Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c, Revision 1.122
1.122 ! markus 1: /* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.121 2013/03/07 00:19:59 djm Exp $ */
1.1 provos 2: /*
3: * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
4: * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
5: * All rights reserved.
6: *
7: * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8: * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9: * are met:
10: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12: * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14: * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15: *
16: * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
17: * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
18: * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
19: * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
20: * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
21: * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
22: * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
23: * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
24: * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
25: * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
26: */
27:
1.67 stevesk 28: #include <sys/types.h>
29: #include <sys/wait.h>
1.79 stevesk 30: #include <sys/socket.h>
1.85 deraadt 31: #include <sys/tree.h>
1.83 stevesk 32: #include <sys/param.h>
1.95 djm 33: #include <sys/queue.h>
1.1 provos 34:
1.78 stevesk 35: #include <openssl/dh.h>
36:
1.81 stevesk 37: #include <errno.h>
1.80 stevesk 38: #include <fcntl.h>
1.65 stevesk 39: #include <paths.h>
1.114 djm 40: #include <poll.h>
1.78 stevesk 41: #include <pwd.h>
1.68 stevesk 42: #include <signal.h>
1.84 stevesk 43: #include <stdlib.h>
1.82 stevesk 44: #include <string.h>
1.1 provos 45:
1.114 djm 46: #include "atomicio.h"
1.85 deraadt 47: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.1 provos 48: #include "ssh.h"
1.85 deraadt 49: #include "key.h"
50: #include "buffer.h"
51: #include "hostfile.h"
1.1 provos 52: #include "auth.h"
1.85 deraadt 53: #include "cipher.h"
1.1 provos 54: #include "kex.h"
55: #include "dh.h"
1.88 miod 56: #include <zlib.h>
1.1 provos 57: #include "packet.h"
58: #include "auth-options.h"
59: #include "sshpty.h"
60: #include "channels.h"
61: #include "session.h"
62: #include "sshlogin.h"
63: #include "canohost.h"
64: #include "log.h"
65: #include "servconf.h"
66: #include "monitor.h"
67: #include "monitor_mm.h"
1.85 deraadt 68: #ifdef GSSAPI
69: #include "ssh-gss.h"
70: #endif
1.1 provos 71: #include "monitor_wrap.h"
72: #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
73: #include "misc.h"
74: #include "compat.h"
75: #include "ssh2.h"
1.100 djm 76: #include "jpake.h"
1.104 andreas 77: #include "roaming.h"
1.1 provos 78:
1.46 markus 79: #ifdef GSSAPI
80: static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
81: #endif
82:
1.1 provos 83: /* Imports */
84: extern ServerOptions options;
85: extern u_int utmp_len;
86: extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
87: extern z_stream incoming_stream;
88: extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
89: extern u_char session_id[];
90: extern Buffer auth_debug;
91: extern int auth_debug_init;
1.61 dtucker 92: extern Buffer loginmsg;
1.1 provos 93:
94: /* State exported from the child */
95:
96: struct {
97: z_stream incoming;
98: z_stream outgoing;
99: u_char *keyin;
100: u_int keyinlen;
101: u_char *keyout;
102: u_int keyoutlen;
103: u_char *ivin;
104: u_int ivinlen;
105: u_char *ivout;
106: u_int ivoutlen;
1.15 markus 107: u_char *ssh1key;
108: u_int ssh1keylen;
1.1 provos 109: int ssh1cipher;
110: int ssh1protoflags;
111: u_char *input;
112: u_int ilen;
113: u_char *output;
114: u_int olen;
1.103 andreas 115: u_int64_t sent_bytes;
116: u_int64_t recv_bytes;
1.1 provos 117: } child_state;
118:
1.43 markus 119: /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
1.1 provos 120:
121: int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
122: int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
123: int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
1.10 djm 124: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
1.1 provos 125: int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
126: int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
127: int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
128: int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
129: int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
130: int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
131: int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
132: int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
133: int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
134: int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
135: int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
136: int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
137: int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
138: int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
139: int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
140: int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
1.100 djm 141: int mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int, Buffer *);
142: int mm_answer_jpake_step1(int, Buffer *);
143: int mm_answer_jpake_step2(int, Buffer *);
144: int mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int, Buffer *);
145: int mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int, Buffer *);
1.1 provos 146:
1.46 markus 147: #ifdef GSSAPI
148: int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
149: int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
150: int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
1.52 markus 151: int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
1.46 markus 152: #endif
1.25 itojun 153:
1.114 djm 154: static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
155:
1.1 provos 156: static Authctxt *authctxt;
157: static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
158:
159: /* local state for key verify */
160: static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
161: static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
162: static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
1.26 markus 163: static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
164: static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
1.1 provos 165: static char *auth_method = "unknown";
1.119 djm 166: static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
1.44 markus 167: static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
1.13 markus 168: static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
1.40 markus 169: static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
1.1 provos 170:
171: struct mon_table {
172: enum monitor_reqtype type;
173: int flags;
174: int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
175: };
176:
177: #define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
178: #define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
179: #define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
1.77 dtucker 180: #define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
1.1 provos 181:
182: #define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
183:
184: #define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
185:
186: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
187: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
188: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
189: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
190: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
1.10 djm 191: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
1.1 provos 192: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
193: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 194: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.1 provos 195: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
196: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
1.46 markus 197: #ifdef GSSAPI
198: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
199: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
200: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
1.52 markus 201: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
1.46 markus 202: #endif
1.100 djm 203: #ifdef JPAKE
204: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata},
205: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_jpake_step1},
206: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_step2},
207: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm},
208: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm},
209: #endif
1.1 provos 210: {0, 0, NULL}
211: };
212:
213: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
214: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
215: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
216: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
217: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
218: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
219: {0, 0, NULL}
220: };
221:
222: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
223: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
224: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
225: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
226: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
1.77 dtucker 227: {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
228: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
1.1 provos 229: {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
230: {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
231: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 232: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.1 provos 233: {0, 0, NULL}
234: };
235:
236: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
237: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
238: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
239: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
240: {0, 0, NULL}
241: };
242:
243: struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
244:
245: /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
246:
247: static void
248: monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
249: {
250: while (ent->f != NULL) {
251: if (ent->type == type) {
252: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
253: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
254: return;
255: }
256: ent++;
257: }
258: }
259:
260: static void
261: monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
262: {
263: struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
264:
265: while (ent->f != NULL) {
266: if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
267: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
268: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
269: }
270: ent++;
271: }
272: }
273:
1.50 markus 274: void
275: monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 276: {
277: struct mon_table *ent;
1.119 djm 278: int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
1.1 provos 279:
280: debug3("preauth child monitor started");
281:
1.114 djm 282: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
283: close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
284: pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
285:
1.50 markus 286: authctxt = _authctxt;
287: memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
288:
1.1 provos 289: if (compat20) {
290: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
291:
292: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
293: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
294: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
295: } else {
296: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
297:
298: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
299: }
300:
301: /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
302: while (!authenticated) {
1.119 djm 303: partial = 0;
1.77 dtucker 304: auth_method = "unknown";
1.119 djm 305: auth_submethod = NULL;
1.89 markus 306: authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
1.118 djm 307:
308: /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
309: if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
310: if (!compat20)
311: fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported"
312: "with SSH protocol 1");
313: if (authenticated &&
314: !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
1.122 ! markus 315: auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
1.118 djm 316: debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
317: auth_method);
318: authenticated = 0;
1.119 djm 319: partial = 1;
1.118 djm 320: }
321: }
322:
1.1 provos 323: if (authenticated) {
324: if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
325: fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
1.14 markus 326: __func__, ent->type);
1.1 provos 327: if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
328: !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
329: authenticated = 0;
330: }
1.77 dtucker 331: if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
1.119 djm 332: auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial,
333: auth_method, auth_submethod,
1.1 provos 334: compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
335: if (!authenticated)
336: authctxt->failures++;
337: }
1.100 djm 338: #ifdef JPAKE
339: /* Cleanup JPAKE context after authentication */
340: if (ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE) {
341: if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL) {
342: jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
343: authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
344: }
345: }
346: #endif
1.1 provos 347: }
348:
349: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 350: fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
1.77 dtucker 351: if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
352: fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
1.1 provos 353:
354: debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
1.14 markus 355: __func__, authctxt->user);
1.1 provos 356:
1.11 mouring 357: mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
1.120 markus 358:
359: /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
360: while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
361: ;
1.114 djm 362:
363: close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
364: close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
365: pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
1.1 provos 366: }
367:
1.40 markus 368: static void
369: monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
370: {
371: monitor_child_pid = pid;
372: }
373:
374: static void
1.59 avsm 375: monitor_child_handler(int sig)
1.40 markus 376: {
1.59 avsm 377: kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
1.40 markus 378: }
379:
1.1 provos 380: void
1.11 mouring 381: monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 382: {
1.114 djm 383: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
384: pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
385:
1.40 markus 386: monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
387: signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
388: signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
1.91 djm 389: signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
1.40 markus 390:
1.1 provos 391: if (compat20) {
392: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
393:
394: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
395: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
396: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
397: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
398: } else {
399: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
400: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
401: }
402: if (!no_pty_flag) {
403: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
404: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
405: }
406:
407: for (;;)
1.11 mouring 408: monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
1.1 provos 409: }
410:
411: void
1.11 mouring 412: monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 413: {
1.16 djm 414: if (options.compression) {
415: /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
416: mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
417: }
1.1 provos 418: }
419:
1.114 djm 420: static int
421: monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
422: {
423: Buffer logmsg;
424: u_int len, level;
425: char *msg;
426:
427: buffer_init(&logmsg);
428:
429: /* Read length */
430: buffer_append_space(&logmsg, 4);
431: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
432: buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) {
433: if (errno == EPIPE) {
1.116 djm 434: buffer_free(&logmsg);
1.114 djm 435: debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
436: close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
437: pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
438: return -1;
439: }
440: fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
441: }
442: len = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
443: if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
444: fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len);
445:
446: /* Read severity, message */
447: buffer_clear(&logmsg);
448: buffer_append_space(&logmsg, len);
449: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
450: buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg))
451: fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
452:
453: /* Log it */
454: level = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
455: msg = buffer_get_string(&logmsg, NULL);
456: if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
457: fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
458: __func__, level);
459: do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
460:
461: buffer_free(&logmsg);
462: xfree(msg);
463:
464: return 0;
465: }
466:
1.1 provos 467: int
1.11 mouring 468: monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
1.1 provos 469: struct mon_table **pent)
470: {
471: Buffer m;
472: int ret;
473: u_char type;
1.114 djm 474: struct pollfd pfd[2];
475:
476: for (;;) {
477: bzero(&pfd, sizeof(pfd));
478: pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
479: pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
480: pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
481: pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
1.115 djm 482: if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
483: if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
484: continue;
1.114 djm 485: fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.115 djm 486: }
1.114 djm 487: if (pfd[1].revents) {
488: /*
489: * Drain all log messages before processing next
490: * monitor request.
491: */
492: monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
493: continue;
494: }
495: if (pfd[0].revents)
496: break; /* Continues below */
497: }
1.1 provos 498:
499: buffer_init(&m);
500:
1.11 mouring 501: mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 502: type = buffer_get_char(&m);
503:
1.14 markus 504: debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 505:
506: while (ent->f != NULL) {
507: if (ent->type == type)
508: break;
509: ent++;
510: }
511:
512: if (ent->f != NULL) {
513: if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
1.14 markus 514: fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
1.1 provos 515: type);
1.11 mouring 516: ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 517: buffer_free(&m);
518:
519: /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
520: if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
1.14 markus 521: debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
1.1 provos 522: type);
523: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
524: }
525:
526: if (pent != NULL)
527: *pent = ent;
1.3 markus 528:
1.1 provos 529: return ret;
530: }
531:
1.14 markus 532: fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 533:
534: /* NOTREACHED */
535: return (-1);
536: }
537:
538: /* allowed key state */
539: static int
540: monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
541: {
542: /* make sure key is allowed */
543: if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
1.108 djm 544: timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
1.1 provos 545: return (0);
546: return (1);
547: }
548:
549: static void
550: monitor_reset_key_state(void)
551: {
552: /* reset state */
553: if (key_blob != NULL)
554: xfree(key_blob);
555: if (hostbased_cuser != NULL)
556: xfree(hostbased_cuser);
557: if (hostbased_chost != NULL)
558: xfree(hostbased_chost);
559: key_blob = NULL;
560: key_bloblen = 0;
561: key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
562: hostbased_cuser = NULL;
563: hostbased_chost = NULL;
564: }
565:
566: int
1.59 avsm 567: mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 568: {
569: DH *dh;
570: int min, want, max;
571:
572: min = buffer_get_int(m);
573: want = buffer_get_int(m);
574: max = buffer_get_int(m);
575:
576: debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 577: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 578: /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
579: if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
580: fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 581: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 582:
583: buffer_clear(m);
584:
585: dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
586: if (dh == NULL) {
587: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
588: return (0);
589: } else {
590: /* Send first bignum */
591: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
592: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
593: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
1.3 markus 594:
1.1 provos 595: DH_free(dh);
596: }
1.59 avsm 597: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
1.1 provos 598: return (0);
599: }
600:
601: int
1.59 avsm 602: mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 603: {
604: Key *key;
605: u_char *p;
606: u_char *signature;
607: u_int siglen, datlen;
608: int keyid;
1.3 markus 609:
1.14 markus 610: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 611:
1.3 markus 612: keyid = buffer_get_int(m);
613: p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen);
1.1 provos 614:
1.69 djm 615: /*
1.110 djm 616: * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
617: * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
1.69 djm 618: */
1.110 djm 619: if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64)
1.19 deraadt 620: fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %u", __func__, datlen);
1.1 provos 621:
1.13 markus 622: /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
623: if (session_id2_len == 0) {
624: session_id2_len = datlen;
625: session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
626: memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
627: }
628:
1.1 provos 629: if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 630: fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
1.1 provos 631: if (key_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen) < 0)
1.14 markus 632: fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 633:
1.19 deraadt 634: debug3("%s: signature %p(%u)", __func__, signature, siglen);
1.1 provos 635:
636: buffer_clear(m);
637: buffer_put_string(m, signature, siglen);
638:
639: xfree(p);
640: xfree(signature);
641:
1.59 avsm 642: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
1.1 provos 643:
644: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
645: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
646:
647: return (0);
648: }
649:
650: /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
651:
652: int
1.59 avsm 653: mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 654: {
1.60 dtucker 655: char *username;
1.1 provos 656: struct passwd *pwent;
657: int allowed = 0;
1.113 djm 658: u_int i;
1.3 markus 659:
1.14 markus 660: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 661:
662: if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
1.14 markus 663: fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
1.1 provos 664:
1.60 dtucker 665: username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.1 provos 666:
1.60 dtucker 667: pwent = getpwnamallow(username);
1.1 provos 668:
1.60 dtucker 669: authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
670: setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
671: xfree(username);
1.1 provos 672:
673: buffer_clear(m);
674:
675: if (pwent == NULL) {
676: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
1.53 djm 677: authctxt->pw = fakepw();
1.1 provos 678: goto out;
679: }
680:
681: allowed = 1;
1.4 markus 682: authctxt->pw = pwent;
1.1 provos 683: authctxt->valid = 1;
684:
685: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
686: buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
687: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
688: buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
689: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
690: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
691: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
692: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
1.94 dtucker 693:
694: out:
1.90 dtucker 695: buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
1.112 djm 696:
697: #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
698: if (options.x != NULL) \
699: buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x); \
700: } while (0)
1.113 djm 701: #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
702: for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) \
703: buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x[i]); \
704: } while (0)
1.112 djm 705: /* See comment in servconf.h */
706: COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
707: #undef M_CP_STROPT
1.113 djm 708: #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
1.118 djm 709:
710: /* Create valid auth method lists */
711: if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
712: /*
713: * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
714: * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
715: * authentication to succeed.
716: */
717: debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
718: }
719:
1.14 markus 720: debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
1.59 avsm 721: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
1.1 provos 722:
723: /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
724: if (!compat20)
725: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
1.10 djm 726: else {
1.1 provos 727: /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
728: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
1.10 djm 729: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
730: }
731:
732: return (0);
733: }
734:
1.59 avsm 735: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.10 djm 736: {
737: char *banner;
738:
739: buffer_clear(m);
740: banner = auth2_read_banner();
741: buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
1.59 avsm 742: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
1.1 provos 743:
1.10 djm 744: if (banner != NULL)
1.21 deraadt 745: xfree(banner);
1.1 provos 746:
747: return (0);
748: }
749:
750: int
1.59 avsm 751: mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 752: {
753: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
754:
755: authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
756: authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.6 stevesk 757: debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
1.14 markus 758: __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
1.6 stevesk 759:
1.1 provos 760: if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
761: xfree(authctxt->style);
762: authctxt->style = NULL;
763: }
764:
765: return (0);
766: }
767:
768: int
1.59 avsm 769: mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 770: {
771: static int call_count;
772: char *passwd;
1.22 stevesk 773: int authenticated;
774: u_int plen;
1.1 provos 775:
776: passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
777: /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
1.12 markus 778: authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
1.48 markus 779: auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
1.1 provos 780: memset(passwd, 0, strlen(passwd));
781: xfree(passwd);
782:
783: buffer_clear(m);
784: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
785:
1.14 markus 786: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 787: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
1.1 provos 788:
789: call_count++;
790: if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
791: auth_method = "none";
792: else
793: auth_method = "password";
794:
795: /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
796: return (authenticated);
797: }
798:
799: int
1.59 avsm 800: mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 801: {
802: char *name, *infotxt;
803: u_int numprompts;
804: u_int *echo_on;
805: char **prompts;
1.31 markus 806: u_int success;
1.1 provos 807:
1.31 markus 808: success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
809: &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
1.1 provos 810:
811: buffer_clear(m);
1.31 markus 812: buffer_put_int(m, success);
813: if (success)
1.1 provos 814: buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
815:
1.31 markus 816: debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
1.59 avsm 817: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
1.1 provos 818:
1.31 markus 819: if (success) {
1.1 provos 820: xfree(name);
821: xfree(infotxt);
822: xfree(prompts);
823: xfree(echo_on);
824: }
825:
826: return (0);
827: }
828:
829: int
1.59 avsm 830: mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 831: {
832: char *response;
833: int authok;
834:
835: if (authctxt->as == 0)
1.14 markus 836: fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
1.1 provos 837:
838: response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.12 markus 839: authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
840: auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
1.1 provos 841: authctxt->as = NULL;
1.14 markus 842: debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
1.1 provos 843: xfree(response);
844:
845: buffer_clear(m);
846: buffer_put_int(m, authok);
847:
1.14 markus 848: debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
1.59 avsm 849: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
1.1 provos 850:
1.122 ! markus 851: if (compat20) {
! 852: auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
! 853: auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
! 854: } else
1.118 djm 855: auth_method = "bsdauth";
1.1 provos 856:
857: return (authok != 0);
858: }
859:
860: int
1.59 avsm 861: mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 862: {
863: Key *key;
1.26 markus 864: char *cuser, *chost;
865: u_char *blob;
1.1 provos 866: u_int bloblen;
867: enum mm_keytype type = 0;
868: int allowed = 0;
869:
1.14 markus 870: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.3 markus 871:
1.1 provos 872: type = buffer_get_int(m);
873: cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
874: chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
875: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
876:
877: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
878:
879: if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
880: (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
1.14 markus 881: fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 882:
1.14 markus 883: debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
1.1 provos 884:
1.51 djm 885: if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
1.63 deraadt 886: switch (type) {
1.1 provos 887: case MM_USERKEY:
1.12 markus 888: allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
889: user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
1.77 dtucker 890: auth_method = "publickey";
1.97 dtucker 891: if (options.pubkey_authentication && allowed != 1)
892: auth_clear_options();
1.1 provos 893: break;
894: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1.12 markus 895: allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
896: hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 897: cuser, chost, key);
1.77 dtucker 898: auth_method = "hostbased";
1.1 provos 899: break;
900: case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
901: key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
1.12 markus 902: allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
903: auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 904: cuser, chost, key);
1.97 dtucker 905: if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
906: auth_clear_options();
1.77 dtucker 907: auth_method = "rsa";
1.1 provos 908: break;
909: default:
1.14 markus 910: fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 911: break;
912: }
1.33 markus 913: }
914: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 915: key_free(key);
916:
917: /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
918: monitor_reset_key_state();
919:
920: if (allowed) {
921: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
922: key_blob = blob;
923: key_bloblen = bloblen;
924: key_blobtype = type;
925: hostbased_cuser = cuser;
926: hostbased_chost = chost;
1.72 djm 927: } else {
1.77 dtucker 928: /* Log failed attempt */
1.119 djm 929: auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL,
930: compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
1.72 djm 931: xfree(blob);
932: xfree(cuser);
933: xfree(chost);
1.1 provos 934: }
935:
936: debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
1.98 dtucker 937: __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
1.1 provos 938:
939: buffer_clear(m);
940: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 941: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 942:
1.59 avsm 943: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 944:
945: if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
946: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
947:
948: return (0);
949: }
950:
951: static int
952: monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
953: {
954: Buffer b;
1.121 djm 955: char *p, *userstyle;
1.1 provos 956: u_int len;
957: int fail = 0;
958:
959: buffer_init(&b);
960: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 961:
1.1 provos 962: if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
1.13 markus 963: p = buffer_ptr(&b);
964: len = buffer_len(&b);
965: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
966: (len < session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 967: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.13 markus 968: fail++;
1.1 provos 969: buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
970: } else {
1.13 markus 971: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
972: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
973: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 974: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 975: fail++;
1.13 markus 976: xfree(p);
1.1 provos 977: }
978: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
979: fail++;
1.121 djm 980: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
981: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
982: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
983: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
984: if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 985: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.121 djm 986: userstyle, p);
1.1 provos 987: fail++;
988: }
1.121 djm 989: xfree(userstyle);
1.1 provos 990: xfree(p);
991: buffer_skip_string(&b);
992: if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
993: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
994: fail++;
995: } else {
1.121 djm 996: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1.1 provos 997: if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
998: fail++;
999: xfree(p);
1000: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
1001: fail++;
1002: buffer_skip_string(&b);
1003: }
1004: buffer_skip_string(&b);
1005: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1006: fail++;
1007: buffer_free(&b);
1008: return (fail == 0);
1009: }
1010:
1011: static int
1.26 markus 1012: monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
1013: char *chost)
1.1 provos 1014: {
1015: Buffer b;
1.121 djm 1016: char *p, *userstyle;
1.1 provos 1017: u_int len;
1018: int fail = 0;
1019:
1020: buffer_init(&b);
1021: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 1022:
1.13 markus 1023: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
1024: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1025: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1026: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 1027: fail++;
1.13 markus 1028: xfree(p);
1029:
1.1 provos 1030: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1031: fail++;
1.121 djm 1032: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1033: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1034: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1035: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1036: if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 1037: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.121 djm 1038: userstyle, p);
1.1 provos 1039: fail++;
1040: }
1.121 djm 1041: free(userstyle);
1.1 provos 1042: xfree(p);
1043: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */
1.121 djm 1044: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1.1 provos 1045: if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
1046: fail++;
1047: xfree(p);
1048: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkalg */
1049: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkblob */
1050:
1051: /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
1052: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1053: if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
1054: p[len - 1] = '\0';
1055: if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
1056: fail++;
1057: xfree(p);
1058:
1059: /* verify client user */
1060: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1061: if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
1062: fail++;
1063: xfree(p);
1064:
1065: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1066: fail++;
1067: buffer_free(&b);
1068: return (fail == 0);
1069: }
1070:
1071: int
1.59 avsm 1072: mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1073: {
1074: Key *key;
1075: u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
1076: u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
1077: int verified = 0;
1078: int valid_data = 0;
1079:
1080: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1081: signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
1082: data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
1083:
1084: if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
1.8 mouring 1085: !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
1.14 markus 1086: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1087:
1088: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1089: if (key == NULL)
1.14 markus 1090: fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 1091:
1092: switch (key_blobtype) {
1093: case MM_USERKEY:
1094: valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
1095: break;
1096: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1097: valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
1098: hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
1099: break;
1100: default:
1101: valid_data = 0;
1102: break;
1103: }
1104: if (!valid_data)
1.14 markus 1105: fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 1106:
1107: verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
1108: debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
1.89 markus 1109: __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
1.1 provos 1110:
1111: key_free(key);
1112: xfree(blob);
1113: xfree(signature);
1114: xfree(data);
1115:
1.17 stevesk 1116: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
1117:
1.1 provos 1118: monitor_reset_key_state();
1.3 markus 1119:
1.1 provos 1120: buffer_clear(m);
1121: buffer_put_int(m, verified);
1.59 avsm 1122: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
1.1 provos 1123:
1.89 markus 1124: return (verified == 1);
1.1 provos 1125: }
1126:
1.2 markus 1127: static void
1.1 provos 1128: mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
1129: {
1130: socklen_t fromlen;
1131: struct sockaddr_storage from;
1132:
1133: /*
1134: * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
1135: * the address be 0.0.0.0.
1136: */
1137: memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
1.24 stevesk 1138: fromlen = sizeof(from);
1.1 provos 1139: if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
1140: if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
1.74 deraadt 1141: (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
1.1 provos 1142: debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1.50 markus 1143: cleanup_exit(255);
1.1 provos 1144: }
1145: }
1146: /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
1147: record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
1.42 markus 1148: get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
1.24 stevesk 1149: (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
1.1 provos 1150: }
1151:
1152: static void
1153: mm_session_close(Session *s)
1154: {
1.41 djm 1155: debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
1.1 provos 1156: if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1.86 stevesk 1157: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
1.1 provos 1158: session_pty_cleanup2(s);
1159: }
1.96 djm 1160: session_unused(s->self);
1.1 provos 1161: }
1162:
1163: int
1.59 avsm 1164: mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1165: {
1.11 mouring 1166: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1167: Session *s;
1168: int res, fd0;
1169:
1.14 markus 1170: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1171:
1172: buffer_clear(m);
1173: s = session_new();
1174: if (s == NULL)
1175: goto error;
1176: s->authctxt = authctxt;
1177: s->pw = authctxt->pw;
1.11 mouring 1178: s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
1.1 provos 1179: res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
1180: if (res == 0)
1181: goto error;
1182: pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
1183:
1184: buffer_put_int(m, 1);
1185: buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
1186:
1187: /* We need to trick ttyslot */
1188: if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
1.14 markus 1189: fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
1.1 provos 1190:
1191: mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
1192:
1193: /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
1194: close(0);
1.61 dtucker 1195:
1196: /* send messages generated by record_login */
1197: buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
1198: buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
1199:
1200: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1201:
1.92 djm 1202: if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
1203: mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
1204: fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1205:
1206: /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
1207: if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
1.14 markus 1208: fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1209: if (fd0 != 0)
1.14 markus 1210: error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
1.1 provos 1211:
1212: /* slave is not needed */
1213: close(s->ttyfd);
1214: s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
1215: /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
1216: s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
1217:
1.86 stevesk 1218: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
1.1 provos 1219:
1220: return (0);
1221:
1222: error:
1223: if (s != NULL)
1224: mm_session_close(s);
1225: buffer_put_int(m, 0);
1.59 avsm 1226: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1.1 provos 1227: return (0);
1228: }
1229:
1230: int
1.59 avsm 1231: mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1232: {
1233: Session *s;
1234: char *tty;
1235:
1.14 markus 1236: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1237:
1238: tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1239: if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
1240: mm_session_close(s);
1241: buffer_clear(m);
1242: xfree(tty);
1243: return (0);
1244: }
1245:
1246: int
1.59 avsm 1247: mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1248: {
1249: BIGNUM *p;
1250: int rsafail;
1251:
1252: /* Turn off permissions */
1.62 dtucker 1253: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
1.1 provos 1254:
1255: if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1256: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1257:
1258: buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
1259:
1260: rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
1261:
1262: buffer_clear(m);
1263: buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
1264: buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
1265:
1266: BN_clear_free(p);
1267:
1.59 avsm 1268: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
1.1 provos 1269:
1270: /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
1271: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
1272:
1273: return (0);
1274: }
1275:
1276: int
1.59 avsm 1277: mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1278: {
1279: int i;
1280:
1.14 markus 1281: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1282:
1283: if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
1.14 markus 1284: fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
1.1 provos 1285: for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1286: session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
1287:
1288: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
1289: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
1290:
1291: return (0);
1292: }
1293:
1294: int
1.59 avsm 1295: mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1296: {
1297: BIGNUM *client_n;
1298: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1299: u_char *blob = NULL;
1300: u_int blen = 0;
1.1 provos 1301: int allowed = 0;
1302:
1.14 markus 1303: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1304:
1.77 dtucker 1305: auth_method = "rsa";
1.12 markus 1306: if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
1.1 provos 1307: if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1308: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1309: buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
1310: allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
1311: BN_clear_free(client_n);
1312: }
1313: buffer_clear(m);
1314: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 1315: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 1316:
1317: /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
1318: monitor_reset_key_state();
1319:
1320: if (allowed && key != NULL) {
1321: key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */
1322: if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
1.14 markus 1323: fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1324: buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
1325:
1326: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1327: key_blob = blob;
1328: key_bloblen = blen;
1329: key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
1.33 markus 1330: }
1331: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 1332: key_free(key);
1333:
1.59 avsm 1334: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 1335:
1336: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
1337: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
1338: return (0);
1339: }
1340:
1341: int
1.59 avsm 1342: mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1343: {
1344: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1345: u_char *blob;
1346: u_int blen;
1.1 provos 1347:
1.14 markus 1348: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1349:
1350: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1351: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1352: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1353: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1354: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1355: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1356: fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 1357: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1358: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.101 djm 1359: if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
1360: fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
1361: key->type = KEY_RSA1;
1.1 provos 1362: if (ssh1_challenge)
1363: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1364: ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
1365:
1366: buffer_clear(m);
1367: buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
1368:
1.14 markus 1369: debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
1.59 avsm 1370: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
1.1 provos 1371:
1372: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
1.33 markus 1373:
1374: xfree(blob);
1375: key_free(key);
1.1 provos 1376: return (0);
1377: }
1378:
1379: int
1.59 avsm 1380: mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1381: {
1382: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1383: u_char *blob, *response;
1384: u_int blen, len;
1385: int success;
1.1 provos 1386:
1.14 markus 1387: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1388:
1389: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1390: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1391: if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
1.14 markus 1392: fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1393:
1394: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1395: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1396: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1397: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1398: fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
1.1 provos 1399: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1400: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.1 provos 1401: response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1402: if (len != 16)
1.14 markus 1403: fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1404: success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
1405:
1.33 markus 1406: xfree(blob);
1.1 provos 1407: key_free(key);
1408: xfree(response);
1409:
1410: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
1411:
1412: /* reset state */
1413: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1414: ssh1_challenge = NULL;
1415: monitor_reset_key_state();
1416:
1417: buffer_clear(m);
1418: buffer_put_int(m, success);
1.59 avsm 1419: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
1.1 provos 1420:
1421: return (success);
1422: }
1423:
1424: int
1.59 avsm 1425: mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
1.1 provos 1426: {
1.11 mouring 1427: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1428: int res, status;
1429:
1.14 markus 1430: debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
1.1 provos 1431:
1432: /* The child is terminating */
1433: session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
1434:
1.11 mouring 1435: while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
1.9 markus 1436: if (errno != EINTR)
1437: exit(1);
1.1 provos 1438:
1439: res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
1440:
1441: /* Terminate process */
1.57 deraadt 1442: exit(res);
1.1 provos 1443: }
1444:
1445: void
1.11 mouring 1446: monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1447: {
1448: if (compat20) {
1449: set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
1450: set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
1451: } else {
1452: packet_set_protocol_flags(child_state.ssh1protoflags);
1.15 markus 1453: packet_set_encryption_key(child_state.ssh1key,
1454: child_state.ssh1keylen, child_state.ssh1cipher);
1455: xfree(child_state.ssh1key);
1.1 provos 1456: }
1457:
1.15 markus 1458: /* for rc4 and other stateful ciphers */
1.1 provos 1459: packet_set_keycontext(MODE_OUT, child_state.keyout);
1460: xfree(child_state.keyout);
1461: packet_set_keycontext(MODE_IN, child_state.keyin);
1462: xfree(child_state.keyin);
1463:
1464: if (!compat20) {
1465: packet_set_iv(MODE_OUT, child_state.ivout);
1466: xfree(child_state.ivout);
1467: packet_set_iv(MODE_IN, child_state.ivin);
1468: xfree(child_state.ivin);
1469: }
1470:
1471: memcpy(&incoming_stream, &child_state.incoming,
1472: sizeof(incoming_stream));
1473: memcpy(&outgoing_stream, &child_state.outgoing,
1474: sizeof(outgoing_stream));
1.3 markus 1475:
1.1 provos 1476: /* Update with new address */
1.16 djm 1477: if (options.compression)
1478: mm_init_compression(pmonitor->m_zlib);
1.1 provos 1479:
1480: /* Network I/O buffers */
1481: /* XXX inefficient for large buffers, need: buffer_init_from_string */
1.102 andreas 1482: buffer_clear(packet_get_input());
1483: buffer_append(packet_get_input(), child_state.input, child_state.ilen);
1.1 provos 1484: memset(child_state.input, 0, child_state.ilen);
1485: xfree(child_state.input);
1486:
1.102 andreas 1487: buffer_clear(packet_get_output());
1488: buffer_append(packet_get_output(), child_state.output,
1489: child_state.olen);
1.1 provos 1490: memset(child_state.output, 0, child_state.olen);
1491: xfree(child_state.output);
1.103 andreas 1492:
1493: /* Roaming */
1494: if (compat20)
1495: roam_set_bytes(child_state.sent_bytes, child_state.recv_bytes);
1.1 provos 1496: }
1497:
1.2 markus 1498: static Kex *
1.1 provos 1499: mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
1500: {
1501: Kex *kex;
1502: void *blob;
1503: u_int bloblen;
1504:
1.75 djm 1505: kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex));
1.1 provos 1506: kex->session_id = buffer_get_string(m, &kex->session_id_len);
1.107 djm 1507: if (session_id2 == NULL ||
1508: kex->session_id_len != session_id2_len ||
1.108 djm 1509: timingsafe_bcmp(kex->session_id, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)
1.13 markus 1510: fatal("mm_get_get: internal error: bad session id");
1.1 provos 1511: kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m);
1.34 markus 1512: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1.58 djm 1513: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1.34 markus 1514: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1.69 djm 1515: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
1.109 djm 1516: kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
1.1 provos 1517: kex->server = 1;
1518: kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
1519: kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
1520: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1521: buffer_init(&kex->my);
1522: buffer_append(&kex->my, blob, bloblen);
1523: xfree(blob);
1524: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1525: buffer_init(&kex->peer);
1526: buffer_append(&kex->peer, blob, bloblen);
1527: xfree(blob);
1528: kex->done = 1;
1529: kex->flags = buffer_get_int(m);
1530: kex->client_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1531: kex->server_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.105 djm 1532: kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
1533: kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
1.1 provos 1534: kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1535:
1536: return (kex);
1537: }
1538:
1539: /* This function requries careful sanity checking */
1540:
1541: void
1.11 mouring 1542: mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1543: {
1544: Buffer m;
1545: u_char *blob, *p;
1546: u_int bloblen, plen;
1.37 markus 1547: u_int32_t seqnr, packets;
1.99 markus 1548: u_int64_t blocks, bytes;
1.1 provos 1549:
1.14 markus 1550: debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
1.1 provos 1551:
1552: buffer_init(&m);
1.11 mouring 1553: mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
1.1 provos 1554: if (!compat20) {
1555: child_state.ssh1protoflags = buffer_get_int(&m);
1556: child_state.ssh1cipher = buffer_get_int(&m);
1.15 markus 1557: child_state.ssh1key = buffer_get_string(&m,
1558: &child_state.ssh1keylen);
1.1 provos 1559: child_state.ivout = buffer_get_string(&m,
1560: &child_state.ivoutlen);
1561: child_state.ivin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ivinlen);
1562: goto skip;
1563: } else {
1564: /* Get the Kex for rekeying */
1.11 mouring 1565: *pmonitor->m_pkex = mm_get_kex(&m);
1.1 provos 1566: }
1567:
1568: blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
1569: current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1570: xfree(blob);
1571:
1.14 markus 1572: debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
1.1 provos 1573: blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
1574: current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1575: xfree(blob);
1.3 markus 1576:
1.1 provos 1577: /* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
1.37 markus 1578: seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
1579: blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1580: packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
1.99 markus 1581: bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1582: packet_set_state(MODE_OUT, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
1.37 markus 1583: seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
1584: blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1585: packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
1.99 markus 1586: bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1587: packet_set_state(MODE_IN, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
1.1 provos 1588:
1589: skip:
1590: /* Get the key context */
1591: child_state.keyout = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyoutlen);
1592: child_state.keyin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyinlen);
1593:
1.14 markus 1594: debug3("%s: Getting compression state", __func__);
1.1 provos 1595: /* Get compression state */
1596: p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
1597: if (plen != sizeof(child_state.outgoing))
1.14 markus 1598: fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
1.1 provos 1599: memcpy(&child_state.outgoing, p, sizeof(child_state.outgoing));
1600: xfree(p);
1601:
1602: p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
1603: if (plen != sizeof(child_state.incoming))
1.14 markus 1604: fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
1.1 provos 1605: memcpy(&child_state.incoming, p, sizeof(child_state.incoming));
1606: xfree(p);
1607:
1608: /* Network I/O buffers */
1.14 markus 1609: debug3("%s: Getting Network I/O buffers", __func__);
1.1 provos 1610: child_state.input = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ilen);
1611: child_state.output = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.olen);
1.103 andreas 1612:
1613: /* Roaming */
1614: if (compat20) {
1615: child_state.sent_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1616: child_state.recv_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1617: }
1.1 provos 1618:
1619: buffer_free(&m);
1620: }
1621:
1622:
1623: /* Allocation functions for zlib */
1624: void *
1625: mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
1626: {
1.30 markus 1627: size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
1.1 provos 1628: void *address;
1629:
1.23 millert 1630: if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_T_MAX / size)
1.18 deraadt 1631: fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
1632:
1633: address = mm_malloc(mm, len);
1.1 provos 1634:
1635: return (address);
1636: }
1637:
1638: void
1639: mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
1640: {
1641: mm_free(mm, address);
1642: }
1643:
1644: void
1645: mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *mm)
1646: {
1647: outgoing_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
1648: outgoing_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
1649: outgoing_stream.opaque = mm;
1650:
1651: incoming_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
1652: incoming_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
1653: incoming_stream.opaque = mm;
1654: }
1655:
1656: /* XXX */
1657:
1658: #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
1.111 djm 1659: if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
1.1 provos 1660: fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
1661: } while (0)
1662:
1.2 markus 1663: static void
1.114 djm 1664: monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
1.3 markus 1665: {
1.114 djm 1666: int pair[2];
1667:
1.1 provos 1668: if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
1.114 djm 1669: fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1670: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1671: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1.114 djm 1672: mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1673: mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1674:
1675: if (do_logfds) {
1676: if (pipe(pair) == -1)
1677: fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1678: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1679: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1680: mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
1681: mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
1682: } else
1683: mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
1.1 provos 1684: }
1685:
1686: #define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
1687:
1688: struct monitor *
1689: monitor_init(void)
1690: {
1691: struct monitor *mon;
1692:
1.75 djm 1693: mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
1.1 provos 1694:
1.114 djm 1695: monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
1.1 provos 1696:
1697: /* Used to share zlib space across processes */
1.16 djm 1698: if (options.compression) {
1699: mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
1700: mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
1.1 provos 1701:
1.16 djm 1702: /* Compression needs to share state across borders */
1703: mm_init_compression(mon->m_zlib);
1704: }
1.1 provos 1705:
1706: return mon;
1707: }
1708:
1709: void
1710: monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
1711: {
1.114 djm 1712: monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
1.1 provos 1713: }
1.46 markus 1714:
1715: #ifdef GSSAPI
1716: int
1.59 avsm 1717: mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1718: {
1.59 avsm 1719: gss_OID_desc goid;
1.46 markus 1720: OM_uint32 major;
1721: u_int len;
1722:
1.59 avsm 1723: goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1724: goid.length = len;
1.46 markus 1725:
1.59 avsm 1726: major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
1.46 markus 1727:
1.59 avsm 1728: xfree(goid.elements);
1.46 markus 1729:
1730: buffer_clear(m);
1731: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1732:
1.64 stevesk 1733: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
1.46 markus 1734:
1735: /* Now we have a context, enable the step */
1736: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
1737:
1738: return (0);
1739: }
1740:
1741: int
1.59 avsm 1742: mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1743: {
1744: gss_buffer_desc in;
1745: gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1.64 stevesk 1746: OM_uint32 major, minor;
1.46 markus 1747: OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
1.47 deraadt 1748: u_int len;
1.46 markus 1749:
1.47 deraadt 1750: in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1751: in.length = len;
1.46 markus 1752: major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
1753: xfree(in.value);
1754:
1755: buffer_clear(m);
1756: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1757: buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
1758: buffer_put_int(m, flags);
1.59 avsm 1759: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
1.46 markus 1760:
1761: gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
1762:
1.64 stevesk 1763: if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1.46 markus 1764: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
1765: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.52 markus 1766: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
1.46 markus 1767: }
1768: return (0);
1769: }
1770:
1771: int
1.59 avsm 1772: mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.52 markus 1773: {
1774: gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
1775: OM_uint32 ret;
1776: u_int len;
1.54 djm 1777:
1.52 markus 1778: gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1779: gssbuf.length = len;
1780: mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1781: mic.length = len;
1.54 djm 1782:
1.52 markus 1783: ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
1.54 djm 1784:
1.52 markus 1785: xfree(gssbuf.value);
1786: xfree(mic.value);
1.54 djm 1787:
1.52 markus 1788: buffer_clear(m);
1789: buffer_put_int(m, ret);
1.54 djm 1790:
1.59 avsm 1791: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
1.54 djm 1792:
1.52 markus 1793: if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
1794: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.54 djm 1795:
1.52 markus 1796: return (0);
1797: }
1798:
1799: int
1.59 avsm 1800: mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1801: {
1802: int authenticated;
1803:
1804: authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
1805:
1806: buffer_clear(m);
1807: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
1808:
1809: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 1810: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
1.46 markus 1811:
1.64 stevesk 1812: auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
1.46 markus 1813:
1814: /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
1815: return (authenticated);
1816: }
1817: #endif /* GSSAPI */
1.100 djm 1818:
1819: #ifdef JPAKE
1820: int
1821: mm_answer_jpake_step1(int sock, Buffer *m)
1822: {
1823: struct jpake_ctx *pctx;
1824: u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof;
1825: u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len;
1826:
1827: if (!options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication)
1828: fatal("zero_knowledge_password_authentication disabled");
1829:
1830: if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL)
1831: fatal("%s: authctxt->jpake_ctx already set (%p)",
1832: __func__, authctxt->jpake_ctx);
1833: authctxt->jpake_ctx = pctx = jpake_new();
1834:
1835: jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
1836: &pctx->server_id, &pctx->server_id_len,
1837: &pctx->x3, &pctx->x4, &pctx->g_x3, &pctx->g_x4,
1838: &x3_proof, &x3_proof_len,
1839: &x4_proof, &x4_proof_len);
1840:
1841: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step1 done in %s", __func__));
1842:
1843: buffer_clear(m);
1844:
1845: buffer_put_string(m, pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
1846: buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x3);
1847: buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x4);
1848: buffer_put_string(m, x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
1849: buffer_put_string(m, x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
1850:
1851: debug3("%s: sending step1", __func__);
1852: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1, m);
1853:
1854: bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
1855: bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
1856: xfree(x3_proof);
1857: xfree(x4_proof);
1858:
1859: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, 1);
1860: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 0);
1861:
1862: return 0;
1863: }
1864:
1865: int
1866: mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int sock, Buffer *m)
1867: {
1868: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1869: char *hash_scheme, *salt;
1870:
1871: if (pctx == NULL)
1872: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1873:
1874: auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(authctxt, &pctx->s, &hash_scheme, &salt);
1875:
1876: buffer_clear(m);
1877: /* pctx->s is sensitive, not returned to slave */
1878: buffer_put_cstring(m, hash_scheme);
1879: buffer_put_cstring(m, salt);
1880:
1881: debug3("%s: sending pwdata", __func__);
1882: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, m);
1883:
1884: bzero(hash_scheme, strlen(hash_scheme));
1885: bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
1886: xfree(hash_scheme);
1887: xfree(salt);
1888:
1889: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, 1);
1890:
1891: return 0;
1892: }
1893:
1894: int
1895: mm_answer_jpake_step2(int sock, Buffer *m)
1896: {
1897: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1898: u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof, *x4_s_proof;
1899: u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len, x4_s_proof_len;
1900:
1901: if (pctx == NULL)
1902: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1903:
1904: if ((pctx->g_x1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
1905: (pctx->g_x2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
1906: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1907: buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x1);
1908: buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x2);
1909: pctx->client_id = buffer_get_string(m, &pctx->client_id_len);
1910: x1_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x1_proof_len);
1911: x2_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_proof_len);
1912:
1913: jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x3,
1914: pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->x4,
1915: pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
1916: pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
1917: x1_proof, x1_proof_len,
1918: x2_proof, x2_proof_len,
1919: &pctx->b,
1920: &x4_s_proof, &x4_s_proof_len);
1921:
1922: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step2 done in %s", __func__));
1923:
1924: bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
1925: bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
1926: xfree(x1_proof);
1927: xfree(x2_proof);
1928:
1929: buffer_clear(m);
1930:
1931: buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->b);
1932: buffer_put_string(m, x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
1933:
1934: debug3("%s: sending step2", __func__);
1935: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2, m);
1936:
1937: bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
1938: xfree(x4_s_proof);
1939:
1940: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, 1);
1941:
1942: return 0;
1943: }
1944:
1945: int
1946: mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
1947: {
1948: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1949: u_char *x2_s_proof;
1950: u_int x2_s_proof_len;
1951:
1952: if (pctx == NULL)
1953: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1954:
1955: if ((pctx->a = BN_new()) == NULL)
1956: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1957: buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->a);
1958: x2_s_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_s_proof_len);
1959:
1960: jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->a,
1961: pctx->x4, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2,
1962: pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
1963: pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
1964: session_id2, session_id2_len,
1965: x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len,
1966: &pctx->k,
1967: &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
1968:
1969: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "key_confirm done in %s", __func__));
1970:
1971: bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
1972: buffer_clear(m);
1973:
1974: /* pctx->k is sensitive, not sent */
1975: buffer_put_string(m, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
1976:
1977: debug3("%s: sending confirmation hash", __func__);
1978: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, m);
1979:
1980: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, 1);
1981:
1982: return 0;
1983: }
1984:
1985: int
1986: mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
1987: {
1988: int authenticated = 0;
1989: u_char *peer_confirm_hash;
1990: u_int peer_confirm_hash_len;
1991: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1992:
1993: if (pctx == NULL)
1994: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1995:
1996: peer_confirm_hash = buffer_get_string(m, &peer_confirm_hash_len);
1997:
1998: authenticated = jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
1999: pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
2000: session_id2, session_id2_len,
2001: peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len) && authctxt->valid;
2002:
2003: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "check_confirm done in %s", __func__));
2004:
2005: bzero(peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len);
2006: xfree(peer_confirm_hash);
2007:
2008: buffer_clear(m);
2009: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
2010:
2011: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
2012: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, m);
2013:
2014: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 1);
2015:
2016: auth_method = "jpake-01@openssh.com";
2017: return authenticated;
2018: }
2019:
2020: #endif /* JPAKE */
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