Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c, Revision 1.154
1.154 ! mmcc 1: /* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.153 2015/09/04 04:44:08 djm Exp $ */
1.1 provos 2: /*
3: * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
4: * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
5: * All rights reserved.
6: *
7: * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8: * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9: * are met:
10: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12: * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14: * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15: *
16: * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
17: * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
18: * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
19: * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
20: * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
21: * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
22: * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
23: * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
24: * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
25: * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
26: */
27:
1.67 stevesk 28: #include <sys/types.h>
29: #include <sys/wait.h>
1.79 stevesk 30: #include <sys/socket.h>
1.85 deraadt 31: #include <sys/tree.h>
1.95 djm 32: #include <sys/queue.h>
1.1 provos 33:
1.132 markus 34: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.78 stevesk 35: #include <openssl/dh.h>
1.132 markus 36: #endif
1.78 stevesk 37:
1.81 stevesk 38: #include <errno.h>
1.80 stevesk 39: #include <fcntl.h>
1.65 stevesk 40: #include <paths.h>
1.114 djm 41: #include <poll.h>
1.78 stevesk 42: #include <pwd.h>
1.68 stevesk 43: #include <signal.h>
1.134 djm 44: #include <stdarg.h>
1.142 millert 45: #include <stdint.h>
1.134 djm 46: #include <stdio.h>
1.84 stevesk 47: #include <stdlib.h>
1.82 stevesk 48: #include <string.h>
1.1 provos 49:
1.114 djm 50: #include "atomicio.h"
1.85 deraadt 51: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.1 provos 52: #include "ssh.h"
1.85 deraadt 53: #include "key.h"
54: #include "buffer.h"
55: #include "hostfile.h"
1.1 provos 56: #include "auth.h"
1.85 deraadt 57: #include "cipher.h"
1.1 provos 58: #include "kex.h"
59: #include "dh.h"
1.88 miod 60: #include <zlib.h>
1.1 provos 61: #include "packet.h"
62: #include "auth-options.h"
63: #include "sshpty.h"
64: #include "channels.h"
65: #include "session.h"
66: #include "sshlogin.h"
67: #include "canohost.h"
68: #include "log.h"
1.135 millert 69: #include "misc.h"
1.1 provos 70: #include "servconf.h"
71: #include "monitor.h"
72: #include "monitor_mm.h"
1.85 deraadt 73: #ifdef GSSAPI
74: #include "ssh-gss.h"
75: #endif
1.1 provos 76: #include "monitor_wrap.h"
77: #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
78: #include "compat.h"
79: #include "ssh2.h"
1.104 andreas 80: #include "roaming.h"
1.127 markus 81: #include "authfd.h"
1.137 djm 82: #include "match.h"
1.138 djm 83: #include "ssherr.h"
1.1 provos 84:
1.46 markus 85: #ifdef GSSAPI
86: static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
87: #endif
88:
1.1 provos 89: /* Imports */
90: extern ServerOptions options;
91: extern u_int utmp_len;
92: extern u_char session_id[];
93: extern Buffer auth_debug;
94: extern int auth_debug_init;
1.61 dtucker 95: extern Buffer loginmsg;
1.1 provos 96:
97: /* State exported from the child */
1.139 markus 98: static struct sshbuf *child_state;
1.1 provos 99:
1.43 markus 100: /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
1.1 provos 101:
102: int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
103: int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
104: int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
1.10 djm 105: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
1.1 provos 106: int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
107: int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
108: int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
109: int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
110: int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
111: int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
112: int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
113: int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
114: int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
115: int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
116: int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
117: int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
118: int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
119: int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
120: int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
121: int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
122:
1.46 markus 123: #ifdef GSSAPI
124: int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
125: int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
126: int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
1.52 markus 127: int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
1.46 markus 128: #endif
1.25 itojun 129:
1.114 djm 130: static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
131:
1.1 provos 132: static Authctxt *authctxt;
1.132 markus 133:
134: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 135: static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
1.132 markus 136: #endif
1.1 provos 137:
138: /* local state for key verify */
139: static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
140: static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
141: static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
1.26 markus 142: static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
143: static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
1.1 provos 144: static char *auth_method = "unknown";
1.119 djm 145: static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
1.44 markus 146: static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
1.13 markus 147: static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
1.40 markus 148: static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
1.1 provos 149:
150: struct mon_table {
151: enum monitor_reqtype type;
152: int flags;
153: int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
154: };
155:
156: #define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
157: #define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
158: #define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
1.77 dtucker 159: #define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
1.1 provos 160:
161: #define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
162:
163: #define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
164:
165: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
1.132 markus 166: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 167: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
1.132 markus 168: #endif
1.1 provos 169: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
170: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
171: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
1.10 djm 172: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
1.1 provos 173: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
174: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 175: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.1 provos 176: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
177: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
1.46 markus 178: #ifdef GSSAPI
179: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
180: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
181: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
1.52 markus 182: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
1.46 markus 183: #endif
1.1 provos 184: {0, 0, NULL}
185: };
186:
187: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
1.132 markus 188: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 189: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
1.132 markus 190: #endif
1.1 provos 191: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
192: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
193: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
194: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
195: {0, 0, NULL}
196: };
197:
198: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
1.132 markus 199: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 200: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
201: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
202: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
203: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
1.77 dtucker 204: {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
205: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
1.1 provos 206: {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
207: {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
208: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 209: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.132 markus 210: #endif
1.1 provos 211: {0, 0, NULL}
212: };
213:
214: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
1.132 markus 215: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 216: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
217: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
218: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
1.132 markus 219: #endif
1.1 provos 220: {0, 0, NULL}
221: };
222:
223: struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
224:
225: /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
226:
227: static void
228: monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
229: {
230: while (ent->f != NULL) {
231: if (ent->type == type) {
232: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
233: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
234: return;
235: }
236: ent++;
237: }
238: }
239:
240: static void
241: monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
242: {
243: struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
244:
245: while (ent->f != NULL) {
246: if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
247: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
248: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
249: }
250: ent++;
251: }
252: }
253:
1.50 markus 254: void
255: monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 256: {
257: struct mon_table *ent;
1.119 djm 258: int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
1.1 provos 259:
260: debug3("preauth child monitor started");
261:
1.114 djm 262: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
263: close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
264: pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
265:
1.50 markus 266: authctxt = _authctxt;
267: memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
268:
1.1 provos 269: if (compat20) {
270: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
271:
272: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
273: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
274: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
275: } else {
276: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
277:
278: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
279: }
280:
281: /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
282: while (!authenticated) {
1.119 djm 283: partial = 0;
1.77 dtucker 284: auth_method = "unknown";
1.119 djm 285: auth_submethod = NULL;
1.89 markus 286: authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
1.118 djm 287:
288: /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
289: if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
290: if (!compat20)
291: fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported"
292: "with SSH protocol 1");
293: if (authenticated &&
294: !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
1.122 markus 295: auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
1.118 djm 296: debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
297: auth_method);
298: authenticated = 0;
1.119 djm 299: partial = 1;
1.118 djm 300: }
301: }
302:
1.1 provos 303: if (authenticated) {
304: if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
305: fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
1.14 markus 306: __func__, ent->type);
1.1 provos 307: if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
308: !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
309: authenticated = 0;
310: }
1.77 dtucker 311: if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
1.119 djm 312: auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial,
1.125 djm 313: auth_method, auth_submethod);
1.150 djm 314: if (!partial && !authenticated)
1.1 provos 315: authctxt->failures++;
316: }
317: }
318:
319: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 320: fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
1.77 dtucker 321: if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
322: fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
1.1 provos 323:
324: debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
1.14 markus 325: __func__, authctxt->user);
1.1 provos 326:
1.11 mouring 327: mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
1.120 markus 328:
329: /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
330: while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
331: ;
1.114 djm 332:
333: close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
334: close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
335: pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
1.1 provos 336: }
337:
1.40 markus 338: static void
339: monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
340: {
341: monitor_child_pid = pid;
342: }
343:
344: static void
1.59 avsm 345: monitor_child_handler(int sig)
1.40 markus 346: {
1.59 avsm 347: kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
1.40 markus 348: }
349:
1.1 provos 350: void
1.11 mouring 351: monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 352: {
1.114 djm 353: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
354: pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
355:
1.40 markus 356: monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
357: signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
358: signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
1.91 djm 359: signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
1.40 markus 360:
1.1 provos 361: if (compat20) {
362: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
363:
364: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
365: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
366: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
367: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
368: } else {
369: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
370: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
371: }
372: if (!no_pty_flag) {
373: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
374: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
375: }
376:
377: for (;;)
1.11 mouring 378: monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
1.1 provos 379: }
380:
381: void
1.11 mouring 382: monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 383: {
1.16 djm 384: if (options.compression) {
385: /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
386: mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
387: }
1.1 provos 388: }
389:
1.139 markus 390: /* Allocation functions for zlib */
391: static void *
392: mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
393: {
1.151 deraadt 394: if (size == 0 || ncount == 0 || ncount > SIZE_MAX / size)
1.139 markus 395: fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
396:
1.151 deraadt 397: return mm_malloc(mm, size * ncount);
1.139 markus 398: }
399:
400: static void
401: mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
402: {
403: mm_free(mm, address);
404: }
405:
1.114 djm 406: static int
407: monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
408: {
409: Buffer logmsg;
410: u_int len, level;
411: char *msg;
412:
413: buffer_init(&logmsg);
414:
415: /* Read length */
416: buffer_append_space(&logmsg, 4);
417: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
418: buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) {
419: if (errno == EPIPE) {
1.116 djm 420: buffer_free(&logmsg);
1.114 djm 421: debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
422: close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
423: pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
424: return -1;
425: }
426: fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
427: }
428: len = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
429: if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
430: fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len);
431:
432: /* Read severity, message */
433: buffer_clear(&logmsg);
434: buffer_append_space(&logmsg, len);
435: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
436: buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg))
437: fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
438:
439: /* Log it */
440: level = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
441: msg = buffer_get_string(&logmsg, NULL);
442: if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
443: fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
444: __func__, level);
445: do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
446:
447: buffer_free(&logmsg);
1.124 djm 448: free(msg);
1.114 djm 449:
450: return 0;
451: }
452:
1.1 provos 453: int
1.11 mouring 454: monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
1.1 provos 455: struct mon_table **pent)
456: {
457: Buffer m;
458: int ret;
459: u_char type;
1.114 djm 460: struct pollfd pfd[2];
461:
462: for (;;) {
1.130 tedu 463: memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
1.114 djm 464: pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
465: pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
466: pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
467: pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
1.115 djm 468: if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
469: if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
470: continue;
1.114 djm 471: fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.115 djm 472: }
1.114 djm 473: if (pfd[1].revents) {
474: /*
475: * Drain all log messages before processing next
476: * monitor request.
477: */
478: monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
479: continue;
480: }
481: if (pfd[0].revents)
482: break; /* Continues below */
483: }
1.1 provos 484:
485: buffer_init(&m);
486:
1.11 mouring 487: mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 488: type = buffer_get_char(&m);
489:
1.14 markus 490: debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 491:
492: while (ent->f != NULL) {
493: if (ent->type == type)
494: break;
495: ent++;
496: }
497:
498: if (ent->f != NULL) {
499: if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
1.14 markus 500: fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
1.1 provos 501: type);
1.11 mouring 502: ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 503: buffer_free(&m);
504:
505: /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
506: if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
1.14 markus 507: debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
1.1 provos 508: type);
509: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
510: }
511:
512: if (pent != NULL)
513: *pent = ent;
1.3 markus 514:
1.1 provos 515: return ret;
516: }
517:
1.14 markus 518: fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 519:
520: /* NOTREACHED */
521: return (-1);
522: }
523:
524: /* allowed key state */
525: static int
526: monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
527: {
528: /* make sure key is allowed */
529: if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
1.108 djm 530: timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
1.1 provos 531: return (0);
532: return (1);
533: }
534:
535: static void
536: monitor_reset_key_state(void)
537: {
538: /* reset state */
1.124 djm 539: free(key_blob);
540: free(hostbased_cuser);
541: free(hostbased_chost);
1.1 provos 542: key_blob = NULL;
543: key_bloblen = 0;
544: key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
545: hostbased_cuser = NULL;
546: hostbased_chost = NULL;
547: }
548:
1.132 markus 549: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 550: int
1.59 avsm 551: mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 552: {
553: DH *dh;
554: int min, want, max;
555:
556: min = buffer_get_int(m);
557: want = buffer_get_int(m);
558: max = buffer_get_int(m);
559:
560: debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 561: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 562: /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
563: if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
564: fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 565: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 566:
567: buffer_clear(m);
568:
569: dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
570: if (dh == NULL) {
571: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
572: return (0);
573: } else {
574: /* Send first bignum */
575: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
576: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
577: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
1.3 markus 578:
1.1 provos 579: DH_free(dh);
580: }
1.59 avsm 581: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
1.1 provos 582: return (0);
583: }
1.132 markus 584: #endif
1.1 provos 585:
586: int
1.59 avsm 587: mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 588: {
1.144 djm 589: struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
1.138 djm 590: extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */
591: struct sshkey *key;
1.144 djm 592: struct sshbuf *sigbuf;
1.1 provos 593: u_char *p;
594: u_char *signature;
1.138 djm 595: size_t datlen, siglen;
1.144 djm 596: int r, keyid, is_proof = 0;
1.145 djm 597: const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
1.3 markus 598:
1.14 markus 599: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 600:
1.138 djm 601: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
602: (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0)
603: fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1.1 provos 604:
1.69 djm 605: /*
1.110 djm 606: * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
607: * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
1.144 djm 608: *
609: * Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey
610: * proof.
611: *
612: * XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too?
613: * it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather
614: * than the full kex structure...
1.69 djm 615: */
1.144 djm 616: if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) {
617: /*
618: * Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what
619: * the client sent us.
620: */
621: if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */
622: fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu", __func__, datlen);
623: if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL)
624: fatal("%s: no hostkey for index %d", __func__, keyid);
625: if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
626: fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
1.145 djm 627: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
628: (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
1.152 jsg 629: session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
1.144 djm 630: (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
631: fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key "
632: "proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
633: if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) ||
634: memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0)
635: fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
636: __func__, datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
637: sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
638: is_proof = 1;
639: }
1.1 provos 640:
1.13 markus 641: /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
642: if (session_id2_len == 0) {
643: session_id2_len = datlen;
644: session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
645: memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
646: }
647:
1.127 markus 648: if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
1.138 djm 649: if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen,
650: datafellows)) != 0)
651: fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s",
652: __func__, ssh_err(r));
1.144 djm 653: } else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
1.138 djm 654: auth_sock > 0) {
655: if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
656: p, datlen, datafellows)) != 0) {
657: fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
658: __func__, ssh_err(r));
659: }
1.127 markus 660: } else
1.14 markus 661: fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
1.1 provos 662:
1.144 djm 663: debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__,
664: is_proof ? "KEX" : "hostkey proof", signature, siglen);
1.1 provos 665:
1.138 djm 666: sshbuf_reset(m);
667: if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
668: fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1.1 provos 669:
1.124 djm 670: free(p);
671: free(signature);
1.1 provos 672:
1.59 avsm 673: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
1.1 provos 674:
675: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
676: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
677:
678: return (0);
679: }
680:
681: /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
682:
683: int
1.59 avsm 684: mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 685: {
1.60 dtucker 686: char *username;
1.1 provos 687: struct passwd *pwent;
688: int allowed = 0;
1.113 djm 689: u_int i;
1.3 markus 690:
1.14 markus 691: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 692:
693: if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
1.14 markus 694: fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
1.1 provos 695:
1.60 dtucker 696: username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.1 provos 697:
1.60 dtucker 698: pwent = getpwnamallow(username);
1.1 provos 699:
1.60 dtucker 700: authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
701: setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
1.124 djm 702: free(username);
1.1 provos 703:
704: buffer_clear(m);
705:
706: if (pwent == NULL) {
707: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
1.53 djm 708: authctxt->pw = fakepw();
1.1 provos 709: goto out;
710: }
711:
712: allowed = 1;
1.4 markus 713: authctxt->pw = pwent;
1.1 provos 714: authctxt->valid = 1;
715:
716: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
717: buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
718: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
719: buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
720: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
721: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
722: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
723: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
1.94 dtucker 724:
725: out:
1.90 dtucker 726: buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
1.112 djm 727:
728: #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
729: if (options.x != NULL) \
730: buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x); \
731: } while (0)
1.113 djm 732: #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
733: for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) \
734: buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x[i]); \
735: } while (0)
1.112 djm 736: /* See comment in servconf.h */
737: COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
738: #undef M_CP_STROPT
1.113 djm 739: #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
1.118 djm 740:
741: /* Create valid auth method lists */
742: if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
743: /*
744: * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
745: * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
746: * authentication to succeed.
747: */
748: debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
749: }
750:
1.14 markus 751: debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
1.59 avsm 752: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
1.1 provos 753:
754: /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
755: if (!compat20)
756: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
1.10 djm 757: else {
1.1 provos 758: /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
759: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
1.10 djm 760: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
761: }
762:
763: return (0);
764: }
765:
1.59 avsm 766: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.10 djm 767: {
768: char *banner;
769:
770: buffer_clear(m);
771: banner = auth2_read_banner();
772: buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
1.59 avsm 773: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
1.124 djm 774: free(banner);
1.1 provos 775:
776: return (0);
777: }
778:
779: int
1.59 avsm 780: mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 781: {
782: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
783:
784: authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
785: authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.6 stevesk 786: debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
1.14 markus 787: __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
1.6 stevesk 788:
1.1 provos 789: if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
1.124 djm 790: free(authctxt->style);
1.1 provos 791: authctxt->style = NULL;
792: }
793:
794: return (0);
795: }
796:
797: int
1.59 avsm 798: mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 799: {
800: static int call_count;
801: char *passwd;
1.22 stevesk 802: int authenticated;
803: u_int plen;
1.1 provos 804:
805: passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
806: /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
1.12 markus 807: authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
1.48 markus 808: auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
1.131 djm 809: explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
1.124 djm 810: free(passwd);
1.1 provos 811:
812: buffer_clear(m);
813: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
814:
1.14 markus 815: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 816: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
1.1 provos 817:
818: call_count++;
819: if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
820: auth_method = "none";
821: else
822: auth_method = "password";
823:
824: /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
825: return (authenticated);
826: }
827:
828: int
1.59 avsm 829: mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 830: {
831: char *name, *infotxt;
832: u_int numprompts;
833: u_int *echo_on;
834: char **prompts;
1.31 markus 835: u_int success;
1.1 provos 836:
1.31 markus 837: success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
838: &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
1.1 provos 839:
840: buffer_clear(m);
1.31 markus 841: buffer_put_int(m, success);
842: if (success)
1.1 provos 843: buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
844:
1.31 markus 845: debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
1.59 avsm 846: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
1.1 provos 847:
1.31 markus 848: if (success) {
1.124 djm 849: free(name);
850: free(infotxt);
851: free(prompts);
852: free(echo_on);
1.1 provos 853: }
854:
855: return (0);
856: }
857:
858: int
1.59 avsm 859: mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 860: {
861: char *response;
862: int authok;
863:
1.154 ! mmcc 864: if (authctxt->as == NULL)
1.14 markus 865: fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
1.1 provos 866:
867: response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.12 markus 868: authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
869: auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
1.1 provos 870: authctxt->as = NULL;
1.14 markus 871: debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
1.124 djm 872: free(response);
1.1 provos 873:
874: buffer_clear(m);
875: buffer_put_int(m, authok);
876:
1.14 markus 877: debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
1.59 avsm 878: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
1.1 provos 879:
1.122 markus 880: if (compat20) {
881: auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
882: auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
883: } else
1.118 djm 884: auth_method = "bsdauth";
1.1 provos 885:
886: return (authok != 0);
887: }
888:
889: int
1.59 avsm 890: mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 891: {
892: Key *key;
1.26 markus 893: char *cuser, *chost;
894: u_char *blob;
1.148 djm 895: u_int bloblen, pubkey_auth_attempt;
1.1 provos 896: enum mm_keytype type = 0;
897: int allowed = 0;
898:
1.14 markus 899: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.3 markus 900:
1.1 provos 901: type = buffer_get_int(m);
902: cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
903: chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
904: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1.148 djm 905: pubkey_auth_attempt = buffer_get_int(m);
1.1 provos 906:
907: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
908:
909: if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
910: (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
1.14 markus 911: fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 912:
1.14 markus 913: debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
1.1 provos 914:
1.51 djm 915: if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
1.137 djm 916: /* These should not make it past the privsep child */
917: if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
918: (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
919: fatal("%s: passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key", __func__);
920:
1.63 deraadt 921: switch (type) {
1.1 provos 922: case MM_USERKEY:
1.12 markus 923: allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
1.136 djm 924: !auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key) &&
1.137 djm 925: match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
1.149 djm 926: options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1 &&
1.148 djm 927: user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key,
928: pubkey_auth_attempt);
1.126 djm 929: pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
1.77 dtucker 930: auth_method = "publickey";
1.148 djm 931: if (options.pubkey_authentication &&
932: (!pubkey_auth_attempt || allowed != 1))
1.97 dtucker 933: auth_clear_options();
1.1 provos 934: break;
935: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1.12 markus 936: allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
1.137 djm 937: match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
1.149 djm 938: options.hostbased_key_types, 0) == 1 &&
1.12 markus 939: hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 940: cuser, chost, key);
1.126 djm 941: pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
942: "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
943: cuser, chost);
1.77 dtucker 944: auth_method = "hostbased";
1.1 provos 945: break;
1.132 markus 946: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 947: case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
948: key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
1.12 markus 949: allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
950: auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 951: cuser, chost, key);
1.97 dtucker 952: if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
953: auth_clear_options();
1.77 dtucker 954: auth_method = "rsa";
1.1 provos 955: break;
1.132 markus 956: #endif
1.1 provos 957: default:
1.14 markus 958: fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 959: break;
960: }
1.33 markus 961: }
962: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 963: key_free(key);
964:
965: /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
966: monitor_reset_key_state();
967:
968: if (allowed) {
969: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
970: key_blob = blob;
971: key_bloblen = bloblen;
972: key_blobtype = type;
973: hostbased_cuser = cuser;
974: hostbased_chost = chost;
1.72 djm 975: } else {
1.77 dtucker 976: /* Log failed attempt */
1.125 djm 977: auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
1.124 djm 978: free(blob);
979: free(cuser);
980: free(chost);
1.1 provos 981: }
982:
983: debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
1.98 dtucker 984: __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
1.1 provos 985:
986: buffer_clear(m);
987: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 988: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 989:
1.59 avsm 990: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 991:
992: if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
993: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
994:
995: return (0);
996: }
997:
998: static int
999: monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
1000: {
1001: Buffer b;
1.121 djm 1002: char *p, *userstyle;
1.1 provos 1003: u_int len;
1004: int fail = 0;
1005:
1006: buffer_init(&b);
1007: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 1008:
1.1 provos 1009: if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
1.13 markus 1010: p = buffer_ptr(&b);
1011: len = buffer_len(&b);
1012: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1013: (len < session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1014: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.13 markus 1015: fail++;
1.1 provos 1016: buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
1017: } else {
1.13 markus 1018: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
1019: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1020: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1021: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 1022: fail++;
1.124 djm 1023: free(p);
1.1 provos 1024: }
1025: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1026: fail++;
1.121 djm 1027: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1028: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1029: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1030: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1031: if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 1032: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.121 djm 1033: userstyle, p);
1.1 provos 1034: fail++;
1035: }
1.124 djm 1036: free(userstyle);
1037: free(p);
1.1 provos 1038: buffer_skip_string(&b);
1039: if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
1040: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
1041: fail++;
1042: } else {
1.121 djm 1043: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1.1 provos 1044: if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
1045: fail++;
1.124 djm 1046: free(p);
1.1 provos 1047: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
1048: fail++;
1049: buffer_skip_string(&b);
1050: }
1051: buffer_skip_string(&b);
1052: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1053: fail++;
1054: buffer_free(&b);
1055: return (fail == 0);
1056: }
1057:
1058: static int
1.26 markus 1059: monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
1060: char *chost)
1.1 provos 1061: {
1062: Buffer b;
1.121 djm 1063: char *p, *userstyle;
1.1 provos 1064: u_int len;
1065: int fail = 0;
1066:
1067: buffer_init(&b);
1068: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 1069:
1.13 markus 1070: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
1071: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1072: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1073: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 1074: fail++;
1.124 djm 1075: free(p);
1.13 markus 1076:
1.1 provos 1077: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1078: fail++;
1.121 djm 1079: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1080: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1081: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1082: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1083: if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 1084: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.121 djm 1085: userstyle, p);
1.1 provos 1086: fail++;
1087: }
1.121 djm 1088: free(userstyle);
1.124 djm 1089: free(p);
1.1 provos 1090: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */
1.121 djm 1091: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1.1 provos 1092: if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
1093: fail++;
1.124 djm 1094: free(p);
1.1 provos 1095: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkalg */
1096: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkblob */
1097:
1098: /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
1099: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1100: if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
1101: p[len - 1] = '\0';
1102: if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
1103: fail++;
1.124 djm 1104: free(p);
1.1 provos 1105:
1106: /* verify client user */
1107: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1108: if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
1109: fail++;
1.124 djm 1110: free(p);
1.1 provos 1111:
1112: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1113: fail++;
1114: buffer_free(&b);
1115: return (fail == 0);
1116: }
1117:
1118: int
1.59 avsm 1119: mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1120: {
1121: Key *key;
1122: u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
1123: u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
1124: int verified = 0;
1125: int valid_data = 0;
1126:
1127: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1128: signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
1129: data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
1130:
1131: if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
1.8 mouring 1132: !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
1.14 markus 1133: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1134:
1135: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1136: if (key == NULL)
1.14 markus 1137: fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 1138:
1139: switch (key_blobtype) {
1140: case MM_USERKEY:
1141: valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
1142: break;
1143: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1144: valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
1145: hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
1146: break;
1147: default:
1148: valid_data = 0;
1149: break;
1150: }
1151: if (!valid_data)
1.14 markus 1152: fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 1153:
1154: verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
1155: debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
1.89 markus 1156: __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
1.1 provos 1157:
1.136 djm 1158: /* If auth was successful then record key to ensure it isn't reused */
1.153 djm 1159: if (verified == 1 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
1.136 djm 1160: auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
1161: else
1162: key_free(key);
1163:
1.124 djm 1164: free(blob);
1165: free(signature);
1166: free(data);
1.1 provos 1167:
1.17 stevesk 1168: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
1169:
1.1 provos 1170: monitor_reset_key_state();
1.3 markus 1171:
1.1 provos 1172: buffer_clear(m);
1173: buffer_put_int(m, verified);
1.59 avsm 1174: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
1.1 provos 1175:
1.89 markus 1176: return (verified == 1);
1.1 provos 1177: }
1178:
1.2 markus 1179: static void
1.1 provos 1180: mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
1181: {
1182: socklen_t fromlen;
1183: struct sockaddr_storage from;
1.146 djm 1184:
1185: if (options.use_login)
1186: return;
1.1 provos 1187:
1188: /*
1189: * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
1190: * the address be 0.0.0.0.
1191: */
1192: memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
1.24 stevesk 1193: fromlen = sizeof(from);
1.1 provos 1194: if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
1195: if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
1.74 deraadt 1196: (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
1.1 provos 1197: debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1.50 markus 1198: cleanup_exit(255);
1.1 provos 1199: }
1200: }
1201: /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
1202: record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
1.42 markus 1203: get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
1.24 stevesk 1204: (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
1.1 provos 1205: }
1206:
1207: static void
1208: mm_session_close(Session *s)
1209: {
1.41 djm 1210: debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
1.1 provos 1211: if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1.86 stevesk 1212: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
1.1 provos 1213: session_pty_cleanup2(s);
1214: }
1.96 djm 1215: session_unused(s->self);
1.1 provos 1216: }
1217:
1218: int
1.59 avsm 1219: mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1220: {
1.11 mouring 1221: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1222: Session *s;
1223: int res, fd0;
1224:
1.14 markus 1225: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1226:
1227: buffer_clear(m);
1228: s = session_new();
1229: if (s == NULL)
1230: goto error;
1231: s->authctxt = authctxt;
1232: s->pw = authctxt->pw;
1.11 mouring 1233: s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
1.1 provos 1234: res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
1235: if (res == 0)
1236: goto error;
1237: pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
1238:
1239: buffer_put_int(m, 1);
1240: buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
1241:
1242: /* We need to trick ttyslot */
1243: if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
1.14 markus 1244: fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
1.1 provos 1245:
1246: mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
1247:
1248: /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
1249: close(0);
1.61 dtucker 1250:
1251: /* send messages generated by record_login */
1252: buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
1253: buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
1254:
1255: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1256:
1.92 djm 1257: if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
1258: mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
1259: fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1260:
1261: /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
1262: if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
1.14 markus 1263: fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1264: if (fd0 != 0)
1.14 markus 1265: error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
1.1 provos 1266:
1267: /* slave is not needed */
1268: close(s->ttyfd);
1269: s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
1270: /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
1271: s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
1272:
1.86 stevesk 1273: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
1.1 provos 1274:
1275: return (0);
1276:
1277: error:
1278: if (s != NULL)
1279: mm_session_close(s);
1280: buffer_put_int(m, 0);
1.59 avsm 1281: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1.1 provos 1282: return (0);
1283: }
1284:
1285: int
1.59 avsm 1286: mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1287: {
1288: Session *s;
1289: char *tty;
1290:
1.14 markus 1291: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1292:
1293: tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1294: if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
1295: mm_session_close(s);
1296: buffer_clear(m);
1.124 djm 1297: free(tty);
1.1 provos 1298: return (0);
1299: }
1300:
1.132 markus 1301: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 1302: int
1.59 avsm 1303: mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1304: {
1305: BIGNUM *p;
1306: int rsafail;
1307:
1308: /* Turn off permissions */
1.62 dtucker 1309: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
1.1 provos 1310:
1311: if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1312: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1313:
1314: buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
1315:
1316: rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
1317:
1318: buffer_clear(m);
1319: buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
1320: buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
1321:
1322: BN_clear_free(p);
1323:
1.59 avsm 1324: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
1.1 provos 1325:
1326: /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
1327: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
1328:
1329: return (0);
1330: }
1331:
1332: int
1.59 avsm 1333: mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1334: {
1335: int i;
1336:
1.14 markus 1337: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1338:
1339: if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
1.14 markus 1340: fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
1.1 provos 1341: for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1342: session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
1343:
1344: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
1345: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
1346:
1347: return (0);
1348: }
1349:
1350: int
1.59 avsm 1351: mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1352: {
1353: BIGNUM *client_n;
1354: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1355: u_char *blob = NULL;
1356: u_int blen = 0;
1.1 provos 1357: int allowed = 0;
1358:
1.14 markus 1359: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1360:
1.77 dtucker 1361: auth_method = "rsa";
1.12 markus 1362: if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
1.1 provos 1363: if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1364: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1365: buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
1366: allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
1367: BN_clear_free(client_n);
1368: }
1369: buffer_clear(m);
1370: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 1371: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 1372:
1373: /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
1374: monitor_reset_key_state();
1375:
1376: if (allowed && key != NULL) {
1377: key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */
1378: if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
1.14 markus 1379: fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1380: buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
1381:
1382: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1383: key_blob = blob;
1384: key_bloblen = blen;
1385: key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
1.33 markus 1386: }
1387: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 1388: key_free(key);
1389:
1.59 avsm 1390: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 1391:
1392: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
1393: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
1394: return (0);
1395: }
1396:
1397: int
1.59 avsm 1398: mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1399: {
1400: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1401: u_char *blob;
1402: u_int blen;
1.1 provos 1403:
1.14 markus 1404: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1405:
1406: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1407: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1408: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1409: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1410: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1411: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1412: fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 1413: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1414: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.101 djm 1415: if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
1416: fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
1417: key->type = KEY_RSA1;
1.1 provos 1418: if (ssh1_challenge)
1419: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1420: ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
1421:
1422: buffer_clear(m);
1423: buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
1424:
1.14 markus 1425: debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
1.59 avsm 1426: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
1.1 provos 1427:
1428: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
1.33 markus 1429:
1.124 djm 1430: free(blob);
1.33 markus 1431: key_free(key);
1.1 provos 1432: return (0);
1433: }
1434:
1435: int
1.59 avsm 1436: mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1437: {
1438: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1439: u_char *blob, *response;
1440: u_int blen, len;
1441: int success;
1.1 provos 1442:
1.14 markus 1443: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1444:
1445: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1446: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1447: if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
1.14 markus 1448: fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1449:
1450: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1451: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1452: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1453: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1454: fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
1.1 provos 1455: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1456: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.1 provos 1457: response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1458: if (len != 16)
1.14 markus 1459: fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1460: success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
1461:
1.124 djm 1462: free(blob);
1.1 provos 1463: key_free(key);
1.124 djm 1464: free(response);
1.1 provos 1465:
1466: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
1467:
1468: /* reset state */
1469: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1470: ssh1_challenge = NULL;
1471: monitor_reset_key_state();
1472:
1473: buffer_clear(m);
1474: buffer_put_int(m, success);
1.59 avsm 1475: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
1.1 provos 1476:
1477: return (success);
1478: }
1.132 markus 1479: #endif
1.1 provos 1480:
1481: int
1.59 avsm 1482: mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
1.1 provos 1483: {
1.11 mouring 1484: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1485: int res, status;
1486:
1.14 markus 1487: debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
1.1 provos 1488:
1489: /* The child is terminating */
1490: session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
1491:
1.11 mouring 1492: while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
1.9 markus 1493: if (errno != EINTR)
1494: exit(1);
1.1 provos 1495:
1496: res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
1497:
1498: /* Terminate process */
1.57 deraadt 1499: exit(res);
1.1 provos 1500: }
1501:
1502: void
1.11 mouring 1503: monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1504: {
1.139 markus 1505: struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
1506: struct kex *kex;
1507: int r;
1508:
1509: debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__);
1510: if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
1511: fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1512: sshbuf_free(child_state);
1513: child_state = NULL;
1514:
1.154 ! mmcc 1515: if ((kex = ssh->kex) != NULL) {
1.139 markus 1516: /* XXX set callbacks */
1.147 djm 1517: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.139 markus 1518: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1519: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1520: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1521: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
1522: kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
1.147 djm 1523: #endif
1.139 markus 1524: kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
1525: kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
1526: kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
1527: kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1528: kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
1529: }
1.3 markus 1530:
1.1 provos 1531: /* Update with new address */
1.139 markus 1532: if (options.compression) {
1533: ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, pmonitor->m_zlib,
1534: (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
1535: (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
1536: }
1.1 provos 1537: }
1538:
1539: /* This function requries careful sanity checking */
1540:
1541: void
1.11 mouring 1542: mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1543: {
1.14 markus 1544: debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
1.1 provos 1545:
1.139 markus 1546: if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1547: fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
1548: mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
1549: child_state);
1550: debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__);
1.1 provos 1551: }
1552:
1553:
1554: /* XXX */
1555:
1556: #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
1.111 djm 1557: if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
1.1 provos 1558: fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
1559: } while (0)
1560:
1.2 markus 1561: static void
1.114 djm 1562: monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
1.3 markus 1563: {
1.114 djm 1564: int pair[2];
1565:
1.1 provos 1566: if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
1.114 djm 1567: fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1568: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1569: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1.114 djm 1570: mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1571: mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1572:
1573: if (do_logfds) {
1574: if (pipe(pair) == -1)
1575: fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1576: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1577: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1578: mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
1579: mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
1580: } else
1581: mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
1.1 provos 1582: }
1583:
1584: #define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
1585:
1586: struct monitor *
1587: monitor_init(void)
1588: {
1.139 markus 1589: struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
1.1 provos 1590: struct monitor *mon;
1591:
1.75 djm 1592: mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
1.1 provos 1593:
1.114 djm 1594: monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
1.1 provos 1595:
1596: /* Used to share zlib space across processes */
1.16 djm 1597: if (options.compression) {
1598: mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
1599: mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
1.1 provos 1600:
1.16 djm 1601: /* Compression needs to share state across borders */
1.139 markus 1602: ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, mon->m_zlib,
1603: (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
1604: (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
1.16 djm 1605: }
1.1 provos 1606:
1607: return mon;
1608: }
1609:
1610: void
1611: monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
1612: {
1.114 djm 1613: monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
1.1 provos 1614: }
1.46 markus 1615:
1616: #ifdef GSSAPI
1617: int
1.59 avsm 1618: mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1619: {
1.59 avsm 1620: gss_OID_desc goid;
1.46 markus 1621: OM_uint32 major;
1622: u_int len;
1623:
1.59 avsm 1624: goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1625: goid.length = len;
1.46 markus 1626:
1.59 avsm 1627: major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
1.46 markus 1628:
1.124 djm 1629: free(goid.elements);
1.46 markus 1630:
1631: buffer_clear(m);
1632: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1633:
1.64 stevesk 1634: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
1.46 markus 1635:
1636: /* Now we have a context, enable the step */
1637: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
1638:
1639: return (0);
1640: }
1641:
1642: int
1.59 avsm 1643: mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1644: {
1645: gss_buffer_desc in;
1646: gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1.64 stevesk 1647: OM_uint32 major, minor;
1.46 markus 1648: OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
1.47 deraadt 1649: u_int len;
1.46 markus 1650:
1.47 deraadt 1651: in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1652: in.length = len;
1.46 markus 1653: major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
1.124 djm 1654: free(in.value);
1.46 markus 1655:
1656: buffer_clear(m);
1657: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1658: buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
1659: buffer_put_int(m, flags);
1.59 avsm 1660: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
1.46 markus 1661:
1662: gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
1663:
1.64 stevesk 1664: if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1.46 markus 1665: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
1666: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.52 markus 1667: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
1.46 markus 1668: }
1669: return (0);
1670: }
1671:
1672: int
1.59 avsm 1673: mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.52 markus 1674: {
1675: gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
1676: OM_uint32 ret;
1677: u_int len;
1.54 djm 1678:
1.52 markus 1679: gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1680: gssbuf.length = len;
1681: mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1682: mic.length = len;
1.54 djm 1683:
1.52 markus 1684: ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
1.54 djm 1685:
1.124 djm 1686: free(gssbuf.value);
1687: free(mic.value);
1.54 djm 1688:
1.52 markus 1689: buffer_clear(m);
1690: buffer_put_int(m, ret);
1.54 djm 1691:
1.59 avsm 1692: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
1.54 djm 1693:
1.52 markus 1694: if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
1695: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.54 djm 1696:
1.52 markus 1697: return (0);
1698: }
1699:
1700: int
1.59 avsm 1701: mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1702: {
1703: int authenticated;
1704:
1705: authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
1706:
1707: buffer_clear(m);
1708: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
1709:
1710: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 1711: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
1.46 markus 1712:
1.64 stevesk 1713: auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
1.46 markus 1714:
1715: /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
1716: return (authenticated);
1717: }
1718: #endif /* GSSAPI */
1.100 djm 1719:
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