77 dtucker 179: #define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
1.1 provos 180:
181: #define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
182:
183: #define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
184:
185: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
186: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
187: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
188: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
189: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
1.10 djm 190: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
1.1 provos 191: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
192: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 193: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.1 provos 194: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
195: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
1.46 markus 196: #ifdef GSSAPI
197: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
198: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
199: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
1.52 markus 200: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
1.46 markus 201: #endif
1.100 djm 202: #ifdef JPAKE
203: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata},
204: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_jpake_step1},
205: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_step2},
206: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm},
207: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm},
208: #endif
1.1 provos 209: {0, 0, NULL}
210: };
211:
212: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
213: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
214: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
215: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
216: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
217: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
218: {0, 0, NULL}
219: };
220:
221: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
222: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
223: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
224: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
225: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
1.77 dtucker 226: {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
227: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
1.1 provos 228: {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
229: {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
230: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 231: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.1 provos 232: {0, 0, NULL}
233: };
234:
235: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
236: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
237: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
238: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
239: {0, 0, NULL}
240: };
241:
242: struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
243:
244: /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
245:
246: static void
247: monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
248: {
249: while (ent->f != NULL) {
250: if (ent->type == type) {
251: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
252: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
253: return;
254: }
255: ent++;
256: }
257: }
258:
259: static void
260: monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
261: {
262: struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
263:
264: while (ent->f != NULL) {
265: if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
266: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
267: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
268: }
269: ent++;
270: }
271: }
272:
1.50 markus 273: void
274: monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 275: {
276: struct mon_table *ent;
277: int authenticated = 0;
278:
279: debug3("preauth child monitor started");
280:
1.114 djm 281: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
282: close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
283: pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
284:
1.50 markus 285: authctxt = _authctxt;
286: memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
287:
1.1 provos 288: if (compat20) {
289: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
290:
291: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
292: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
293: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
294: } else {
295: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
296:
297: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
298: }
299:
300: /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
301: while (!authenticated) {
1.77 dtucker 302: auth_method = "unknown";
1.89 markus 303: authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
1.1 provos 304: if (authenticated) {
305: if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
306: fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
1.14 markus 307: __func__, ent->type);
1.1 provos 308: if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
309: !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
310: authenticated = 0;
311: }
312:
1.77 dtucker 313: if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
1.1 provos 314: auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, auth_method,
315: compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
316: if (!authenticated)
317: authctxt->failures++;
318: }
1.100 djm 319: #ifdef JPAKE
320: /* Cleanup JPAKE context after authentication */
321: if (ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE) {
322: if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL) {
323: jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
324: authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
325: }
326: }
327: #endif
1.1 provos 328: }
329:
1.114 djm 330: /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
331: while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
332: ;
333:
1.1 provos 334: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 335: fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
1.77 dtucker 336: if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
337: fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
1.1 provos 338:
339: debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
1.14 markus 340: __func__, authctxt->user);
1.1 provos 341:
1.11 mouring 342: mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
1.114 djm 343:
344: close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
345: close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
346: pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
1.1 provos 347: }
348:
1.40 markus 349: static void
350: monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
351: {
352: monitor_child_pid = pid;
353: }
354:
355: static void
1.59 avsm 356: monitor_child_handler(int sig)
1.40 markus 357: {
1.59 avsm 358: kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
1.40 markus 359: }
360:
1.1 provos 361: void
1.11 mouring 362: monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 363: {
1.114 djm 364: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
365: pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
366:
1.40 markus 367: monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
368: signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
369: signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
1.91 djm 370: signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
1.40 markus 371:
1.1 provos 372: if (compat20) {
373: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
374:
375: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
376: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
377: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
378: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
379: } else {
380: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
381: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
382: }
383: if (!no_pty_flag) {
384: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
385: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
386: }
387:
388: for (;;)
1.11 mouring 389: monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
1.1 provos 390: }
391:
392: void
1.11 mouring 393: monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 394: {
1.16 djm 395: if (options.compression) {
396: /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
397: mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
398: }
1.1 provos 399: }
400:
1.114 djm 401: static int
402: monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
403: {
404: Buffer logmsg;
405: u_int len, level;
406: char *msg;
407:
408: buffer_init(&logmsg);
409:
410: /* Read length */
411: buffer_append_space(&logmsg, 4);
412: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
413: buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) {
414: if (errno == EPIPE) {
1.116 djm 415: buffer_free(&logmsg);
1.114 djm 416: debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
417: close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
418: pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
419: return -1;
420: }
421: fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
422: }
423: len = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
424: if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
425: fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len);
426:
427: /* Read severity, message */
428: buffer_clear(&logmsg);
429: buffer_append_space(&logmsg, len);
430: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
431: buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg))
432: fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
433:
434: /* Log it */
435: level = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
436: msg = buffer_get_string(&logmsg, NULL);
437: if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
438: fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
439: __func__, level);
440: do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
441:
442: buffer_free(&logmsg);
443: xfree(msg);
444:
445: return 0;
446: }
447:
1.1 provos 448: int
1.11 mouring 449: monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
1.1 provos 450: struct mon_table **pent)
451: {
452: Buffer m;
453: int ret;
454: u_char type;
1.114 djm 455: struct pollfd pfd[2];
456:
457: for (;;) {
458: bzero(&pfd, sizeof(pfd));
459: pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
460: pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
461: pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
462: pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
1.115 djm 463: if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
464: if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
465: continue;
1.114 djm 466: fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.115 djm 467: }
1.114 djm 468: if (pfd[1].revents) {
469: /*
470: * Drain all log messages before processing next
471: * monitor request.
472: */
473: monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
474: continue;
475: }
476: if (pfd[0].revents)
477: break; /* Continues below */
478: }
1.1 provos 479:
480: buffer_init(&m);
481:
1.11 mouring 482: mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 483: type = buffer_get_char(&m);
484:
1.14 markus 485: debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 486:
487: while (ent->f != NULL) {
488: if (ent->type == type)
489: break;
490: ent++;
491: }
492:
493: if (ent->f != NULL) {
494: if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
1.14 markus 495: fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
1.1 provos 496: type);
1.11 mouring 497: ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 498: buffer_free(&m);
499:
500: /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
501: if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
1.14 markus 502: debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
1.1 provos 503: type);
504: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
505: }
506:
507: if (pent != NULL)
508: *pent = ent;
1.3 markus 509:
1.1 provos 510: return ret;
511: }
512:
1.14 markus 513: fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 514:
515: /* NOTREACHED */
516: return (-1);
517: }
518:
519: /* allowed key state */
520: static int
521: monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
522: {
523: /* make sure key is allowed */
524: if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
1.108 djm 525: timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
1.1 provos 526: return (0);
527: return (1);
528: }
529:
530: static void
531: monitor_reset_key_state(void)
532: {
533: /* reset state */
534: if (key_blob != NULL)
535: xfree(key_blob);
536: if (hostbased_cuser != NULL)
537: xfree(hostbased_cuser);
538: if (hostbased_chost != NULL)
539: xfree(hostbased_chost);
540: key_blob = NULL;
541: key_bloblen = 0;
542: key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
543: hostbased_cuser = NULL;
544: hostbased_chost = NULL;
545: }
546:
547: int
1.59 avsm 548: mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 549: {
550: DH *dh;
551: int min, want, max;
552:
553: min = buffer_get_int(m);
554: want = buffer_get_int(m);
555: max = buffer_get_int(m);
556:
557: debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 558: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 559: /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
560: if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
561: fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 562: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 563:
564: buffer_clear(m);
565:
566: dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
567: if (dh == NULL) {
568: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
569: return (0);
570: } else {
571: /* Send first bignum */
572: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
573: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
574: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
1.3 markus 575:
1.1 provos 576: DH_free(dh);
577: }
1.59 avsm 578: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
1.1 provos 579: return (0);
580: }
581:
582: int
1.59 avsm 583: mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 584: {
585: Key *key;
586: u_char *p;
587: u_char *signature;
588: u_int siglen, datlen;
589: int keyid;
1.3 markus 590:
1.14 markus 591: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 592:
1.3 markus 593: keyid = buffer_get_int(m);
594: p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen);
1.1 provos 595:
1.69 djm 596: /*
1.110 djm 597: * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
598: * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
1.69 djm 599: */
1.110 djm 600: if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64)
1.19 deraadt 601: fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %u", __func__, datlen);
1.1 provos 602:
1.13 markus 603: /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
604: if (session_id2_len == 0) {
605: session_id2_len = datlen;
606: session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
607: memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
608: }
609:
1.1 provos 610: if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 611: fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
1.1 provos 612: if (key_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen) < 0)
1.14 markus 613: fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 614:
1.19 deraadt 615: debug3("%s: signature %p(%u)", __func__, signature, siglen);
1.1 provos 616:
617: buffer_clear(m);
618: buffer_put_string(m, signature, siglen);
619:
620: xfree(p);
621: xfree(signature);
622:
1.59 avsm 623: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
1.1 provos 624:
625: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
626: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
627:
628: return (0);
629: }
630:
631: /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
632:
633: int
1.59 avsm 634: mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 635: {
1.60 dtucker 636: char *username;
1.1 provos 637: struct passwd *pwent;
638: int allowed = 0;
1.113 djm 639: u_int i;
1.3 markus 640:
1.14 markus 641: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 642:
643: if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
1.14 markus 644: fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
1.1 provos 645:
1.60 dtucker 646: username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.1 provos 647:
1.60 dtucker 648: pwent = getpwnamallow(username);
1.1 provos 649:
1.60 dtucker 650: authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
651: setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
652: xfree(username);
1.1 provos 653:
654: buffer_clear(m);
655:
656: if (pwent == NULL) {
657: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
1.53 djm 658: authctxt->pw = fakepw();
1.1 provos 659: goto out;
660: }
661:
662: allowed = 1;
1.4 markus 663: authctxt->pw = pwent;
1.1 provos 664: authctxt->valid = 1;
665:
666: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
667: buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
668: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
669: buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
670: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
671: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
672: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
673: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
1.94 dtucker 674:
675: out:
1.90 dtucker 676: buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
1.112 djm 677:
678: #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
679: if (options.x != NULL) \
680: buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x); \
681: } while (0)
1.113 djm 682: #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
683: for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) \
684: buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x[i]); \
685: } while (0)
1.112 djm 686: /* See comment in servconf.h */
687: COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
688: #undef M_CP_STROPT
1.113 djm 689: #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
1.112 djm 690:
1.14 markus 691: debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
1.59 avsm 692: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
1.1 provos 693:
694: /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
695: if (!compat20)
696: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
1.10 djm 697: else {
1.1 provos 698: /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
699: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
1.10 djm 700: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
701: }
702:
703: return (0);
704: }
705:
1.59 avsm 706: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.10 djm 707: {
708: char *banner;
709:
710: buffer_clear(m);
711: banner = auth2_read_banner();
712: buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
1.59 avsm 713: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
1.1 provos 714:
1.10 djm 715: if (banner != NULL)
1.21 deraadt 716: xfree(banner);
1.1 provos 717:
718: return (0);
719: }
720:
721: int
1.59 avsm 722: mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 723: {
724: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
725:
726: authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
727: authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.6 stevesk 728: debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
1.14 markus 729: __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
1.6 stevesk 730:
1.1 provos 731: if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
732: xfree(authctxt->style);
733: authctxt->style = NULL;
734: }
735:
736: return (0);
737: }
738:
739: int
1.59 avsm 740: mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 741: {
742: static int call_count;
743: char *passwd;
1.22 stevesk 744: int authenticated;
745: u_int plen;
1.1 provos 746:
747: passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
748: /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
1.12 markus 749: authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
1.48 markus 750: auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
1.1 provos 751: memset(passwd, 0, strlen(passwd));
752: xfree(passwd);
753:
754: buffer_clear(m);
755: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
756:
1.14 markus 757: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 758: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
1.1 provos 759:
760: call_count++;
761: if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
762: auth_method = "none";
763: else
764: auth_method = "password";
765:
766: /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
767: return (authenticated);
768: }
769:
770: int
1.59 avsm 771: mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 772: {
773: char *name, *infotxt;
774: u_int numprompts;
775: u_int *echo_on;
776: char **prompts;
1.31 markus 777: u_int success;
1.1 provos 778:
1.31 markus 779: success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
780: &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
1.1 provos 781:
782: buffer_clear(m);
1.31 markus 783: buffer_put_int(m, success);
784: if (success)
1.1 provos 785: buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
786:
1.31 markus 787: debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
1.59 avsm 788: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
1.1 provos 789:
1.31 markus 790: if (success) {
1.1 provos 791: xfree(name);
792: xfree(infotxt);
793: xfree(prompts);
794: xfree(echo_on);
795: }
796:
797: return (0);
798: }
799:
800: int
1.59 avsm 801: mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 802: {
803: char *response;
804: int authok;
805:
806: if (authctxt->as == 0)
1.14 markus 807: fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
1.1 provos 808:
809: response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.12 markus 810: authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
811: auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
1.1 provos 812: authctxt->as = NULL;
1.14 markus 813: debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
1.1 provos 814: xfree(response);
815:
816: buffer_clear(m);
817: buffer_put_int(m, authok);
818:
1.14 markus 819: debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
1.59 avsm 820: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
1.1 provos 821:
822: auth_method = "bsdauth";
823:
824: return (authok != 0);
825: }
826:
827: int
1.59 avsm 828: mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 829: {
830: Key *key;
1.26 markus 831: char *cuser, *chost;
832: u_char *blob;
1.1 provos 833: u_int bloblen;
834: enum mm_keytype type = 0;
835: int allowed = 0;
836:
1.14 markus 837: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.3 markus 838:
1.1 provos 839: type = buffer_get_int(m);
840: cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
841: chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
842: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
843:
844: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
845:
846: if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
847: (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
1.14 markus 848: fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 849:
1.14 markus 850: debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
1.1 provos 851:
1.51 djm 852: if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
1.63 deraadt 853: switch (type) {
1.1 provos 854: case MM_USERKEY:
1.12 markus 855: allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
856: user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
1.77 dtucker 857: auth_method = "publickey";
1.97 dtucker 858: if (options.pubkey_authentication && allowed != 1)
859: auth_clear_options();
1.1 provos 860: break;
861: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1.12 markus 862: allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
863: hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 864: cuser, chost, key);
1.77 dtucker 865: auth_method = "hostbased";
1.1 provos 866: break;
867: case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
868: key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
1.12 markus 869: allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
870: auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 871: cuser, chost, key);
1.97 dtucker 872: if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
873: auth_clear_options();
1.77 dtucker 874: auth_method = "rsa";
1.1 provos 875: break;
876: default:
1.14 markus 877: fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 878: break;
879: }
1.33 markus 880: }
881: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 882: key_free(key);
883:
884: /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
885: monitor_reset_key_state();
886:
887: if (allowed) {
888: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
889: key_blob = blob;
890: key_bloblen = bloblen;
891: key_blobtype = type;
892: hostbased_cuser = cuser;
893: hostbased_chost = chost;
1.72 djm 894: } else {
1.77 dtucker 895: /* Log failed attempt */
896: auth_log(authctxt, 0, auth_method, compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
1.72 djm 897: xfree(blob);
898: xfree(cuser);
899: xfree(chost);
1.1 provos 900: }
901:
902: debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
1.98 dtucker 903: __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
1.1 provos 904:
905: buffer_clear(m);
906: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 907: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 908:
1.59 avsm 909: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 910:
911: if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
912: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
913:
914: return (0);
915: }
916:
917: static int
918: monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
919: {
920: Buffer b;
1.26 markus 921: char *p;
1.1 provos 922: u_int len;
923: int fail = 0;
924:
925: buffer_init(&b);
926: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 927:
1.1 provos 928: if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
1.13 markus 929: p = buffer_ptr(&b);
930: len = buffer_len(&b);
931: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
932: (len < session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 933: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.13 markus 934: fail++;
1.1 provos 935: buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
936: } else {
1.13 markus 937: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
938: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
939: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 940: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 941: fail++;
1.13 markus 942: xfree(p);
1.1 provos 943: }
944: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
945: fail++;
946: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
947: if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 948: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.1 provos 949: authctxt->user, p);
950: fail++;
951: }
952: xfree(p);
953: buffer_skip_string(&b);
954: if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
955: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
956: fail++;
957: } else {
958: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
959: if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
960: fail++;
961: xfree(p);
962: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
963: fail++;
964: buffer_skip_string(&b);
965: }
966: buffer_skip_string(&b);
967: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
968: fail++;
969: buffer_free(&b);
970: return (fail == 0);
971: }
972:
973: static int
1.26 markus 974: monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
975: char *chost)
1.1 provos 976: {
977: Buffer b;
1.26 markus 978: char *p;
1.1 provos 979: u_int len;
980: int fail = 0;
981:
982: buffer_init(&b);
983: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 984:
1.13 markus 985: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
986: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
987: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 988: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 989: fail++;
1.13 markus 990: xfree(p);
991:
1.1 provos 992: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
993: fail++;
994: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
995: if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 996: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.1 provos 997: authctxt->user, p);
998: fail++;
999: }
1000: xfree(p);
1001: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */
1002: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1003: if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
1004: fail++;
1005: xfree(p);
1006: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkalg */
1007: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkblob */
1008:
1009: /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
1010: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1011: if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
1012: p[len - 1] = '\0';
1013: if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
1014: fail++;
1015: xfree(p);
1016:
1017: /* verify client user */
1018: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1019: if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
1020: fail++;
1021: xfree(p);
1022:
1023: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1024: fail++;
1025: buffer_free(&b);
1026: return (fail == 0);
1027: }
1028:
1029: int
1.59 avsm 1030: mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1031: {
1032: Key *key;
1033: u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
1034: u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
1035: int verified = 0;
1036: int valid_data = 0;
1037:
1038: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1039: signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
1040: data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
1041:
1042: if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
1.8 mouring 1043: !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
1.14 markus 1044: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1045:
1046: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1047: if (key == NULL)
1.14 markus 1048: fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 1049:
1050: switch (key_blobtype) {
1051: case MM_USERKEY:
1052: valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
1053: break;
1054: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1055: valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
1056: hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
1057: break;
1058: default:
1059: valid_data = 0;
1060: break;
1061: }
1062: if (!valid_data)
1.14 markus 1063: fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 1064:
1065: verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
1066: debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
1.89 markus 1067: __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
1.1 provos 1068:
1069: key_free(key);
1070: xfree(blob);
1071: xfree(signature);
1072: xfree(data);
1073:
1.17 stevesk 1074: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
1075:
1.1 provos 1076: monitor_reset_key_state();
1.3 markus 1077:
1.1 provos 1078: buffer_clear(m);
1079: buffer_put_int(m, verified);
1.59 avsm 1080: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
1.1 provos 1081:
1.89 markus 1082: return (verified == 1);
1.1 provos 1083: }
1084:
1.2 markus 1085: static void
1.1 provos 1086: mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
1087: {
1088: socklen_t fromlen;
1089: struct sockaddr_storage from;
1090:
1091: /*
1092: * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
1093: * the address be 0.0.0.0.
1094: */
1095: memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
1.24 stevesk 1096: fromlen = sizeof(from);
1.1 provos 1097: if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
1098: if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
1.74 deraadt 1099: (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
1.1 provos 1100: debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1.50 markus 1101: cleanup_exit(255);
1.1 provos 1102: }
1103: }
1104: /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
1105: record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
1.42 markus 1106: get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
1.24 stevesk 1107: (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
1.1 provos 1108: }
1109:
1110: static void
1111: mm_session_close(Session *s)
1112: {
1.41 djm 1113: debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
1.1 provos 1114: if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1.86 stevesk 1115: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
1.1 provos 1116: session_pty_cleanup2(s);
1117: }
1.96 djm 1118: session_unused(s->self);
1.1 provos 1119: }
1120:
1121: int
1.59 avsm 1122: mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1123: {
1.11 mouring 1124: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1125: Session *s;
1126: int res, fd0;
1127:
1.14 markus 1128: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1129:
1130: buffer_clear(m);
1131: s = session_new();
1132: if (s == NULL)
1133: goto error;
1134: s->authctxt = authctxt;
1135: s->pw = authctxt->pw;
1.11 mouring 1136: s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
1.1 provos 1137: res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
1138: if (res == 0)
1139: goto error;
1140: pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
1141:
1142: buffer_put_int(m, 1);
1143: buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
1144:
1145: /* We need to trick ttyslot */
1146: if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
1.14 markus 1147: fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
1.1 provos 1148:
1149: mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
1150:
1151: /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
1152: close(0);
1.61 dtucker 1153:
1154: /* send messages generated by record_login */
1155: buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
1156: buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
1157:
1158: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1159:
1.92 djm 1160: if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
1161: mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
1162: fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1163:
1164: /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
1165: if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
1.14 markus 1166: fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1167: if (fd0 != 0)
1.14 markus 1168: error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
1.1 provos 1169:
1170: /* slave is not needed */
1171: close(s->ttyfd);
1172: s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
1173: /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
1174: s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
1175:
1.86 stevesk 1176: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
1.1 provos 1177:
1178: return (0);
1179:
1180: error:
1181: if (s != NULL)
1182: mm_session_close(s);
1183: buffer_put_int(m, 0);
1.59 avsm 1184: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1.1 provos 1185: return (0);
1186: }
1187:
1188: int
1.59 avsm 1189: mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1190: {
1191: Session *s;
1192: char *tty;
1193:
1.14 markus 1194: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1195:
1196: tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1197: if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
1198: mm_session_close(s);
1199: buffer_clear(m);
1200: xfree(tty);
1201: return (0);
1202: }
1203:
1204: int
1.59 avsm 1205: mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1206: {
1207: BIGNUM *p;
1208: int rsafail;
1209:
1210: /* Turn off permissions */
1.62 dtucker 1211: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
1.1 provos 1212:
1213: if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1214: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1215:
1216: buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
1217:
1218: rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
1219:
1220: buffer_clear(m);
1221: buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
1222: buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
1223:
1224: BN_clear_free(p);
1225:
1.59 avsm 1226: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
1.1 provos 1227:
1228: /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
1229: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
1230:
1231: return (0);
1232: }
1233:
1234: int
1.59 avsm 1235: mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1236: {
1237: int i;
1238:
1.14 markus 1239: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1240:
1241: if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
1.14 markus 1242: fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
1.1 provos 1243: for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1244: session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
1245:
1246: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
1247: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
1248:
1249: return (0);
1250: }
1251:
1252: int
1.59 avsm 1253: mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1254: {
1255: BIGNUM *client_n;
1256: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1257: u_char *blob = NULL;
1258: u_int blen = 0;
1.1 provos 1259: int allowed = 0;
1260:
1.14 markus 1261: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1262:
1.77 dtucker 1263: auth_method = "rsa";
1.12 markus 1264: if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
1.1 provos 1265: if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1266: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1267: buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
1268: allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
1269: BN_clear_free(client_n);
1270: }
1271: buffer_clear(m);
1272: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 1273: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 1274:
1275: /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
1276: monitor_reset_key_state();
1277:
1278: if (allowed && key != NULL) {
1279: key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */
1280: if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
1.14 markus 1281: fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1282: buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
1283:
1284: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1285: key_blob = blob;
1286: key_bloblen = blen;
1287: key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
1.33 markus 1288: }
1289: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 1290: key_free(key);
1291:
1.59 avsm 1292: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 1293:
1294: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
1295: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
1296: return (0);
1297: }
1298:
1299: int
1.59 avsm 1300: mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1301: {
1302: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1303: u_char *blob;
1304: u_int blen;
1.1 provos 1305:
1.14 markus 1306: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1307:
1308: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1309: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1310: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1311: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1312: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1313: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1314: fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 1315: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1316: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.101 djm 1317: if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
1318: fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
1319: key->type = KEY_RSA1;
1.1 provos 1320: if (ssh1_challenge)
1321: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1322: ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
1323:
1324: buffer_clear(m);
1325: buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
1326:
1.14 markus 1327: debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
1.59 avsm 1328: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
1.1 provos 1329:
1330: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
1.33 markus 1331:
1332: xfree(blob);
1333: key_free(key);
1.1 provos 1334: return (0);
1335: }
1336:
1337: int
1.59 avsm 1338: mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1339: {
1340: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1341: u_char *blob, *response;
1342: u_int blen, len;
1343: int success;
1.1 provos 1344:
1.14 markus 1345: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1346:
1347: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1348: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1349: if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
1.14 markus 1350: fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1351:
1352: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1353: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1354: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1355: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1356: fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
1.1 provos 1357: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1358: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.1 provos 1359: response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1360: if (len != 16)
1.14 markus 1361: fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1362: success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
1363:
1.33 markus 1364: xfree(blob);
1.1 provos 1365: key_free(key);
1366: xfree(response);
1367:
1368: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
1369:
1370: /* reset state */
1371: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1372: ssh1_challenge = NULL;
1373: monitor_reset_key_state();
1374:
1375: buffer_clear(m);
1376: buffer_put_int(m, success);
1.59 avsm 1377: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
1.1 provos 1378:
1379: return (success);
1380: }
1381:
1382: int
1.59 avsm 1383: mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
1.1 provos 1384: {
1.11 mouring 1385: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1386: int res, status;
1387:
1.14 markus 1388: debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
1.1 provos 1389:
1390: /* The child is terminating */
1391: session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
1392:
1.11 mouring 1393: while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
1.9 markus 1394: if (errno != EINTR)
1395: exit(1);
1.1 provos 1396:
1397: res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
1398:
1399: /* Terminate process */
1.57 deraadt 1400: exit(res);
1.1 provos 1401: }
1402:
1403: void
1.11 mouring 1404: monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1405: {
1406: if (compat20) {
1407: set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
1408: set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
1409: } else {
1410: packet_set_protocol_flags(child_state.ssh1protoflags);
1.15 markus 1411: packet_set_encryption_key(child_state.ssh1key,
1412: child_state.ssh1keylen, child_state.ssh1cipher);
1413: xfree(child_state.ssh1key);
1.1 provos 1414: }
1415:
1.15 markus 1416: /* for rc4 and other stateful ciphers */
1.1 provos 1417: packet_set_keycontext(MODE_OUT, child_state.keyout);
1418: xfree(child_state.keyout);
1419: packet_set_keycontext(MODE_IN, child_state.keyin);
1420: xfree(child_state.keyin);
1421:
1422: if (!compat20) {
1423: packet_set_iv(MODE_OUT, child_state.ivout);
1424: xfree(child_state.ivout);
1425: packet_set_iv(MODE_IN, child_state.ivin);
1426: xfree(child_state.ivin);
1427: }
1428:
1429: memcpy(&incoming_stream, &child_state.incoming,
1430: sizeof(incoming_stream));
1431: memcpy(&outgoing_stream, &child_state.outgoing,
1432: sizeof(outgoing_stream));
1.3 markus 1433:
1.1 provos 1434: /* Update with new address */
1.16 djm 1435: if (options.compression)
1436: mm_init_compression(pmonitor->m_zlib);
1.1 provos 1437:
1438: /* Network I/O buffers */
1439: /* XXX inefficient for large buffers, need: buffer_init_from_string */
1.102 andreas 1440: buffer_clear(packet_get_input());
1441: buffer_append(packet_get_input(), child_state.input, child_state.ilen);
1.1 provos 1442: memset(child_state.input, 0, child_state.ilen);
1443: xfree(child_state.input);
1444:
1.102 andreas 1445: buffer_clear(packet_get_output());
1446: buffer_append(packet_get_output(), child_state.output,
1447: child_state.olen);
1.1 provos 1448: memset(child_state.output, 0, child_state.olen);
1449: xfree(child_state.output);
1.103 andreas 1450:
1451: /* Roaming */
1452: if (compat20)
1453: roam_set_bytes(child_state.sent_bytes, child_state.recv_bytes);
1.1 provos 1454: }
1455:
1.2 markus 1456: static Kex *
1.1 provos 1457: mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
1458: {
1459: Kex *kex;
1460: void *blob;
1461: u_int bloblen;
1462:
1.75 djm 1463: kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex));
1.1 provos 1464: kex->session_id = buffer_get_string(m, &kex->session_id_len);
1.107 djm 1465: if (session_id2 == NULL ||
1466: kex->session_id_len != session_id2_len ||
1.108 djm 1467: timingsafe_bcmp(kex->session_id, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)
1.13 markus 1468: fatal("mm_get_get: internal error: bad session id");
1.1 provos 1469: kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m);
1.34 markus 1470: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1.58 djm 1471: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1.34 markus 1472: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1.69 djm 1473: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
1.109 djm 1474: kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
1.1 provos 1475: kex->server = 1;
1476: kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
1477: kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
1478: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1479: buffer_init(&kex->my);
1480: buffer_append(&kex->my, blob, bloblen);
1481: xfree(blob);
1482: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1483: buffer_init(&kex->peer);
1484: buffer_append(&kex->peer, blob, bloblen);
1485: xfree(blob);
1486: kex->done = 1;
1487: kex->flags = buffer_get_int(m);
1488: kex->client_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1489: kex->server_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.105 djm 1490: kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
1491: kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
1.1 provos 1492: kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1493:
1494: return (kex);
1495: }
1496:
1497: /* This function requries careful sanity checking */
1498:
1499: void
1.11 mouring 1500: mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1501: {
1502: Buffer m;
1503: u_char *blob, *p;
1504: u_int bloblen, plen;
1.37 markus 1505: u_int32_t seqnr, packets;
1.99 markus 1506: u_int64_t blocks, bytes;
1.1 provos 1507:
1.14 markus 1508: debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
1.1 provos 1509:
1510: buffer_init(&m);
1.11 mouring 1511: mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
1.1 provos 1512: if (!compat20) {
1513: child_state.ssh1protoflags = buffer_get_int(&m);
1514: child_state.ssh1cipher = buffer_get_int(&m);
1.15 markus 1515: child_state.ssh1key = buffer_get_string(&m,
1516: &child_state.ssh1keylen);
1.1 provos 1517: child_state.ivout = buffer_get_string(&m,
1518: &child_state.ivoutlen);
1519: child_state.ivin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ivinlen);
1520: goto skip;
1521: } else {
1522: /* Get the Kex for rekeying */
1.11 mouring 1523: *pmonitor->m_pkex = mm_get_kex(&m);
1.1 provos 1524: }
1525:
1526: blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
1527: current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1528: xfree(blob);
1529:
1.14 markus 1530: debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
1.1 provos 1531: blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
1532: current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1533: xfree(blob);
1.3 markus 1534:
1.1 provos 1535: /* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
1.37 markus 1536: seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
1537: blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1538: packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
1.99 markus 1539: bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1540: packet_set_state(MODE_OUT, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
1.37 markus 1541: seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
1542: blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1543: packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
1.99 markus 1544: bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1545: packet_set_state(MODE_IN, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
1.1 provos 1546:
1547: skip:
1548: /* Get the key context */
1549: child_state.keyout = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyoutlen);
1550: child_state.keyin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyinlen);
1551:
1.14 markus 1552: debug3("%s: Getting compression state", __func__);
1.1 provos 1553: /* Get compression state */
1554: p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
1555: if (plen != sizeof(child_state.outgoing))
1.14 markus 1556: fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
1.1 provos 1557: memcpy(&child_state.outgoing, p, sizeof(child_state.outgoing));
1558: xfree(p);
1559:
1560: p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
1561: if (plen != sizeof(child_state.incoming))
1.14 markus 1562: fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
1.1 provos 1563: memcpy(&child_state.incoming, p, sizeof(child_state.incoming));
1564: xfree(p);
1565:
1566: /* Network I/O buffers */
1.14 markus 1567: debug3("%s: Getting Network I/O buffers", __func__);
1.1 provos 1568: child_state.input = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ilen);
1569: child_state.output = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.olen);
1.103 andreas 1570:
1571: /* Roaming */
1572: if (compat20) {
1573: child_state.sent_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1574: child_state.recv_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1575: }
1.1 provos 1576:
1577: buffer_free(&m);
1578: }
1579:
1580:
1581: /* Allocation functions for zlib */
1582: void *
1583: mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
1584: {
1.30 markus 1585: size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
1.1 provos 1586: void *address;
1587:
1.23 millert 1588: if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_T_MAX / size)
1.18 deraadt 1589: fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
1590:
1591: address = mm_malloc(mm, len);
1.1 provos 1592:
1593: return (address);
1594: }
1595:
1596: void
1597: mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
1598: {
1599: mm_free(mm, address);
1600: }
1601:
1602: void
1603: mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *mm)
1604: {
1605: outgoing_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
1606: outgoing_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
1607: outgoing_stream.opaque = mm;
1608:
1609: incoming_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
1610: incoming_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
1611: incoming_stream.opaque = mm;
1612: }
1613:
1614: /* XXX */
1615:
1616: #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
1.111 djm 1617: if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
1.1 provos 1618: fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
1619: } while (0)
1620:
1.2 markus 1621: static void
1.114 djm 1622: monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
1.3 markus 1623: {
1.114 djm 1624: int pair[2];
1625:
1.1 provos 1626: if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
1.114 djm 1627: fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1628: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1629: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1.114 djm 1630: mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1631: mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1632:
1633: if (do_logfds) {
1634: if (pipe(pair) == -1)
1635: fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1636: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1637: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1638: mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
1639: mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
1640: } else
1641: mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
1.1 provos 1642: }
1643:
1644: #define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
1645:
1646: struct monitor *
1647: monitor_init(void)
1648: {
1649: struct monitor *mon;
1650:
1.75 djm 1651: mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
1.1 provos 1652:
1.114 djm 1653: monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
1.1 provos 1654:
1655: /* Used to share zlib space across processes */
1.16 djm 1656: if (options.compression) {
1657: mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
1658: mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
1.1 provos 1659:
1.16 djm 1660: /* Compression needs to share state across borders */
1661: mm_init_compression(mon->m_zlib);
1662: }
1.1 provos 1663:
1664: return mon;
1665: }
1666:
1667: void
1668: monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
1669: {
1.114 djm 1670: monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
1.1 provos 1671: }
1.46 markus 1672:
1673: #ifdef GSSAPI
1674: int
1.59 avsm 1675: mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1676: {
1.59 avsm 1677: gss_OID_desc goid;
1.46 markus 1678: OM_uint32 major;
1679: u_int len;
1680:
1.59 avsm 1681: goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1682: goid.length = len;
1.46 markus 1683:
1.59 avsm 1684: major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
1.46 markus 1685:
1.59 avsm 1686: xfree(goid.elements);
1.46 markus 1687:
1688: buffer_clear(m);
1689: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1690:
1.64 stevesk 1691: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
1.46 markus 1692:
1693: /* Now we have a context, enable the step */
1694: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
1695:
1696: return (0);
1697: }
1698:
1699: int
1.59 avsm 1700: mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1701: {
1702: gss_buffer_desc in;
1703: gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1.64 stevesk 1704: OM_uint32 major, minor;
1.46 markus 1705: OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
1.47 deraadt 1706: u_int len;
1.46 markus 1707:
1.47 deraadt 1708: in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1709: in.length = len;
1.46 markus 1710: major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
1711: xfree(in.value);
1712:
1713: buffer_clear(m);
1714: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1715: buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
1716: buffer_put_int(m, flags);
1.59 avsm 1717: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
1.46 markus 1718:
1719: gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
1720:
1.64 stevesk 1721: if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1.46 markus 1722: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
1723: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.52 markus 1724: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
1.46 markus 1725: }
1726: return (0);
1727: }
1728:
1729: int
1.59 avsm 1730: mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.52 markus 1731: {
1732: gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
1733: OM_uint32 ret;
1734: u_int len;
1.54 djm 1735:
1.52 markus 1736: gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1737: gssbuf.length = len;
1738: mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1739: mic.length = len;
1.54 djm 1740:
1.52 markus 1741: ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
1.54 djm 1742:
1.52 markus 1743: xfree(gssbuf.value);
1744: xfree(mic.value);
1.54 djm 1745:
1.52 markus 1746: buffer_clear(m);
1747: buffer_put_int(m, ret);
1.54 djm 1748:
1.59 avsm 1749: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
1.54 djm 1750:
1.52 markus 1751: if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
1752: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.54 djm 1753:
1.52 markus 1754: return (0);
1755: }
1756:
1757: int
1.59 avsm 1758: mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1759: {
1760: int authenticated;
1761:
1762: authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
1763:
1764: buffer_clear(m);
1765: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
1766:
1767: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 1768: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
1.46 markus 1769:
1.64 stevesk 1770: auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
1.46 markus 1771:
1772: /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
1773: return (authenticated);
1774: }
1775: #endif /* GSSAPI */
1.100 djm 1776:
1777: #ifdef JPAKE
1778: int
1779: mm_answer_jpake_step1(int sock, Buffer *m)
1780: {
1781: struct jpake_ctx *pctx;
1782: u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof;
1783: u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len;
1784:
1785: if (!options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication)
1786: fatal("zero_knowledge_password_authentication disabled");
1787:
1788: if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL)
1789: fatal("%s: authctxt->jpake_ctx already set (%p)",
1790: __func__, authctxt->jpake_ctx);
1791: authctxt->jpake_ctx = pctx = jpake_new();
1792:
1793: jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
1794: &pctx->server_id, &pctx->server_id_len,
1795: &pctx->x3, &pctx->x4, &pctx->g_x3, &pctx->g_x4,
1796: &x3_proof, &x3_proof_len,
1797: &x4_proof, &x4_proof_len);
1798:
1799: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step1 done in %s", __func__));
1800:
1801: buffer_clear(m);
1802:
1803: buffer_put_string(m, pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
1804: buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x3);
1805: buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x4);
1806: buffer_put_string(m, x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
1807: buffer_put_string(m, x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
1808:
1809: debug3("%s: sending step1", __func__);
1810: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1, m);
1811:
1812: bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
1813: bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
1814: xfree(x3_proof);
1815: xfree(x4_proof);
1816:
1817: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, 1);
1818: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 0);
1819:
1820: return 0;
1821: }
1822:
1823: int
1824: mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int sock, Buffer *m)
1825: {
1826: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1827: char *hash_scheme, *salt;
1828:
1829: if (pctx == NULL)
1830: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1831:
1832: auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(authctxt, &pctx->s, &hash_scheme, &salt);
1833:
1834: buffer_clear(m);
1835: /* pctx->s is sensitive, not returned to slave */
1836: buffer_put_cstring(m, hash_scheme);
1837: buffer_put_cstring(m, salt);
1838:
1839: debug3("%s: sending pwdata", __func__);
1840: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, m);
1841:
1842: bzero(hash_scheme, strlen(hash_scheme));
1843: bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
1844: xfree(hash_scheme);
1845: xfree(salt);
1846:
1847: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, 1);
1848:
1849: return 0;
1850: }
1851:
1852: int
1853: mm_answer_jpake_step2(int sock, Buffer *m)
1854: {
1855: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1856: u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof, *x4_s_proof;
1857: u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len, x4_s_proof_len;
1858:
1859: if (pctx == NULL)
1860: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1861:
1862: if ((pctx->g_x1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
1863: (pctx->g_x2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
1864: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1865: buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x1);
1866: buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x2);
1867: pctx->client_id = buffer_get_string(m, &pctx->client_id_len);
1868: x1_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x1_proof_len);
1869: x2_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_proof_len);
1870:
1871: jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x3,
1872: pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->x4,
1873: pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
1874: pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
1875: x1_proof, x1_proof_len,
1876: x2_proof, x2_proof_len,
1877: &pctx->b,
1878: &x4_s_proof, &x4_s_proof_len);
1879:
1880: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step2 done in %s", __func__));
1881:
1882: bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
1883: bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
1884: xfree(x1_proof);
1885: xfree(x2_proof);
1886:
1887: buffer_clear(m);
1888:
1889: buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->b);
1890: buffer_put_string(m, x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
1891:
1892: debug3("%s: sending step2", __func__);
1893: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2, m);
1894:
1895: bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
1896: xfree(x4_s_proof);
1897:
1898: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, 1);
1899:
1900: return 0;
1901: }
1902:
1903: int
1904: mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
1905: {
1906: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1907: u_char *x2_s_proof;
1908: u_int x2_s_proof_len;
1909:
1910: if (pctx == NULL)
1911: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1912:
1913: if ((pctx->a = BN_new()) == NULL)
1914: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1915: buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->a);
1916: x2_s_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_s_proof_len);
1917:
1918: jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->a,
1919: pctx->x4, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2,
1920: pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
1921: pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
1922: session_id2, session_id2_len,
1923: x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len,
1924: &pctx->k,
1925: &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
1926:
1927: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "key_confirm done in %s", __func__));
1928:
1929: bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
1930: buffer_clear(m);
1931:
1932: /* pctx->k is sensitive, not sent */
1933: buffer_put_string(m, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
1934:
1935: debug3("%s: sending confirmation hash", __func__);
1936: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, m);
1937:
1938: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, 1);
1939:
1940: return 0;
1941: }
1942:
1943: int
1944: mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
1945: {
1946: int authenticated = 0;
1947: u_char *peer_confirm_hash;
1948: u_int peer_confirm_hash_len;
1949: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1950:
1951: if (pctx == NULL)
1952: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1953:
1954: peer_confirm_hash = buffer_get_string(m, &peer_confirm_hash_len);
1955:
1956: authenticated = jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
1957: pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
1958: session_id2, session_id2_len,
1959: peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len) && authctxt->valid;
1960:
1961: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "check_confirm done in %s", __func__));
1962:
1963: bzero(peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len);
1964: xfree(peer_confirm_hash);
1965:
1966: buffer_clear(m);
1967: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
1968:
1969: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1970: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, m);
1971:
1972: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 1);
1973:
1974: auth_method = "jpake-01@openssh.com";
1975: return authenticated;
1976: }
1977:
1978: #endif /* JPAKE */
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