Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c, Revision 1.147
1.147 ! djm 1: /* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.146 2015/04/17 04:32:31 djm Exp $ */
1.1 provos 2: /*
3: * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
4: * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
5: * All rights reserved.
6: *
7: * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8: * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9: * are met:
10: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12: * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14: * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15: *
16: * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
17: * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
18: * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
19: * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
20: * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
21: * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
22: * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
23: * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
24: * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
25: * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
26: */
27:
1.67 stevesk 28: #include <sys/types.h>
29: #include <sys/wait.h>
1.79 stevesk 30: #include <sys/socket.h>
1.85 deraadt 31: #include <sys/tree.h>
1.95 djm 32: #include <sys/queue.h>
1.1 provos 33:
1.132 markus 34: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.78 stevesk 35: #include <openssl/dh.h>
1.132 markus 36: #endif
1.78 stevesk 37:
1.81 stevesk 38: #include <errno.h>
1.80 stevesk 39: #include <fcntl.h>
1.65 stevesk 40: #include <paths.h>
1.114 djm 41: #include <poll.h>
1.78 stevesk 42: #include <pwd.h>
1.68 stevesk 43: #include <signal.h>
1.134 djm 44: #include <stdarg.h>
1.142 millert 45: #include <stdint.h>
1.134 djm 46: #include <stdio.h>
1.84 stevesk 47: #include <stdlib.h>
1.82 stevesk 48: #include <string.h>
1.1 provos 49:
1.114 djm 50: #include "atomicio.h"
1.85 deraadt 51: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.1 provos 52: #include "ssh.h"
1.85 deraadt 53: #include "key.h"
54: #include "buffer.h"
55: #include "hostfile.h"
1.1 provos 56: #include "auth.h"
1.85 deraadt 57: #include "cipher.h"
1.1 provos 58: #include "kex.h"
59: #include "dh.h"
1.88 miod 60: #include <zlib.h>
1.1 provos 61: #include "packet.h"
62: #include "auth-options.h"
63: #include "sshpty.h"
64: #include "channels.h"
65: #include "session.h"
66: #include "sshlogin.h"
67: #include "canohost.h"
68: #include "log.h"
1.135 millert 69: #include "misc.h"
1.1 provos 70: #include "servconf.h"
71: #include "monitor.h"
72: #include "monitor_mm.h"
1.85 deraadt 73: #ifdef GSSAPI
74: #include "ssh-gss.h"
75: #endif
1.1 provos 76: #include "monitor_wrap.h"
77: #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
78: #include "compat.h"
79: #include "ssh2.h"
1.104 andreas 80: #include "roaming.h"
1.127 markus 81: #include "authfd.h"
1.137 djm 82: #include "match.h"
1.138 djm 83: #include "ssherr.h"
1.1 provos 84:
1.46 markus 85: #ifdef GSSAPI
86: static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
87: #endif
88:
1.1 provos 89: /* Imports */
90: extern ServerOptions options;
91: extern u_int utmp_len;
92: extern u_char session_id[];
93: extern Buffer auth_debug;
94: extern int auth_debug_init;
1.61 dtucker 95: extern Buffer loginmsg;
1.1 provos 96:
97: /* State exported from the child */
1.139 markus 98: static struct sshbuf *child_state;
1.1 provos 99:
1.43 markus 100: /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
1.1 provos 101:
102: int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
103: int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
104: int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
1.10 djm 105: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
1.1 provos 106: int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
107: int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
108: int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
109: int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
110: int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
111: int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
112: int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
113: int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
114: int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
115: int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
116: int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
117: int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
118: int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
119: int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
120: int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
121: int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
122:
1.46 markus 123: #ifdef GSSAPI
124: int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
125: int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
126: int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
1.52 markus 127: int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
1.46 markus 128: #endif
1.25 itojun 129:
1.114 djm 130: static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
131:
1.1 provos 132: static Authctxt *authctxt;
1.132 markus 133:
134: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 135: static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
1.132 markus 136: #endif
1.1 provos 137:
138: /* local state for key verify */
139: static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
140: static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
141: static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
1.26 markus 142: static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
143: static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
1.1 provos 144: static char *auth_method = "unknown";
1.119 djm 145: static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
1.44 markus 146: static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
1.13 markus 147: static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
1.40 markus 148: static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
1.1 provos 149:
150: struct mon_table {
151: enum monitor_reqtype type;
152: int flags;
153: int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
154: };
155:
156: #define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
157: #define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
158: #define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
1.77 dtucker 159: #define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
1.1 provos 160:
161: #define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
162:
163: #define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
164:
165: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
1.132 markus 166: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 167: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
1.132 markus 168: #endif
1.1 provos 169: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
170: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
171: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
1.10 djm 172: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
1.1 provos 173: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
174: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 175: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.1 provos 176: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
177: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
1.46 markus 178: #ifdef GSSAPI
179: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
180: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
181: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
1.52 markus 182: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
1.46 markus 183: #endif
1.1 provos 184: {0, 0, NULL}
185: };
186:
187: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
1.132 markus 188: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 189: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
1.132 markus 190: #endif
1.1 provos 191: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
192: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
193: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
194: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
195: {0, 0, NULL}
196: };
197:
198: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
1.132 markus 199: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 200: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
201: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
202: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
203: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
1.77 dtucker 204: {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
205: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
1.1 provos 206: {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
207: {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
208: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 209: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.132 markus 210: #endif
1.1 provos 211: {0, 0, NULL}
212: };
213:
214: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
1.132 markus 215: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 216: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
217: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
218: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
1.132 markus 219: #endif
1.1 provos 220: {0, 0, NULL}
221: };
222:
223: struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
224:
225: /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
226:
227: static void
228: monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
229: {
230: while (ent->f != NULL) {
231: if (ent->type == type) {
232: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
233: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
234: return;
235: }
236: ent++;
237: }
238: }
239:
240: static void
241: monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
242: {
243: struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
244:
245: while (ent->f != NULL) {
246: if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
247: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
248: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
249: }
250: ent++;
251: }
252: }
253:
1.50 markus 254: void
255: monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 256: {
257: struct mon_table *ent;
1.119 djm 258: int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
1.1 provos 259:
260: debug3("preauth child monitor started");
261:
1.114 djm 262: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
263: close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
264: pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
265:
1.50 markus 266: authctxt = _authctxt;
267: memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
268:
1.1 provos 269: if (compat20) {
270: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
271:
272: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
273: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
274: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
275: } else {
276: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
277:
278: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
279: }
280:
281: /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
282: while (!authenticated) {
1.119 djm 283: partial = 0;
1.77 dtucker 284: auth_method = "unknown";
1.119 djm 285: auth_submethod = NULL;
1.89 markus 286: authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
1.118 djm 287:
288: /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
289: if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
290: if (!compat20)
291: fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported"
292: "with SSH protocol 1");
293: if (authenticated &&
294: !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
1.122 markus 295: auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
1.118 djm 296: debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
297: auth_method);
298: authenticated = 0;
1.119 djm 299: partial = 1;
1.118 djm 300: }
301: }
302:
1.1 provos 303: if (authenticated) {
304: if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
305: fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
1.14 markus 306: __func__, ent->type);
1.1 provos 307: if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
308: !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
309: authenticated = 0;
310: }
1.77 dtucker 311: if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
1.119 djm 312: auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial,
1.125 djm 313: auth_method, auth_submethod);
1.1 provos 314: if (!authenticated)
315: authctxt->failures++;
316: }
317: }
318:
319: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 320: fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
1.77 dtucker 321: if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
322: fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
1.1 provos 323:
324: debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
1.14 markus 325: __func__, authctxt->user);
1.1 provos 326:
1.11 mouring 327: mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
1.120 markus 328:
329: /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
330: while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
331: ;
1.114 djm 332:
333: close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
334: close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
335: pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
1.1 provos 336: }
337:
1.40 markus 338: static void
339: monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
340: {
341: monitor_child_pid = pid;
342: }
343:
344: static void
1.59 avsm 345: monitor_child_handler(int sig)
1.40 markus 346: {
1.59 avsm 347: kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
1.40 markus 348: }
349:
1.1 provos 350: void
1.11 mouring 351: monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 352: {
1.114 djm 353: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
354: pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
355:
1.40 markus 356: monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
357: signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
358: signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
1.91 djm 359: signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
1.40 markus 360:
1.1 provos 361: if (compat20) {
362: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
363:
364: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
365: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
366: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
367: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
368: } else {
369: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
370: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
371: }
372: if (!no_pty_flag) {
373: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
374: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
375: }
376:
377: for (;;)
1.11 mouring 378: monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
1.1 provos 379: }
380:
381: void
1.11 mouring 382: monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 383: {
1.16 djm 384: if (options.compression) {
385: /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
386: mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
387: }
1.1 provos 388: }
389:
1.139 markus 390: /* Allocation functions for zlib */
391: static void *
392: mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
393: {
394: size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
395: void *address;
396:
1.142 millert 397: if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_MAX / size)
1.139 markus 398: fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
399:
400: address = mm_malloc(mm, len);
401:
402: return (address);
403: }
404:
405: static void
406: mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
407: {
408: mm_free(mm, address);
409: }
410:
1.114 djm 411: static int
412: monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
413: {
414: Buffer logmsg;
415: u_int len, level;
416: char *msg;
417:
418: buffer_init(&logmsg);
419:
420: /* Read length */
421: buffer_append_space(&logmsg, 4);
422: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
423: buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) {
424: if (errno == EPIPE) {
1.116 djm 425: buffer_free(&logmsg);
1.114 djm 426: debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
427: close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
428: pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
429: return -1;
430: }
431: fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
432: }
433: len = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
434: if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
435: fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len);
436:
437: /* Read severity, message */
438: buffer_clear(&logmsg);
439: buffer_append_space(&logmsg, len);
440: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
441: buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg))
442: fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
443:
444: /* Log it */
445: level = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
446: msg = buffer_get_string(&logmsg, NULL);
447: if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
448: fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
449: __func__, level);
450: do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
451:
452: buffer_free(&logmsg);
1.124 djm 453: free(msg);
1.114 djm 454:
455: return 0;
456: }
457:
1.1 provos 458: int
1.11 mouring 459: monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
1.1 provos 460: struct mon_table **pent)
461: {
462: Buffer m;
463: int ret;
464: u_char type;
1.114 djm 465: struct pollfd pfd[2];
466:
467: for (;;) {
1.130 tedu 468: memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
1.114 djm 469: pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
470: pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
471: pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
472: pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
1.115 djm 473: if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
474: if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
475: continue;
1.114 djm 476: fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.115 djm 477: }
1.114 djm 478: if (pfd[1].revents) {
479: /*
480: * Drain all log messages before processing next
481: * monitor request.
482: */
483: monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
484: continue;
485: }
486: if (pfd[0].revents)
487: break; /* Continues below */
488: }
1.1 provos 489:
490: buffer_init(&m);
491:
1.11 mouring 492: mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 493: type = buffer_get_char(&m);
494:
1.14 markus 495: debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 496:
497: while (ent->f != NULL) {
498: if (ent->type == type)
499: break;
500: ent++;
501: }
502:
503: if (ent->f != NULL) {
504: if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
1.14 markus 505: fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
1.1 provos 506: type);
1.11 mouring 507: ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 508: buffer_free(&m);
509:
510: /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
511: if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
1.14 markus 512: debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
1.1 provos 513: type);
514: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
515: }
516:
517: if (pent != NULL)
518: *pent = ent;
1.3 markus 519:
1.1 provos 520: return ret;
521: }
522:
1.14 markus 523: fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 524:
525: /* NOTREACHED */
526: return (-1);
527: }
528:
529: /* allowed key state */
530: static int
531: monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
532: {
533: /* make sure key is allowed */
534: if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
1.108 djm 535: timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
1.1 provos 536: return (0);
537: return (1);
538: }
539:
540: static void
541: monitor_reset_key_state(void)
542: {
543: /* reset state */
1.124 djm 544: free(key_blob);
545: free(hostbased_cuser);
546: free(hostbased_chost);
1.1 provos 547: key_blob = NULL;
548: key_bloblen = 0;
549: key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
550: hostbased_cuser = NULL;
551: hostbased_chost = NULL;
552: }
553:
1.132 markus 554: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 555: int
1.59 avsm 556: mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 557: {
558: DH *dh;
559: int min, want, max;
560:
561: min = buffer_get_int(m);
562: want = buffer_get_int(m);
563: max = buffer_get_int(m);
564:
565: debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 566: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 567: /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
568: if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
569: fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 570: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 571:
572: buffer_clear(m);
573:
574: dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
575: if (dh == NULL) {
576: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
577: return (0);
578: } else {
579: /* Send first bignum */
580: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
581: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
582: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
1.3 markus 583:
1.1 provos 584: DH_free(dh);
585: }
1.59 avsm 586: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
1.1 provos 587: return (0);
588: }
1.132 markus 589: #endif
1.1 provos 590:
591: int
1.59 avsm 592: mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 593: {
1.144 djm 594: struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
1.138 djm 595: extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */
596: struct sshkey *key;
1.144 djm 597: struct sshbuf *sigbuf;
1.1 provos 598: u_char *p;
599: u_char *signature;
1.138 djm 600: size_t datlen, siglen;
1.144 djm 601: int r, keyid, is_proof = 0;
1.145 djm 602: const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
1.3 markus 603:
1.14 markus 604: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 605:
1.138 djm 606: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
607: (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0)
608: fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1.1 provos 609:
1.69 djm 610: /*
1.110 djm 611: * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
612: * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
1.144 djm 613: *
614: * Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey
615: * proof.
616: *
617: * XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too?
618: * it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather
619: * than the full kex structure...
1.69 djm 620: */
1.144 djm 621: if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) {
622: /*
623: * Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what
624: * the client sent us.
625: */
626: if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */
627: fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu", __func__, datlen);
628: if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL)
629: fatal("%s: no hostkey for index %d", __func__, keyid);
630: if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
631: fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
1.145 djm 632: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
633: (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
1.144 djm 634: session_id2_len) != 0) ||
635: (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
636: fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key "
637: "proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
638: if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) ||
639: memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0)
640: fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
641: __func__, datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
642: sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
643: is_proof = 1;
644: }
1.1 provos 645:
1.13 markus 646: /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
647: if (session_id2_len == 0) {
648: session_id2_len = datlen;
649: session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
650: memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
651: }
652:
1.127 markus 653: if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
1.138 djm 654: if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen,
655: datafellows)) != 0)
656: fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s",
657: __func__, ssh_err(r));
1.144 djm 658: } else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
1.138 djm 659: auth_sock > 0) {
660: if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
661: p, datlen, datafellows)) != 0) {
662: fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
663: __func__, ssh_err(r));
664: }
1.127 markus 665: } else
1.14 markus 666: fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
1.1 provos 667:
1.144 djm 668: debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__,
669: is_proof ? "KEX" : "hostkey proof", signature, siglen);
1.1 provos 670:
1.138 djm 671: sshbuf_reset(m);
672: if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
673: fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1.1 provos 674:
1.124 djm 675: free(p);
676: free(signature);
1.1 provos 677:
1.59 avsm 678: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
1.1 provos 679:
680: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
681: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
682:
683: return (0);
684: }
685:
686: /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
687:
688: int
1.59 avsm 689: mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 690: {
1.60 dtucker 691: char *username;
1.1 provos 692: struct passwd *pwent;
693: int allowed = 0;
1.113 djm 694: u_int i;
1.3 markus 695:
1.14 markus 696: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 697:
698: if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
1.14 markus 699: fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
1.1 provos 700:
1.60 dtucker 701: username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.1 provos 702:
1.60 dtucker 703: pwent = getpwnamallow(username);
1.1 provos 704:
1.60 dtucker 705: authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
706: setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
1.124 djm 707: free(username);
1.1 provos 708:
709: buffer_clear(m);
710:
711: if (pwent == NULL) {
712: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
1.53 djm 713: authctxt->pw = fakepw();
1.1 provos 714: goto out;
715: }
716:
717: allowed = 1;
1.4 markus 718: authctxt->pw = pwent;
1.1 provos 719: authctxt->valid = 1;
720:
721: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
722: buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
723: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
724: buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
725: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
726: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
727: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
728: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
1.94 dtucker 729:
730: out:
1.90 dtucker 731: buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
1.112 djm 732:
733: #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
734: if (options.x != NULL) \
735: buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x); \
736: } while (0)
1.113 djm 737: #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
738: for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) \
739: buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x[i]); \
740: } while (0)
1.112 djm 741: /* See comment in servconf.h */
742: COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
743: #undef M_CP_STROPT
1.113 djm 744: #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
1.118 djm 745:
746: /* Create valid auth method lists */
747: if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
748: /*
749: * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
750: * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
751: * authentication to succeed.
752: */
753: debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
754: }
755:
1.14 markus 756: debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
1.59 avsm 757: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
1.1 provos 758:
759: /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
760: if (!compat20)
761: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
1.10 djm 762: else {
1.1 provos 763: /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
764: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
1.10 djm 765: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
766: }
767:
768: return (0);
769: }
770:
1.59 avsm 771: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.10 djm 772: {
773: char *banner;
774:
775: buffer_clear(m);
776: banner = auth2_read_banner();
777: buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
1.59 avsm 778: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
1.124 djm 779: free(banner);
1.1 provos 780:
781: return (0);
782: }
783:
784: int
1.59 avsm 785: mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 786: {
787: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
788:
789: authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
790: authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.6 stevesk 791: debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
1.14 markus 792: __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
1.6 stevesk 793:
1.1 provos 794: if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
1.124 djm 795: free(authctxt->style);
1.1 provos 796: authctxt->style = NULL;
797: }
798:
799: return (0);
800: }
801:
802: int
1.59 avsm 803: mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 804: {
805: static int call_count;
806: char *passwd;
1.22 stevesk 807: int authenticated;
808: u_int plen;
1.1 provos 809:
810: passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
811: /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
1.12 markus 812: authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
1.48 markus 813: auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
1.131 djm 814: explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
1.124 djm 815: free(passwd);
1.1 provos 816:
817: buffer_clear(m);
818: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
819:
1.14 markus 820: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 821: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
1.1 provos 822:
823: call_count++;
824: if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
825: auth_method = "none";
826: else
827: auth_method = "password";
828:
829: /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
830: return (authenticated);
831: }
832:
833: int
1.59 avsm 834: mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 835: {
836: char *name, *infotxt;
837: u_int numprompts;
838: u_int *echo_on;
839: char **prompts;
1.31 markus 840: u_int success;
1.1 provos 841:
1.31 markus 842: success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
843: &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
1.1 provos 844:
845: buffer_clear(m);
1.31 markus 846: buffer_put_int(m, success);
847: if (success)
1.1 provos 848: buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
849:
1.31 markus 850: debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
1.59 avsm 851: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
1.1 provos 852:
1.31 markus 853: if (success) {
1.124 djm 854: free(name);
855: free(infotxt);
856: free(prompts);
857: free(echo_on);
1.1 provos 858: }
859:
860: return (0);
861: }
862:
863: int
1.59 avsm 864: mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 865: {
866: char *response;
867: int authok;
868:
869: if (authctxt->as == 0)
1.14 markus 870: fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
1.1 provos 871:
872: response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.12 markus 873: authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
874: auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
1.1 provos 875: authctxt->as = NULL;
1.14 markus 876: debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
1.124 djm 877: free(response);
1.1 provos 878:
879: buffer_clear(m);
880: buffer_put_int(m, authok);
881:
1.14 markus 882: debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
1.59 avsm 883: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
1.1 provos 884:
1.122 markus 885: if (compat20) {
886: auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
887: auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
888: } else
1.118 djm 889: auth_method = "bsdauth";
1.1 provos 890:
891: return (authok != 0);
892: }
893:
894: int
1.59 avsm 895: mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 896: {
897: Key *key;
1.26 markus 898: char *cuser, *chost;
899: u_char *blob;
1.1 provos 900: u_int bloblen;
901: enum mm_keytype type = 0;
902: int allowed = 0;
903:
1.14 markus 904: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.3 markus 905:
1.1 provos 906: type = buffer_get_int(m);
907: cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
908: chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
909: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
910:
911: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
912:
913: if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
914: (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
1.14 markus 915: fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 916:
1.14 markus 917: debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
1.1 provos 918:
1.51 djm 919: if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
1.137 djm 920: /* These should not make it past the privsep child */
921: if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
922: (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
923: fatal("%s: passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key", __func__);
924:
1.63 deraadt 925: switch (type) {
1.1 provos 926: case MM_USERKEY:
1.12 markus 927: allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
1.136 djm 928: !auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key) &&
1.137 djm 929: match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
930: options.pubkey_key_types,
931: strlen(options.pubkey_key_types), 0) == 1 &&
1.12 markus 932: user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
1.126 djm 933: pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
1.77 dtucker 934: auth_method = "publickey";
1.97 dtucker 935: if (options.pubkey_authentication && allowed != 1)
936: auth_clear_options();
1.1 provos 937: break;
938: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1.12 markus 939: allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
1.137 djm 940: match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
941: options.hostbased_key_types,
942: strlen(options.hostbased_key_types), 0) == 1 &&
1.12 markus 943: hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 944: cuser, chost, key);
1.126 djm 945: pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
946: "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
947: cuser, chost);
1.77 dtucker 948: auth_method = "hostbased";
1.1 provos 949: break;
1.132 markus 950: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 951: case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
952: key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
1.12 markus 953: allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
954: auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 955: cuser, chost, key);
1.97 dtucker 956: if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
957: auth_clear_options();
1.77 dtucker 958: auth_method = "rsa";
1.1 provos 959: break;
1.132 markus 960: #endif
1.1 provos 961: default:
1.14 markus 962: fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 963: break;
964: }
1.33 markus 965: }
966: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 967: key_free(key);
968:
969: /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
970: monitor_reset_key_state();
971:
972: if (allowed) {
973: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
974: key_blob = blob;
975: key_bloblen = bloblen;
976: key_blobtype = type;
977: hostbased_cuser = cuser;
978: hostbased_chost = chost;
1.72 djm 979: } else {
1.77 dtucker 980: /* Log failed attempt */
1.125 djm 981: auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
1.124 djm 982: free(blob);
983: free(cuser);
984: free(chost);
1.1 provos 985: }
986:
987: debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
1.98 dtucker 988: __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
1.1 provos 989:
990: buffer_clear(m);
991: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 992: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 993:
1.59 avsm 994: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 995:
996: if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
997: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
998:
999: return (0);
1000: }
1001:
1002: static int
1003: monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
1004: {
1005: Buffer b;
1.121 djm 1006: char *p, *userstyle;
1.1 provos 1007: u_int len;
1008: int fail = 0;
1009:
1010: buffer_init(&b);
1011: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 1012:
1.1 provos 1013: if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
1.13 markus 1014: p = buffer_ptr(&b);
1015: len = buffer_len(&b);
1016: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1017: (len < session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1018: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.13 markus 1019: fail++;
1.1 provos 1020: buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
1021: } else {
1.13 markus 1022: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
1023: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1024: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1025: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 1026: fail++;
1.124 djm 1027: free(p);
1.1 provos 1028: }
1029: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1030: fail++;
1.121 djm 1031: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1032: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1033: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1034: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1035: if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 1036: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.121 djm 1037: userstyle, p);
1.1 provos 1038: fail++;
1039: }
1.124 djm 1040: free(userstyle);
1041: free(p);
1.1 provos 1042: buffer_skip_string(&b);
1043: if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
1044: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
1045: fail++;
1046: } else {
1.121 djm 1047: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1.1 provos 1048: if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
1049: fail++;
1.124 djm 1050: free(p);
1.1 provos 1051: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
1052: fail++;
1053: buffer_skip_string(&b);
1054: }
1055: buffer_skip_string(&b);
1056: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1057: fail++;
1058: buffer_free(&b);
1059: return (fail == 0);
1060: }
1061:
1062: static int
1.26 markus 1063: monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
1064: char *chost)
1.1 provos 1065: {
1066: Buffer b;
1.121 djm 1067: char *p, *userstyle;
1.1 provos 1068: u_int len;
1069: int fail = 0;
1070:
1071: buffer_init(&b);
1072: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 1073:
1.13 markus 1074: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
1075: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1076: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1077: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 1078: fail++;
1.124 djm 1079: free(p);
1.13 markus 1080:
1.1 provos 1081: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1082: fail++;
1.121 djm 1083: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1084: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1085: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1086: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1087: if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 1088: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.121 djm 1089: userstyle, p);
1.1 provos 1090: fail++;
1091: }
1.121 djm 1092: free(userstyle);
1.124 djm 1093: free(p);
1.1 provos 1094: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */
1.121 djm 1095: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1.1 provos 1096: if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
1097: fail++;
1.124 djm 1098: free(p);
1.1 provos 1099: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkalg */
1100: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkblob */
1101:
1102: /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
1103: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1104: if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
1105: p[len - 1] = '\0';
1106: if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
1107: fail++;
1.124 djm 1108: free(p);
1.1 provos 1109:
1110: /* verify client user */
1111: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1112: if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
1113: fail++;
1.124 djm 1114: free(p);
1.1 provos 1115:
1116: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1117: fail++;
1118: buffer_free(&b);
1119: return (fail == 0);
1120: }
1121:
1122: int
1.59 avsm 1123: mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1124: {
1125: Key *key;
1126: u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
1127: u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
1128: int verified = 0;
1129: int valid_data = 0;
1130:
1131: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1132: signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
1133: data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
1134:
1135: if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
1.8 mouring 1136: !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
1.14 markus 1137: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1138:
1139: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1140: if (key == NULL)
1.14 markus 1141: fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 1142:
1143: switch (key_blobtype) {
1144: case MM_USERKEY:
1145: valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
1146: break;
1147: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1148: valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
1149: hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
1150: break;
1151: default:
1152: valid_data = 0;
1153: break;
1154: }
1155: if (!valid_data)
1.14 markus 1156: fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 1157:
1158: verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
1159: debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
1.89 markus 1160: __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
1.1 provos 1161:
1.136 djm 1162: /* If auth was successful then record key to ensure it isn't reused */
1163: if (verified == 1)
1164: auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
1165: else
1166: key_free(key);
1167:
1.124 djm 1168: free(blob);
1169: free(signature);
1170: free(data);
1.1 provos 1171:
1.17 stevesk 1172: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
1173:
1.1 provos 1174: monitor_reset_key_state();
1.3 markus 1175:
1.1 provos 1176: buffer_clear(m);
1177: buffer_put_int(m, verified);
1.59 avsm 1178: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
1.1 provos 1179:
1.89 markus 1180: return (verified == 1);
1.1 provos 1181: }
1182:
1.2 markus 1183: static void
1.1 provos 1184: mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
1185: {
1186: socklen_t fromlen;
1187: struct sockaddr_storage from;
1.146 djm 1188:
1189: if (options.use_login)
1190: return;
1.1 provos 1191:
1192: /*
1193: * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
1194: * the address be 0.0.0.0.
1195: */
1196: memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
1.24 stevesk 1197: fromlen = sizeof(from);
1.1 provos 1198: if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
1199: if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
1.74 deraadt 1200: (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
1.1 provos 1201: debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1.50 markus 1202: cleanup_exit(255);
1.1 provos 1203: }
1204: }
1205: /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
1206: record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
1.42 markus 1207: get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
1.24 stevesk 1208: (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
1.1 provos 1209: }
1210:
1211: static void
1212: mm_session_close(Session *s)
1213: {
1.41 djm 1214: debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
1.1 provos 1215: if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1.86 stevesk 1216: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
1.1 provos 1217: session_pty_cleanup2(s);
1218: }
1.96 djm 1219: session_unused(s->self);
1.1 provos 1220: }
1221:
1222: int
1.59 avsm 1223: mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1224: {
1.11 mouring 1225: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1226: Session *s;
1227: int res, fd0;
1228:
1.14 markus 1229: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1230:
1231: buffer_clear(m);
1232: s = session_new();
1233: if (s == NULL)
1234: goto error;
1235: s->authctxt = authctxt;
1236: s->pw = authctxt->pw;
1.11 mouring 1237: s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
1.1 provos 1238: res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
1239: if (res == 0)
1240: goto error;
1241: pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
1242:
1243: buffer_put_int(m, 1);
1244: buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
1245:
1246: /* We need to trick ttyslot */
1247: if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
1.14 markus 1248: fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
1.1 provos 1249:
1250: mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
1251:
1252: /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
1253: close(0);
1.61 dtucker 1254:
1255: /* send messages generated by record_login */
1256: buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
1257: buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
1258:
1259: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1260:
1.92 djm 1261: if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
1262: mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
1263: fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1264:
1265: /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
1266: if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
1.14 markus 1267: fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1268: if (fd0 != 0)
1.14 markus 1269: error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
1.1 provos 1270:
1271: /* slave is not needed */
1272: close(s->ttyfd);
1273: s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
1274: /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
1275: s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
1276:
1.86 stevesk 1277: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
1.1 provos 1278:
1279: return (0);
1280:
1281: error:
1282: if (s != NULL)
1283: mm_session_close(s);
1284: buffer_put_int(m, 0);
1.59 avsm 1285: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1.1 provos 1286: return (0);
1287: }
1288:
1289: int
1.59 avsm 1290: mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1291: {
1292: Session *s;
1293: char *tty;
1294:
1.14 markus 1295: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1296:
1297: tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1298: if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
1299: mm_session_close(s);
1300: buffer_clear(m);
1.124 djm 1301: free(tty);
1.1 provos 1302: return (0);
1303: }
1304:
1.132 markus 1305: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 1306: int
1.59 avsm 1307: mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1308: {
1309: BIGNUM *p;
1310: int rsafail;
1311:
1312: /* Turn off permissions */
1.62 dtucker 1313: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
1.1 provos 1314:
1315: if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1316: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1317:
1318: buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
1319:
1320: rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
1321:
1322: buffer_clear(m);
1323: buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
1324: buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
1325:
1326: BN_clear_free(p);
1327:
1.59 avsm 1328: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
1.1 provos 1329:
1330: /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
1331: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
1332:
1333: return (0);
1334: }
1335:
1336: int
1.59 avsm 1337: mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1338: {
1339: int i;
1340:
1.14 markus 1341: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1342:
1343: if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
1.14 markus 1344: fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
1.1 provos 1345: for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1346: session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
1347:
1348: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
1349: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
1350:
1351: return (0);
1352: }
1353:
1354: int
1.59 avsm 1355: mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1356: {
1357: BIGNUM *client_n;
1358: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1359: u_char *blob = NULL;
1360: u_int blen = 0;
1.1 provos 1361: int allowed = 0;
1362:
1.14 markus 1363: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1364:
1.77 dtucker 1365: auth_method = "rsa";
1.12 markus 1366: if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
1.1 provos 1367: if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1368: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1369: buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
1370: allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
1371: BN_clear_free(client_n);
1372: }
1373: buffer_clear(m);
1374: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 1375: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 1376:
1377: /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
1378: monitor_reset_key_state();
1379:
1380: if (allowed && key != NULL) {
1381: key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */
1382: if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
1.14 markus 1383: fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1384: buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
1385:
1386: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1387: key_blob = blob;
1388: key_bloblen = blen;
1389: key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
1.33 markus 1390: }
1391: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 1392: key_free(key);
1393:
1.59 avsm 1394: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 1395:
1396: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
1397: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
1398: return (0);
1399: }
1400:
1401: int
1.59 avsm 1402: mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1403: {
1404: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1405: u_char *blob;
1406: u_int blen;
1.1 provos 1407:
1.14 markus 1408: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1409:
1410: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1411: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1412: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1413: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1414: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1415: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1416: fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 1417: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1418: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.101 djm 1419: if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
1420: fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
1421: key->type = KEY_RSA1;
1.1 provos 1422: if (ssh1_challenge)
1423: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1424: ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
1425:
1426: buffer_clear(m);
1427: buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
1428:
1.14 markus 1429: debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
1.59 avsm 1430: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
1.1 provos 1431:
1432: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
1.33 markus 1433:
1.124 djm 1434: free(blob);
1.33 markus 1435: key_free(key);
1.1 provos 1436: return (0);
1437: }
1438:
1439: int
1.59 avsm 1440: mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1441: {
1442: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1443: u_char *blob, *response;
1444: u_int blen, len;
1445: int success;
1.1 provos 1446:
1.14 markus 1447: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1448:
1449: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1450: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1451: if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
1.14 markus 1452: fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1453:
1454: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1455: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1456: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1457: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1458: fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
1.1 provos 1459: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1460: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.1 provos 1461: response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1462: if (len != 16)
1.14 markus 1463: fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1464: success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
1465:
1.124 djm 1466: free(blob);
1.1 provos 1467: key_free(key);
1.124 djm 1468: free(response);
1.1 provos 1469:
1470: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
1471:
1472: /* reset state */
1473: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1474: ssh1_challenge = NULL;
1475: monitor_reset_key_state();
1476:
1477: buffer_clear(m);
1478: buffer_put_int(m, success);
1.59 avsm 1479: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
1.1 provos 1480:
1481: return (success);
1482: }
1.132 markus 1483: #endif
1.1 provos 1484:
1485: int
1.59 avsm 1486: mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
1.1 provos 1487: {
1.11 mouring 1488: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1489: int res, status;
1490:
1.14 markus 1491: debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
1.1 provos 1492:
1493: /* The child is terminating */
1494: session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
1495:
1.11 mouring 1496: while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
1.9 markus 1497: if (errno != EINTR)
1498: exit(1);
1.1 provos 1499:
1500: res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
1501:
1502: /* Terminate process */
1.57 deraadt 1503: exit(res);
1.1 provos 1504: }
1505:
1506: void
1.11 mouring 1507: monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1508: {
1.139 markus 1509: struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
1510: struct kex *kex;
1511: int r;
1512:
1513: debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__);
1514: if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
1515: fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1516: sshbuf_free(child_state);
1517: child_state = NULL;
1518:
1519: if ((kex = ssh->kex) != 0) {
1520: /* XXX set callbacks */
1.147 ! djm 1521: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.139 markus 1522: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1523: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1524: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1525: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
1526: kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
1.147 ! djm 1527: #endif
1.139 markus 1528: kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
1529: kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
1530: kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
1531: kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1532: kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
1533: }
1.3 markus 1534:
1.1 provos 1535: /* Update with new address */
1.139 markus 1536: if (options.compression) {
1537: ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, pmonitor->m_zlib,
1538: (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
1539: (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
1540: }
1.1 provos 1541: }
1542:
1543: /* This function requries careful sanity checking */
1544:
1545: void
1.11 mouring 1546: mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1547: {
1.14 markus 1548: debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
1.1 provos 1549:
1.139 markus 1550: if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1551: fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
1552: mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
1553: child_state);
1554: debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__);
1.1 provos 1555: }
1556:
1557:
1558: /* XXX */
1559:
1560: #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
1.111 djm 1561: if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
1.1 provos 1562: fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
1563: } while (0)
1564:
1.2 markus 1565: static void
1.114 djm 1566: monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
1.3 markus 1567: {
1.114 djm 1568: int pair[2];
1569:
1.1 provos 1570: if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
1.114 djm 1571: fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1572: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1573: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1.114 djm 1574: mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1575: mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1576:
1577: if (do_logfds) {
1578: if (pipe(pair) == -1)
1579: fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1580: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1581: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1582: mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
1583: mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
1584: } else
1585: mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
1.1 provos 1586: }
1587:
1588: #define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
1589:
1590: struct monitor *
1591: monitor_init(void)
1592: {
1.139 markus 1593: struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
1.1 provos 1594: struct monitor *mon;
1595:
1.75 djm 1596: mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
1.1 provos 1597:
1.114 djm 1598: monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
1.1 provos 1599:
1600: /* Used to share zlib space across processes */
1.16 djm 1601: if (options.compression) {
1602: mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
1603: mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
1.1 provos 1604:
1.16 djm 1605: /* Compression needs to share state across borders */
1.139 markus 1606: ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, mon->m_zlib,
1607: (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
1608: (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
1.16 djm 1609: }
1.1 provos 1610:
1611: return mon;
1612: }
1613:
1614: void
1615: monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
1616: {
1.114 djm 1617: monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
1.1 provos 1618: }
1.46 markus 1619:
1620: #ifdef GSSAPI
1621: int
1.59 avsm 1622: mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1623: {
1.59 avsm 1624: gss_OID_desc goid;
1.46 markus 1625: OM_uint32 major;
1626: u_int len;
1627:
1.59 avsm 1628: goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1629: goid.length = len;
1.46 markus 1630:
1.59 avsm 1631: major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
1.46 markus 1632:
1.124 djm 1633: free(goid.elements);
1.46 markus 1634:
1635: buffer_clear(m);
1636: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1637:
1.64 stevesk 1638: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
1.46 markus 1639:
1640: /* Now we have a context, enable the step */
1641: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
1642:
1643: return (0);
1644: }
1645:
1646: int
1.59 avsm 1647: mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1648: {
1649: gss_buffer_desc in;
1650: gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1.64 stevesk 1651: OM_uint32 major, minor;
1.46 markus 1652: OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
1.47 deraadt 1653: u_int len;
1.46 markus 1654:
1.47 deraadt 1655: in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1656: in.length = len;
1.46 markus 1657: major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
1.124 djm 1658: free(in.value);
1.46 markus 1659:
1660: buffer_clear(m);
1661: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1662: buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
1663: buffer_put_int(m, flags);
1.59 avsm 1664: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
1.46 markus 1665:
1666: gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
1667:
1.64 stevesk 1668: if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1.46 markus 1669: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
1670: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.52 markus 1671: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
1.46 markus 1672: }
1673: return (0);
1674: }
1675:
1676: int
1.59 avsm 1677: mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.52 markus 1678: {
1679: gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
1680: OM_uint32 ret;
1681: u_int len;
1.54 djm 1682:
1.52 markus 1683: gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1684: gssbuf.length = len;
1685: mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1686: mic.length = len;
1.54 djm 1687:
1.52 markus 1688: ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
1.54 djm 1689:
1.124 djm 1690: free(gssbuf.value);
1691: free(mic.value);
1.54 djm 1692:
1.52 markus 1693: buffer_clear(m);
1694: buffer_put_int(m, ret);
1.54 djm 1695:
1.59 avsm 1696: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
1.54 djm 1697:
1.52 markus 1698: if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
1699: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.54 djm 1700:
1.52 markus 1701: return (0);
1702: }
1703:
1704: int
1.59 avsm 1705: mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1706: {
1707: int authenticated;
1708:
1709: authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
1710:
1711: buffer_clear(m);
1712: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
1713:
1714: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 1715: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
1.46 markus 1716:
1.64 stevesk 1717: auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
1.46 markus 1718:
1719: /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
1720: return (authenticated);
1721: }
1722: #endif /* GSSAPI */
1.100 djm 1723:
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