Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c, Revision 1.126
1.126 ! djm 1: /* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.125 2013/05/19 02:42:42 djm Exp $ */
1.1 provos 2: /*
3: * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
4: * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
5: * All rights reserved.
6: *
7: * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8: * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9: * are met:
10: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12: * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14: * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15: *
16: * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
17: * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
18: * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
19: * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
20: * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
21: * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
22: * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
23: * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
24: * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
25: * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
26: */
27:
1.67 stevesk 28: #include <sys/types.h>
29: #include <sys/wait.h>
1.79 stevesk 30: #include <sys/socket.h>
1.85 deraadt 31: #include <sys/tree.h>
1.83 stevesk 32: #include <sys/param.h>
1.95 djm 33: #include <sys/queue.h>
1.1 provos 34:
1.78 stevesk 35: #include <openssl/dh.h>
36:
1.81 stevesk 37: #include <errno.h>
1.80 stevesk 38: #include <fcntl.h>
1.65 stevesk 39: #include <paths.h>
1.114 djm 40: #include <poll.h>
1.78 stevesk 41: #include <pwd.h>
1.68 stevesk 42: #include <signal.h>
1.84 stevesk 43: #include <stdlib.h>
1.82 stevesk 44: #include <string.h>
1.1 provos 45:
1.114 djm 46: #include "atomicio.h"
1.85 deraadt 47: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.1 provos 48: #include "ssh.h"
1.85 deraadt 49: #include "key.h"
50: #include "buffer.h"
51: #include "hostfile.h"
1.1 provos 52: #include "auth.h"
1.85 deraadt 53: #include "cipher.h"
1.1 provos 54: #include "kex.h"
55: #include "dh.h"
1.88 miod 56: #include <zlib.h>
1.1 provos 57: #include "packet.h"
58: #include "auth-options.h"
59: #include "sshpty.h"
60: #include "channels.h"
61: #include "session.h"
62: #include "sshlogin.h"
63: #include "canohost.h"
64: #include "log.h"
65: #include "servconf.h"
66: #include "monitor.h"
67: #include "monitor_mm.h"
1.85 deraadt 68: #ifdef GSSAPI
69: #include "ssh-gss.h"
70: #endif
1.1 provos 71: #include "monitor_wrap.h"
72: #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
73: #include "misc.h"
74: #include "compat.h"
75: #include "ssh2.h"
1.100 djm 76: #include "jpake.h"
1.104 andreas 77: #include "roaming.h"
1.1 provos 78:
1.46 markus 79: #ifdef GSSAPI
80: static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
81: #endif
82:
1.1 provos 83: /* Imports */
84: extern ServerOptions options;
85: extern u_int utmp_len;
86: extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
87: extern z_stream incoming_stream;
88: extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
89: extern u_char session_id[];
90: extern Buffer auth_debug;
91: extern int auth_debug_init;
1.61 dtucker 92: extern Buffer loginmsg;
1.1 provos 93:
94: /* State exported from the child */
95:
96: struct {
97: z_stream incoming;
98: z_stream outgoing;
99: u_char *keyin;
100: u_int keyinlen;
101: u_char *keyout;
102: u_int keyoutlen;
103: u_char *ivin;
104: u_int ivinlen;
105: u_char *ivout;
106: u_int ivoutlen;
1.15 markus 107: u_char *ssh1key;
108: u_int ssh1keylen;
1.1 provos 109: int ssh1cipher;
110: int ssh1protoflags;
111: u_char *input;
112: u_int ilen;
113: u_char *output;
114: u_int olen;
1.103 andreas 115: u_int64_t sent_bytes;
116: u_int64_t recv_bytes;
1.1 provos 117: } child_state;
118:
1.43 markus 119: /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
1.1 provos 120:
121: int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
122: int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
123: int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
1.10 djm 124: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
1.1 provos 125: int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
126: int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
127: int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
128: int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
129: int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
130: int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
131: int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
132: int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
133: int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
134: int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
135: int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
136: int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
137: int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
138: int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
139: int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
140: int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
1.100 djm 141: int mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int, Buffer *);
142: int mm_answer_jpake_step1(int, Buffer *);
143: int mm_answer_jpake_step2(int, Buffer *);
144: int mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int, Buffer *);
145: int mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int, Buffer *);
1.1 provos 146:
1.46 markus 147: #ifdef GSSAPI
148: int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
149: int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
150: int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
1.52 markus 151: int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
1.46 markus 152: #endif
1.25 itojun 153:
1.114 djm 154: static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
155:
1.1 provos 156: static Authctxt *authctxt;
157: static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
158:
159: /* local state for key verify */
160: static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
161: static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
162: static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
1.26 markus 163: static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
164: static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
1.1 provos 165: static char *auth_method = "unknown";
1.119 djm 166: static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
1.44 markus 167: static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
1.13 markus 168: static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
1.40 markus 169: static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
1.1 provos 170:
171: struct mon_table {
172: enum monitor_reqtype type;
173: int flags;
174: int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
175: };
176:
177: #define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
178: #define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
179: #define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
1.77 dtucker 180: #define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
1.1 provos 181:
182: #define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
183:
184: #define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
185:
186: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
187: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
188: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
189: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
190: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
1.10 djm 191: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
1.1 provos 192: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
193: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 194: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.1 provos 195: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
196: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
1.46 markus 197: #ifdef GSSAPI
198: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
199: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
200: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
1.52 markus 201: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
1.46 markus 202: #endif
1.100 djm 203: #ifdef JPAKE
204: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata},
205: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_jpake_step1},
206: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_step2},
207: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm},
208: {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm},
209: #endif
1.1 provos 210: {0, 0, NULL}
211: };
212:
213: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
214: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
215: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
216: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
217: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
218: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
219: {0, 0, NULL}
220: };
221:
222: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
223: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
224: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
225: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
226: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
1.77 dtucker 227: {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
228: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
1.1 provos 229: {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
230: {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
231: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 232: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.1 provos 233: {0, 0, NULL}
234: };
235:
236: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
237: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
238: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
239: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
240: {0, 0, NULL}
241: };
242:
243: struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
244:
245: /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
246:
247: static void
248: monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
249: {
250: while (ent->f != NULL) {
251: if (ent->type == type) {
252: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
253: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
254: return;
255: }
256: ent++;
257: }
258: }
259:
260: static void
261: monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
262: {
263: struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
264:
265: while (ent->f != NULL) {
266: if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
267: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
268: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
269: }
270: ent++;
271: }
272: }
273:
1.50 markus 274: void
275: monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 276: {
277: struct mon_table *ent;
1.119 djm 278: int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
1.1 provos 279:
280: debug3("preauth child monitor started");
281:
1.114 djm 282: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
283: close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
284: pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
285:
1.50 markus 286: authctxt = _authctxt;
287: memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
288:
1.1 provos 289: if (compat20) {
290: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
291:
292: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
293: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
294: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
295: } else {
296: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
297:
298: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
299: }
300:
301: /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
302: while (!authenticated) {
1.119 djm 303: partial = 0;
1.77 dtucker 304: auth_method = "unknown";
1.119 djm 305: auth_submethod = NULL;
1.89 markus 306: authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
1.118 djm 307:
308: /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
309: if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
310: if (!compat20)
311: fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported"
312: "with SSH protocol 1");
313: if (authenticated &&
314: !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
1.122 markus 315: auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
1.118 djm 316: debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
317: auth_method);
318: authenticated = 0;
1.119 djm 319: partial = 1;
1.118 djm 320: }
321: }
322:
1.1 provos 323: if (authenticated) {
324: if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
325: fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
1.14 markus 326: __func__, ent->type);
1.1 provos 327: if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
328: !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
329: authenticated = 0;
330: }
1.77 dtucker 331: if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
1.119 djm 332: auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial,
1.125 djm 333: auth_method, auth_submethod);
1.1 provos 334: if (!authenticated)
335: authctxt->failures++;
336: }
1.100 djm 337: #ifdef JPAKE
338: /* Cleanup JPAKE context after authentication */
339: if (ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE) {
340: if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL) {
341: jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
342: authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
343: }
344: }
345: #endif
1.1 provos 346: }
347:
348: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 349: fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
1.77 dtucker 350: if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
351: fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
1.1 provos 352:
353: debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
1.14 markus 354: __func__, authctxt->user);
1.1 provos 355:
1.11 mouring 356: mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
1.120 markus 357:
358: /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
359: while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
360: ;
1.114 djm 361:
362: close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
363: close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
364: pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
1.1 provos 365: }
366:
1.40 markus 367: static void
368: monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
369: {
370: monitor_child_pid = pid;
371: }
372:
373: static void
1.59 avsm 374: monitor_child_handler(int sig)
1.40 markus 375: {
1.59 avsm 376: kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
1.40 markus 377: }
378:
1.1 provos 379: void
1.11 mouring 380: monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 381: {
1.114 djm 382: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
383: pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
384:
1.40 markus 385: monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
386: signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
387: signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
1.91 djm 388: signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
1.40 markus 389:
1.1 provos 390: if (compat20) {
391: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
392:
393: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
394: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
395: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
396: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
397: } else {
398: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
399: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
400: }
401: if (!no_pty_flag) {
402: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
403: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
404: }
405:
406: for (;;)
1.11 mouring 407: monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
1.1 provos 408: }
409:
410: void
1.11 mouring 411: monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 412: {
1.16 djm 413: if (options.compression) {
414: /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
415: mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
416: }
1.1 provos 417: }
418:
1.114 djm 419: static int
420: monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
421: {
422: Buffer logmsg;
423: u_int len, level;
424: char *msg;
425:
426: buffer_init(&logmsg);
427:
428: /* Read length */
429: buffer_append_space(&logmsg, 4);
430: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
431: buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) {
432: if (errno == EPIPE) {
1.116 djm 433: buffer_free(&logmsg);
1.114 djm 434: debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
435: close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
436: pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
437: return -1;
438: }
439: fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
440: }
441: len = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
442: if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
443: fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len);
444:
445: /* Read severity, message */
446: buffer_clear(&logmsg);
447: buffer_append_space(&logmsg, len);
448: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
449: buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg))
450: fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
451:
452: /* Log it */
453: level = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
454: msg = buffer_get_string(&logmsg, NULL);
455: if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
456: fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
457: __func__, level);
458: do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
459:
460: buffer_free(&logmsg);
1.124 djm 461: free(msg);
1.114 djm 462:
463: return 0;
464: }
465:
1.1 provos 466: int
1.11 mouring 467: monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
1.1 provos 468: struct mon_table **pent)
469: {
470: Buffer m;
471: int ret;
472: u_char type;
1.114 djm 473: struct pollfd pfd[2];
474:
475: for (;;) {
476: bzero(&pfd, sizeof(pfd));
477: pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
478: pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
479: pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
480: pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
1.115 djm 481: if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
482: if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
483: continue;
1.114 djm 484: fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.115 djm 485: }
1.114 djm 486: if (pfd[1].revents) {
487: /*
488: * Drain all log messages before processing next
489: * monitor request.
490: */
491: monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
492: continue;
493: }
494: if (pfd[0].revents)
495: break; /* Continues below */
496: }
1.1 provos 497:
498: buffer_init(&m);
499:
1.11 mouring 500: mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 501: type = buffer_get_char(&m);
502:
1.14 markus 503: debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 504:
505: while (ent->f != NULL) {
506: if (ent->type == type)
507: break;
508: ent++;
509: }
510:
511: if (ent->f != NULL) {
512: if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
1.14 markus 513: fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
1.1 provos 514: type);
1.11 mouring 515: ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 516: buffer_free(&m);
517:
518: /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
519: if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
1.14 markus 520: debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
1.1 provos 521: type);
522: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
523: }
524:
525: if (pent != NULL)
526: *pent = ent;
1.3 markus 527:
1.1 provos 528: return ret;
529: }
530:
1.14 markus 531: fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 532:
533: /* NOTREACHED */
534: return (-1);
535: }
536:
537: /* allowed key state */
538: static int
539: monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
540: {
541: /* make sure key is allowed */
542: if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
1.108 djm 543: timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
1.1 provos 544: return (0);
545: return (1);
546: }
547:
548: static void
549: monitor_reset_key_state(void)
550: {
551: /* reset state */
1.124 djm 552: free(key_blob);
553: free(hostbased_cuser);
554: free(hostbased_chost);
1.1 provos 555: key_blob = NULL;
556: key_bloblen = 0;
557: key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
558: hostbased_cuser = NULL;
559: hostbased_chost = NULL;
560: }
561:
562: int
1.59 avsm 563: mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 564: {
565: DH *dh;
566: int min, want, max;
567:
568: min = buffer_get_int(m);
569: want = buffer_get_int(m);
570: max = buffer_get_int(m);
571:
572: debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 573: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 574: /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
575: if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
576: fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 577: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 578:
579: buffer_clear(m);
580:
581: dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
582: if (dh == NULL) {
583: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
584: return (0);
585: } else {
586: /* Send first bignum */
587: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
588: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
589: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
1.3 markus 590:
1.1 provos 591: DH_free(dh);
592: }
1.59 avsm 593: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
1.1 provos 594: return (0);
595: }
596:
597: int
1.59 avsm 598: mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 599: {
600: Key *key;
601: u_char *p;
602: u_char *signature;
603: u_int siglen, datlen;
604: int keyid;
1.3 markus 605:
1.14 markus 606: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 607:
1.3 markus 608: keyid = buffer_get_int(m);
609: p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen);
1.1 provos 610:
1.69 djm 611: /*
1.110 djm 612: * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
613: * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
1.69 djm 614: */
1.110 djm 615: if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64)
1.19 deraadt 616: fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %u", __func__, datlen);
1.1 provos 617:
1.13 markus 618: /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
619: if (session_id2_len == 0) {
620: session_id2_len = datlen;
621: session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
622: memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
623: }
624:
1.1 provos 625: if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 626: fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
1.1 provos 627: if (key_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen) < 0)
1.14 markus 628: fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 629:
1.19 deraadt 630: debug3("%s: signature %p(%u)", __func__, signature, siglen);
1.1 provos 631:
632: buffer_clear(m);
633: buffer_put_string(m, signature, siglen);
634:
1.124 djm 635: free(p);
636: free(signature);
1.1 provos 637:
1.59 avsm 638: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
1.1 provos 639:
640: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
641: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
642:
643: return (0);
644: }
645:
646: /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
647:
648: int
1.59 avsm 649: mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 650: {
1.60 dtucker 651: char *username;
1.1 provos 652: struct passwd *pwent;
653: int allowed = 0;
1.113 djm 654: u_int i;
1.3 markus 655:
1.14 markus 656: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 657:
658: if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
1.14 markus 659: fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
1.1 provos 660:
1.60 dtucker 661: username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.1 provos 662:
1.60 dtucker 663: pwent = getpwnamallow(username);
1.1 provos 664:
1.60 dtucker 665: authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
666: setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
1.124 djm 667: free(username);
1.1 provos 668:
669: buffer_clear(m);
670:
671: if (pwent == NULL) {
672: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
1.53 djm 673: authctxt->pw = fakepw();
1.1 provos 674: goto out;
675: }
676:
677: allowed = 1;
1.4 markus 678: authctxt->pw = pwent;
1.1 provos 679: authctxt->valid = 1;
680:
681: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
682: buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
683: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
684: buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
685: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
686: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
687: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
688: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
1.94 dtucker 689:
690: out:
1.90 dtucker 691: buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
1.112 djm 692:
693: #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
694: if (options.x != NULL) \
695: buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x); \
696: } while (0)
1.113 djm 697: #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
698: for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) \
699: buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x[i]); \
700: } while (0)
1.112 djm 701: /* See comment in servconf.h */
702: COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
703: #undef M_CP_STROPT
1.113 djm 704: #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
1.118 djm 705:
706: /* Create valid auth method lists */
707: if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
708: /*
709: * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
710: * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
711: * authentication to succeed.
712: */
713: debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
714: }
715:
1.14 markus 716: debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
1.59 avsm 717: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
1.1 provos 718:
719: /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
720: if (!compat20)
721: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
1.10 djm 722: else {
1.1 provos 723: /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
724: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
1.10 djm 725: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
726: }
727:
728: return (0);
729: }
730:
1.59 avsm 731: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.10 djm 732: {
733: char *banner;
734:
735: buffer_clear(m);
736: banner = auth2_read_banner();
737: buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
1.59 avsm 738: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
1.124 djm 739: free(banner);
1.1 provos 740:
741: return (0);
742: }
743:
744: int
1.59 avsm 745: mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 746: {
747: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
748:
749: authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
750: authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.6 stevesk 751: debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
1.14 markus 752: __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
1.6 stevesk 753:
1.1 provos 754: if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
1.124 djm 755: free(authctxt->style);
1.1 provos 756: authctxt->style = NULL;
757: }
758:
759: return (0);
760: }
761:
762: int
1.59 avsm 763: mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 764: {
765: static int call_count;
766: char *passwd;
1.22 stevesk 767: int authenticated;
768: u_int plen;
1.1 provos 769:
770: passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
771: /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
1.12 markus 772: authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
1.48 markus 773: auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
1.1 provos 774: memset(passwd, 0, strlen(passwd));
1.124 djm 775: free(passwd);
1.1 provos 776:
777: buffer_clear(m);
778: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
779:
1.14 markus 780: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 781: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
1.1 provos 782:
783: call_count++;
784: if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
785: auth_method = "none";
786: else
787: auth_method = "password";
788:
789: /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
790: return (authenticated);
791: }
792:
793: int
1.59 avsm 794: mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 795: {
796: char *name, *infotxt;
797: u_int numprompts;
798: u_int *echo_on;
799: char **prompts;
1.31 markus 800: u_int success;
1.1 provos 801:
1.31 markus 802: success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
803: &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
1.1 provos 804:
805: buffer_clear(m);
1.31 markus 806: buffer_put_int(m, success);
807: if (success)
1.1 provos 808: buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
809:
1.31 markus 810: debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
1.59 avsm 811: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
1.1 provos 812:
1.31 markus 813: if (success) {
1.124 djm 814: free(name);
815: free(infotxt);
816: free(prompts);
817: free(echo_on);
1.1 provos 818: }
819:
820: return (0);
821: }
822:
823: int
1.59 avsm 824: mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 825: {
826: char *response;
827: int authok;
828:
829: if (authctxt->as == 0)
1.14 markus 830: fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
1.1 provos 831:
832: response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.12 markus 833: authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
834: auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
1.1 provos 835: authctxt->as = NULL;
1.14 markus 836: debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
1.124 djm 837: free(response);
1.1 provos 838:
839: buffer_clear(m);
840: buffer_put_int(m, authok);
841:
1.14 markus 842: debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
1.59 avsm 843: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
1.1 provos 844:
1.122 markus 845: if (compat20) {
846: auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
847: auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
848: } else
1.118 djm 849: auth_method = "bsdauth";
1.1 provos 850:
851: return (authok != 0);
852: }
853:
854: int
1.59 avsm 855: mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 856: {
857: Key *key;
1.26 markus 858: char *cuser, *chost;
859: u_char *blob;
1.1 provos 860: u_int bloblen;
861: enum mm_keytype type = 0;
862: int allowed = 0;
863:
1.14 markus 864: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.3 markus 865:
1.1 provos 866: type = buffer_get_int(m);
867: cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
868: chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
869: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
870:
871: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
872:
873: if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
874: (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
1.14 markus 875: fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 876:
1.14 markus 877: debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
1.1 provos 878:
1.51 djm 879: if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
1.63 deraadt 880: switch (type) {
1.1 provos 881: case MM_USERKEY:
1.12 markus 882: allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
883: user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
1.126 ! djm 884: pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
1.77 dtucker 885: auth_method = "publickey";
1.97 dtucker 886: if (options.pubkey_authentication && allowed != 1)
887: auth_clear_options();
1.1 provos 888: break;
889: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1.12 markus 890: allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
891: hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 892: cuser, chost, key);
1.126 ! djm 893: pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
! 894: "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
! 895: cuser, chost);
1.77 dtucker 896: auth_method = "hostbased";
1.1 provos 897: break;
898: case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
899: key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
1.12 markus 900: allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
901: auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 902: cuser, chost, key);
1.97 dtucker 903: if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
904: auth_clear_options();
1.77 dtucker 905: auth_method = "rsa";
1.1 provos 906: break;
907: default:
1.14 markus 908: fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 909: break;
910: }
1.33 markus 911: }
912: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 913: key_free(key);
914:
915: /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
916: monitor_reset_key_state();
917:
918: if (allowed) {
919: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
920: key_blob = blob;
921: key_bloblen = bloblen;
922: key_blobtype = type;
923: hostbased_cuser = cuser;
924: hostbased_chost = chost;
1.72 djm 925: } else {
1.77 dtucker 926: /* Log failed attempt */
1.125 djm 927: auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
1.124 djm 928: free(blob);
929: free(cuser);
930: free(chost);
1.1 provos 931: }
932:
933: debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
1.98 dtucker 934: __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
1.1 provos 935:
936: buffer_clear(m);
937: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 938: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 939:
1.59 avsm 940: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 941:
942: if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
943: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
944:
945: return (0);
946: }
947:
948: static int
949: monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
950: {
951: Buffer b;
1.121 djm 952: char *p, *userstyle;
1.1 provos 953: u_int len;
954: int fail = 0;
955:
956: buffer_init(&b);
957: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 958:
1.1 provos 959: if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
1.13 markus 960: p = buffer_ptr(&b);
961: len = buffer_len(&b);
962: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
963: (len < session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 964: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.13 markus 965: fail++;
1.1 provos 966: buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
967: } else {
1.13 markus 968: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
969: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
970: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 971: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 972: fail++;
1.124 djm 973: free(p);
1.1 provos 974: }
975: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
976: fail++;
1.121 djm 977: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
978: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
979: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
980: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
981: if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 982: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.121 djm 983: userstyle, p);
1.1 provos 984: fail++;
985: }
1.124 djm 986: free(userstyle);
987: free(p);
1.1 provos 988: buffer_skip_string(&b);
989: if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
990: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
991: fail++;
992: } else {
1.121 djm 993: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1.1 provos 994: if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
995: fail++;
1.124 djm 996: free(p);
1.1 provos 997: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
998: fail++;
999: buffer_skip_string(&b);
1000: }
1001: buffer_skip_string(&b);
1002: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1003: fail++;
1004: buffer_free(&b);
1005: return (fail == 0);
1006: }
1007:
1008: static int
1.26 markus 1009: monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
1010: char *chost)
1.1 provos 1011: {
1012: Buffer b;
1.121 djm 1013: char *p, *userstyle;
1.1 provos 1014: u_int len;
1015: int fail = 0;
1016:
1017: buffer_init(&b);
1018: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 1019:
1.13 markus 1020: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
1021: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1022: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1023: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 1024: fail++;
1.124 djm 1025: free(p);
1.13 markus 1026:
1.1 provos 1027: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1028: fail++;
1.121 djm 1029: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1030: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1031: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1032: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1033: if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 1034: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.121 djm 1035: userstyle, p);
1.1 provos 1036: fail++;
1037: }
1.121 djm 1038: free(userstyle);
1.124 djm 1039: free(p);
1.1 provos 1040: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */
1.121 djm 1041: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1.1 provos 1042: if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
1043: fail++;
1.124 djm 1044: free(p);
1.1 provos 1045: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkalg */
1046: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkblob */
1047:
1048: /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
1049: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1050: if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
1051: p[len - 1] = '\0';
1052: if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
1053: fail++;
1.124 djm 1054: free(p);
1.1 provos 1055:
1056: /* verify client user */
1057: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1058: if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
1059: fail++;
1.124 djm 1060: free(p);
1.1 provos 1061:
1062: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1063: fail++;
1064: buffer_free(&b);
1065: return (fail == 0);
1066: }
1067:
1068: int
1.59 avsm 1069: mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1070: {
1071: Key *key;
1072: u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
1073: u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
1074: int verified = 0;
1075: int valid_data = 0;
1076:
1077: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1078: signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
1079: data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
1080:
1081: if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
1.8 mouring 1082: !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
1.14 markus 1083: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1084:
1085: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1086: if (key == NULL)
1.14 markus 1087: fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 1088:
1089: switch (key_blobtype) {
1090: case MM_USERKEY:
1091: valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
1092: break;
1093: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1094: valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
1095: hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
1096: break;
1097: default:
1098: valid_data = 0;
1099: break;
1100: }
1101: if (!valid_data)
1.14 markus 1102: fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 1103:
1104: verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
1105: debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
1.89 markus 1106: __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
1.1 provos 1107:
1108: key_free(key);
1.124 djm 1109: free(blob);
1110: free(signature);
1111: free(data);
1.1 provos 1112:
1.17 stevesk 1113: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
1114:
1.1 provos 1115: monitor_reset_key_state();
1.3 markus 1116:
1.1 provos 1117: buffer_clear(m);
1118: buffer_put_int(m, verified);
1.59 avsm 1119: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
1.1 provos 1120:
1.89 markus 1121: return (verified == 1);
1.1 provos 1122: }
1123:
1.2 markus 1124: static void
1.1 provos 1125: mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
1126: {
1127: socklen_t fromlen;
1128: struct sockaddr_storage from;
1129:
1130: /*
1131: * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
1132: * the address be 0.0.0.0.
1133: */
1134: memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
1.24 stevesk 1135: fromlen = sizeof(from);
1.1 provos 1136: if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
1137: if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
1.74 deraadt 1138: (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
1.1 provos 1139: debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1.50 markus 1140: cleanup_exit(255);
1.1 provos 1141: }
1142: }
1143: /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
1144: record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
1.42 markus 1145: get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
1.24 stevesk 1146: (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
1.1 provos 1147: }
1148:
1149: static void
1150: mm_session_close(Session *s)
1151: {
1.41 djm 1152: debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
1.1 provos 1153: if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1.86 stevesk 1154: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
1.1 provos 1155: session_pty_cleanup2(s);
1156: }
1.96 djm 1157: session_unused(s->self);
1.1 provos 1158: }
1159:
1160: int
1.59 avsm 1161: mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1162: {
1.11 mouring 1163: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1164: Session *s;
1165: int res, fd0;
1166:
1.14 markus 1167: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1168:
1169: buffer_clear(m);
1170: s = session_new();
1171: if (s == NULL)
1172: goto error;
1173: s->authctxt = authctxt;
1174: s->pw = authctxt->pw;
1.11 mouring 1175: s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
1.1 provos 1176: res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
1177: if (res == 0)
1178: goto error;
1179: pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
1180:
1181: buffer_put_int(m, 1);
1182: buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
1183:
1184: /* We need to trick ttyslot */
1185: if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
1.14 markus 1186: fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
1.1 provos 1187:
1188: mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
1189:
1190: /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
1191: close(0);
1.61 dtucker 1192:
1193: /* send messages generated by record_login */
1194: buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
1195: buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
1196:
1197: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1198:
1.92 djm 1199: if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
1200: mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
1201: fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1202:
1203: /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
1204: if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
1.14 markus 1205: fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1206: if (fd0 != 0)
1.14 markus 1207: error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
1.1 provos 1208:
1209: /* slave is not needed */
1210: close(s->ttyfd);
1211: s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
1212: /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
1213: s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
1214:
1.86 stevesk 1215: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
1.1 provos 1216:
1217: return (0);
1218:
1219: error:
1220: if (s != NULL)
1221: mm_session_close(s);
1222: buffer_put_int(m, 0);
1.59 avsm 1223: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1.1 provos 1224: return (0);
1225: }
1226:
1227: int
1.59 avsm 1228: mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1229: {
1230: Session *s;
1231: char *tty;
1232:
1.14 markus 1233: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1234:
1235: tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1236: if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
1237: mm_session_close(s);
1238: buffer_clear(m);
1.124 djm 1239: free(tty);
1.1 provos 1240: return (0);
1241: }
1242:
1243: int
1.59 avsm 1244: mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1245: {
1246: BIGNUM *p;
1247: int rsafail;
1248:
1249: /* Turn off permissions */
1.62 dtucker 1250: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
1.1 provos 1251:
1252: if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1253: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1254:
1255: buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
1256:
1257: rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
1258:
1259: buffer_clear(m);
1260: buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
1261: buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
1262:
1263: BN_clear_free(p);
1264:
1.59 avsm 1265: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
1.1 provos 1266:
1267: /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
1268: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
1269:
1270: return (0);
1271: }
1272:
1273: int
1.59 avsm 1274: mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1275: {
1276: int i;
1277:
1.14 markus 1278: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1279:
1280: if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
1.14 markus 1281: fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
1.1 provos 1282: for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1283: session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
1284:
1285: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
1286: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
1287:
1288: return (0);
1289: }
1290:
1291: int
1.59 avsm 1292: mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1293: {
1294: BIGNUM *client_n;
1295: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1296: u_char *blob = NULL;
1297: u_int blen = 0;
1.1 provos 1298: int allowed = 0;
1299:
1.14 markus 1300: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1301:
1.77 dtucker 1302: auth_method = "rsa";
1.12 markus 1303: if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
1.1 provos 1304: if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1305: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1306: buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
1307: allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
1308: BN_clear_free(client_n);
1309: }
1310: buffer_clear(m);
1311: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 1312: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 1313:
1314: /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
1315: monitor_reset_key_state();
1316:
1317: if (allowed && key != NULL) {
1318: key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */
1319: if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
1.14 markus 1320: fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1321: buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
1322:
1323: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1324: key_blob = blob;
1325: key_bloblen = blen;
1326: key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
1.33 markus 1327: }
1328: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 1329: key_free(key);
1330:
1.59 avsm 1331: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 1332:
1333: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
1334: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
1335: return (0);
1336: }
1337:
1338: int
1.59 avsm 1339: mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1340: {
1341: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1342: u_char *blob;
1343: u_int blen;
1.1 provos 1344:
1.14 markus 1345: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1346:
1347: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1348: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1349: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1350: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1351: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1352: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1353: fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 1354: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1355: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.101 djm 1356: if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
1357: fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
1358: key->type = KEY_RSA1;
1.1 provos 1359: if (ssh1_challenge)
1360: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1361: ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
1362:
1363: buffer_clear(m);
1364: buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
1365:
1.14 markus 1366: debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
1.59 avsm 1367: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
1.1 provos 1368:
1369: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
1.33 markus 1370:
1.124 djm 1371: free(blob);
1.33 markus 1372: key_free(key);
1.1 provos 1373: return (0);
1374: }
1375:
1376: int
1.59 avsm 1377: mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1378: {
1379: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1380: u_char *blob, *response;
1381: u_int blen, len;
1382: int success;
1.1 provos 1383:
1.14 markus 1384: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1385:
1386: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1387: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1388: if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
1.14 markus 1389: fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1390:
1391: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1392: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1393: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1394: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1395: fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
1.1 provos 1396: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1397: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.1 provos 1398: response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1399: if (len != 16)
1.14 markus 1400: fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1401: success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
1402:
1.124 djm 1403: free(blob);
1.1 provos 1404: key_free(key);
1.124 djm 1405: free(response);
1.1 provos 1406:
1407: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
1408:
1409: /* reset state */
1410: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1411: ssh1_challenge = NULL;
1412: monitor_reset_key_state();
1413:
1414: buffer_clear(m);
1415: buffer_put_int(m, success);
1.59 avsm 1416: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
1.1 provos 1417:
1418: return (success);
1419: }
1420:
1421: int
1.59 avsm 1422: mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
1.1 provos 1423: {
1.11 mouring 1424: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1425: int res, status;
1426:
1.14 markus 1427: debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
1.1 provos 1428:
1429: /* The child is terminating */
1430: session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
1431:
1.11 mouring 1432: while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
1.9 markus 1433: if (errno != EINTR)
1434: exit(1);
1.1 provos 1435:
1436: res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
1437:
1438: /* Terminate process */
1.57 deraadt 1439: exit(res);
1.1 provos 1440: }
1441:
1442: void
1.11 mouring 1443: monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1444: {
1445: if (compat20) {
1446: set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
1447: set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
1448: } else {
1449: packet_set_protocol_flags(child_state.ssh1protoflags);
1.15 markus 1450: packet_set_encryption_key(child_state.ssh1key,
1451: child_state.ssh1keylen, child_state.ssh1cipher);
1.124 djm 1452: free(child_state.ssh1key);
1.1 provos 1453: }
1454:
1.15 markus 1455: /* for rc4 and other stateful ciphers */
1.1 provos 1456: packet_set_keycontext(MODE_OUT, child_state.keyout);
1.124 djm 1457: free(child_state.keyout);
1.1 provos 1458: packet_set_keycontext(MODE_IN, child_state.keyin);
1.124 djm 1459: free(child_state.keyin);
1.1 provos 1460:
1461: if (!compat20) {
1462: packet_set_iv(MODE_OUT, child_state.ivout);
1.124 djm 1463: free(child_state.ivout);
1.1 provos 1464: packet_set_iv(MODE_IN, child_state.ivin);
1.124 djm 1465: free(child_state.ivin);
1.1 provos 1466: }
1467:
1468: memcpy(&incoming_stream, &child_state.incoming,
1469: sizeof(incoming_stream));
1470: memcpy(&outgoing_stream, &child_state.outgoing,
1471: sizeof(outgoing_stream));
1.3 markus 1472:
1.1 provos 1473: /* Update with new address */
1.16 djm 1474: if (options.compression)
1475: mm_init_compression(pmonitor->m_zlib);
1.123 dtucker 1476:
1477: if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
1478: packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
1479: (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
1.1 provos 1480:
1481: /* Network I/O buffers */
1482: /* XXX inefficient for large buffers, need: buffer_init_from_string */
1.102 andreas 1483: buffer_clear(packet_get_input());
1484: buffer_append(packet_get_input(), child_state.input, child_state.ilen);
1.1 provos 1485: memset(child_state.input, 0, child_state.ilen);
1.124 djm 1486: free(child_state.input);
1.1 provos 1487:
1.102 andreas 1488: buffer_clear(packet_get_output());
1489: buffer_append(packet_get_output(), child_state.output,
1490: child_state.olen);
1.1 provos 1491: memset(child_state.output, 0, child_state.olen);
1.124 djm 1492: free(child_state.output);
1.103 andreas 1493:
1494: /* Roaming */
1495: if (compat20)
1496: roam_set_bytes(child_state.sent_bytes, child_state.recv_bytes);
1.1 provos 1497: }
1498:
1.2 markus 1499: static Kex *
1.1 provos 1500: mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
1501: {
1502: Kex *kex;
1503: void *blob;
1504: u_int bloblen;
1505:
1.75 djm 1506: kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex));
1.1 provos 1507: kex->session_id = buffer_get_string(m, &kex->session_id_len);
1.107 djm 1508: if (session_id2 == NULL ||
1509: kex->session_id_len != session_id2_len ||
1.108 djm 1510: timingsafe_bcmp(kex->session_id, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)
1.13 markus 1511: fatal("mm_get_get: internal error: bad session id");
1.1 provos 1512: kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m);
1.34 markus 1513: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1.58 djm 1514: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1.34 markus 1515: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1.69 djm 1516: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
1.109 djm 1517: kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
1.1 provos 1518: kex->server = 1;
1519: kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
1520: kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
1521: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1522: buffer_init(&kex->my);
1523: buffer_append(&kex->my, blob, bloblen);
1.124 djm 1524: free(blob);
1.1 provos 1525: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1526: buffer_init(&kex->peer);
1527: buffer_append(&kex->peer, blob, bloblen);
1.124 djm 1528: free(blob);
1.1 provos 1529: kex->done = 1;
1530: kex->flags = buffer_get_int(m);
1531: kex->client_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1532: kex->server_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.105 djm 1533: kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
1534: kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
1.1 provos 1535: kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1536:
1537: return (kex);
1538: }
1539:
1540: /* This function requries careful sanity checking */
1541:
1542: void
1.11 mouring 1543: mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1544: {
1545: Buffer m;
1546: u_char *blob, *p;
1547: u_int bloblen, plen;
1.37 markus 1548: u_int32_t seqnr, packets;
1.99 markus 1549: u_int64_t blocks, bytes;
1.1 provos 1550:
1.14 markus 1551: debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
1.1 provos 1552:
1553: buffer_init(&m);
1.11 mouring 1554: mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
1.1 provos 1555: if (!compat20) {
1556: child_state.ssh1protoflags = buffer_get_int(&m);
1557: child_state.ssh1cipher = buffer_get_int(&m);
1.15 markus 1558: child_state.ssh1key = buffer_get_string(&m,
1559: &child_state.ssh1keylen);
1.1 provos 1560: child_state.ivout = buffer_get_string(&m,
1561: &child_state.ivoutlen);
1562: child_state.ivin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ivinlen);
1563: goto skip;
1564: } else {
1565: /* Get the Kex for rekeying */
1.11 mouring 1566: *pmonitor->m_pkex = mm_get_kex(&m);
1.1 provos 1567: }
1568:
1569: blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
1570: current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1.124 djm 1571: free(blob);
1.1 provos 1572:
1.14 markus 1573: debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
1.1 provos 1574: blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
1575: current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1.124 djm 1576: free(blob);
1.3 markus 1577:
1.1 provos 1578: /* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
1.37 markus 1579: seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
1580: blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1581: packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
1.99 markus 1582: bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1583: packet_set_state(MODE_OUT, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
1.37 markus 1584: seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
1585: blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1586: packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
1.99 markus 1587: bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1588: packet_set_state(MODE_IN, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
1.1 provos 1589:
1590: skip:
1591: /* Get the key context */
1592: child_state.keyout = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyoutlen);
1593: child_state.keyin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyinlen);
1594:
1.14 markus 1595: debug3("%s: Getting compression state", __func__);
1.1 provos 1596: /* Get compression state */
1597: p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
1598: if (plen != sizeof(child_state.outgoing))
1.14 markus 1599: fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
1.1 provos 1600: memcpy(&child_state.outgoing, p, sizeof(child_state.outgoing));
1.124 djm 1601: free(p);
1.1 provos 1602:
1603: p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
1604: if (plen != sizeof(child_state.incoming))
1.14 markus 1605: fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
1.1 provos 1606: memcpy(&child_state.incoming, p, sizeof(child_state.incoming));
1.124 djm 1607: free(p);
1.1 provos 1608:
1609: /* Network I/O buffers */
1.14 markus 1610: debug3("%s: Getting Network I/O buffers", __func__);
1.1 provos 1611: child_state.input = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ilen);
1612: child_state.output = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.olen);
1.103 andreas 1613:
1614: /* Roaming */
1615: if (compat20) {
1616: child_state.sent_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1617: child_state.recv_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1618: }
1.1 provos 1619:
1620: buffer_free(&m);
1621: }
1622:
1623:
1624: /* Allocation functions for zlib */
1625: void *
1626: mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
1627: {
1.30 markus 1628: size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
1.1 provos 1629: void *address;
1630:
1.23 millert 1631: if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_T_MAX / size)
1.18 deraadt 1632: fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
1633:
1634: address = mm_malloc(mm, len);
1.1 provos 1635:
1636: return (address);
1637: }
1638:
1639: void
1640: mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
1641: {
1642: mm_free(mm, address);
1643: }
1644:
1645: void
1646: mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *mm)
1647: {
1648: outgoing_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
1649: outgoing_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
1650: outgoing_stream.opaque = mm;
1651:
1652: incoming_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
1653: incoming_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
1654: incoming_stream.opaque = mm;
1655: }
1656:
1657: /* XXX */
1658:
1659: #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
1.111 djm 1660: if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
1.1 provos 1661: fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
1662: } while (0)
1663:
1.2 markus 1664: static void
1.114 djm 1665: monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
1.3 markus 1666: {
1.114 djm 1667: int pair[2];
1668:
1.1 provos 1669: if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
1.114 djm 1670: fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1671: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1672: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1.114 djm 1673: mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1674: mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1675:
1676: if (do_logfds) {
1677: if (pipe(pair) == -1)
1678: fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1679: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1680: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1681: mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
1682: mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
1683: } else
1684: mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
1.1 provos 1685: }
1686:
1687: #define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
1688:
1689: struct monitor *
1690: monitor_init(void)
1691: {
1692: struct monitor *mon;
1693:
1.75 djm 1694: mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
1.1 provos 1695:
1.114 djm 1696: monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
1.1 provos 1697:
1698: /* Used to share zlib space across processes */
1.16 djm 1699: if (options.compression) {
1700: mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
1701: mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
1.1 provos 1702:
1.16 djm 1703: /* Compression needs to share state across borders */
1704: mm_init_compression(mon->m_zlib);
1705: }
1.1 provos 1706:
1707: return mon;
1708: }
1709:
1710: void
1711: monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
1712: {
1.114 djm 1713: monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
1.1 provos 1714: }
1.46 markus 1715:
1716: #ifdef GSSAPI
1717: int
1.59 avsm 1718: mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1719: {
1.59 avsm 1720: gss_OID_desc goid;
1.46 markus 1721: OM_uint32 major;
1722: u_int len;
1723:
1.59 avsm 1724: goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1725: goid.length = len;
1.46 markus 1726:
1.59 avsm 1727: major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
1.46 markus 1728:
1.124 djm 1729: free(goid.elements);
1.46 markus 1730:
1731: buffer_clear(m);
1732: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1733:
1.64 stevesk 1734: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
1.46 markus 1735:
1736: /* Now we have a context, enable the step */
1737: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
1738:
1739: return (0);
1740: }
1741:
1742: int
1.59 avsm 1743: mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1744: {
1745: gss_buffer_desc in;
1746: gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1.64 stevesk 1747: OM_uint32 major, minor;
1.46 markus 1748: OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
1.47 deraadt 1749: u_int len;
1.46 markus 1750:
1.47 deraadt 1751: in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1752: in.length = len;
1.46 markus 1753: major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
1.124 djm 1754: free(in.value);
1.46 markus 1755:
1756: buffer_clear(m);
1757: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1758: buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
1759: buffer_put_int(m, flags);
1.59 avsm 1760: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
1.46 markus 1761:
1762: gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
1763:
1.64 stevesk 1764: if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1.46 markus 1765: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
1766: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.52 markus 1767: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
1.46 markus 1768: }
1769: return (0);
1770: }
1771:
1772: int
1.59 avsm 1773: mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.52 markus 1774: {
1775: gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
1776: OM_uint32 ret;
1777: u_int len;
1.54 djm 1778:
1.52 markus 1779: gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1780: gssbuf.length = len;
1781: mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1782: mic.length = len;
1.54 djm 1783:
1.52 markus 1784: ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
1.54 djm 1785:
1.124 djm 1786: free(gssbuf.value);
1787: free(mic.value);
1.54 djm 1788:
1.52 markus 1789: buffer_clear(m);
1790: buffer_put_int(m, ret);
1.54 djm 1791:
1.59 avsm 1792: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
1.54 djm 1793:
1.52 markus 1794: if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
1795: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.54 djm 1796:
1.52 markus 1797: return (0);
1798: }
1799:
1800: int
1.59 avsm 1801: mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1802: {
1803: int authenticated;
1804:
1805: authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
1806:
1807: buffer_clear(m);
1808: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
1809:
1810: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 1811: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
1.46 markus 1812:
1.64 stevesk 1813: auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
1.46 markus 1814:
1815: /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
1816: return (authenticated);
1817: }
1818: #endif /* GSSAPI */
1.100 djm 1819:
1820: #ifdef JPAKE
1821: int
1822: mm_answer_jpake_step1(int sock, Buffer *m)
1823: {
1824: struct jpake_ctx *pctx;
1825: u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof;
1826: u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len;
1827:
1828: if (!options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication)
1829: fatal("zero_knowledge_password_authentication disabled");
1830:
1831: if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL)
1832: fatal("%s: authctxt->jpake_ctx already set (%p)",
1833: __func__, authctxt->jpake_ctx);
1834: authctxt->jpake_ctx = pctx = jpake_new();
1835:
1836: jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
1837: &pctx->server_id, &pctx->server_id_len,
1838: &pctx->x3, &pctx->x4, &pctx->g_x3, &pctx->g_x4,
1839: &x3_proof, &x3_proof_len,
1840: &x4_proof, &x4_proof_len);
1841:
1842: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step1 done in %s", __func__));
1843:
1844: buffer_clear(m);
1845:
1846: buffer_put_string(m, pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
1847: buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x3);
1848: buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x4);
1849: buffer_put_string(m, x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
1850: buffer_put_string(m, x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
1851:
1852: debug3("%s: sending step1", __func__);
1853: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1, m);
1854:
1855: bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
1856: bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
1.124 djm 1857: free(x3_proof);
1858: free(x4_proof);
1.100 djm 1859:
1860: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, 1);
1861: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 0);
1862:
1863: return 0;
1864: }
1865:
1866: int
1867: mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int sock, Buffer *m)
1868: {
1869: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1870: char *hash_scheme, *salt;
1871:
1872: if (pctx == NULL)
1873: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1874:
1875: auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(authctxt, &pctx->s, &hash_scheme, &salt);
1876:
1877: buffer_clear(m);
1878: /* pctx->s is sensitive, not returned to slave */
1879: buffer_put_cstring(m, hash_scheme);
1880: buffer_put_cstring(m, salt);
1881:
1882: debug3("%s: sending pwdata", __func__);
1883: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, m);
1884:
1885: bzero(hash_scheme, strlen(hash_scheme));
1886: bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
1.124 djm 1887: free(hash_scheme);
1888: free(salt);
1.100 djm 1889:
1890: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, 1);
1891:
1892: return 0;
1893: }
1894:
1895: int
1896: mm_answer_jpake_step2(int sock, Buffer *m)
1897: {
1898: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1899: u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof, *x4_s_proof;
1900: u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len, x4_s_proof_len;
1901:
1902: if (pctx == NULL)
1903: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1904:
1905: if ((pctx->g_x1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
1906: (pctx->g_x2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
1907: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1908: buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x1);
1909: buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x2);
1910: pctx->client_id = buffer_get_string(m, &pctx->client_id_len);
1911: x1_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x1_proof_len);
1912: x2_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_proof_len);
1913:
1914: jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x3,
1915: pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->x4,
1916: pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
1917: pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
1918: x1_proof, x1_proof_len,
1919: x2_proof, x2_proof_len,
1920: &pctx->b,
1921: &x4_s_proof, &x4_s_proof_len);
1922:
1923: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step2 done in %s", __func__));
1924:
1925: bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
1926: bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
1.124 djm 1927: free(x1_proof);
1928: free(x2_proof);
1.100 djm 1929:
1930: buffer_clear(m);
1931:
1932: buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->b);
1933: buffer_put_string(m, x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
1934:
1935: debug3("%s: sending step2", __func__);
1936: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2, m);
1937:
1938: bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
1.124 djm 1939: free(x4_s_proof);
1.100 djm 1940:
1941: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, 1);
1942:
1943: return 0;
1944: }
1945:
1946: int
1947: mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
1948: {
1949: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1950: u_char *x2_s_proof;
1951: u_int x2_s_proof_len;
1952:
1953: if (pctx == NULL)
1954: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1955:
1956: if ((pctx->a = BN_new()) == NULL)
1957: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1958: buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->a);
1959: x2_s_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_s_proof_len);
1960:
1961: jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->a,
1962: pctx->x4, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2,
1963: pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
1964: pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
1965: session_id2, session_id2_len,
1966: x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len,
1967: &pctx->k,
1968: &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
1969:
1970: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "key_confirm done in %s", __func__));
1971:
1972: bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
1973: buffer_clear(m);
1974:
1975: /* pctx->k is sensitive, not sent */
1976: buffer_put_string(m, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
1977:
1978: debug3("%s: sending confirmation hash", __func__);
1979: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, m);
1980:
1981: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, 1);
1982:
1983: return 0;
1984: }
1985:
1986: int
1987: mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
1988: {
1989: int authenticated = 0;
1990: u_char *peer_confirm_hash;
1991: u_int peer_confirm_hash_len;
1992: struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1993:
1994: if (pctx == NULL)
1995: fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1996:
1997: peer_confirm_hash = buffer_get_string(m, &peer_confirm_hash_len);
1998:
1999: authenticated = jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
2000: pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
2001: session_id2, session_id2_len,
2002: peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len) && authctxt->valid;
2003:
2004: JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "check_confirm done in %s", __func__));
2005:
2006: bzero(peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len);
1.124 djm 2007: free(peer_confirm_hash);
1.100 djm 2008:
2009: buffer_clear(m);
2010: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
2011:
2012: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
2013: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, m);
2014:
2015: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 1);
2016:
2017: auth_method = "jpake-01@openssh.com";
2018: return authenticated;
2019: }
2020:
2021: #endif /* JPAKE */
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