Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c, Revision 1.121
1.121 ! djm 1: /* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.120 2012/12/11 22:16:21 markus Exp $ */
1.1 provos 2: /*
3: * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
4: * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
5: * All rights reserved.
6: *
7: * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8: * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9: * are met:
10: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12: * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14: * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15: *
16: * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
17: * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
18: * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
19: * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
20: * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
21: * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
22: * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
23: * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
24: * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
25: * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
26: */
27:
1.67 stevesk 28: #include <sys/types.h>
29: #include <sys/wait.h>
1.79 stevesk 30: #include <sys/socket.h>
1.85 deraadt 31: #include <sys/tree.h>
1.83 stevesk 32: #include <sys/param.h>
1.95 djm 33: #include <sys/queue.h>
1.1 provos 34:
1.78 stevesk 35: #include <openssl/dh.h>
36:
1.81 stevesk 37: #include <errno.h>
1.80 stevesk 38: #include <fcntl.h>
1.65 stevesk 39: #include <paths.h>
1.114 djm 40: #include <poll.h>
1.78 stevesk 41: #include <pwd.h>
1.68 stevesk 42: #include <signal.h>
1.84 stevesk 43: #include <stdlib.h>
1.82 stevesk 44: #include <string.h>
1.1 provos 45:
1.114 djm 46: #include "atomicio.h"
1.85 deraadt 47: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.1 provos 48: #include "ssh.h"
1.85 deraadt 49: #include "key.h"
50: #include "buffer.h"
51: #include "hostfile.h"
1.1 provos 52: #include "auth.h"
1.85 deraadt 53: #include "cipher.h"
1.1 provos 54: #include "kex.h"
55: #include "dh.h"
1.88 miod 56: #include <zlib.h>
1.1 provos 57: #include "packet.h"
58: #include "auth-options.h"
59: #include "sshpty.h"
60: #include "channels.h"
61: #include "session.h"
62: #include "sshlogin.h"
63: #include "canohost.h"
64: #include "log.h"
65: #include "servconf.h"
66: #include "monitor.h"
67: #include "monitor_mm.h"
1.85 deraadt 68: #ifdef GSSAPI
69: #include "ssh-gss.h"
70: #endif
1.1 provos 71: #include "monitor_wrap.h"
72: #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
73: #include "misc.h"
74: #include "compat.h"
75: #include "ssh2.h"
1.100 djm 76: #include "jpake.h"
1.104 andreas 77: #include "roaming.h"
1.1 provos 78:
1.46 markus 79: #ifdef GSSAPI
80: static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
81: #endif
82:
1.1 provos 83: /* Imports */
84: extern ServerOptions options;
85: extern u_int utmp_len;
86: extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
87: extern z_stream incoming_stream;
88: extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
89: extern u_char session_id[];
90: extern Buffer auth_debug;
91: extern int auth_debug_init;
1.61 dtucker 92: extern Buffer loginmsg;
1.1 provos 93:
94: /* State exported from the child */
95:
96: struct {
97: z_stream incoming;
98: z_stream outgoing;
99: u_char *keyin;
100: u_int keyinlen;
101: u_char *keyout;
102: u_int keyoutlen;
103: u_char *ivin;
104: u_int ivinlen;
105: u_char *ivout;
106: u_int ivoutlen;
1.15 markus 107: u_char *ssh1key;
108: u_int ssh1keylen;
1.1 provos 109: int ssh1cipher;
110: int ssh1protoflags;
111: u_char *input;
112: u_int ilen;
113: u_char *output;
114: u_int olen;
1.103 andreas 115: u_int64_t sent_bytes;
116: u_int64_t recv_bytes;
1.1 provos 117: } child_state;
118:
1.43 markus 119: /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
1.1 provos 120:
121: int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
122: int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
123: int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
1.10 djm 124: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
1.1 provos 125: int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
126: int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
127: int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
128: int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
129: int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
130: int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
131: int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
132: int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
133: int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
134: int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
135: int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
136: int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
137: int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
138: int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
139: int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
140: int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
1.100 djm 141: int mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int, Buffer *);
142: int mm_answer_jpake_step1(int, Buffer *);
143: int mm_answer_jpake_step2(int, Buffer *);
144: int mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int, Buffer *);
145: int mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int, Buffer *);
1.1 provos 146:
1.46 markus 147: #ifdef GSSAPI
148: int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
149: int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
150: int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
1.52 markus 151: int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
1.46 markus 152: #endif
1.25 itojun 153:
1.114 djm 154: static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
155:
1.1 provos 156: static Authctxt *authctxt;
157: static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
158:
159: /* local state for key verify */
160: static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
161: static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
162: static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
1.26 markus 163: static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
164: static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
1.1 provos 165: static char *auth_method = "unknown";
1.119 djm 166: static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
1.44 markus 167: static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
1.13 markus 168: static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
1.40 markus 169: static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
1.1 provos 170:
171: struct mon_table {
172: enum monitor_reqtype type;
173: int flags;
174: int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
175: };
176:
177: #define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
178: #define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
179: #define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
1.77 dtucker 180: #define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
1.1 provos 181:
182: #define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
183:
184: #define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
185:
186: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
187: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
188: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
189: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
190: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
1.10 djm 191: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
1.1 provos 192: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
193: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 194: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.1 provos 195: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
196: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
1.46 markus 197: #ifdef GSSAPI
198: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
199: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
200: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
1.52 markus 201: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
1.46 markus 202: #endif
1.100 djm 203: #ifdef JPAKE
204: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata},
205: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_jpake_step1},
206: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_step2},
207: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm},
208: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm},
209: #endif
1.1 provos 210: {0, 0, NULL}
211: };
212:
213: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
214: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
215: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
216: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
217: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
218: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
219: {0, 0, NULL}
220: };
221:
222: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
223: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
224: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
225: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
226: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
1.77 dtucker 227: {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
228: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
1.1 provos 229: {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
230: {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
231: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 232: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.1 provos 233: {0, 0, NULL}
234: };
235:
236: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
237: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
238: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
239: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
240: {0, 0, NULL}
241: };
242:
243: struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
244:
245: /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
246:
247: static void
248: monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
249: {
250: while (ent->f != NULL) {
251: if (ent->type == type) {
252: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
253: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
254: return;
255: }
256: ent++;
257: }
258: }
259:
260: static void
261: monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
262: {
263: struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
264:
265: while (ent->f != NULL) {
266: if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
267: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
268: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
269: }
270: ent++;
271: }
272: }
273:
1.50 markus 274: void
275: monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 276: {
277: struct mon_table *ent;
1.119 djm 278: int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
1.1 provos 279:
280: debug3("preauth child monitor started");
281:
1.114 djm 282: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
283: close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
284: pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
285:
1.50 markus 286: authctxt = _authctxt;
287: memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
288:
1.1 provos 289: if (compat20) {
290: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
291:
292: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
293: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
294: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
295: } else {
296: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
297:
298: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
299: }
300:
301: /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
302: while (!authenticated) {
1.119 djm 303: partial = 0;
1.77 dtucker 304: auth_method = "unknown";
1.119 djm 305: auth_submethod = NULL;
1.89 markus 306: authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
1.118 djm 307:
308: /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
309: if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
310: if (!compat20)
311: fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported"
312: "with SSH protocol 1");
313: if (authenticated &&
314: !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
315: auth_method)) {
316: debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
317: auth_method);
318: authenticated = 0;
1.119 djm 319: partial = 1;
1.118 djm 320: }
321: }
322:
1.1 provos 323: if (authenticated) {
324: if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
325: fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
1.14 markus 326: __func__, ent->type);
1.1 provos 327: if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
328: !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
329: authenticated = 0;
330: }
1.77 dtucker 331: if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
1.119 djm 332: auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial,
333: auth_method, auth_submethod,
1.1 provos 334: compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
335: if (!authenticated)
336: authctxt->failures++;
337: }
1.100 djm 338: #ifdef JPAKE
339: /* Cleanup JPAKE context after authentication */
340: if (ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE) {
341: if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL) {
342: jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
343: authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
344: }
345: }
346: #endif
1.1 provos 347: }
348:
349: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 350: fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
1.77 dtucker 351: if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
352: fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
1.1 provos 353:
354: debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
1.14 markus 355: __func__, authctxt->user);
1.1 provos 356:
1.11 mouring 357: mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
1.120 markus 358:
359: /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
360: while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
361: ;
1.114 djm 362:
363: close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
364: close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
365: pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
1.1 provos 366: }
367:
1.40 markus 368: static void
369: monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
370: {
371: monitor_child_pid = pid;
372: }
373:
374: static void
1.59 avsm 375: monitor_child_handler(int sig)
1.40 markus 376: {
1.59 avsm 377: kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
1.40 markus 378: }
379:
1.1 provos 380: void
1.11 mouring 381: monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 382: {
1.114 djm 383: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
384: pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
385:
1.40 markus 386: monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
387: signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
388: signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
1.91 djm 389: signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
1.40 markus 390:
1.1 provos 391: if (compat20) {
392: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
393:
394: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
395: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
396: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
397: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
398: } else {
399: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
400: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
401: }
402: if (!no_pty_flag) {
403: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
404: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
405: }
406:
407: for (;;)
1.11 mouring 408: monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
1.1 provos 409: }
410:
411: void
1.11 mouring 412: monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 413: {
1.16 djm 414: if (options.compression) {
415: /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
416: mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
417: }
1.1 provos 418: }
419:
1.114 djm 420: static int
421: monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
422: {
423: Buffer logmsg;
424: u_int len, level;
425: char *msg;
426:
427: buffer_init(&logmsg);
428:
429: /* Read length */
430: buffer_append_space(&logmsg, 4);
431: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
432: buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) {
433: if (errno == EPIPE) {
1.116 djm 434: buffer_free(&logmsg);
1.114 djm 435: debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
436: close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
437: pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
438: return -1;
439: }
440: fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
441: }
442: len = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
443: if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
444: fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len);
445:
446: /* Read severity, message */
447: buffer_clear(&logmsg);
448: buffer_append_space(&logmsg, len);
449: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
450: buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg))
451: fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
452:
453: /* Log it */
454: level = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
455: msg = buffer_get_string(&logmsg, NULL);
456: if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
457: fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
458: __func__, level);
459: do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
460:
461: buffer_free(&logmsg);
462: xfree(msg);
463:
464: return 0;
465: }
466:
1.1 provos 467: int
1.11 mouring 468: monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
1.1 provos 469: struct mon_table **pent)
470: {
471: Buffer m;
472: int ret;
473: u_char type;
1.114 djm 474: struct pollfd pfd[2];
475:
476: for (;;) {
477: bzero(&pfd, sizeof(pfd));
478: pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
479: pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
480: pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
481: pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
1.115 djm 482: if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
483: if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
484: continue;
1.114 djm 485: fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.115 djm 486: }
1.114 djm 487: if (pfd[1].revents) {
488: /*
489: * Drain all log messages before processing next
490: * monitor request.
491: */
492: monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
493: continue;
494: }
495: if (pfd[0].revents)
496: break; /* Continues below */
497: }
1.1 provos 498:
499: buffer_init(&m);
500:
1.11 mouring 501: mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 502: type = buffer_get_char(&m);
503:
1.14 markus 504: debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 505:
506: while (ent->f != NULL) {
507: if (ent->type == type)
508: break;
509: ent++;
510: }
511:
512: if (ent->f != NULL) {
513: if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
1.14 markus 514: fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
1.1 provos 515: type);
1.11 mouring 516: ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 517: buffer_free(&m);
518:
519: /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
520: if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
1.14 markus 521: debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
1.1 provos 522: type);
523: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
524: }
525:
526: if (pent != NULL)
527: *pent = ent;
1.3 markus 528:
1.1 provos 529: return ret;
530: }
531:
1.14 markus 532: fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 533:
534: /* NOTREACHED */
535: return (-1);
536: }
537:
538: /* allowed key state */
539: static int
540: monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
541: {
542: /* make sure key is allowed */
543: if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
1.108 djm 544: timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
1.1 provos 545: return (0);
546: return (1);
547: }
548:
549: static void
550: monitor_reset_key_state(void)
551: {
552: /* reset state */
553: if (key_blob != NULL)
554: xfree(key_blob);
555: if (hostbased_cuser != NULL)
556: xfree(hostbased_cuser);
557: if (hostbased_chost != NULL)
558: xfree(hostbased_chost);
559: key_blob = NULL;
560: key_bloblen = 0;
561: key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
562: hostbased_cuser = NULL;
563: hostbased_chost = NULL;
564: }
565:
566: int
1.59 avsm 567: mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 568: {
569: DH *dh;
570: int min, want, max;
571:
572: min = buffer_get_int(m);
573: want = buffer_get_int(m);
574: max = buffer_get_int(m);
575:
576: debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 577: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 578: /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
579: if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
580: fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 581: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 582:
583: buffer_clear(m);
584:
585: dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
586: if (dh == NULL) {
587: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
588: return (0);
589: } else {
590: /* Send first bignum */
591: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
592: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
593: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
1.3 markus 594:
1.1 provos 595: DH_free(dh);
596: }
1.59 avsm 597: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
1.1 provos 598: return (0);
599: }
600:
601: int
1.59 avsm 602: mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 603: {
604: Key *key;
605: u_char *p;
606: u_char *signature;
607: u_int siglen, datlen;
608: int keyid;
1.3 markus 609:
1.14 markus 610: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 611:
1.3 markus 612: keyid = buffer_get_int(m);
613: p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen);
1.1 provos 614:
1.69 djm 615: /*
1.110 djm 616: * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
617: * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
1.69 djm 618: */
1.110 djm 619: if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64)
1.19 deraadt 620: fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %u", __func__, datlen);
1.1 provos 621:
1.13 markus 622: /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
623: if (session_id2_len == 0) {
624: session_id2_len = datlen;
625: session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
626: memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
627: }
628:
1.1 provos 629: if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 630: fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
1.1 provos 631: if (key_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen) < 0)
1.14 markus 632: fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 633:
1.19 deraadt 634: debug3("%s: signature %p(%u)", __func__, signature, siglen);
1.1 provos 635:
636: buffer_clear(m);
637: buffer_put_string(m, signature, siglen);
638:
639: xfree(p);
640: xfree(signature);
641:
1.59 avsm 642: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
1.1 provos 643:
644: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
645: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
646:
647: return (0);
648: }
649:
650: /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
651:
652: int
1.59 avsm 653: mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 654: {
1.60 dtucker 655: char *username;
1.1 provos 656: struct passwd *pwent;
657: int allowed = 0;
1.113 djm 658: u_int i;
1.3 markus 659:
1.14 markus 660: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 661:
662: if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
1.14 markus 663: fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
1.1 provos 664:
1.60 dtucker 665: username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.1 provos 666:
1.60 dtucker 667: pwent = getpwnamallow(username);
1.1 provos 668:
1.60 dtucker 669: authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
670: setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
671: xfree(username);
1.1 provos 672:
673: buffer_clear(m);
674:
675: if (pwent == NULL) {
676: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
1.53 djm 677: authctxt->pw = fakepw();
1.1 provos 678: goto out;
679: }
680:
681: allowed = 1;
1.4 markus 682: authctxt->pw = pwent;
1.1 provos 683: authctxt->valid = 1;
684:
685: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
686: buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
687: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
688: buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
689: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
690: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
691: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
692: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
1.94 dtucker 693:
694: out:
1.90 dtucker 695: buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
1.112 djm 696:
697: #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
698: if (options.x != NULL) \
699: buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x); \
700: } while (0)
1.113 djm 701: #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
702: for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) \
703: buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x[i]); \
704: } while (0)
1.112 djm 705: /* See comment in servconf.h */
706: COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
707: #undef M_CP_STROPT
1.113 djm 708: #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
1.118 djm 709:
710: /* Create valid auth method lists */
711: if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
712: /*
713: * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
714: * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
715: * authentication to succeed.
716: */
717: debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
718: }
719:
1.14 markus 720: debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
1.59 avsm 721: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
1.1 provos 722:
723: /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
724: if (!compat20)
725: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
1.10 djm 726: else {
1.1 provos 727: /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
728: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
1.10 djm 729: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
730: }
731:
732: return (0);
733: }
734:
1.59 avsm 735: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.10 djm 736: {
737: char *banner;
738:
739: buffer_clear(m);
740: banner = auth2_read_banner();
741: buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
1.59 avsm 742: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
1.1 provos 743:
1.10 djm 744: if (banner != NULL)
1.21 deraadt 745: xfree(banner);
1.1 provos 746:
747: return (0);
748: }
749:
750: int
1.59 avsm 751: mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 752: {
753: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
754:
755: authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
756: authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.6 stevesk 757: debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
1.14 markus 758: __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
1.6 stevesk 759:
1.1 provos 760: if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
761: xfree(authctxt->style);
762: authctxt->style = NULL;
763: }
764:
765: return (0);
766: }
767:
768: int
1.59 avsm 769: mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 770: {
771: static int call_count;
772: char *passwd;
1.22 stevesk 773: int authenticated;
774: u_int plen;
1.1 provos 775:
776: passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
777: /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
1.12 markus 778: authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
1.48 markus 779: auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
1.1 provos 780: memset(passwd, 0, strlen(passwd));
781: xfree(passwd);
782:
783: buffer_clear(m);
784: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
785:
1.14 markus 786: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 787: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
1.1 provos 788:
789: call_count++;
790: if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
791: auth_method = "none";
792: else
793: auth_method = "password";
794:
795: /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
796: return (authenticated);
797: }
798:
799: int
1.59 avsm 800: mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 801: {
802: char *name, *infotxt;
803: u_int numprompts;
804: u_int *echo_on;
805: char **prompts;
1.31 markus 806: u_int success;
1.1 provos 807:
1.31 markus 808: success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
809: &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
1.1 provos 810:
811: buffer_clear(m);
1.31 markus 812: buffer_put_int(m, success);
813: if (success)
1.1 provos 814: buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
815:
1.31 markus 816: debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
1.59 avsm 817: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
1.1 provos 818:
1.31 markus 819: if (success) {
1.1 provos 820: xfree(name);
821: xfree(infotxt);
822: xfree(prompts);
823: xfree(echo_on);
824: }
825:
826: return (0);
827: }
828:
829: int
1.59 avsm 830: mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 831: {
832: char *response;
833: int authok;
834:
835: if (authctxt->as == 0)
1.14 markus 836: fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
1.1 provos 837:
838: response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.12 markus 839: authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
840: auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
1.1 provos 841: authctxt->as = NULL;
1.14 markus 842: debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
1.1 provos 843: xfree(response);
844:
845: buffer_clear(m);
846: buffer_put_int(m, authok);
847:
1.14 markus 848: debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
1.59 avsm 849: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
1.1 provos 850:
1.118 djm 851: if (compat20)
1.119 djm 852: auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; /* XXX auth_submethod */
1.118 djm 853: else
854: auth_method = "bsdauth";
1.1 provos 855:
856: return (authok != 0);
857: }
858:
859: int
1.59 avsm 860: mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 861: {
862: Key *key;
1.26 markus 863: char *cuser, *chost;
864: u_char *blob;
1.1 provos 865: u_int bloblen;
866: enum mm_keytype type = 0;
867: int allowed = 0;
868:
1.14 markus 869: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.3 markus 870:
1.1 provos 871: type = buffer_get_int(m);
872: cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
873: chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
874: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
875:
876: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
877:
878: if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
879: (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
1.14 markus 880: fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 881:
1.14 markus 882: debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
1.1 provos 883:
1.51 djm 884: if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
1.63 deraadt 885: switch (type) {
1.1 provos 886: case MM_USERKEY:
1.12 markus 887: allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
888: user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
1.77 dtucker 889: auth_method = "publickey";
1.97 dtucker 890: if (options.pubkey_authentication && allowed != 1)
891: auth_clear_options();
1.1 provos 892: break;
893: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1.12 markus 894: allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
895: hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 896: cuser, chost, key);
1.77 dtucker 897: auth_method = "hostbased";
1.1 provos 898: break;
899: case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
900: key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
1.12 markus 901: allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
902: auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 903: cuser, chost, key);
1.97 dtucker 904: if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
905: auth_clear_options();
1.77 dtucker 906: auth_method = "rsa";
1.1 provos 907: break;
908: default:
1.14 markus 909: fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 910: break;
911: }
1.33 markus 912: }
913: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 914: key_free(key);
915:
916: /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
917: monitor_reset_key_state();
918:
919: if (allowed) {
920: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
921: key_blob = blob;
922: key_bloblen = bloblen;
923: key_blobtype = type;
924: hostbased_cuser = cuser;
925: hostbased_chost = chost;
1.72 djm 926: } else {
1.77 dtucker 927: /* Log failed attempt */
1.119 djm 928: auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL,
929: compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
1.72 djm 930: xfree(blob);
931: xfree(cuser);
932: xfree(chost);
1.1 provos 933: }
934:
935: debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
1.98 dtucker 936: __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
1.1 provos 937:
938: buffer_clear(m);
939: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 940: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 941:
1.59 avsm 942: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 943:
944: if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
945: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
946:
947: return (0);
948: }
949:
950: static int
951: monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
952: {
953: Buffer b;
1.121 ! djm 954: char *p, *userstyle;
1.1 provos 955: u_int len;
956: int fail = 0;
957:
958: buffer_init(&b);
959: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 960:
1.1 provos 961: if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
1.13 markus 962: p = buffer_ptr(&b);
963: len = buffer_len(&b);
964: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
965: (len < session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 966: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.13 markus 967: fail++;
1.1 provos 968: buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
969: } else {
1.13 markus 970: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
971: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
972: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 973: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 974: fail++;
1.13 markus 975: xfree(p);
1.1 provos 976: }
977: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
978: fail++;
1.121 ! djm 979: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
! 980: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
! 981: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
! 982: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
! 983: if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 984: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.121 ! djm 985: userstyle, p);
1.1 provos 986: fail++;
987: }
1.121 ! djm 988: xfree(userstyle);
1.1 provos 989: xfree(p);
990: buffer_skip_string(&b);
991: if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
992: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
993: fail++;
994: } else {
1.121 ! djm 995: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1.1 provos 996: if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
997: fail++;
998: xfree(p);
999: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
1000: fail++;
1001: buffer_skip_string(&b);
1002: }
1003: buffer_skip_string(&b);
1004: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1005: fail++;
1006: buffer_free(&b);
1007: return (fail == 0);
1008: }
1009:
1010: static int
1.26 markus 1011: monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
1012: char *chost)
1.1 provos 1013: {
1014: Buffer b;
1.121 ! djm 1015: char *p, *userstyle;
1.1 provos 1016: u_int len;
1017: int fail = 0;
1018:
1019: buffer_init(&b);
1020: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 1021:
1.13 markus 1022: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
1023: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1024: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1025: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 1026: fail++;
1.13 markus 1027: xfree(p);
1028:
1.1 provos 1029: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1030: fail++;
1.121 ! djm 1031: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
! 1032: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
! 1033: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
! 1034: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
! 1035: if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 1036: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.121 ! djm 1037: userstyle, p);
1.1 provos 1038: fail++;
1039: }
1.121 ! djm 1040: free(userstyle);
1.1 provos 1041: xfree(p);
1042: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */
1.121 ! djm 1043: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1.1 provos 1044: if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
1045: fail++;
1046: xfree(p);
1047: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkalg */
1048: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkblob */
1049:
1050: /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
1051: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1052: if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
1053: p[len - 1] = '\0';
1054: if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
1055: fail++;
1056: xfree(p);
1057:
1058: /* verify client user */
1059: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1060: if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
1061: fail++;
1062: xfree(p);
1063:
1064: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1065: fail++;
1066: buffer_free(&b);
1067: return (fail == 0);
1068: }
1069:
1070: int
1.59 avsm 1071: mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1072: {
1073: Key *key;
1074: u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
1075: u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
1076: int verified = 0;
1077: int valid_data = 0;
1078:
1079: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1080: signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
1081: data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
1082:
1083: if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
1.8 mouring 1084: !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
1.14 markus 1085: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1086:
1087: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1088: if (key == NULL)
1.14 markus 1089: fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 1090:
1091: switch (key_blobtype) {
1092: case MM_USERKEY:
1093: valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
1094: break;
1095: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1096: valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
1097: hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
1098: break;
1099: default:
1100: valid_data = 0;
1101: break;
1102: }
1103: if (!valid_data)
1.14 markus 1104: fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 1105:
1106: verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
1107: debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
1.89 markus 1108: __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
1.1 provos 1109:
1110: key_free(key);
1111: xfree(blob);
1112: xfree(signature);
1113: xfree(data);
1114:
1.17 stevesk 1115: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
1116:
1.1 provos 1117: monitor_reset_key_state();
1.3 markus 1118:
1.1 provos 1119: buffer_clear(m);
1120: buffer_put_int(m, verified);
1.59 avsm 1121: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
1.1 provos 1122:
1.89 markus 1123: return (verified == 1);
1.1 provos 1124: }
1125:
1.2 markus 1126: static void
1.1 provos 1127: mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
1128: {
1129: socklen_t fromlen;
1130: struct sockaddr_storage from;
1131:
1132: /*
1133: * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
1134: * the address be 0.0.0.0.
1135: */
1136: memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
1.24 stevesk 1137: fromlen = sizeof(from);
1.1 provos 1138: if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
1139: if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
1.74 deraadt 1140: (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
1.1 provos 1141: debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1.50 markus 1142: cleanup_exit(255);
1.1 provos 1143: }
1144: }
1145: /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
1146: record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
1.42 markus 1147: get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
1.24 stevesk 1148: (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
1.1 provos 1149: }
1150:
1151: static void
1152: mm_session_close(Session *s)
1153: {
1.41 djm 1154: debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
1.1 provos 1155: if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1.86 stevesk 1156: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
1.1 provos 1157: session_pty_cleanup2(s);
1158: }
1.96 djm 1159: session_unused(s->self);
1.1 provos 1160: }
1161:
1162: int
1.59 avsm 1163: mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1164: {
1.11 mouring 1165: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1166: Session *s;
1167: int res, fd0;
1168:
1.14 markus 1169: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1170:
1171: buffer_clear(m);
1172: s = session_new();
1173: if (s == NULL)
1174: goto error;
1175: s->authctxt = authctxt;
1176: s->pw = authctxt->pw;
1.11 mouring 1177: s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
1.1 provos 1178: res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
1179: if (res == 0)
1180: goto error;
1181: pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
1182:
1183: buffer_put_int(m, 1);
1184: buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
1185:
1186: /* We need to trick ttyslot */
1187: if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
1.14 markus 1188: fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
1.1 provos 1189:
1190: mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
1191:
1192: /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
1193: close(0);
1.61 dtucker 1194:
1195: /* send messages generated by record_login */
1196: buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
1197: buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
1198:
1199: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1200:
1.92 djm 1201: if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
1202: mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
1203: fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1204:
1205: /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
1206: if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
1.14 markus 1207: fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1208: if (fd0 != 0)
1.14 markus 1209: error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
1.1 provos 1210:
1211: /* slave is not needed */
1212: close(s->ttyfd);
1213: s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
1214: /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
1215: s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
1216:
1.86 stevesk 1217: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
1.1 provos 1218:
1219: return (0);
1220:
1221: error:
1222: if (s != NULL)
1223: mm_session_close(s);
1224: buffer_put_int(m, 0);
1.59 avsm 1225: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1.1 provos 1226: return (0);
1227: }
1228:
1229: int
1.59 avsm 1230: mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1231: {
1232: Session *s;
1233: char *tty;
1234:
1.14 markus 1235: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1236:
1237: tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1238: if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
1239: mm_session_close(s);
1240: buffer_clear(m);
1241: xfree(tty);
1242: return (0);
1243: }
1244:
1245: int
1.59 avsm 1246: mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1247: {
1248: BIGNUM *p;
1249: int rsafail;
1250:
1251: /* Turn off permissions */
1.62 dtucker 1252: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
1.1 provos 1253:
1254: if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1255: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1256:
1257: buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
1258:
1259: rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
1260:
1261: buffer_clear(m);
1262: buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
1263: buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
1264:
1265: BN_clear_free(p);
1266:
1.59 avsm 1267: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
1.1 provos 1268:
1269: /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
1270: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
1271:
1272: return (0);
1273: }
1274:
1275: int
1.59 avsm 1276: mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1277: {
1278: int i;
1279:
1.14 markus 1280: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1281:
1282: if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
1.14 markus 1283: fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
1.1 provos 1284: for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1285: session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
1286:
1287: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
1288: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
1289:
1290: return (0);
1291: }
1292:
1293: int
1.59 avsm 1294: mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1295: {
1296: BIGNUM *client_n;
1297: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1298: u_char *blob = NULL;
1299: u_int blen = 0;
1.1 provos 1300: int allowed = 0;
1301:
1.14 markus 1302: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1303:
1.77 dtucker 1304: auth_method = "rsa";
1.12 markus 1305: if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
1.1 provos 1306: if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1307: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1308: buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
1309: allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
1310: BN_clear_free(client_n);
1311: }
1312: buffer_clear(m);
1313: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 1314: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 1315:
1316: /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
1317: monitor_reset_key_state();
1318:
1319: if (allowed && key != NULL) {
1320: key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */
1321: if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
1.14 markus 1322: fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1323: buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
1324:
1325: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1326: key_blob = blob;
1327: key_bloblen = blen;
1328: key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
1.33 markus 1329: }
1330: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 1331: key_free(key);
1332:
1.59 avsm 1333: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 1334:
1335: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
1336: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
1337: return (0);
1338: }
1339:
1340: int
1.59 avsm 1341: mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1342: {
1343: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1344: u_char *blob;
1345: u_int blen;
1.1 provos 1346:
1.14 markus 1347: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1348:
1349: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1350: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1351: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1352: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1353: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1354: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1355: fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 1356: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1357: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.101 djm 1358: if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
1359: fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
1360: key->type = KEY_RSA1;
1.1 provos 1361: if (ssh1_challenge)
1362: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1363: ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
1364:
1365: buffer_clear(m);
1366: buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
1367:
1.14 markus 1368: debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
1.59 avsm 1369: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
1.1 provos 1370:
1371: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
1.33 markus 1372:
1373: xfree(blob);
1374: key_free(key);
1.1 provos 1375: return (0);
1376: }
1377:
1378: int
1.59 avsm 1379: mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1380: {
1381: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1382: u_char *blob, *response;
1383: u_int blen, len;
1384: int success;
1.1 provos 1385:
1.14 markus 1386: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1387:
1388: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1389: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1390: if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
1.14 markus 1391: fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1392:
1393: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1394: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1395: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1396: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1397: fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
1.1 provos 1398: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1399: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.1 provos 1400: response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1401: if (len != 16)
1.14 markus 1402: fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1403: success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
1404:
1.33 markus 1405: xfree(blob);
1.1 provos 1406: key_free(key);
1407: xfree(response);
1408:
1409: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
1410:
1411: /* reset state */
1412: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1413: ssh1_challenge = NULL;
1414: monitor_reset_key_state();
1415:
1416: buffer_clear(m);
1417: buffer_put_int(m, success);
1.59 avsm 1418: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
1.1 provos 1419:
1420: return (success);
1421: }
1422:
1423: int
1.59 avsm 1424: mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
1.1 provos 1425: {
1.11 mouring 1426: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1427: int res, status;
1428:
1.14 markus 1429: debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
1.1 provos 1430:
1431: /* The child is terminating */
1432: session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
1433:
1.11 mouring 1434: while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
1.9 markus 1435: if (errno != EINTR)
1436: exit(1);
1.1 provos 1437:
1438: res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
1439:
1440: /* Terminate process */
1.57 deraadt 1441: exit(res);
1.1 provos 1442: }
1443:
1444: void
1.11 mouring 1445: monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1446: {
1447: if (compat20) {
1448: set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
1449: set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
1450: } else {
1451: packet_set_protocol_flags(child_state.ssh1protoflags);
1.15 markus 1452: packet_set_encryption_key(child_state.ssh1key,
1453: child_state.ssh1keylen, child_state.ssh1cipher);
1454: xfree(child_state.ssh1key);
1.1 provos 1455: }
1456:
1.15 markus 1457: /* for rc4 and other stateful ciphers */
1.1 provos 1458: packet_set_keycontext(MODE_OUT, child_state.keyout);
1459: xfree(child_state.keyout);
1460: packet_set_keycontext(MODE_IN, child_state.keyin);
1461: xfree(child_state.keyin);
1462:
1463: if (!compat20) {
1464: packet_set_iv(MODE_OUT, child_state.ivout);
1465: xfree(child_state.ivout);
1466: packet_set_iv(MODE_IN, child_state.ivin);
1467: xfree(child_state.ivin);
1468: }
1469:
1470: memcpy(&incoming_stream, &child_state.incoming,
1471: sizeof(incoming_stream));
1472: memcpy(&outgoing_stream, &child_state.outgoing,
1473: sizeof(outgoing_stream));
1.3 markus 1474:
1.1 provos 1475: /* Update with new address */
1.16 djm 1476: if (options.compression)
1477: mm_init_compression(pmonitor->m_zlib);
1.1 provos 1478:
1479: /* Network I/O buffers */
1480: /* XXX inefficient for large buffers, need: buffer_init_from_string */
1.102 andreas 1481: buffer_clear(packet_get_input());
1482: buffer_append(packet_get_input(), child_state.input, child_state.ilen);
1.1 provos 1483: memset(child_state.input, 0, child_state.ilen);
1484: xfree(child_state.input);
1485:
1.102 andreas 1486: buffer_clear(packet_get_output());
1487: buffer_append(packet_get_output(), child_state.output,
1488: child_state.olen);
1.1 provos 1489: memset(child_state.output, 0, child_state.olen);
1490: xfree(child_state.output);
1.103 andreas 1491:
1492: /* Roaming */
1493: if (compat20)
1494: roam_set_bytes(child_state.sent_bytes, child_state.recv_bytes);
1.1 provos 1495: }
1496:
1.2 markus 1497: static Kex *
1.1 provos 1498: mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
1499: {
1500: Kex *kex;
1501: void *blob;
1502: u_int bloblen;
1503:
1.75 djm 1504: kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex));
1.1 provos 1505: kex->session_id = buffer_get_string(m, &kex->session_id_len);
1.107 djm 1506: if (session_id2 == NULL ||
1507: kex->session_id_len != session_id2_len ||
1.108 djm 1508: timingsafe_bcmp(kex->session_id, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)
1.13 markus 1509: fatal("mm_get_get: internal error: bad session id");
1.1 provos 1510: kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m);
1.34 markus 1511: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1.58 djm 1512: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1.34 markus 1513: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1.69 djm 1514: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
1.109 djm 1515: kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
1.1 provos 1516: kex->server = 1;
1517: kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
1518: kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
1519: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1520: buffer_init(&kex->my);
1521: buffer_append(&kex->my, blob, bloblen);
1522: xfree(blob);
1523: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1524: buffer_init(&kex->peer);
1525: buffer_append(&kex->peer, blob, bloblen);
1526: xfree(blob);
1527: kex->done = 1;
1528: kex->flags = buffer_get_int(m);
1529: kex->client_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1530: kex->server_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.105 djm 1531: kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
1532: kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
1.1 provos 1533: kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1534:
1535: return (kex);
1536: }
1537:
1538: /* This function requries careful sanity checking */
1539:
1540: void
1.11 mouring 1541: mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1542: {
1543: Buffer m;
1544: u_char *blob, *p;
1545: u_int bloblen, plen;
1.37 markus 1546: u_int32_t seqnr, packets;
1.99 markus 1547: u_int64_t blocks, bytes;
1.1 provos 1548:
1.14 markus 1549: debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
1.1 provos 1550:
1551: buffer_init(&m);
1.11 mouring 1552: mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
1.1 provos 1553: if (!compat20) {
1554: child_state.ssh1protoflags = buffer_get_int(&m);
1555: child_state.ssh1cipher = buffer_get_int(&m);
1.15 markus 1556: child_state.ssh1key = buffer_get_string(&m,
1557: &child_state.ssh1keylen);
1.1 provos 1558: child_state.ivout = buffer_get_string(&m,
1559: &child_state.ivoutlen);
1560: child_state.ivin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ivinlen);
1561: goto skip;
1562: } else {
1563: /* Get the Kex for rekeying */
1.11 mouring 1564: *pmonitor->m_pkex = mm_get_kex(&m);
1.1 provos 1565: }
1566:
1567: blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
1568: current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1569: xfree(blob);
1570:
1.14 markus 1571: debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
1.1 provos 1572: blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
1573: current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1574: xfree(blob);
1.3 markus 1575:
1.1 provos 1576: /* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
1.37 markus 1577: seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
1578: blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1579: packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
1.99 markus 1580: bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1581: packet_set_state(MODE_OUT, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
1.37 markus 1582: seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
1583: blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1584: packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
1.99 markus 1585: bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1586: packet_set_state(MODE_IN, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
1.1 provos 1587:
1588: skip:
1589: /* Get the key context */
1590: child_state.keyout = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyoutlen);
1591: child_state.keyin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyinlen);
1592:
1.14 markus 1593: debug3("%s: Getting compression state", __func__);
1.1 provos 1594: /* Get compression state */
1595: p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
1596: if (plen != sizeof(child_state.outgoing))
1.14 markus 1597: fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
1.1 provos 1598: memcpy(&child_state.outgoing, p, sizeof(child_state.outgoing));
1599: xfree(p);
1600:
1601: p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
1602: if (plen != sizeof(child_state.incoming))
1.14 markus 1603: fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
1.1 provos 1604: memcpy(&child_state.incoming, p, sizeof(child_state.incoming));
1605: xfree(p);
1606:
1607: /* Network I/O buffers */
1.14 markus 1608: debug3("%s: Getting Network I/O buffers", __func__);
1.1 provos 1609: child_state.input = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ilen);
1610: child_state.output = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.olen);
1.103 andreas 1611:
1612: /* Roaming */
1613: if (compat20) {
1614: child_state.sent_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1615: child_state.recv_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1616: }
1.1 provos 1617:
1618: buffer_free(&m);
1619: }
1620:
1621:
1622: /* Allocation functions for zlib */
1623: void *
1624: mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
1625: {
1.30 markus 1626: size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
1.1 provos 1627: void *address;
1628:
1.23 millert 1629: if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_T_MAX / size)
1.18 deraadt 1630: fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
1631:
1632: address = mm_malloc(mm, len);
1.1 provos 1633:
1634: return (address);
1635: }
1636:
1637: void
1638: mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
1639: {
1640: mm_free(mm, address);
1641: }
1642:
1643: void
1644: mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *mm)
1645: {
1646: outgoing_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
1647: outgoing_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
1648: outgoing_stream.opaque = mm;
1649:
1650: incoming_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
1651: incoming_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
1652: incoming_stream.opaque = mm;
1653: }
1654:
1655: /* XXX */
1656:
1657: #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
1.111 djm 1658: if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
1.1 provos 1659: fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
1660: } while (0)
1661:
1.2 markus 1662: static void
1.114 djm 1663: monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
1.3 markus 1664: {
1.114 djm 1665: int pair[2];
1666:
1.1 provos 1667: if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
1.114 djm 1668: fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1669: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1670: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1.114 djm 1671: mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1672: mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1673:
1674: if (do_logfds) {
1675: if (pipe(pair) == -1)
1676: fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1677: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1678: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1679: mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
1680: mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
1681: } else
1682: mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
1.1 provos 1683: }
1684:
1685: #define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
1686:
1687: struct monitor *
1688: monitor_init(void)
1689: {
1690: struct monitor *mon;
1691:
1.75 djm 1692: mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
1.1 provos 1693:
1.114 djm 1694: monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
1.1 provos 1695:
1696: /* Used to share zlib space across processes */
1.16 djm 1697: if (options.compression) {
1698: mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
1699: mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
1.1 provos 1700:
1.16 djm 1701: /* Compression needs to share state across borders */
1702: mm_init_compression(mon->m_zlib);
1703: }
1.1 provos 1704:
1705: return mon;
1706: }
1707:
1708: void
1709: monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
1710: {
1.114 djm 1711: monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
1.1 provos 1712: }
1.46 markus 1713:
1714: #ifdef GSSAPI
1715: int
1.59 avsm 1716: mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1717: {
1.59 avsm 1718: gss_OID_desc goid;
1.46 markus 1719: OM_uint32 major;
1720: u_int len;
1721:
1.59 avsm 1722: goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1723: goid.length = len;
1.46 markus 1724:
1.59 avsm 1725: major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
1.46 markus 1726:
1.59 avsm 1727: xfree(goid.elements);
1.46 markus 1728:
1729: buffer_clear(m);
1730: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1731:
1.64 stevesk 1732: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
1.46 markus 1733:
1734: /* Now we have a context, enable the step */
1735: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
1736:
1737: return (0);
1738: }
1739:
1740: int
1.59 avsm 1741: mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1742: {
1743: gss_buffer_desc in;
1744: gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1.64 stevesk 1745: OM_uint32 major, minor;
1.46 markus 1746: OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
1.47 deraadt 1747: u_int len;
1.46 markus 1748:
1.47 deraadt 1749: in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1750: in.length = len;
1.46 markus 1751: major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
1752: xfree(in.value);
1753:
1754: buffer_clear(m);
1755: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1756: buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
1757: buffer_put_int(m, flags);
1.59 avsm 1758: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
1.46 markus 1759:
1760: gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
1761:
1.64 stevesk 1762: if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1.46 markus 1763: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
1764: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.52 markus 1765: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
1.46 markus 1766: }
1767: return (0);
1768: }
1769:
1770: int
1.59 avsm 1771: mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.52 markus 1772: {
1773: gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
1774: OM_uint32 ret;
1775: u_int len;
1.54 djm 1776:
1.52 markus 1777: gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1778: gssbuf.length = len;
1779: mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1780: mic.length = len;
1.54 djm 1781:
1.52 markus 1782: ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
1.54 djm 1783:
1.52 markus 1784: xfree(gssbuf.value);
1785: xfree(mic.value);
1.54 djm 1786:
1.52 markus 1787: buffer_clear(m);
1788: buffer_put_int(m, ret);
1.54 djm 1789:
1.59 avsm 1790: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
1.54 djm 1791:
1.52 markus 1792: if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
1793: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.54 djm 1794:
1.52 markus 1795: return (0);
1796: }
1797:
1798: int
1.59 avsm 1799: mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1800: {
1801: int authenticated;
1802:
1803: authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
1804:
1805: buffer_clear(m);
1806: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
1807:
1808: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 1809: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
1.46 markus 1810:
1.64 stevesk 1811: auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
1.46 markus 1812:
1813: /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
1814: return (authenticated);
1815: }
1816: #endif /* GSSAPI */
1.100 djm 1817:
1818: #ifdef JPAKE
1819: int
1820: mm_answer_jpake_step1(int sock, Buffer *m)
1821: {
1822: struct jpake_ctx *pctx;
1823: u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof;
1824: u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len;
1825:
1826: if (!options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication)
1827: fatal("zero_knowledge_password_authentication disabled");
1828:
1829: if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL)
1830: fatal("%s: authctxt->jpake_ctx already set (%p)",
1831: __func__, authctxt->jpake_ctx);
1832: authctxt->jpake_ctx = pctx = jpake_new();
1833:
1834: jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
1835: &pctx->server_id, &pctx->server_id_len,
1836: &pctx->x3, &pctx->x4, &pctx->g_x3, &pctx->g_x4,
1837: &x3_proof, &x3_proof_len,
1838: &x4_proof, &x4_proof_len);
1839:
1840: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step1 done in %s", __func__));
1841:
1842: buffer_clear(m);
1843:
1844: buffer_put_string(m, pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
1845: buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x3);
1846: buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x4);
1847: buffer_put_string(m, x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
1848: buffer_put_string(m, x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
1849:
1850: debug3("%s: sending step1", __func__);
1851: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1, m);
1852:
1853: bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
1854: bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
1855: xfree(x3_proof);
1856: xfree(x4_proof);
1857:
1858: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, 1);
1859: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 0);
1860:
1861: return 0;
1862: }
1863:
1864: int
1865: mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int sock, Buffer *m)
1866: {
1867: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1868: char *hash_scheme, *salt;
1869:
1870: if (pctx == NULL)
1871: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1872:
1873: auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(authctxt, &pctx->s, &hash_scheme, &salt);
1874:
1875: buffer_clear(m);
1876: /* pctx->s is sensitive, not returned to slave */
1877: buffer_put_cstring(m, hash_scheme);
1878: buffer_put_cstring(m, salt);
1879:
1880: debug3("%s: sending pwdata", __func__);
1881: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, m);
1882:
1883: bzero(hash_scheme, strlen(hash_scheme));
1884: bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
1885: xfree(hash_scheme);
1886: xfree(salt);
1887:
1888: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, 1);
1889:
1890: return 0;
1891: }
1892:
1893: int
1894: mm_answer_jpake_step2(int sock, Buffer *m)
1895: {
1896: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1897: u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof, *x4_s_proof;
1898: u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len, x4_s_proof_len;
1899:
1900: if (pctx == NULL)
1901: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1902:
1903: if ((pctx->g_x1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
1904: (pctx->g_x2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
1905: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1906: buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x1);
1907: buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x2);
1908: pctx->client_id = buffer_get_string(m, &pctx->client_id_len);
1909: x1_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x1_proof_len);
1910: x2_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_proof_len);
1911:
1912: jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x3,
1913: pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->x4,
1914: pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
1915: pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
1916: x1_proof, x1_proof_len,
1917: x2_proof, x2_proof_len,
1918: &pctx->b,
1919: &x4_s_proof, &x4_s_proof_len);
1920:
1921: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step2 done in %s", __func__));
1922:
1923: bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
1924: bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
1925: xfree(x1_proof);
1926: xfree(x2_proof);
1927:
1928: buffer_clear(m);
1929:
1930: buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->b);
1931: buffer_put_string(m, x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
1932:
1933: debug3("%s: sending step2", __func__);
1934: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2, m);
1935:
1936: bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
1937: xfree(x4_s_proof);
1938:
1939: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, 1);
1940:
1941: return 0;
1942: }
1943:
1944: int
1945: mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
1946: {
1947: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1948: u_char *x2_s_proof;
1949: u_int x2_s_proof_len;
1950:
1951: if (pctx == NULL)
1952: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1953:
1954: if ((pctx->a = BN_new()) == NULL)
1955: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1956: buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->a);
1957: x2_s_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_s_proof_len);
1958:
1959: jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->a,
1960: pctx->x4, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2,
1961: pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
1962: pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
1963: session_id2, session_id2_len,
1964: x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len,
1965: &pctx->k,
1966: &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
1967:
1968: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "key_confirm done in %s", __func__));
1969:
1970: bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
1971: buffer_clear(m);
1972:
1973: /* pctx->k is sensitive, not sent */
1974: buffer_put_string(m, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
1975:
1976: debug3("%s: sending confirmation hash", __func__);
1977: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, m);
1978:
1979: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, 1);
1980:
1981: return 0;
1982: }
1983:
1984: int
1985: mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
1986: {
1987: int authenticated = 0;
1988: u_char *peer_confirm_hash;
1989: u_int peer_confirm_hash_len;
1990: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1991:
1992: if (pctx == NULL)
1993: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1994:
1995: peer_confirm_hash = buffer_get_string(m, &peer_confirm_hash_len);
1996:
1997: authenticated = jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
1998: pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
1999: session_id2, session_id2_len,
2000: peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len) && authctxt->valid;
2001:
2002: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "check_confirm done in %s", __func__));
2003:
2004: bzero(peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len);
2005: xfree(peer_confirm_hash);
2006:
2007: buffer_clear(m);
2008: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
2009:
2010: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
2011: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, m);
2012:
2013: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 1);
2014:
2015: auth_method = "jpake-01@openssh.com";
2016: return authenticated;
2017: }
2018:
2019: #endif /* JPAKE */
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