Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c, Revision 1.148
1.148 ! djm 1: /* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.147 2015/04/27 01:52:30 djm Exp $ */
1.1 provos 2: /*
3: * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
4: * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
5: * All rights reserved.
6: *
7: * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8: * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9: * are met:
10: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12: * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14: * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15: *
16: * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
17: * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
18: * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
19: * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
20: * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
21: * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
22: * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
23: * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
24: * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
25: * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
26: */
27:
1.67 stevesk 28: #include <sys/types.h>
29: #include <sys/wait.h>
1.79 stevesk 30: #include <sys/socket.h>
1.85 deraadt 31: #include <sys/tree.h>
1.95 djm 32: #include <sys/queue.h>
1.1 provos 33:
1.132 markus 34: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.78 stevesk 35: #include <openssl/dh.h>
1.132 markus 36: #endif
1.78 stevesk 37:
1.81 stevesk 38: #include <errno.h>
1.80 stevesk 39: #include <fcntl.h>
1.65 stevesk 40: #include <paths.h>
1.114 djm 41: #include <poll.h>
1.78 stevesk 42: #include <pwd.h>
1.68 stevesk 43: #include <signal.h>
1.134 djm 44: #include <stdarg.h>
1.142 millert 45: #include <stdint.h>
1.134 djm 46: #include <stdio.h>
1.84 stevesk 47: #include <stdlib.h>
1.82 stevesk 48: #include <string.h>
1.1 provos 49:
1.114 djm 50: #include "atomicio.h"
1.85 deraadt 51: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.1 provos 52: #include "ssh.h"
1.85 deraadt 53: #include "key.h"
54: #include "buffer.h"
55: #include "hostfile.h"
1.1 provos 56: #include "auth.h"
1.85 deraadt 57: #include "cipher.h"
1.1 provos 58: #include "kex.h"
59: #include "dh.h"
1.88 miod 60: #include <zlib.h>
1.1 provos 61: #include "packet.h"
62: #include "auth-options.h"
63: #include "sshpty.h"
64: #include "channels.h"
65: #include "session.h"
66: #include "sshlogin.h"
67: #include "canohost.h"
68: #include "log.h"
1.135 millert 69: #include "misc.h"
1.1 provos 70: #include "servconf.h"
71: #include "monitor.h"
72: #include "monitor_mm.h"
1.85 deraadt 73: #ifdef GSSAPI
74: #include "ssh-gss.h"
75: #endif
1.1 provos 76: #include "monitor_wrap.h"
77: #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
78: #include "compat.h"
79: #include "ssh2.h"
1.104 andreas 80: #include "roaming.h"
1.127 markus 81: #include "authfd.h"
1.137 djm 82: #include "match.h"
1.138 djm 83: #include "ssherr.h"
1.1 provos 84:
1.46 markus 85: #ifdef GSSAPI
86: static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
87: #endif
88:
1.1 provos 89: /* Imports */
90: extern ServerOptions options;
91: extern u_int utmp_len;
92: extern u_char session_id[];
93: extern Buffer auth_debug;
94: extern int auth_debug_init;
1.61 dtucker 95: extern Buffer loginmsg;
1.1 provos 96:
97: /* State exported from the child */
1.139 markus 98: static struct sshbuf *child_state;
1.1 provos 99:
1.43 markus 100: /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
1.1 provos 101:
102: int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
103: int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
104: int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
1.10 djm 105: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
1.1 provos 106: int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
107: int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
108: int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
109: int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
110: int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
111: int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
112: int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
113: int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
114: int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
115: int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
116: int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
117: int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
118: int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
119: int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
120: int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
121: int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
122:
1.46 markus 123: #ifdef GSSAPI
124: int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
125: int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
126: int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
1.52 markus 127: int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
1.46 markus 128: #endif
1.25 itojun 129:
1.114 djm 130: static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
131:
1.1 provos 132: static Authctxt *authctxt;
1.132 markus 133:
134: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 135: static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
1.132 markus 136: #endif
1.1 provos 137:
138: /* local state for key verify */
139: static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
140: static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
141: static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
1.26 markus 142: static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
143: static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
1.1 provos 144: static char *auth_method = "unknown";
1.119 djm 145: static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
1.44 markus 146: static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
1.13 markus 147: static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
1.40 markus 148: static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
1.1 provos 149:
150: struct mon_table {
151: enum monitor_reqtype type;
152: int flags;
153: int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
154: };
155:
156: #define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
157: #define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
158: #define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
1.77 dtucker 159: #define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
1.1 provos 160:
161: #define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
162:
163: #define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
164:
165: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
1.132 markus 166: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 167: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
1.132 markus 168: #endif
1.1 provos 169: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
170: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
171: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
1.10 djm 172: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
1.1 provos 173: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
174: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 175: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.1 provos 176: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
177: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
1.46 markus 178: #ifdef GSSAPI
179: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
180: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
181: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
1.52 markus 182: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
1.46 markus 183: #endif
1.1 provos 184: {0, 0, NULL}
185: };
186:
187: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
1.132 markus 188: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 189: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
1.132 markus 190: #endif
1.1 provos 191: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
192: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
193: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
194: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
195: {0, 0, NULL}
196: };
197:
198: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
1.132 markus 199: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 200: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
201: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
202: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
203: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
1.77 dtucker 204: {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
205: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
1.1 provos 206: {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
207: {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
208: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 209: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.132 markus 210: #endif
1.1 provos 211: {0, 0, NULL}
212: };
213:
214: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
1.132 markus 215: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 216: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
217: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
218: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
1.132 markus 219: #endif
1.1 provos 220: {0, 0, NULL}
221: };
222:
223: struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
224:
225: /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
226:
227: static void
228: monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
229: {
230: while (ent->f != NULL) {
231: if (ent->type == type) {
232: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
233: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
234: return;
235: }
236: ent++;
237: }
238: }
239:
240: static void
241: monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
242: {
243: struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
244:
245: while (ent->f != NULL) {
246: if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
247: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
248: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
249: }
250: ent++;
251: }
252: }
253:
1.50 markus 254: void
255: monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 256: {
257: struct mon_table *ent;
1.119 djm 258: int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
1.1 provos 259:
260: debug3("preauth child monitor started");
261:
1.114 djm 262: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
263: close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
264: pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
265:
1.50 markus 266: authctxt = _authctxt;
267: memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
268:
1.1 provos 269: if (compat20) {
270: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
271:
272: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
273: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
274: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
275: } else {
276: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
277:
278: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
279: }
280:
281: /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
282: while (!authenticated) {
1.119 djm 283: partial = 0;
1.77 dtucker 284: auth_method = "unknown";
1.119 djm 285: auth_submethod = NULL;
1.89 markus 286: authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
1.118 djm 287:
288: /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
289: if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
290: if (!compat20)
291: fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported"
292: "with SSH protocol 1");
293: if (authenticated &&
294: !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
1.122 markus 295: auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
1.118 djm 296: debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
297: auth_method);
298: authenticated = 0;
1.119 djm 299: partial = 1;
1.118 djm 300: }
301: }
302:
1.1 provos 303: if (authenticated) {
304: if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
305: fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
1.14 markus 306: __func__, ent->type);
1.1 provos 307: if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
308: !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
309: authenticated = 0;
310: }
1.77 dtucker 311: if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
1.119 djm 312: auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial,
1.125 djm 313: auth_method, auth_submethod);
1.1 provos 314: if (!authenticated)
315: authctxt->failures++;
316: }
317: }
318:
319: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 320: fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
1.77 dtucker 321: if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
322: fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
1.1 provos 323:
324: debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
1.14 markus 325: __func__, authctxt->user);
1.1 provos 326:
1.11 mouring 327: mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
1.120 markus 328:
329: /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
330: while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
331: ;
1.114 djm 332:
333: close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
334: close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
335: pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
1.1 provos 336: }
337:
1.40 markus 338: static void
339: monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
340: {
341: monitor_child_pid = pid;
342: }
343:
344: static void
1.59 avsm 345: monitor_child_handler(int sig)
1.40 markus 346: {
1.59 avsm 347: kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
1.40 markus 348: }
349:
1.1 provos 350: void
1.11 mouring 351: monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 352: {
1.114 djm 353: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
354: pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
355:
1.40 markus 356: monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
357: signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
358: signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
1.91 djm 359: signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
1.40 markus 360:
1.1 provos 361: if (compat20) {
362: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
363:
364: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
365: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
366: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
367: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
368: } else {
369: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
370: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
371: }
372: if (!no_pty_flag) {
373: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
374: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
375: }
376:
377: for (;;)
1.11 mouring 378: monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
1.1 provos 379: }
380:
381: void
1.11 mouring 382: monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 383: {
1.16 djm 384: if (options.compression) {
385: /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
386: mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
387: }
1.1 provos 388: }
389:
1.139 markus 390: /* Allocation functions for zlib */
391: static void *
392: mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
393: {
394: size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
395: void *address;
396:
1.142 millert 397: if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_MAX / size)
1.139 markus 398: fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
399:
400: address = mm_malloc(mm, len);
401:
402: return (address);
403: }
404:
405: static void
406: mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
407: {
408: mm_free(mm, address);
409: }
410:
1.114 djm 411: static int
412: monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
413: {
414: Buffer logmsg;
415: u_int len, level;
416: char *msg;
417:
418: buffer_init(&logmsg);
419:
420: /* Read length */
421: buffer_append_space(&logmsg, 4);
422: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
423: buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) {
424: if (errno == EPIPE) {
1.116 djm 425: buffer_free(&logmsg);
1.114 djm 426: debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
427: close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
428: pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
429: return -1;
430: }
431: fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
432: }
433: len = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
434: if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
435: fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len);
436:
437: /* Read severity, message */
438: buffer_clear(&logmsg);
439: buffer_append_space(&logmsg, len);
440: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
441: buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg))
442: fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
443:
444: /* Log it */
445: level = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
446: msg = buffer_get_string(&logmsg, NULL);
447: if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
448: fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
449: __func__, level);
450: do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
451:
452: buffer_free(&logmsg);
1.124 djm 453: free(msg);
1.114 djm 454:
455: return 0;
456: }
457:
1.1 provos 458: int
1.11 mouring 459: monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
1.1 provos 460: struct mon_table **pent)
461: {
462: Buffer m;
463: int ret;
464: u_char type;
1.114 djm 465: struct pollfd pfd[2];
466:
467: for (;;) {
1.130 tedu 468: memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
1.114 djm 469: pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
470: pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
471: pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
472: pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
1.115 djm 473: if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
474: if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
475: continue;
1.114 djm 476: fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.115 djm 477: }
1.114 djm 478: if (pfd[1].revents) {
479: /*
480: * Drain all log messages before processing next
481: * monitor request.
482: */
483: monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
484: continue;
485: }
486: if (pfd[0].revents)
487: break; /* Continues below */
488: }
1.1 provos 489:
490: buffer_init(&m);
491:
1.11 mouring 492: mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 493: type = buffer_get_char(&m);
494:
1.14 markus 495: debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 496:
497: while (ent->f != NULL) {
498: if (ent->type == type)
499: break;
500: ent++;
501: }
502:
503: if (ent->f != NULL) {
504: if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
1.14 markus 505: fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
1.1 provos 506: type);
1.11 mouring 507: ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 508: buffer_free(&m);
509:
510: /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
511: if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
1.14 markus 512: debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
1.1 provos 513: type);
514: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
515: }
516:
517: if (pent != NULL)
518: *pent = ent;
1.3 markus 519:
1.1 provos 520: return ret;
521: }
522:
1.14 markus 523: fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 524:
525: /* NOTREACHED */
526: return (-1);
527: }
528:
529: /* allowed key state */
530: static int
531: monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
532: {
533: /* make sure key is allowed */
534: if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
1.108 djm 535: timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
1.1 provos 536: return (0);
537: return (1);
538: }
539:
540: static void
541: monitor_reset_key_state(void)
542: {
543: /* reset state */
1.124 djm 544: free(key_blob);
545: free(hostbased_cuser);
546: free(hostbased_chost);
1.1 provos 547: key_blob = NULL;
548: key_bloblen = 0;
549: key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
550: hostbased_cuser = NULL;
551: hostbased_chost = NULL;
552: }
553:
1.132 markus 554: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 555: int
1.59 avsm 556: mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 557: {
558: DH *dh;
559: int min, want, max;
560:
561: min = buffer_get_int(m);
562: want = buffer_get_int(m);
563: max = buffer_get_int(m);
564:
565: debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 566: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 567: /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
568: if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
569: fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 570: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 571:
572: buffer_clear(m);
573:
574: dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
575: if (dh == NULL) {
576: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
577: return (0);
578: } else {
579: /* Send first bignum */
580: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
581: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
582: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
1.3 markus 583:
1.1 provos 584: DH_free(dh);
585: }
1.59 avsm 586: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
1.1 provos 587: return (0);
588: }
1.132 markus 589: #endif
1.1 provos 590:
591: int
1.59 avsm 592: mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 593: {
1.144 djm 594: struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
1.138 djm 595: extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */
596: struct sshkey *key;
1.144 djm 597: struct sshbuf *sigbuf;
1.1 provos 598: u_char *p;
599: u_char *signature;
1.138 djm 600: size_t datlen, siglen;
1.144 djm 601: int r, keyid, is_proof = 0;
1.145 djm 602: const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
1.3 markus 603:
1.14 markus 604: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 605:
1.138 djm 606: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
607: (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0)
608: fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1.1 provos 609:
1.69 djm 610: /*
1.110 djm 611: * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
612: * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
1.144 djm 613: *
614: * Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey
615: * proof.
616: *
617: * XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too?
618: * it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather
619: * than the full kex structure...
1.69 djm 620: */
1.144 djm 621: if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) {
622: /*
623: * Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what
624: * the client sent us.
625: */
626: if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */
627: fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu", __func__, datlen);
628: if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL)
629: fatal("%s: no hostkey for index %d", __func__, keyid);
630: if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
631: fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
1.145 djm 632: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
633: (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
1.144 djm 634: session_id2_len) != 0) ||
635: (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
636: fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key "
637: "proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
638: if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) ||
639: memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0)
640: fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
641: __func__, datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
642: sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
643: is_proof = 1;
644: }
1.1 provos 645:
1.13 markus 646: /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
647: if (session_id2_len == 0) {
648: session_id2_len = datlen;
649: session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
650: memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
651: }
652:
1.127 markus 653: if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
1.138 djm 654: if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen,
655: datafellows)) != 0)
656: fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s",
657: __func__, ssh_err(r));
1.144 djm 658: } else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
1.138 djm 659: auth_sock > 0) {
660: if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
661: p, datlen, datafellows)) != 0) {
662: fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
663: __func__, ssh_err(r));
664: }
1.127 markus 665: } else
1.14 markus 666: fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
1.1 provos 667:
1.144 djm 668: debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__,
669: is_proof ? "KEX" : "hostkey proof", signature, siglen);
1.1 provos 670:
1.138 djm 671: sshbuf_reset(m);
672: if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
673: fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1.1 provos 674:
1.124 djm 675: free(p);
676: free(signature);
1.1 provos 677:
1.59 avsm 678: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
1.1 provos 679:
680: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
681: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
682:
683: return (0);
684: }
685:
686: /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
687:
688: int
1.59 avsm 689: mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 690: {
1.60 dtucker 691: char *username;
1.1 provos 692: struct passwd *pwent;
693: int allowed = 0;
1.113 djm 694: u_int i;
1.3 markus 695:
1.14 markus 696: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 697:
698: if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
1.14 markus 699: fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
1.1 provos 700:
1.60 dtucker 701: username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.1 provos 702:
1.60 dtucker 703: pwent = getpwnamallow(username);
1.1 provos 704:
1.60 dtucker 705: authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
706: setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
1.124 djm 707: free(username);
1.1 provos 708:
709: buffer_clear(m);
710:
711: if (pwent == NULL) {
712: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
1.53 djm 713: authctxt->pw = fakepw();
1.1 provos 714: goto out;
715: }
716:
717: allowed = 1;
1.4 markus 718: authctxt->pw = pwent;
1.1 provos 719: authctxt->valid = 1;
720:
721: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
722: buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
723: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
724: buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
725: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
726: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
727: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
728: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
1.94 dtucker 729:
730: out:
1.90 dtucker 731: buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
1.112 djm 732:
733: #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
734: if (options.x != NULL) \
735: buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x); \
736: } while (0)
1.113 djm 737: #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
738: for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) \
739: buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x[i]); \
740: } while (0)
1.112 djm 741: /* See comment in servconf.h */
742: COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
743: #undef M_CP_STROPT
1.113 djm 744: #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
1.118 djm 745:
746: /* Create valid auth method lists */
747: if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
748: /*
749: * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
750: * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
751: * authentication to succeed.
752: */
753: debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
754: }
755:
1.14 markus 756: debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
1.59 avsm 757: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
1.1 provos 758:
759: /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
760: if (!compat20)
761: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
1.10 djm 762: else {
1.1 provos 763: /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
764: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
1.10 djm 765: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
766: }
767:
768: return (0);
769: }
770:
1.59 avsm 771: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.10 djm 772: {
773: char *banner;
774:
775: buffer_clear(m);
776: banner = auth2_read_banner();
777: buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
1.59 avsm 778: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
1.124 djm 779: free(banner);
1.1 provos 780:
781: return (0);
782: }
783:
784: int
1.59 avsm 785: mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 786: {
787: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
788:
789: authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
790: authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.6 stevesk 791: debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
1.14 markus 792: __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
1.6 stevesk 793:
1.1 provos 794: if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
1.124 djm 795: free(authctxt->style);
1.1 provos 796: authctxt->style = NULL;
797: }
798:
799: return (0);
800: }
801:
802: int
1.59 avsm 803: mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 804: {
805: static int call_count;
806: char *passwd;
1.22 stevesk 807: int authenticated;
808: u_int plen;
1.1 provos 809:
810: passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
811: /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
1.12 markus 812: authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
1.48 markus 813: auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
1.131 djm 814: explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
1.124 djm 815: free(passwd);
1.1 provos 816:
817: buffer_clear(m);
818: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
819:
1.14 markus 820: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 821: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
1.1 provos 822:
823: call_count++;
824: if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
825: auth_method = "none";
826: else
827: auth_method = "password";
828:
829: /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
830: return (authenticated);
831: }
832:
833: int
1.59 avsm 834: mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 835: {
836: char *name, *infotxt;
837: u_int numprompts;
838: u_int *echo_on;
839: char **prompts;
1.31 markus 840: u_int success;
1.1 provos 841:
1.31 markus 842: success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
843: &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
1.1 provos 844:
845: buffer_clear(m);
1.31 markus 846: buffer_put_int(m, success);
847: if (success)
1.1 provos 848: buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
849:
1.31 markus 850: debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
1.59 avsm 851: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
1.1 provos 852:
1.31 markus 853: if (success) {
1.124 djm 854: free(name);
855: free(infotxt);
856: free(prompts);
857: free(echo_on);
1.1 provos 858: }
859:
860: return (0);
861: }
862:
863: int
1.59 avsm 864: mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 865: {
866: char *response;
867: int authok;
868:
869: if (authctxt->as == 0)
1.14 markus 870: fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
1.1 provos 871:
872: response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.12 markus 873: authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
874: auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
1.1 provos 875: authctxt->as = NULL;
1.14 markus 876: debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
1.124 djm 877: free(response);
1.1 provos 878:
879: buffer_clear(m);
880: buffer_put_int(m, authok);
881:
1.14 markus 882: debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
1.59 avsm 883: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
1.1 provos 884:
1.122 markus 885: if (compat20) {
886: auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
887: auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
888: } else
1.118 djm 889: auth_method = "bsdauth";
1.1 provos 890:
891: return (authok != 0);
892: }
893:
894: int
1.59 avsm 895: mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 896: {
897: Key *key;
1.26 markus 898: char *cuser, *chost;
899: u_char *blob;
1.148 ! djm 900: u_int bloblen, pubkey_auth_attempt;
1.1 provos 901: enum mm_keytype type = 0;
902: int allowed = 0;
903:
1.14 markus 904: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.3 markus 905:
1.1 provos 906: type = buffer_get_int(m);
907: cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
908: chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
909: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1.148 ! djm 910: pubkey_auth_attempt = buffer_get_int(m);
1.1 provos 911:
912: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
913:
914: if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
915: (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
1.14 markus 916: fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 917:
1.14 markus 918: debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
1.1 provos 919:
1.51 djm 920: if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
1.137 djm 921: /* These should not make it past the privsep child */
922: if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
923: (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
924: fatal("%s: passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key", __func__);
925:
1.63 deraadt 926: switch (type) {
1.1 provos 927: case MM_USERKEY:
1.12 markus 928: allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
1.136 djm 929: !auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key) &&
1.137 djm 930: match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
931: options.pubkey_key_types,
932: strlen(options.pubkey_key_types), 0) == 1 &&
1.148 ! djm 933: user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key,
! 934: pubkey_auth_attempt);
1.126 djm 935: pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
1.77 dtucker 936: auth_method = "publickey";
1.148 ! djm 937: if (options.pubkey_authentication &&
! 938: (!pubkey_auth_attempt || allowed != 1))
1.97 dtucker 939: auth_clear_options();
1.1 provos 940: break;
941: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1.12 markus 942: allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
1.137 djm 943: match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
944: options.hostbased_key_types,
945: strlen(options.hostbased_key_types), 0) == 1 &&
1.12 markus 946: hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 947: cuser, chost, key);
1.126 djm 948: pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
949: "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
950: cuser, chost);
1.77 dtucker 951: auth_method = "hostbased";
1.1 provos 952: break;
1.132 markus 953: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 954: case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
955: key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
1.12 markus 956: allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
957: auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 958: cuser, chost, key);
1.97 dtucker 959: if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
960: auth_clear_options();
1.77 dtucker 961: auth_method = "rsa";
1.1 provos 962: break;
1.132 markus 963: #endif
1.1 provos 964: default:
1.14 markus 965: fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 966: break;
967: }
1.33 markus 968: }
969: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 970: key_free(key);
971:
972: /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
973: monitor_reset_key_state();
974:
975: if (allowed) {
976: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
977: key_blob = blob;
978: key_bloblen = bloblen;
979: key_blobtype = type;
980: hostbased_cuser = cuser;
981: hostbased_chost = chost;
1.72 djm 982: } else {
1.77 dtucker 983: /* Log failed attempt */
1.125 djm 984: auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
1.124 djm 985: free(blob);
986: free(cuser);
987: free(chost);
1.1 provos 988: }
989:
990: debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
1.98 dtucker 991: __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
1.1 provos 992:
993: buffer_clear(m);
994: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 995: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 996:
1.59 avsm 997: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 998:
999: if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1000: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
1001:
1002: return (0);
1003: }
1004:
1005: static int
1006: monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
1007: {
1008: Buffer b;
1.121 djm 1009: char *p, *userstyle;
1.1 provos 1010: u_int len;
1011: int fail = 0;
1012:
1013: buffer_init(&b);
1014: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 1015:
1.1 provos 1016: if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
1.13 markus 1017: p = buffer_ptr(&b);
1018: len = buffer_len(&b);
1019: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1020: (len < session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1021: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.13 markus 1022: fail++;
1.1 provos 1023: buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
1024: } else {
1.13 markus 1025: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
1026: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1027: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1028: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 1029: fail++;
1.124 djm 1030: free(p);
1.1 provos 1031: }
1032: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1033: fail++;
1.121 djm 1034: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1035: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1036: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1037: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1038: if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 1039: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.121 djm 1040: userstyle, p);
1.1 provos 1041: fail++;
1042: }
1.124 djm 1043: free(userstyle);
1044: free(p);
1.1 provos 1045: buffer_skip_string(&b);
1046: if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
1047: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
1048: fail++;
1049: } else {
1.121 djm 1050: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1.1 provos 1051: if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
1052: fail++;
1.124 djm 1053: free(p);
1.1 provos 1054: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
1055: fail++;
1056: buffer_skip_string(&b);
1057: }
1058: buffer_skip_string(&b);
1059: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1060: fail++;
1061: buffer_free(&b);
1062: return (fail == 0);
1063: }
1064:
1065: static int
1.26 markus 1066: monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
1067: char *chost)
1.1 provos 1068: {
1069: Buffer b;
1.121 djm 1070: char *p, *userstyle;
1.1 provos 1071: u_int len;
1072: int fail = 0;
1073:
1074: buffer_init(&b);
1075: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 1076:
1.13 markus 1077: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
1078: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1079: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1080: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 1081: fail++;
1.124 djm 1082: free(p);
1.13 markus 1083:
1.1 provos 1084: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1085: fail++;
1.121 djm 1086: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1087: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1088: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1089: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1090: if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 1091: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.121 djm 1092: userstyle, p);
1.1 provos 1093: fail++;
1094: }
1.121 djm 1095: free(userstyle);
1.124 djm 1096: free(p);
1.1 provos 1097: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */
1.121 djm 1098: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1.1 provos 1099: if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
1100: fail++;
1.124 djm 1101: free(p);
1.1 provos 1102: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkalg */
1103: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkblob */
1104:
1105: /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
1106: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1107: if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
1108: p[len - 1] = '\0';
1109: if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
1110: fail++;
1.124 djm 1111: free(p);
1.1 provos 1112:
1113: /* verify client user */
1114: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1115: if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
1116: fail++;
1.124 djm 1117: free(p);
1.1 provos 1118:
1119: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1120: fail++;
1121: buffer_free(&b);
1122: return (fail == 0);
1123: }
1124:
1125: int
1.59 avsm 1126: mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1127: {
1128: Key *key;
1129: u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
1130: u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
1131: int verified = 0;
1132: int valid_data = 0;
1133:
1134: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1135: signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
1136: data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
1137:
1138: if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
1.8 mouring 1139: !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
1.14 markus 1140: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1141:
1142: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1143: if (key == NULL)
1.14 markus 1144: fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 1145:
1146: switch (key_blobtype) {
1147: case MM_USERKEY:
1148: valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
1149: break;
1150: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1151: valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
1152: hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
1153: break;
1154: default:
1155: valid_data = 0;
1156: break;
1157: }
1158: if (!valid_data)
1.14 markus 1159: fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 1160:
1161: verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
1162: debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
1.89 markus 1163: __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
1.1 provos 1164:
1.136 djm 1165: /* If auth was successful then record key to ensure it isn't reused */
1166: if (verified == 1)
1167: auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
1168: else
1169: key_free(key);
1170:
1.124 djm 1171: free(blob);
1172: free(signature);
1173: free(data);
1.1 provos 1174:
1.17 stevesk 1175: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
1176:
1.1 provos 1177: monitor_reset_key_state();
1.3 markus 1178:
1.1 provos 1179: buffer_clear(m);
1180: buffer_put_int(m, verified);
1.59 avsm 1181: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
1.1 provos 1182:
1.89 markus 1183: return (verified == 1);
1.1 provos 1184: }
1185:
1.2 markus 1186: static void
1.1 provos 1187: mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
1188: {
1189: socklen_t fromlen;
1190: struct sockaddr_storage from;
1.146 djm 1191:
1192: if (options.use_login)
1193: return;
1.1 provos 1194:
1195: /*
1196: * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
1197: * the address be 0.0.0.0.
1198: */
1199: memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
1.24 stevesk 1200: fromlen = sizeof(from);
1.1 provos 1201: if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
1202: if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
1.74 deraadt 1203: (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
1.1 provos 1204: debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1.50 markus 1205: cleanup_exit(255);
1.1 provos 1206: }
1207: }
1208: /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
1209: record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
1.42 markus 1210: get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
1.24 stevesk 1211: (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
1.1 provos 1212: }
1213:
1214: static void
1215: mm_session_close(Session *s)
1216: {
1.41 djm 1217: debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
1.1 provos 1218: if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1.86 stevesk 1219: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
1.1 provos 1220: session_pty_cleanup2(s);
1221: }
1.96 djm 1222: session_unused(s->self);
1.1 provos 1223: }
1224:
1225: int
1.59 avsm 1226: mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1227: {
1.11 mouring 1228: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1229: Session *s;
1230: int res, fd0;
1231:
1.14 markus 1232: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1233:
1234: buffer_clear(m);
1235: s = session_new();
1236: if (s == NULL)
1237: goto error;
1238: s->authctxt = authctxt;
1239: s->pw = authctxt->pw;
1.11 mouring 1240: s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
1.1 provos 1241: res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
1242: if (res == 0)
1243: goto error;
1244: pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
1245:
1246: buffer_put_int(m, 1);
1247: buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
1248:
1249: /* We need to trick ttyslot */
1250: if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
1.14 markus 1251: fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
1.1 provos 1252:
1253: mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
1254:
1255: /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
1256: close(0);
1.61 dtucker 1257:
1258: /* send messages generated by record_login */
1259: buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
1260: buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
1261:
1262: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1263:
1.92 djm 1264: if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
1265: mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
1266: fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1267:
1268: /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
1269: if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
1.14 markus 1270: fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1271: if (fd0 != 0)
1.14 markus 1272: error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
1.1 provos 1273:
1274: /* slave is not needed */
1275: close(s->ttyfd);
1276: s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
1277: /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
1278: s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
1279:
1.86 stevesk 1280: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
1.1 provos 1281:
1282: return (0);
1283:
1284: error:
1285: if (s != NULL)
1286: mm_session_close(s);
1287: buffer_put_int(m, 0);
1.59 avsm 1288: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1.1 provos 1289: return (0);
1290: }
1291:
1292: int
1.59 avsm 1293: mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1294: {
1295: Session *s;
1296: char *tty;
1297:
1.14 markus 1298: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1299:
1300: tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1301: if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
1302: mm_session_close(s);
1303: buffer_clear(m);
1.124 djm 1304: free(tty);
1.1 provos 1305: return (0);
1306: }
1307:
1.132 markus 1308: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 1309: int
1.59 avsm 1310: mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1311: {
1312: BIGNUM *p;
1313: int rsafail;
1314:
1315: /* Turn off permissions */
1.62 dtucker 1316: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
1.1 provos 1317:
1318: if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1319: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1320:
1321: buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
1322:
1323: rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
1324:
1325: buffer_clear(m);
1326: buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
1327: buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
1328:
1329: BN_clear_free(p);
1330:
1.59 avsm 1331: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
1.1 provos 1332:
1333: /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
1334: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
1335:
1336: return (0);
1337: }
1338:
1339: int
1.59 avsm 1340: mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1341: {
1342: int i;
1343:
1.14 markus 1344: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1345:
1346: if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
1.14 markus 1347: fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
1.1 provos 1348: for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1349: session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
1350:
1351: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
1352: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
1353:
1354: return (0);
1355: }
1356:
1357: int
1.59 avsm 1358: mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1359: {
1360: BIGNUM *client_n;
1361: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1362: u_char *blob = NULL;
1363: u_int blen = 0;
1.1 provos 1364: int allowed = 0;
1365:
1.14 markus 1366: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1367:
1.77 dtucker 1368: auth_method = "rsa";
1.12 markus 1369: if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
1.1 provos 1370: if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1371: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1372: buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
1373: allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
1374: BN_clear_free(client_n);
1375: }
1376: buffer_clear(m);
1377: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 1378: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 1379:
1380: /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
1381: monitor_reset_key_state();
1382:
1383: if (allowed && key != NULL) {
1384: key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */
1385: if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
1.14 markus 1386: fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1387: buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
1388:
1389: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1390: key_blob = blob;
1391: key_bloblen = blen;
1392: key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
1.33 markus 1393: }
1394: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 1395: key_free(key);
1396:
1.59 avsm 1397: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 1398:
1399: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
1400: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
1401: return (0);
1402: }
1403:
1404: int
1.59 avsm 1405: mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1406: {
1407: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1408: u_char *blob;
1409: u_int blen;
1.1 provos 1410:
1.14 markus 1411: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1412:
1413: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1414: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1415: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1416: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1417: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1418: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1419: fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 1420: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1421: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.101 djm 1422: if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
1423: fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
1424: key->type = KEY_RSA1;
1.1 provos 1425: if (ssh1_challenge)
1426: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1427: ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
1428:
1429: buffer_clear(m);
1430: buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
1431:
1.14 markus 1432: debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
1.59 avsm 1433: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
1.1 provos 1434:
1435: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
1.33 markus 1436:
1.124 djm 1437: free(blob);
1.33 markus 1438: key_free(key);
1.1 provos 1439: return (0);
1440: }
1441:
1442: int
1.59 avsm 1443: mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1444: {
1445: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1446: u_char *blob, *response;
1447: u_int blen, len;
1448: int success;
1.1 provos 1449:
1.14 markus 1450: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1451:
1452: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1453: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1454: if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
1.14 markus 1455: fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1456:
1457: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1458: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1459: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1460: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1461: fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
1.1 provos 1462: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1463: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.1 provos 1464: response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1465: if (len != 16)
1.14 markus 1466: fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1467: success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
1468:
1.124 djm 1469: free(blob);
1.1 provos 1470: key_free(key);
1.124 djm 1471: free(response);
1.1 provos 1472:
1473: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
1474:
1475: /* reset state */
1476: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1477: ssh1_challenge = NULL;
1478: monitor_reset_key_state();
1479:
1480: buffer_clear(m);
1481: buffer_put_int(m, success);
1.59 avsm 1482: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
1.1 provos 1483:
1484: return (success);
1485: }
1.132 markus 1486: #endif
1.1 provos 1487:
1488: int
1.59 avsm 1489: mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
1.1 provos 1490: {
1.11 mouring 1491: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1492: int res, status;
1493:
1.14 markus 1494: debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
1.1 provos 1495:
1496: /* The child is terminating */
1497: session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
1498:
1.11 mouring 1499: while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
1.9 markus 1500: if (errno != EINTR)
1501: exit(1);
1.1 provos 1502:
1503: res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
1504:
1505: /* Terminate process */
1.57 deraadt 1506: exit(res);
1.1 provos 1507: }
1508:
1509: void
1.11 mouring 1510: monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1511: {
1.139 markus 1512: struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
1513: struct kex *kex;
1514: int r;
1515:
1516: debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__);
1517: if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
1518: fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1519: sshbuf_free(child_state);
1520: child_state = NULL;
1521:
1522: if ((kex = ssh->kex) != 0) {
1523: /* XXX set callbacks */
1.147 djm 1524: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.139 markus 1525: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1526: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1527: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1528: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
1529: kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
1.147 djm 1530: #endif
1.139 markus 1531: kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
1532: kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
1533: kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
1534: kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1535: kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
1536: }
1.3 markus 1537:
1.1 provos 1538: /* Update with new address */
1.139 markus 1539: if (options.compression) {
1540: ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, pmonitor->m_zlib,
1541: (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
1542: (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
1543: }
1.1 provos 1544: }
1545:
1546: /* This function requries careful sanity checking */
1547:
1548: void
1.11 mouring 1549: mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1550: {
1.14 markus 1551: debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
1.1 provos 1552:
1.139 markus 1553: if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1554: fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
1555: mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
1556: child_state);
1557: debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__);
1.1 provos 1558: }
1559:
1560:
1561: /* XXX */
1562:
1563: #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
1.111 djm 1564: if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
1.1 provos 1565: fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
1566: } while (0)
1567:
1.2 markus 1568: static void
1.114 djm 1569: monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
1.3 markus 1570: {
1.114 djm 1571: int pair[2];
1572:
1.1 provos 1573: if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
1.114 djm 1574: fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1575: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1576: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1.114 djm 1577: mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1578: mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1579:
1580: if (do_logfds) {
1581: if (pipe(pair) == -1)
1582: fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1583: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1584: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1585: mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
1586: mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
1587: } else
1588: mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
1.1 provos 1589: }
1590:
1591: #define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
1592:
1593: struct monitor *
1594: monitor_init(void)
1595: {
1.139 markus 1596: struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
1.1 provos 1597: struct monitor *mon;
1598:
1.75 djm 1599: mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
1.1 provos 1600:
1.114 djm 1601: monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
1.1 provos 1602:
1603: /* Used to share zlib space across processes */
1.16 djm 1604: if (options.compression) {
1605: mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
1606: mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
1.1 provos 1607:
1.16 djm 1608: /* Compression needs to share state across borders */
1.139 markus 1609: ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, mon->m_zlib,
1610: (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
1611: (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
1.16 djm 1612: }
1.1 provos 1613:
1614: return mon;
1615: }
1616:
1617: void
1618: monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
1619: {
1.114 djm 1620: monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
1.1 provos 1621: }
1.46 markus 1622:
1623: #ifdef GSSAPI
1624: int
1.59 avsm 1625: mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1626: {
1.59 avsm 1627: gss_OID_desc goid;
1.46 markus 1628: OM_uint32 major;
1629: u_int len;
1630:
1.59 avsm 1631: goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1632: goid.length = len;
1.46 markus 1633:
1.59 avsm 1634: major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
1.46 markus 1635:
1.124 djm 1636: free(goid.elements);
1.46 markus 1637:
1638: buffer_clear(m);
1639: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1640:
1.64 stevesk 1641: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
1.46 markus 1642:
1643: /* Now we have a context, enable the step */
1644: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
1645:
1646: return (0);
1647: }
1648:
1649: int
1.59 avsm 1650: mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1651: {
1652: gss_buffer_desc in;
1653: gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1.64 stevesk 1654: OM_uint32 major, minor;
1.46 markus 1655: OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
1.47 deraadt 1656: u_int len;
1.46 markus 1657:
1.47 deraadt 1658: in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1659: in.length = len;
1.46 markus 1660: major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
1.124 djm 1661: free(in.value);
1.46 markus 1662:
1663: buffer_clear(m);
1664: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1665: buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
1666: buffer_put_int(m, flags);
1.59 avsm 1667: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
1.46 markus 1668:
1669: gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
1670:
1.64 stevesk 1671: if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1.46 markus 1672: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
1673: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.52 markus 1674: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
1.46 markus 1675: }
1676: return (0);
1677: }
1678:
1679: int
1.59 avsm 1680: mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.52 markus 1681: {
1682: gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
1683: OM_uint32 ret;
1684: u_int len;
1.54 djm 1685:
1.52 markus 1686: gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1687: gssbuf.length = len;
1688: mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1689: mic.length = len;
1.54 djm 1690:
1.52 markus 1691: ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
1.54 djm 1692:
1.124 djm 1693: free(gssbuf.value);
1694: free(mic.value);
1.54 djm 1695:
1.52 markus 1696: buffer_clear(m);
1697: buffer_put_int(m, ret);
1.54 djm 1698:
1.59 avsm 1699: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
1.54 djm 1700:
1.52 markus 1701: if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
1702: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.54 djm 1703:
1.52 markus 1704: return (0);
1705: }
1706:
1707: int
1.59 avsm 1708: mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1709: {
1710: int authenticated;
1711:
1712: authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
1713:
1714: buffer_clear(m);
1715: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
1716:
1717: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 1718: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
1.46 markus 1719:
1.64 stevesk 1720: auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
1.46 markus 1721:
1722: /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
1723: return (authenticated);
1724: }
1725: #endif /* GSSAPI */
1.100 djm 1726:
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