Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c, Revision 1.155
1.155 ! markus 1: /* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.154 2015/10/20 23:24:25 mmcc Exp $ */
1.1 provos 2: /*
3: * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
4: * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
5: * All rights reserved.
6: *
7: * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8: * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9: * are met:
10: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12: * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14: * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15: *
16: * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
17: * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
18: * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
19: * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
20: * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
21: * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
22: * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
23: * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
24: * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
25: * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
26: */
27:
1.67 stevesk 28: #include <sys/types.h>
29: #include <sys/wait.h>
1.79 stevesk 30: #include <sys/socket.h>
1.85 deraadt 31: #include <sys/tree.h>
1.95 djm 32: #include <sys/queue.h>
1.1 provos 33:
1.132 markus 34: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.78 stevesk 35: #include <openssl/dh.h>
1.132 markus 36: #endif
1.78 stevesk 37:
1.81 stevesk 38: #include <errno.h>
1.80 stevesk 39: #include <fcntl.h>
1.65 stevesk 40: #include <paths.h>
1.114 djm 41: #include <poll.h>
1.78 stevesk 42: #include <pwd.h>
1.68 stevesk 43: #include <signal.h>
1.134 djm 44: #include <stdarg.h>
1.142 millert 45: #include <stdint.h>
1.134 djm 46: #include <stdio.h>
1.84 stevesk 47: #include <stdlib.h>
1.82 stevesk 48: #include <string.h>
1.1 provos 49:
1.114 djm 50: #include "atomicio.h"
1.85 deraadt 51: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.1 provos 52: #include "ssh.h"
1.85 deraadt 53: #include "key.h"
54: #include "buffer.h"
55: #include "hostfile.h"
1.1 provos 56: #include "auth.h"
1.85 deraadt 57: #include "cipher.h"
1.1 provos 58: #include "kex.h"
59: #include "dh.h"
1.88 miod 60: #include <zlib.h>
1.1 provos 61: #include "packet.h"
62: #include "auth-options.h"
63: #include "sshpty.h"
64: #include "channels.h"
65: #include "session.h"
66: #include "sshlogin.h"
67: #include "canohost.h"
68: #include "log.h"
1.135 millert 69: #include "misc.h"
1.1 provos 70: #include "servconf.h"
71: #include "monitor.h"
72: #include "monitor_mm.h"
1.85 deraadt 73: #ifdef GSSAPI
74: #include "ssh-gss.h"
75: #endif
1.1 provos 76: #include "monitor_wrap.h"
77: #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
78: #include "compat.h"
79: #include "ssh2.h"
1.104 andreas 80: #include "roaming.h"
1.127 markus 81: #include "authfd.h"
1.137 djm 82: #include "match.h"
1.138 djm 83: #include "ssherr.h"
1.1 provos 84:
1.46 markus 85: #ifdef GSSAPI
86: static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
87: #endif
88:
1.1 provos 89: /* Imports */
90: extern ServerOptions options;
91: extern u_int utmp_len;
92: extern u_char session_id[];
93: extern Buffer auth_debug;
94: extern int auth_debug_init;
1.61 dtucker 95: extern Buffer loginmsg;
1.1 provos 96:
97: /* State exported from the child */
1.139 markus 98: static struct sshbuf *child_state;
1.1 provos 99:
1.43 markus 100: /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
1.1 provos 101:
102: int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
103: int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
104: int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
1.10 djm 105: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
1.1 provos 106: int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
107: int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
108: int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
109: int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
110: int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
111: int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
112: int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
113: int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
114: int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
115: int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
116: int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
117: int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
118: int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
119: int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
120: int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
121: int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
122:
1.46 markus 123: #ifdef GSSAPI
124: int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
125: int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
126: int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
1.52 markus 127: int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
1.46 markus 128: #endif
1.25 itojun 129:
1.114 djm 130: static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
131:
1.1 provos 132: static Authctxt *authctxt;
1.132 markus 133:
134: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 135: static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
1.132 markus 136: #endif
1.1 provos 137:
138: /* local state for key verify */
139: static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
140: static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
141: static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
1.26 markus 142: static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
143: static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
1.1 provos 144: static char *auth_method = "unknown";
1.119 djm 145: static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
1.44 markus 146: static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
1.13 markus 147: static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
1.40 markus 148: static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
1.1 provos 149:
150: struct mon_table {
151: enum monitor_reqtype type;
152: int flags;
153: int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
154: };
155:
156: #define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
157: #define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
158: #define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
1.77 dtucker 159: #define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
1.1 provos 160:
161: #define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
162:
163: #define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
164:
165: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
1.132 markus 166: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 167: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
1.132 markus 168: #endif
1.1 provos 169: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
170: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
171: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
1.10 djm 172: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
1.1 provos 173: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
174: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 175: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.1 provos 176: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
177: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
1.46 markus 178: #ifdef GSSAPI
179: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
180: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
181: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
1.52 markus 182: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
1.46 markus 183: #endif
1.1 provos 184: {0, 0, NULL}
185: };
186:
187: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
1.132 markus 188: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 189: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
1.132 markus 190: #endif
1.1 provos 191: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
192: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
193: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
194: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
195: {0, 0, NULL}
196: };
197:
198: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
1.132 markus 199: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 200: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
201: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
202: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
203: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
1.77 dtucker 204: {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
205: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
1.1 provos 206: {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
207: {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
208: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 209: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.132 markus 210: #endif
1.1 provos 211: {0, 0, NULL}
212: };
213:
214: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
1.132 markus 215: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 216: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
217: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
218: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
1.132 markus 219: #endif
1.1 provos 220: {0, 0, NULL}
221: };
222:
223: struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
224:
225: /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
226:
227: static void
228: monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
229: {
230: while (ent->f != NULL) {
231: if (ent->type == type) {
232: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
233: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
234: return;
235: }
236: ent++;
237: }
238: }
239:
240: static void
241: monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
242: {
243: struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
244:
245: while (ent->f != NULL) {
246: if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
247: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
248: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
249: }
250: ent++;
251: }
252: }
253:
1.50 markus 254: void
255: monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 256: {
257: struct mon_table *ent;
1.119 djm 258: int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
1.1 provos 259:
260: debug3("preauth child monitor started");
261:
1.114 djm 262: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
263: close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
264: pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
265:
1.50 markus 266: authctxt = _authctxt;
267: memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
268:
1.1 provos 269: if (compat20) {
270: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
271:
272: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
273: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
274: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
275: } else {
276: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
277:
278: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
279: }
280:
281: /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
282: while (!authenticated) {
1.119 djm 283: partial = 0;
1.77 dtucker 284: auth_method = "unknown";
1.119 djm 285: auth_submethod = NULL;
1.89 markus 286: authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
1.118 djm 287:
288: /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
289: if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
290: if (!compat20)
291: fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported"
292: "with SSH protocol 1");
293: if (authenticated &&
294: !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
1.122 markus 295: auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
1.118 djm 296: debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
297: auth_method);
298: authenticated = 0;
1.119 djm 299: partial = 1;
1.118 djm 300: }
301: }
302:
1.1 provos 303: if (authenticated) {
304: if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
305: fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
1.14 markus 306: __func__, ent->type);
1.1 provos 307: if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
308: !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
309: authenticated = 0;
310: }
1.77 dtucker 311: if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
1.119 djm 312: auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial,
1.125 djm 313: auth_method, auth_submethod);
1.150 djm 314: if (!partial && !authenticated)
1.1 provos 315: authctxt->failures++;
316: }
317: }
318:
319: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 320: fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
1.77 dtucker 321: if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
322: fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
1.1 provos 323:
324: debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
1.14 markus 325: __func__, authctxt->user);
1.1 provos 326:
1.11 mouring 327: mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
1.120 markus 328:
329: /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
330: while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
331: ;
1.114 djm 332:
333: close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
334: close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
335: pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
1.1 provos 336: }
337:
1.40 markus 338: static void
339: monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
340: {
341: monitor_child_pid = pid;
342: }
343:
344: static void
1.59 avsm 345: monitor_child_handler(int sig)
1.40 markus 346: {
1.59 avsm 347: kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
1.40 markus 348: }
349:
1.1 provos 350: void
1.11 mouring 351: monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 352: {
1.114 djm 353: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
354: pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
355:
1.40 markus 356: monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
357: signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
358: signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
1.91 djm 359: signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
1.40 markus 360:
1.1 provos 361: if (compat20) {
362: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
363:
364: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
365: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
366: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
367: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
368: } else {
369: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
370: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
371: }
372: if (!no_pty_flag) {
373: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
374: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
375: }
376:
377: for (;;)
1.11 mouring 378: monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
1.1 provos 379: }
380:
381: void
1.11 mouring 382: monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 383: {
1.16 djm 384: if (options.compression) {
385: /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
386: mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
387: }
1.1 provos 388: }
389:
1.139 markus 390: /* Allocation functions for zlib */
391: static void *
392: mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
393: {
1.151 deraadt 394: if (size == 0 || ncount == 0 || ncount > SIZE_MAX / size)
1.139 markus 395: fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
396:
1.151 deraadt 397: return mm_malloc(mm, size * ncount);
1.139 markus 398: }
399:
400: static void
401: mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
402: {
403: mm_free(mm, address);
404: }
405:
1.114 djm 406: static int
407: monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
408: {
409: Buffer logmsg;
410: u_int len, level;
411: char *msg;
412:
413: buffer_init(&logmsg);
414:
415: /* Read length */
416: buffer_append_space(&logmsg, 4);
417: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
418: buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) {
419: if (errno == EPIPE) {
1.116 djm 420: buffer_free(&logmsg);
1.114 djm 421: debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
422: close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
423: pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
424: return -1;
425: }
426: fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
427: }
428: len = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
429: if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
430: fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len);
431:
432: /* Read severity, message */
433: buffer_clear(&logmsg);
434: buffer_append_space(&logmsg, len);
435: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
436: buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg))
437: fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
438:
439: /* Log it */
440: level = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
441: msg = buffer_get_string(&logmsg, NULL);
442: if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
443: fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
444: __func__, level);
445: do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
446:
447: buffer_free(&logmsg);
1.124 djm 448: free(msg);
1.114 djm 449:
450: return 0;
451: }
452:
1.1 provos 453: int
1.11 mouring 454: monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
1.1 provos 455: struct mon_table **pent)
456: {
457: Buffer m;
458: int ret;
459: u_char type;
1.114 djm 460: struct pollfd pfd[2];
461:
462: for (;;) {
1.130 tedu 463: memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
1.114 djm 464: pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
465: pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
466: pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
467: pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
1.115 djm 468: if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
469: if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
470: continue;
1.114 djm 471: fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.115 djm 472: }
1.114 djm 473: if (pfd[1].revents) {
474: /*
475: * Drain all log messages before processing next
476: * monitor request.
477: */
478: monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
479: continue;
480: }
481: if (pfd[0].revents)
482: break; /* Continues below */
483: }
1.1 provos 484:
485: buffer_init(&m);
486:
1.11 mouring 487: mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 488: type = buffer_get_char(&m);
489:
1.14 markus 490: debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 491:
492: while (ent->f != NULL) {
493: if (ent->type == type)
494: break;
495: ent++;
496: }
497:
498: if (ent->f != NULL) {
499: if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
1.14 markus 500: fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
1.1 provos 501: type);
1.11 mouring 502: ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 503: buffer_free(&m);
504:
505: /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
506: if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
1.14 markus 507: debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
1.1 provos 508: type);
509: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
510: }
511:
512: if (pent != NULL)
513: *pent = ent;
1.3 markus 514:
1.1 provos 515: return ret;
516: }
517:
1.14 markus 518: fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 519:
520: /* NOTREACHED */
521: return (-1);
522: }
523:
524: /* allowed key state */
525: static int
526: monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
527: {
528: /* make sure key is allowed */
529: if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
1.108 djm 530: timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
1.1 provos 531: return (0);
532: return (1);
533: }
534:
535: static void
536: monitor_reset_key_state(void)
537: {
538: /* reset state */
1.124 djm 539: free(key_blob);
540: free(hostbased_cuser);
541: free(hostbased_chost);
1.1 provos 542: key_blob = NULL;
543: key_bloblen = 0;
544: key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
545: hostbased_cuser = NULL;
546: hostbased_chost = NULL;
547: }
548:
1.132 markus 549: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 550: int
1.59 avsm 551: mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 552: {
553: DH *dh;
554: int min, want, max;
555:
556: min = buffer_get_int(m);
557: want = buffer_get_int(m);
558: max = buffer_get_int(m);
559:
560: debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 561: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 562: /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
563: if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
564: fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 565: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 566:
567: buffer_clear(m);
568:
569: dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
570: if (dh == NULL) {
571: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
572: return (0);
573: } else {
574: /* Send first bignum */
575: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
576: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
577: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
1.3 markus 578:
1.1 provos 579: DH_free(dh);
580: }
1.59 avsm 581: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
1.1 provos 582: return (0);
583: }
1.132 markus 584: #endif
1.1 provos 585:
586: int
1.59 avsm 587: mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 588: {
1.144 djm 589: struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
1.138 djm 590: extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */
591: struct sshkey *key;
1.144 djm 592: struct sshbuf *sigbuf;
1.1 provos 593: u_char *p;
594: u_char *signature;
1.155 ! markus 595: char *alg;
! 596: size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
1.144 djm 597: int r, keyid, is_proof = 0;
1.145 djm 598: const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
1.3 markus 599:
1.14 markus 600: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 601:
1.138 djm 602: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
1.155 ! markus 603: (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 ||
! 604: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0)
1.138 djm 605: fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1.1 provos 606:
1.69 djm 607: /*
1.110 djm 608: * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
609: * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
1.144 djm 610: *
611: * Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey
612: * proof.
613: *
614: * XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too?
615: * it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather
616: * than the full kex structure...
1.69 djm 617: */
1.144 djm 618: if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) {
619: /*
620: * Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what
621: * the client sent us.
622: */
623: if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */
624: fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu", __func__, datlen);
625: if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL)
626: fatal("%s: no hostkey for index %d", __func__, keyid);
627: if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
628: fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
1.145 djm 629: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
630: (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
1.152 jsg 631: session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
1.144 djm 632: (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
633: fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key "
634: "proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
635: if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) ||
636: memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0)
637: fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
638: __func__, datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
639: sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
640: is_proof = 1;
641: }
1.1 provos 642:
1.13 markus 643: /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
644: if (session_id2_len == 0) {
645: session_id2_len = datlen;
646: session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
647: memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
648: }
649:
1.127 markus 650: if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
1.155 ! markus 651: if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
1.138 djm 652: datafellows)) != 0)
653: fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s",
654: __func__, ssh_err(r));
1.144 djm 655: } else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
1.138 djm 656: auth_sock > 0) {
657: if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
1.155 ! markus 658: p, datlen, alg, datafellows)) != 0) {
1.138 djm 659: fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
660: __func__, ssh_err(r));
661: }
1.127 markus 662: } else
1.14 markus 663: fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
1.1 provos 664:
1.144 djm 665: debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__,
666: is_proof ? "KEX" : "hostkey proof", signature, siglen);
1.1 provos 667:
1.138 djm 668: sshbuf_reset(m);
669: if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
670: fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1.1 provos 671:
1.124 djm 672: free(p);
673: free(signature);
1.1 provos 674:
1.59 avsm 675: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
1.1 provos 676:
677: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
678: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
679:
680: return (0);
681: }
682:
683: /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
684:
685: int
1.59 avsm 686: mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 687: {
1.60 dtucker 688: char *username;
1.1 provos 689: struct passwd *pwent;
690: int allowed = 0;
1.113 djm 691: u_int i;
1.3 markus 692:
1.14 markus 693: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 694:
695: if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
1.14 markus 696: fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
1.1 provos 697:
1.60 dtucker 698: username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.1 provos 699:
1.60 dtucker 700: pwent = getpwnamallow(username);
1.1 provos 701:
1.60 dtucker 702: authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
703: setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
1.124 djm 704: free(username);
1.1 provos 705:
706: buffer_clear(m);
707:
708: if (pwent == NULL) {
709: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
1.53 djm 710: authctxt->pw = fakepw();
1.1 provos 711: goto out;
712: }
713:
714: allowed = 1;
1.4 markus 715: authctxt->pw = pwent;
1.1 provos 716: authctxt->valid = 1;
717:
718: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
719: buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
720: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
721: buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
722: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
723: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
724: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
725: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
1.94 dtucker 726:
727: out:
1.90 dtucker 728: buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
1.112 djm 729:
730: #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
731: if (options.x != NULL) \
732: buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x); \
733: } while (0)
1.113 djm 734: #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
735: for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) \
736: buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x[i]); \
737: } while (0)
1.112 djm 738: /* See comment in servconf.h */
739: COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
740: #undef M_CP_STROPT
1.113 djm 741: #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
1.118 djm 742:
743: /* Create valid auth method lists */
744: if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
745: /*
746: * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
747: * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
748: * authentication to succeed.
749: */
750: debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
751: }
752:
1.14 markus 753: debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
1.59 avsm 754: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
1.1 provos 755:
756: /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
757: if (!compat20)
758: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
1.10 djm 759: else {
1.1 provos 760: /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
761: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
1.10 djm 762: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
763: }
764:
765: return (0);
766: }
767:
1.59 avsm 768: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.10 djm 769: {
770: char *banner;
771:
772: buffer_clear(m);
773: banner = auth2_read_banner();
774: buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
1.59 avsm 775: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
1.124 djm 776: free(banner);
1.1 provos 777:
778: return (0);
779: }
780:
781: int
1.59 avsm 782: mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 783: {
784: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
785:
786: authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
787: authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.6 stevesk 788: debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
1.14 markus 789: __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
1.6 stevesk 790:
1.1 provos 791: if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
1.124 djm 792: free(authctxt->style);
1.1 provos 793: authctxt->style = NULL;
794: }
795:
796: return (0);
797: }
798:
799: int
1.59 avsm 800: mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 801: {
802: static int call_count;
803: char *passwd;
1.22 stevesk 804: int authenticated;
805: u_int plen;
1.1 provos 806:
807: passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
808: /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
1.12 markus 809: authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
1.48 markus 810: auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
1.131 djm 811: explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
1.124 djm 812: free(passwd);
1.1 provos 813:
814: buffer_clear(m);
815: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
816:
1.14 markus 817: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 818: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
1.1 provos 819:
820: call_count++;
821: if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
822: auth_method = "none";
823: else
824: auth_method = "password";
825:
826: /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
827: return (authenticated);
828: }
829:
830: int
1.59 avsm 831: mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 832: {
833: char *name, *infotxt;
834: u_int numprompts;
835: u_int *echo_on;
836: char **prompts;
1.31 markus 837: u_int success;
1.1 provos 838:
1.31 markus 839: success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
840: &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
1.1 provos 841:
842: buffer_clear(m);
1.31 markus 843: buffer_put_int(m, success);
844: if (success)
1.1 provos 845: buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
846:
1.31 markus 847: debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
1.59 avsm 848: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
1.1 provos 849:
1.31 markus 850: if (success) {
1.124 djm 851: free(name);
852: free(infotxt);
853: free(prompts);
854: free(echo_on);
1.1 provos 855: }
856:
857: return (0);
858: }
859:
860: int
1.59 avsm 861: mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 862: {
863: char *response;
864: int authok;
865:
1.154 mmcc 866: if (authctxt->as == NULL)
1.14 markus 867: fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
1.1 provos 868:
869: response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.12 markus 870: authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
871: auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
1.1 provos 872: authctxt->as = NULL;
1.14 markus 873: debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
1.124 djm 874: free(response);
1.1 provos 875:
876: buffer_clear(m);
877: buffer_put_int(m, authok);
878:
1.14 markus 879: debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
1.59 avsm 880: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
1.1 provos 881:
1.122 markus 882: if (compat20) {
883: auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
884: auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
885: } else
1.118 djm 886: auth_method = "bsdauth";
1.1 provos 887:
888: return (authok != 0);
889: }
890:
891: int
1.59 avsm 892: mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 893: {
894: Key *key;
1.26 markus 895: char *cuser, *chost;
896: u_char *blob;
1.148 djm 897: u_int bloblen, pubkey_auth_attempt;
1.1 provos 898: enum mm_keytype type = 0;
899: int allowed = 0;
900:
1.14 markus 901: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.3 markus 902:
1.1 provos 903: type = buffer_get_int(m);
904: cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
905: chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
906: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1.148 djm 907: pubkey_auth_attempt = buffer_get_int(m);
1.1 provos 908:
909: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
910:
911: if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
912: (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
1.14 markus 913: fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 914:
1.14 markus 915: debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
1.1 provos 916:
1.51 djm 917: if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
1.137 djm 918: /* These should not make it past the privsep child */
919: if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
920: (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
921: fatal("%s: passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key", __func__);
922:
1.63 deraadt 923: switch (type) {
1.1 provos 924: case MM_USERKEY:
1.12 markus 925: allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
1.136 djm 926: !auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key) &&
1.137 djm 927: match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
1.149 djm 928: options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1 &&
1.148 djm 929: user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key,
930: pubkey_auth_attempt);
1.126 djm 931: pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
1.77 dtucker 932: auth_method = "publickey";
1.148 djm 933: if (options.pubkey_authentication &&
934: (!pubkey_auth_attempt || allowed != 1))
1.97 dtucker 935: auth_clear_options();
1.1 provos 936: break;
937: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1.12 markus 938: allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
1.137 djm 939: match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
1.149 djm 940: options.hostbased_key_types, 0) == 1 &&
1.12 markus 941: hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 942: cuser, chost, key);
1.126 djm 943: pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
944: "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
945: cuser, chost);
1.77 dtucker 946: auth_method = "hostbased";
1.1 provos 947: break;
1.132 markus 948: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 949: case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
950: key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
1.12 markus 951: allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
952: auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 953: cuser, chost, key);
1.97 dtucker 954: if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
955: auth_clear_options();
1.77 dtucker 956: auth_method = "rsa";
1.1 provos 957: break;
1.132 markus 958: #endif
1.1 provos 959: default:
1.14 markus 960: fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 961: break;
962: }
1.33 markus 963: }
964: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 965: key_free(key);
966:
967: /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
968: monitor_reset_key_state();
969:
970: if (allowed) {
971: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
972: key_blob = blob;
973: key_bloblen = bloblen;
974: key_blobtype = type;
975: hostbased_cuser = cuser;
976: hostbased_chost = chost;
1.72 djm 977: } else {
1.77 dtucker 978: /* Log failed attempt */
1.125 djm 979: auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
1.124 djm 980: free(blob);
981: free(cuser);
982: free(chost);
1.1 provos 983: }
984:
985: debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
1.98 dtucker 986: __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
1.1 provos 987:
988: buffer_clear(m);
989: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 990: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 991:
1.59 avsm 992: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 993:
994: if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
995: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
996:
997: return (0);
998: }
999:
1000: static int
1001: monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
1002: {
1003: Buffer b;
1.121 djm 1004: char *p, *userstyle;
1.1 provos 1005: u_int len;
1006: int fail = 0;
1007:
1008: buffer_init(&b);
1009: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 1010:
1.1 provos 1011: if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
1.13 markus 1012: p = buffer_ptr(&b);
1013: len = buffer_len(&b);
1014: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1015: (len < session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1016: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.13 markus 1017: fail++;
1.1 provos 1018: buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
1019: } else {
1.13 markus 1020: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
1021: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1022: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1023: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 1024: fail++;
1.124 djm 1025: free(p);
1.1 provos 1026: }
1027: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1028: fail++;
1.121 djm 1029: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1030: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1031: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1032: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1033: if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 1034: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.121 djm 1035: userstyle, p);
1.1 provos 1036: fail++;
1037: }
1.124 djm 1038: free(userstyle);
1039: free(p);
1.1 provos 1040: buffer_skip_string(&b);
1041: if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
1042: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
1043: fail++;
1044: } else {
1.121 djm 1045: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1.1 provos 1046: if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
1047: fail++;
1.124 djm 1048: free(p);
1.1 provos 1049: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
1050: fail++;
1051: buffer_skip_string(&b);
1052: }
1053: buffer_skip_string(&b);
1054: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1055: fail++;
1056: buffer_free(&b);
1057: return (fail == 0);
1058: }
1059:
1060: static int
1.26 markus 1061: monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
1062: char *chost)
1.1 provos 1063: {
1064: Buffer b;
1.121 djm 1065: char *p, *userstyle;
1.1 provos 1066: u_int len;
1067: int fail = 0;
1068:
1069: buffer_init(&b);
1070: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 1071:
1.13 markus 1072: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
1073: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1074: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1075: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 1076: fail++;
1.124 djm 1077: free(p);
1.13 markus 1078:
1.1 provos 1079: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1080: fail++;
1.121 djm 1081: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1082: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1083: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1084: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1085: if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 1086: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.121 djm 1087: userstyle, p);
1.1 provos 1088: fail++;
1089: }
1.121 djm 1090: free(userstyle);
1.124 djm 1091: free(p);
1.1 provos 1092: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */
1.121 djm 1093: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1.1 provos 1094: if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
1095: fail++;
1.124 djm 1096: free(p);
1.1 provos 1097: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkalg */
1098: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkblob */
1099:
1100: /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
1101: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1102: if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
1103: p[len - 1] = '\0';
1104: if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
1105: fail++;
1.124 djm 1106: free(p);
1.1 provos 1107:
1108: /* verify client user */
1109: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1110: if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
1111: fail++;
1.124 djm 1112: free(p);
1.1 provos 1113:
1114: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1115: fail++;
1116: buffer_free(&b);
1117: return (fail == 0);
1118: }
1119:
1120: int
1.59 avsm 1121: mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1122: {
1123: Key *key;
1124: u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
1125: u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
1126: int verified = 0;
1127: int valid_data = 0;
1128:
1129: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1130: signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
1131: data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
1132:
1133: if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
1.8 mouring 1134: !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
1.14 markus 1135: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1136:
1137: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1138: if (key == NULL)
1.14 markus 1139: fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 1140:
1141: switch (key_blobtype) {
1142: case MM_USERKEY:
1143: valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
1144: break;
1145: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1146: valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
1147: hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
1148: break;
1149: default:
1150: valid_data = 0;
1151: break;
1152: }
1153: if (!valid_data)
1.14 markus 1154: fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 1155:
1156: verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
1157: debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
1.89 markus 1158: __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
1.1 provos 1159:
1.136 djm 1160: /* If auth was successful then record key to ensure it isn't reused */
1.153 djm 1161: if (verified == 1 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
1.136 djm 1162: auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
1163: else
1164: key_free(key);
1165:
1.124 djm 1166: free(blob);
1167: free(signature);
1168: free(data);
1.1 provos 1169:
1.17 stevesk 1170: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
1171:
1.1 provos 1172: monitor_reset_key_state();
1.3 markus 1173:
1.1 provos 1174: buffer_clear(m);
1175: buffer_put_int(m, verified);
1.59 avsm 1176: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
1.1 provos 1177:
1.89 markus 1178: return (verified == 1);
1.1 provos 1179: }
1180:
1.2 markus 1181: static void
1.1 provos 1182: mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
1183: {
1184: socklen_t fromlen;
1185: struct sockaddr_storage from;
1.146 djm 1186:
1187: if (options.use_login)
1188: return;
1.1 provos 1189:
1190: /*
1191: * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
1192: * the address be 0.0.0.0.
1193: */
1194: memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
1.24 stevesk 1195: fromlen = sizeof(from);
1.1 provos 1196: if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
1197: if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
1.74 deraadt 1198: (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
1.1 provos 1199: debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1.50 markus 1200: cleanup_exit(255);
1.1 provos 1201: }
1202: }
1203: /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
1204: record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
1.42 markus 1205: get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
1.24 stevesk 1206: (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
1.1 provos 1207: }
1208:
1209: static void
1210: mm_session_close(Session *s)
1211: {
1.41 djm 1212: debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
1.1 provos 1213: if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1.86 stevesk 1214: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
1.1 provos 1215: session_pty_cleanup2(s);
1216: }
1.96 djm 1217: session_unused(s->self);
1.1 provos 1218: }
1219:
1220: int
1.59 avsm 1221: mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1222: {
1.11 mouring 1223: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1224: Session *s;
1225: int res, fd0;
1226:
1.14 markus 1227: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1228:
1229: buffer_clear(m);
1230: s = session_new();
1231: if (s == NULL)
1232: goto error;
1233: s->authctxt = authctxt;
1234: s->pw = authctxt->pw;
1.11 mouring 1235: s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
1.1 provos 1236: res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
1237: if (res == 0)
1238: goto error;
1239: pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
1240:
1241: buffer_put_int(m, 1);
1242: buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
1243:
1244: /* We need to trick ttyslot */
1245: if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
1.14 markus 1246: fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
1.1 provos 1247:
1248: mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
1249:
1250: /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
1251: close(0);
1.61 dtucker 1252:
1253: /* send messages generated by record_login */
1254: buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
1255: buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
1256:
1257: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1258:
1.92 djm 1259: if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
1260: mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
1261: fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1262:
1263: /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
1264: if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
1.14 markus 1265: fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1266: if (fd0 != 0)
1.14 markus 1267: error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
1.1 provos 1268:
1269: /* slave is not needed */
1270: close(s->ttyfd);
1271: s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
1272: /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
1273: s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
1274:
1.86 stevesk 1275: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
1.1 provos 1276:
1277: return (0);
1278:
1279: error:
1280: if (s != NULL)
1281: mm_session_close(s);
1282: buffer_put_int(m, 0);
1.59 avsm 1283: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1.1 provos 1284: return (0);
1285: }
1286:
1287: int
1.59 avsm 1288: mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1289: {
1290: Session *s;
1291: char *tty;
1292:
1.14 markus 1293: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1294:
1295: tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1296: if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
1297: mm_session_close(s);
1298: buffer_clear(m);
1.124 djm 1299: free(tty);
1.1 provos 1300: return (0);
1301: }
1302:
1.132 markus 1303: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 1304: int
1.59 avsm 1305: mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1306: {
1307: BIGNUM *p;
1308: int rsafail;
1309:
1310: /* Turn off permissions */
1.62 dtucker 1311: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
1.1 provos 1312:
1313: if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1314: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1315:
1316: buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
1317:
1318: rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
1319:
1320: buffer_clear(m);
1321: buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
1322: buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
1323:
1324: BN_clear_free(p);
1325:
1.59 avsm 1326: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
1.1 provos 1327:
1328: /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
1329: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
1330:
1331: return (0);
1332: }
1333:
1334: int
1.59 avsm 1335: mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1336: {
1337: int i;
1338:
1.14 markus 1339: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1340:
1341: if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
1.14 markus 1342: fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
1.1 provos 1343: for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1344: session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
1345:
1346: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
1347: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
1348:
1349: return (0);
1350: }
1351:
1352: int
1.59 avsm 1353: mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1354: {
1355: BIGNUM *client_n;
1356: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1357: u_char *blob = NULL;
1358: u_int blen = 0;
1.1 provos 1359: int allowed = 0;
1360:
1.14 markus 1361: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1362:
1.77 dtucker 1363: auth_method = "rsa";
1.12 markus 1364: if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
1.1 provos 1365: if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1366: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1367: buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
1368: allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
1369: BN_clear_free(client_n);
1370: }
1371: buffer_clear(m);
1372: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 1373: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 1374:
1375: /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
1376: monitor_reset_key_state();
1377:
1378: if (allowed && key != NULL) {
1379: key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */
1380: if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
1.14 markus 1381: fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1382: buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
1383:
1384: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1385: key_blob = blob;
1386: key_bloblen = blen;
1387: key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
1.33 markus 1388: }
1389: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 1390: key_free(key);
1391:
1.59 avsm 1392: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 1393:
1394: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
1395: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
1396: return (0);
1397: }
1398:
1399: int
1.59 avsm 1400: mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1401: {
1402: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1403: u_char *blob;
1404: u_int blen;
1.1 provos 1405:
1.14 markus 1406: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1407:
1408: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1409: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1410: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1411: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1412: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1413: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1414: fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 1415: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1416: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.101 djm 1417: if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
1418: fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
1419: key->type = KEY_RSA1;
1.1 provos 1420: if (ssh1_challenge)
1421: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1422: ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
1423:
1424: buffer_clear(m);
1425: buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
1426:
1.14 markus 1427: debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
1.59 avsm 1428: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
1.1 provos 1429:
1430: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
1.33 markus 1431:
1.124 djm 1432: free(blob);
1.33 markus 1433: key_free(key);
1.1 provos 1434: return (0);
1435: }
1436:
1437: int
1.59 avsm 1438: mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1439: {
1440: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1441: u_char *blob, *response;
1442: u_int blen, len;
1443: int success;
1.1 provos 1444:
1.14 markus 1445: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1446:
1447: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1448: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1449: if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
1.14 markus 1450: fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1451:
1452: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1453: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1454: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1455: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1456: fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
1.1 provos 1457: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1458: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.1 provos 1459: response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1460: if (len != 16)
1.14 markus 1461: fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1462: success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
1463:
1.124 djm 1464: free(blob);
1.1 provos 1465: key_free(key);
1.124 djm 1466: free(response);
1.1 provos 1467:
1468: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
1469:
1470: /* reset state */
1471: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1472: ssh1_challenge = NULL;
1473: monitor_reset_key_state();
1474:
1475: buffer_clear(m);
1476: buffer_put_int(m, success);
1.59 avsm 1477: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
1.1 provos 1478:
1479: return (success);
1480: }
1.132 markus 1481: #endif
1.1 provos 1482:
1483: int
1.59 avsm 1484: mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
1.1 provos 1485: {
1.11 mouring 1486: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1487: int res, status;
1488:
1.14 markus 1489: debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
1.1 provos 1490:
1491: /* The child is terminating */
1492: session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
1493:
1.11 mouring 1494: while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
1.9 markus 1495: if (errno != EINTR)
1496: exit(1);
1.1 provos 1497:
1498: res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
1499:
1500: /* Terminate process */
1.57 deraadt 1501: exit(res);
1.1 provos 1502: }
1503:
1504: void
1.11 mouring 1505: monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1506: {
1.139 markus 1507: struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
1508: struct kex *kex;
1509: int r;
1510:
1511: debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__);
1512: if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
1513: fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1514: sshbuf_free(child_state);
1515: child_state = NULL;
1516:
1.154 mmcc 1517: if ((kex = ssh->kex) != NULL) {
1.139 markus 1518: /* XXX set callbacks */
1.147 djm 1519: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.139 markus 1520: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1521: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1522: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1523: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
1524: kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
1.147 djm 1525: #endif
1.139 markus 1526: kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
1527: kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
1528: kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
1529: kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1530: kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
1531: }
1.3 markus 1532:
1.1 provos 1533: /* Update with new address */
1.139 markus 1534: if (options.compression) {
1535: ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, pmonitor->m_zlib,
1536: (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
1537: (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
1538: }
1.1 provos 1539: }
1540:
1541: /* This function requries careful sanity checking */
1542:
1543: void
1.11 mouring 1544: mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1545: {
1.14 markus 1546: debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
1.1 provos 1547:
1.139 markus 1548: if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1549: fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
1550: mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
1551: child_state);
1552: debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__);
1.1 provos 1553: }
1554:
1555:
1556: /* XXX */
1557:
1558: #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
1.111 djm 1559: if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
1.1 provos 1560: fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
1561: } while (0)
1562:
1.2 markus 1563: static void
1.114 djm 1564: monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
1.3 markus 1565: {
1.114 djm 1566: int pair[2];
1567:
1.1 provos 1568: if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
1.114 djm 1569: fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1570: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1571: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1.114 djm 1572: mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1573: mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1574:
1575: if (do_logfds) {
1576: if (pipe(pair) == -1)
1577: fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1578: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1579: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1580: mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
1581: mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
1582: } else
1583: mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
1.1 provos 1584: }
1585:
1586: #define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
1587:
1588: struct monitor *
1589: monitor_init(void)
1590: {
1.139 markus 1591: struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
1.1 provos 1592: struct monitor *mon;
1593:
1.75 djm 1594: mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
1.1 provos 1595:
1.114 djm 1596: monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
1.1 provos 1597:
1598: /* Used to share zlib space across processes */
1.16 djm 1599: if (options.compression) {
1600: mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
1601: mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
1.1 provos 1602:
1.16 djm 1603: /* Compression needs to share state across borders */
1.139 markus 1604: ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, mon->m_zlib,
1605: (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
1606: (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
1.16 djm 1607: }
1.1 provos 1608:
1609: return mon;
1610: }
1611:
1612: void
1613: monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
1614: {
1.114 djm 1615: monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
1.1 provos 1616: }
1.46 markus 1617:
1618: #ifdef GSSAPI
1619: int
1.59 avsm 1620: mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1621: {
1.59 avsm 1622: gss_OID_desc goid;
1.46 markus 1623: OM_uint32 major;
1624: u_int len;
1625:
1.59 avsm 1626: goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1627: goid.length = len;
1.46 markus 1628:
1.59 avsm 1629: major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
1.46 markus 1630:
1.124 djm 1631: free(goid.elements);
1.46 markus 1632:
1633: buffer_clear(m);
1634: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1635:
1.64 stevesk 1636: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
1.46 markus 1637:
1638: /* Now we have a context, enable the step */
1639: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
1640:
1641: return (0);
1642: }
1643:
1644: int
1.59 avsm 1645: mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1646: {
1647: gss_buffer_desc in;
1648: gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1.64 stevesk 1649: OM_uint32 major, minor;
1.46 markus 1650: OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
1.47 deraadt 1651: u_int len;
1.46 markus 1652:
1.47 deraadt 1653: in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1654: in.length = len;
1.46 markus 1655: major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
1.124 djm 1656: free(in.value);
1.46 markus 1657:
1658: buffer_clear(m);
1659: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1660: buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
1661: buffer_put_int(m, flags);
1.59 avsm 1662: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
1.46 markus 1663:
1664: gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
1665:
1.64 stevesk 1666: if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1.46 markus 1667: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
1668: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.52 markus 1669: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
1.46 markus 1670: }
1671: return (0);
1672: }
1673:
1674: int
1.59 avsm 1675: mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.52 markus 1676: {
1677: gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
1678: OM_uint32 ret;
1679: u_int len;
1.54 djm 1680:
1.52 markus 1681: gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1682: gssbuf.length = len;
1683: mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1684: mic.length = len;
1.54 djm 1685:
1.52 markus 1686: ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
1.54 djm 1687:
1.124 djm 1688: free(gssbuf.value);
1689: free(mic.value);
1.54 djm 1690:
1.52 markus 1691: buffer_clear(m);
1692: buffer_put_int(m, ret);
1.54 djm 1693:
1.59 avsm 1694: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
1.54 djm 1695:
1.52 markus 1696: if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
1697: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.54 djm 1698:
1.52 markus 1699: return (0);
1700: }
1701:
1702: int
1.59 avsm 1703: mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1704: {
1705: int authenticated;
1706:
1707: authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
1708:
1709: buffer_clear(m);
1710: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
1711:
1712: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 1713: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
1.46 markus 1714:
1.64 stevesk 1715: auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
1.46 markus 1716:
1717: /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
1718: return (authenticated);
1719: }
1720: #endif /* GSSAPI */
1.100 djm 1721: