Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c, Revision 1.158
1.158 ! djm 1: /* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.157 2016/02/15 23:32:37 djm Exp $ */
1.1 provos 2: /*
3: * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
4: * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
5: * All rights reserved.
6: *
7: * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8: * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9: * are met:
10: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12: * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14: * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15: *
16: * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
17: * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
18: * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
19: * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
20: * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
21: * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
22: * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
23: * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
24: * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
25: * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
26: */
27:
1.67 stevesk 28: #include <sys/types.h>
29: #include <sys/wait.h>
1.79 stevesk 30: #include <sys/socket.h>
1.85 deraadt 31: #include <sys/tree.h>
1.95 djm 32: #include <sys/queue.h>
1.1 provos 33:
1.132 markus 34: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.78 stevesk 35: #include <openssl/dh.h>
1.132 markus 36: #endif
1.78 stevesk 37:
1.81 stevesk 38: #include <errno.h>
1.80 stevesk 39: #include <fcntl.h>
1.65 stevesk 40: #include <paths.h>
1.114 djm 41: #include <poll.h>
1.78 stevesk 42: #include <pwd.h>
1.68 stevesk 43: #include <signal.h>
1.134 djm 44: #include <stdarg.h>
1.142 millert 45: #include <stdint.h>
1.134 djm 46: #include <stdio.h>
1.84 stevesk 47: #include <stdlib.h>
1.82 stevesk 48: #include <string.h>
1.1 provos 49:
1.114 djm 50: #include "atomicio.h"
1.85 deraadt 51: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.1 provos 52: #include "ssh.h"
1.85 deraadt 53: #include "key.h"
54: #include "buffer.h"
55: #include "hostfile.h"
1.1 provos 56: #include "auth.h"
1.85 deraadt 57: #include "cipher.h"
1.1 provos 58: #include "kex.h"
59: #include "dh.h"
1.88 miod 60: #include <zlib.h>
1.1 provos 61: #include "packet.h"
62: #include "auth-options.h"
63: #include "sshpty.h"
64: #include "channels.h"
65: #include "session.h"
66: #include "sshlogin.h"
67: #include "canohost.h"
68: #include "log.h"
1.135 millert 69: #include "misc.h"
1.1 provos 70: #include "servconf.h"
71: #include "monitor.h"
72: #include "monitor_mm.h"
1.85 deraadt 73: #ifdef GSSAPI
74: #include "ssh-gss.h"
75: #endif
1.1 provos 76: #include "monitor_wrap.h"
77: #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
78: #include "compat.h"
79: #include "ssh2.h"
1.127 markus 80: #include "authfd.h"
1.137 djm 81: #include "match.h"
1.138 djm 82: #include "ssherr.h"
1.1 provos 83:
1.46 markus 84: #ifdef GSSAPI
85: static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
86: #endif
87:
1.1 provos 88: /* Imports */
89: extern ServerOptions options;
90: extern u_int utmp_len;
91: extern u_char session_id[];
92: extern Buffer auth_debug;
93: extern int auth_debug_init;
1.61 dtucker 94: extern Buffer loginmsg;
1.1 provos 95:
96: /* State exported from the child */
1.139 markus 97: static struct sshbuf *child_state;
1.1 provos 98:
1.43 markus 99: /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
1.1 provos 100:
101: int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
102: int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
103: int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
1.10 djm 104: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
1.1 provos 105: int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
106: int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
107: int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
108: int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
109: int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
110: int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
111: int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
112: int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
113: int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
114: int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
115: int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
116: int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
117: int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
118: int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
119: int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
120: int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
121:
1.46 markus 122: #ifdef GSSAPI
123: int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
124: int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
125: int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
1.52 markus 126: int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
1.46 markus 127: #endif
1.25 itojun 128:
1.114 djm 129: static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
130:
1.1 provos 131: static Authctxt *authctxt;
1.132 markus 132:
133: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 134: static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
1.132 markus 135: #endif
1.1 provos 136:
137: /* local state for key verify */
138: static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
139: static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
140: static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
1.26 markus 141: static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
142: static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
1.1 provos 143: static char *auth_method = "unknown";
1.119 djm 144: static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
1.44 markus 145: static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
1.13 markus 146: static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
1.40 markus 147: static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
1.1 provos 148:
149: struct mon_table {
150: enum monitor_reqtype type;
151: int flags;
152: int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
153: };
154:
155: #define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
156: #define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
157: #define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
1.77 dtucker 158: #define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
1.1 provos 159:
160: #define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
161:
162: #define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
163:
164: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
1.132 markus 165: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 166: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
1.132 markus 167: #endif
1.1 provos 168: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
169: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
170: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
1.10 djm 171: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
1.1 provos 172: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
173: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 174: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.1 provos 175: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
176: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
1.46 markus 177: #ifdef GSSAPI
178: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
179: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
180: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
1.52 markus 181: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
1.46 markus 182: #endif
1.1 provos 183: {0, 0, NULL}
184: };
185:
186: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
1.132 markus 187: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 188: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
1.132 markus 189: #endif
1.1 provos 190: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
191: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
192: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
193: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
194: {0, 0, NULL}
195: };
196:
197: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
1.132 markus 198: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 199: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
200: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
201: {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
202: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
1.77 dtucker 203: {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
204: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
1.1 provos 205: {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
206: {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
207: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 208: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.132 markus 209: #endif
1.1 provos 210: {0, 0, NULL}
211: };
212:
213: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
1.132 markus 214: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 215: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
216: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
217: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
1.132 markus 218: #endif
1.1 provos 219: {0, 0, NULL}
220: };
221:
222: struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
223:
224: /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
225:
226: static void
227: monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
228: {
229: while (ent->f != NULL) {
230: if (ent->type == type) {
231: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
232: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
233: return;
234: }
235: ent++;
236: }
237: }
238:
239: static void
240: monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
241: {
242: struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
243:
244: while (ent->f != NULL) {
245: if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
246: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
247: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
248: }
249: ent++;
250: }
251: }
252:
1.50 markus 253: void
254: monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 255: {
256: struct mon_table *ent;
1.119 djm 257: int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
1.1 provos 258:
259: debug3("preauth child monitor started");
260:
1.114 djm 261: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
262: close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
263: pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
264:
1.50 markus 265: authctxt = _authctxt;
266: memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
267:
1.1 provos 268: if (compat20) {
269: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
270:
271: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
272: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
273: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
274: } else {
275: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
276:
277: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
278: }
279:
280: /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
281: while (!authenticated) {
1.119 djm 282: partial = 0;
1.77 dtucker 283: auth_method = "unknown";
1.119 djm 284: auth_submethod = NULL;
1.89 markus 285: authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
1.118 djm 286:
287: /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
288: if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
289: if (!compat20)
290: fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported"
291: "with SSH protocol 1");
292: if (authenticated &&
293: !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
1.122 markus 294: auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
1.118 djm 295: debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
296: auth_method);
297: authenticated = 0;
1.119 djm 298: partial = 1;
1.118 djm 299: }
300: }
301:
1.1 provos 302: if (authenticated) {
303: if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
304: fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
1.14 markus 305: __func__, ent->type);
1.1 provos 306: if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
307: !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
308: authenticated = 0;
309: }
1.77 dtucker 310: if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
1.119 djm 311: auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial,
1.125 djm 312: auth_method, auth_submethod);
1.150 djm 313: if (!partial && !authenticated)
1.1 provos 314: authctxt->failures++;
315: }
316: }
317:
318: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 319: fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
1.77 dtucker 320: if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
321: fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
1.1 provos 322:
323: debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
1.14 markus 324: __func__, authctxt->user);
1.1 provos 325:
1.11 mouring 326: mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
1.120 markus 327:
328: /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
329: while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
330: ;
1.114 djm 331:
332: close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
333: close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
334: pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
1.1 provos 335: }
336:
1.40 markus 337: static void
338: monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
339: {
340: monitor_child_pid = pid;
341: }
342:
343: static void
1.59 avsm 344: monitor_child_handler(int sig)
1.40 markus 345: {
1.59 avsm 346: kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
1.40 markus 347: }
348:
1.1 provos 349: void
1.11 mouring 350: monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 351: {
1.114 djm 352: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
353: pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
354:
1.40 markus 355: monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
356: signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
357: signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
1.91 djm 358: signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
1.40 markus 359:
1.1 provos 360: if (compat20) {
361: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
362:
363: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
364: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
365: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
366: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
367: } else {
368: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
369: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
370: }
371: if (!no_pty_flag) {
372: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
373: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
374: }
375:
376: for (;;)
1.11 mouring 377: monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
1.1 provos 378: }
379:
380: void
1.11 mouring 381: monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 382: {
1.16 djm 383: if (options.compression) {
384: /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
385: mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
386: }
1.1 provos 387: }
388:
1.139 markus 389: /* Allocation functions for zlib */
390: static void *
391: mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
392: {
1.151 deraadt 393: if (size == 0 || ncount == 0 || ncount > SIZE_MAX / size)
1.139 markus 394: fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
395:
1.151 deraadt 396: return mm_malloc(mm, size * ncount);
1.139 markus 397: }
398:
399: static void
400: mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
401: {
402: mm_free(mm, address);
403: }
404:
1.114 djm 405: static int
406: monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
407: {
408: Buffer logmsg;
409: u_int len, level;
410: char *msg;
411:
412: buffer_init(&logmsg);
413:
414: /* Read length */
415: buffer_append_space(&logmsg, 4);
416: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
417: buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) {
418: if (errno == EPIPE) {
1.116 djm 419: buffer_free(&logmsg);
1.114 djm 420: debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
421: close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
422: pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
423: return -1;
424: }
425: fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
426: }
427: len = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
428: if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
429: fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len);
430:
431: /* Read severity, message */
432: buffer_clear(&logmsg);
433: buffer_append_space(&logmsg, len);
434: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
435: buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg))
436: fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
437:
438: /* Log it */
439: level = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
440: msg = buffer_get_string(&logmsg, NULL);
441: if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
442: fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
443: __func__, level);
444: do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
445:
446: buffer_free(&logmsg);
1.124 djm 447: free(msg);
1.114 djm 448:
449: return 0;
450: }
451:
1.1 provos 452: int
1.11 mouring 453: monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
1.1 provos 454: struct mon_table **pent)
455: {
456: Buffer m;
457: int ret;
458: u_char type;
1.114 djm 459: struct pollfd pfd[2];
460:
461: for (;;) {
1.130 tedu 462: memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
1.114 djm 463: pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
464: pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
465: pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
466: pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
1.115 djm 467: if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
468: if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
469: continue;
1.114 djm 470: fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.115 djm 471: }
1.114 djm 472: if (pfd[1].revents) {
473: /*
474: * Drain all log messages before processing next
475: * monitor request.
476: */
477: monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
478: continue;
479: }
480: if (pfd[0].revents)
481: break; /* Continues below */
482: }
1.1 provos 483:
484: buffer_init(&m);
485:
1.11 mouring 486: mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 487: type = buffer_get_char(&m);
488:
1.14 markus 489: debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 490:
491: while (ent->f != NULL) {
492: if (ent->type == type)
493: break;
494: ent++;
495: }
496:
497: if (ent->f != NULL) {
498: if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
1.14 markus 499: fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
1.1 provos 500: type);
1.11 mouring 501: ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
1.1 provos 502: buffer_free(&m);
503:
504: /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
505: if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
1.14 markus 506: debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
1.1 provos 507: type);
508: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
509: }
510:
511: if (pent != NULL)
512: *pent = ent;
1.3 markus 513:
1.1 provos 514: return ret;
515: }
516:
1.14 markus 517: fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 518:
519: /* NOTREACHED */
520: return (-1);
521: }
522:
523: /* allowed key state */
524: static int
525: monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
526: {
527: /* make sure key is allowed */
528: if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
1.108 djm 529: timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
1.1 provos 530: return (0);
531: return (1);
532: }
533:
534: static void
535: monitor_reset_key_state(void)
536: {
537: /* reset state */
1.124 djm 538: free(key_blob);
539: free(hostbased_cuser);
540: free(hostbased_chost);
1.1 provos 541: key_blob = NULL;
542: key_bloblen = 0;
543: key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
544: hostbased_cuser = NULL;
545: hostbased_chost = NULL;
546: }
547:
1.132 markus 548: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 549: int
1.59 avsm 550: mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 551: {
552: DH *dh;
553: int min, want, max;
554:
555: min = buffer_get_int(m);
556: want = buffer_get_int(m);
557: max = buffer_get_int(m);
558:
559: debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 560: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 561: /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
562: if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
563: fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
1.14 markus 564: __func__, min, want, max);
1.1 provos 565:
566: buffer_clear(m);
567:
568: dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
569: if (dh == NULL) {
570: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
571: return (0);
572: } else {
573: /* Send first bignum */
574: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
575: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
576: buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
1.3 markus 577:
1.1 provos 578: DH_free(dh);
579: }
1.59 avsm 580: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
1.1 provos 581: return (0);
582: }
1.132 markus 583: #endif
1.1 provos 584:
585: int
1.59 avsm 586: mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 587: {
1.144 djm 588: struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
1.138 djm 589: extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */
590: struct sshkey *key;
1.157 djm 591: struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
592: u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
593: char *alg = NULL;
1.155 markus 594: size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
1.144 djm 595: int r, keyid, is_proof = 0;
1.145 djm 596: const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
1.3 markus 597:
1.14 markus 598: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 599:
1.138 djm 600: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
1.155 markus 601: (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 ||
602: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0)
1.138 djm 603: fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1.1 provos 604:
1.69 djm 605: /*
1.110 djm 606: * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
607: * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
1.144 djm 608: *
609: * Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey
610: * proof.
611: *
612: * XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too?
613: * it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather
614: * than the full kex structure...
1.69 djm 615: */
1.144 djm 616: if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) {
617: /*
618: * Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what
619: * the client sent us.
620: */
621: if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */
622: fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu", __func__, datlen);
623: if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL)
624: fatal("%s: no hostkey for index %d", __func__, keyid);
625: if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
626: fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
1.145 djm 627: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
628: (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
1.152 jsg 629: session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
1.144 djm 630: (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
631: fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key "
632: "proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
633: if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) ||
634: memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0)
635: fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
636: __func__, datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
637: sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
638: is_proof = 1;
639: }
1.1 provos 640:
1.13 markus 641: /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
642: if (session_id2_len == 0) {
643: session_id2_len = datlen;
644: session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
645: memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
646: }
647:
1.127 markus 648: if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
1.155 markus 649: if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
1.138 djm 650: datafellows)) != 0)
651: fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s",
652: __func__, ssh_err(r));
1.144 djm 653: } else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
1.138 djm 654: auth_sock > 0) {
655: if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
1.155 markus 656: p, datlen, alg, datafellows)) != 0) {
1.138 djm 657: fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
658: __func__, ssh_err(r));
659: }
1.127 markus 660: } else
1.14 markus 661: fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
1.1 provos 662:
1.144 djm 663: debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__,
664: is_proof ? "KEX" : "hostkey proof", signature, siglen);
1.1 provos 665:
1.138 djm 666: sshbuf_reset(m);
667: if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
668: fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1.1 provos 669:
1.157 djm 670: free(alg);
1.124 djm 671: free(p);
672: free(signature);
1.1 provos 673:
1.59 avsm 674: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
1.1 provos 675:
676: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
677: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
678:
679: return (0);
680: }
681:
682: /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
683:
684: int
1.59 avsm 685: mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 686: {
1.60 dtucker 687: char *username;
1.1 provos 688: struct passwd *pwent;
689: int allowed = 0;
1.113 djm 690: u_int i;
1.3 markus 691:
1.14 markus 692: debug3("%s", __func__);
1.1 provos 693:
694: if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
1.14 markus 695: fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
1.1 provos 696:
1.60 dtucker 697: username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.1 provos 698:
1.60 dtucker 699: pwent = getpwnamallow(username);
1.1 provos 700:
1.60 dtucker 701: authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
702: setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
1.124 djm 703: free(username);
1.1 provos 704:
705: buffer_clear(m);
706:
707: if (pwent == NULL) {
708: buffer_put_char(m, 0);
1.53 djm 709: authctxt->pw = fakepw();
1.1 provos 710: goto out;
711: }
712:
713: allowed = 1;
1.4 markus 714: authctxt->pw = pwent;
1.1 provos 715: authctxt->valid = 1;
716:
717: buffer_put_char(m, 1);
718: buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
719: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
720: buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
721: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
722: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
723: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
724: buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
1.94 dtucker 725:
726: out:
1.90 dtucker 727: buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
1.112 djm 728:
729: #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
730: if (options.x != NULL) \
731: buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x); \
732: } while (0)
1.113 djm 733: #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
734: for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) \
735: buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x[i]); \
736: } while (0)
1.112 djm 737: /* See comment in servconf.h */
738: COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
739: #undef M_CP_STROPT
1.113 djm 740: #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
1.118 djm 741:
742: /* Create valid auth method lists */
743: if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
744: /*
745: * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
746: * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
747: * authentication to succeed.
748: */
749: debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
750: }
751:
1.14 markus 752: debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
1.59 avsm 753: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
1.1 provos 754:
755: /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
756: if (!compat20)
757: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
1.10 djm 758: else {
1.1 provos 759: /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
760: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
1.10 djm 761: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
762: }
763:
764: return (0);
765: }
766:
1.59 avsm 767: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.10 djm 768: {
769: char *banner;
770:
771: buffer_clear(m);
772: banner = auth2_read_banner();
773: buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
1.59 avsm 774: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
1.124 djm 775: free(banner);
1.1 provos 776:
777: return (0);
778: }
779:
780: int
1.59 avsm 781: mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 782: {
783: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
784:
785: authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
786: authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.6 stevesk 787: debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
1.14 markus 788: __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
1.6 stevesk 789:
1.1 provos 790: if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
1.124 djm 791: free(authctxt->style);
1.1 provos 792: authctxt->style = NULL;
793: }
794:
795: return (0);
796: }
797:
798: int
1.59 avsm 799: mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 800: {
801: static int call_count;
802: char *passwd;
1.22 stevesk 803: int authenticated;
804: u_int plen;
1.1 provos 805:
806: passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
807: /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
1.12 markus 808: authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
1.48 markus 809: auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
1.131 djm 810: explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
1.124 djm 811: free(passwd);
1.1 provos 812:
813: buffer_clear(m);
814: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
815:
1.14 markus 816: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 817: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
1.1 provos 818:
819: call_count++;
820: if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
821: auth_method = "none";
822: else
823: auth_method = "password";
824:
825: /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
826: return (authenticated);
827: }
828:
829: int
1.59 avsm 830: mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 831: {
832: char *name, *infotxt;
833: u_int numprompts;
834: u_int *echo_on;
835: char **prompts;
1.31 markus 836: u_int success;
1.1 provos 837:
1.31 markus 838: success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
839: &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
1.1 provos 840:
841: buffer_clear(m);
1.31 markus 842: buffer_put_int(m, success);
843: if (success)
1.1 provos 844: buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
845:
1.31 markus 846: debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
1.59 avsm 847: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
1.1 provos 848:
1.31 markus 849: if (success) {
1.124 djm 850: free(name);
851: free(infotxt);
852: free(prompts);
853: free(echo_on);
1.1 provos 854: }
855:
856: return (0);
857: }
858:
859: int
1.59 avsm 860: mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 861: {
862: char *response;
863: int authok;
864:
1.154 mmcc 865: if (authctxt->as == NULL)
1.14 markus 866: fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
1.1 provos 867:
868: response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1.12 markus 869: authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
870: auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
1.1 provos 871: authctxt->as = NULL;
1.14 markus 872: debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
1.124 djm 873: free(response);
1.1 provos 874:
875: buffer_clear(m);
876: buffer_put_int(m, authok);
877:
1.14 markus 878: debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
1.59 avsm 879: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
1.1 provos 880:
1.122 markus 881: if (compat20) {
882: auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
883: auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
884: } else
1.118 djm 885: auth_method = "bsdauth";
1.1 provos 886:
887: return (authok != 0);
888: }
889:
890: int
1.59 avsm 891: mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 892: {
893: Key *key;
1.26 markus 894: char *cuser, *chost;
895: u_char *blob;
1.148 djm 896: u_int bloblen, pubkey_auth_attempt;
1.1 provos 897: enum mm_keytype type = 0;
898: int allowed = 0;
899:
1.14 markus 900: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.3 markus 901:
1.1 provos 902: type = buffer_get_int(m);
903: cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
904: chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
905: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1.148 djm 906: pubkey_auth_attempt = buffer_get_int(m);
1.1 provos 907:
908: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
909:
910: if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
911: (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
1.14 markus 912: fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 913:
1.14 markus 914: debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
1.1 provos 915:
1.51 djm 916: if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
1.137 djm 917: /* These should not make it past the privsep child */
918: if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
919: (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
920: fatal("%s: passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key", __func__);
921:
1.63 deraadt 922: switch (type) {
1.1 provos 923: case MM_USERKEY:
1.12 markus 924: allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
1.136 djm 925: !auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key) &&
1.137 djm 926: match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
1.149 djm 927: options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1 &&
1.148 djm 928: user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key,
929: pubkey_auth_attempt);
1.126 djm 930: pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
1.77 dtucker 931: auth_method = "publickey";
1.148 djm 932: if (options.pubkey_authentication &&
933: (!pubkey_auth_attempt || allowed != 1))
1.97 dtucker 934: auth_clear_options();
1.1 provos 935: break;
936: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1.12 markus 937: allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
1.137 djm 938: match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
1.149 djm 939: options.hostbased_key_types, 0) == 1 &&
1.12 markus 940: hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 941: cuser, chost, key);
1.126 djm 942: pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
943: "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
944: cuser, chost);
1.77 dtucker 945: auth_method = "hostbased";
1.1 provos 946: break;
1.132 markus 947: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 948: case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
949: key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
1.12 markus 950: allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
951: auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 952: cuser, chost, key);
1.97 dtucker 953: if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
954: auth_clear_options();
1.77 dtucker 955: auth_method = "rsa";
1.1 provos 956: break;
1.132 markus 957: #endif
1.1 provos 958: default:
1.14 markus 959: fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
1.1 provos 960: break;
961: }
1.33 markus 962: }
963: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 964: key_free(key);
965:
966: /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
967: monitor_reset_key_state();
968:
969: if (allowed) {
970: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
971: key_blob = blob;
972: key_bloblen = bloblen;
973: key_blobtype = type;
974: hostbased_cuser = cuser;
975: hostbased_chost = chost;
1.72 djm 976: } else {
1.77 dtucker 977: /* Log failed attempt */
1.125 djm 978: auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
1.124 djm 979: free(blob);
980: free(cuser);
981: free(chost);
1.1 provos 982: }
983:
984: debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
1.98 dtucker 985: __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
1.1 provos 986:
987: buffer_clear(m);
988: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 989: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 990:
1.59 avsm 991: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 992:
993: if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
994: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
995:
996: return (0);
997: }
998:
999: static int
1000: monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
1001: {
1002: Buffer b;
1.121 djm 1003: char *p, *userstyle;
1.1 provos 1004: u_int len;
1005: int fail = 0;
1006:
1007: buffer_init(&b);
1008: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 1009:
1.1 provos 1010: if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
1.13 markus 1011: p = buffer_ptr(&b);
1012: len = buffer_len(&b);
1013: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1014: (len < session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1015: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.13 markus 1016: fail++;
1.1 provos 1017: buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
1018: } else {
1.13 markus 1019: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
1020: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1021: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1022: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 1023: fail++;
1.124 djm 1024: free(p);
1.1 provos 1025: }
1026: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1027: fail++;
1.121 djm 1028: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1029: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1030: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1031: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1032: if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 1033: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.121 djm 1034: userstyle, p);
1.1 provos 1035: fail++;
1036: }
1.124 djm 1037: free(userstyle);
1038: free(p);
1.1 provos 1039: buffer_skip_string(&b);
1040: if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
1041: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
1042: fail++;
1043: } else {
1.121 djm 1044: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1.1 provos 1045: if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
1046: fail++;
1.124 djm 1047: free(p);
1.1 provos 1048: if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
1049: fail++;
1050: buffer_skip_string(&b);
1051: }
1052: buffer_skip_string(&b);
1053: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1054: fail++;
1055: buffer_free(&b);
1056: return (fail == 0);
1057: }
1058:
1059: static int
1.26 markus 1060: monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
1061: char *chost)
1.1 provos 1062: {
1063: Buffer b;
1.121 djm 1064: char *p, *userstyle;
1.1 provos 1065: u_int len;
1066: int fail = 0;
1067:
1068: buffer_init(&b);
1069: buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1.3 markus 1070:
1.13 markus 1071: p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
1072: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1073: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1074: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 1075: fail++;
1.124 djm 1076: free(p);
1.13 markus 1077:
1.1 provos 1078: if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1079: fail++;
1.121 djm 1080: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1081: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1082: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1083: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1084: if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
1.38 itojun 1085: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1.121 djm 1086: userstyle, p);
1.1 provos 1087: fail++;
1088: }
1.121 djm 1089: free(userstyle);
1.124 djm 1090: free(p);
1.1 provos 1091: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */
1.121 djm 1092: p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1.1 provos 1093: if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
1094: fail++;
1.124 djm 1095: free(p);
1.1 provos 1096: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkalg */
1097: buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkblob */
1098:
1099: /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
1100: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1101: if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
1102: p[len - 1] = '\0';
1103: if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
1104: fail++;
1.124 djm 1105: free(p);
1.1 provos 1106:
1107: /* verify client user */
1108: p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1109: if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
1110: fail++;
1.124 djm 1111: free(p);
1.1 provos 1112:
1113: if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1114: fail++;
1115: buffer_free(&b);
1116: return (fail == 0);
1117: }
1118:
1119: int
1.59 avsm 1120: mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1121: {
1122: Key *key;
1123: u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
1124: u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
1125: int verified = 0;
1126: int valid_data = 0;
1127:
1128: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1129: signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
1130: data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
1131:
1132: if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
1.8 mouring 1133: !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
1.14 markus 1134: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1135:
1136: key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1137: if (key == NULL)
1.14 markus 1138: fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 1139:
1140: switch (key_blobtype) {
1141: case MM_USERKEY:
1142: valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
1143: break;
1144: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1145: valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
1146: hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
1147: break;
1148: default:
1149: valid_data = 0;
1150: break;
1151: }
1152: if (!valid_data)
1.14 markus 1153: fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
1.1 provos 1154:
1155: verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
1156: debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
1.89 markus 1157: __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
1.1 provos 1158:
1.136 djm 1159: /* If auth was successful then record key to ensure it isn't reused */
1.153 djm 1160: if (verified == 1 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
1.136 djm 1161: auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
1162: else
1163: key_free(key);
1164:
1.124 djm 1165: free(blob);
1166: free(signature);
1167: free(data);
1.1 provos 1168:
1.17 stevesk 1169: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
1170:
1.1 provos 1171: monitor_reset_key_state();
1.3 markus 1172:
1.1 provos 1173: buffer_clear(m);
1174: buffer_put_int(m, verified);
1.59 avsm 1175: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
1.1 provos 1176:
1.89 markus 1177: return (verified == 1);
1.1 provos 1178: }
1179:
1.2 markus 1180: static void
1.1 provos 1181: mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
1182: {
1.158 ! djm 1183: struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
1.1 provos 1184: socklen_t fromlen;
1185: struct sockaddr_storage from;
1.146 djm 1186:
1187: if (options.use_login)
1188: return;
1.1 provos 1189:
1190: /*
1191: * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
1192: * the address be 0.0.0.0.
1193: */
1194: memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
1.24 stevesk 1195: fromlen = sizeof(from);
1.1 provos 1196: if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
1197: if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
1.74 deraadt 1198: (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
1.1 provos 1199: debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1.50 markus 1200: cleanup_exit(255);
1.1 provos 1201: }
1202: }
1203: /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
1204: record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
1.158 ! djm 1205: session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns),
1.24 stevesk 1206: (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
1.1 provos 1207: }
1208:
1209: static void
1210: mm_session_close(Session *s)
1211: {
1.41 djm 1212: debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
1.1 provos 1213: if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1.86 stevesk 1214: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
1.1 provos 1215: session_pty_cleanup2(s);
1216: }
1.96 djm 1217: session_unused(s->self);
1.1 provos 1218: }
1219:
1220: int
1.59 avsm 1221: mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1222: {
1.11 mouring 1223: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1224: Session *s;
1225: int res, fd0;
1226:
1.14 markus 1227: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1228:
1229: buffer_clear(m);
1230: s = session_new();
1231: if (s == NULL)
1232: goto error;
1233: s->authctxt = authctxt;
1234: s->pw = authctxt->pw;
1.11 mouring 1235: s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
1.1 provos 1236: res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
1237: if (res == 0)
1238: goto error;
1239: pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
1240:
1241: buffer_put_int(m, 1);
1242: buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
1243:
1244: /* We need to trick ttyslot */
1245: if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
1.14 markus 1246: fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
1.1 provos 1247:
1248: mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
1249:
1250: /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
1251: close(0);
1.61 dtucker 1252:
1253: /* send messages generated by record_login */
1254: buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
1255: buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
1256:
1257: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1258:
1.92 djm 1259: if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
1260: mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
1261: fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1262:
1263: /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
1264: if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
1.14 markus 1265: fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1266: if (fd0 != 0)
1.14 markus 1267: error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
1.1 provos 1268:
1269: /* slave is not needed */
1270: close(s->ttyfd);
1271: s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
1272: /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
1273: s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
1274:
1.86 stevesk 1275: debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
1.1 provos 1276:
1277: return (0);
1278:
1279: error:
1280: if (s != NULL)
1281: mm_session_close(s);
1282: buffer_put_int(m, 0);
1.59 avsm 1283: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1.1 provos 1284: return (0);
1285: }
1286:
1287: int
1.59 avsm 1288: mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1289: {
1290: Session *s;
1291: char *tty;
1292:
1.14 markus 1293: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1294:
1295: tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1296: if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
1297: mm_session_close(s);
1298: buffer_clear(m);
1.124 djm 1299: free(tty);
1.1 provos 1300: return (0);
1301: }
1302:
1.132 markus 1303: #ifdef WITH_SSH1
1.1 provos 1304: int
1.59 avsm 1305: mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1306: {
1307: BIGNUM *p;
1308: int rsafail;
1309:
1310: /* Turn off permissions */
1.62 dtucker 1311: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
1.1 provos 1312:
1313: if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1314: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1315:
1316: buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
1317:
1318: rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
1319:
1320: buffer_clear(m);
1321: buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
1322: buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
1323:
1324: BN_clear_free(p);
1325:
1.59 avsm 1326: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
1.1 provos 1327:
1328: /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
1329: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
1330:
1331: return (0);
1332: }
1333:
1334: int
1.59 avsm 1335: mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1336: {
1337: int i;
1338:
1.14 markus 1339: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1340:
1341: if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
1.14 markus 1342: fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
1.1 provos 1343: for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1344: session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
1345:
1346: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
1347: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
1348:
1349: return (0);
1350: }
1351:
1352: int
1.59 avsm 1353: mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1354: {
1355: BIGNUM *client_n;
1356: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1357: u_char *blob = NULL;
1358: u_int blen = 0;
1.1 provos 1359: int allowed = 0;
1360:
1.14 markus 1361: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1362:
1.77 dtucker 1363: auth_method = "rsa";
1.12 markus 1364: if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
1.1 provos 1365: if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1366: fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1.1 provos 1367: buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
1368: allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
1369: BN_clear_free(client_n);
1370: }
1371: buffer_clear(m);
1372: buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1.32 markus 1373: buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1.1 provos 1374:
1375: /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
1376: monitor_reset_key_state();
1377:
1378: if (allowed && key != NULL) {
1379: key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */
1380: if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
1.14 markus 1381: fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1382: buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
1383:
1384: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1385: key_blob = blob;
1386: key_bloblen = blen;
1387: key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
1.33 markus 1388: }
1389: if (key != NULL)
1.1 provos 1390: key_free(key);
1391:
1.59 avsm 1392: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 1393:
1394: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
1395: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
1396: return (0);
1397: }
1398:
1399: int
1.59 avsm 1400: mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1401: {
1402: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1403: u_char *blob;
1404: u_int blen;
1.1 provos 1405:
1.14 markus 1406: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1407:
1408: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1409: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1410: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1411: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1412: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1413: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1414: fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
1.1 provos 1415: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1416: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.101 djm 1417: if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
1418: fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
1419: key->type = KEY_RSA1;
1.1 provos 1420: if (ssh1_challenge)
1421: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1422: ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
1423:
1424: buffer_clear(m);
1425: buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
1426:
1.14 markus 1427: debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
1.59 avsm 1428: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
1.1 provos 1429:
1430: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
1.33 markus 1431:
1.124 djm 1432: free(blob);
1.33 markus 1433: key_free(key);
1.1 provos 1434: return (0);
1435: }
1436:
1437: int
1.59 avsm 1438: mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.1 provos 1439: {
1440: Key *key = NULL;
1.3 markus 1441: u_char *blob, *response;
1442: u_int blen, len;
1443: int success;
1.1 provos 1444:
1.14 markus 1445: debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1.1 provos 1446:
1447: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.14 markus 1448: fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1.1 provos 1449: if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
1.14 markus 1450: fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1451:
1452: blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1453: if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1.14 markus 1454: fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1.1 provos 1455: if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1.14 markus 1456: fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
1.1 provos 1457: if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1.14 markus 1458: fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1.1 provos 1459: response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1460: if (len != 16)
1.14 markus 1461: fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
1.1 provos 1462: success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
1463:
1.124 djm 1464: free(blob);
1.1 provos 1465: key_free(key);
1.124 djm 1466: free(response);
1.1 provos 1467:
1468: auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
1469:
1470: /* reset state */
1471: BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1472: ssh1_challenge = NULL;
1473: monitor_reset_key_state();
1474:
1475: buffer_clear(m);
1476: buffer_put_int(m, success);
1.59 avsm 1477: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
1.1 provos 1478:
1479: return (success);
1480: }
1.132 markus 1481: #endif
1.1 provos 1482:
1483: int
1.59 avsm 1484: mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
1.1 provos 1485: {
1.11 mouring 1486: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1487: int res, status;
1488:
1.14 markus 1489: debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
1.1 provos 1490:
1491: /* The child is terminating */
1492: session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
1493:
1.11 mouring 1494: while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
1.9 markus 1495: if (errno != EINTR)
1496: exit(1);
1.1 provos 1497:
1498: res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
1499:
1500: /* Terminate process */
1.57 deraadt 1501: exit(res);
1.1 provos 1502: }
1503:
1504: void
1.11 mouring 1505: monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1506: {
1.139 markus 1507: struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
1508: struct kex *kex;
1509: int r;
1510:
1511: debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__);
1512: if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
1513: fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1514: sshbuf_free(child_state);
1515: child_state = NULL;
1516:
1.154 mmcc 1517: if ((kex = ssh->kex) != NULL) {
1.139 markus 1518: /* XXX set callbacks */
1.147 djm 1519: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.139 markus 1520: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1521: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1522: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1523: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
1524: kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
1.147 djm 1525: #endif
1.139 markus 1526: kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
1527: kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
1528: kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
1529: kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1530: kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
1531: }
1.3 markus 1532:
1.1 provos 1533: /* Update with new address */
1.139 markus 1534: if (options.compression) {
1535: ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, pmonitor->m_zlib,
1536: (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
1537: (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
1538: }
1.1 provos 1539: }
1540:
1541: /* This function requries careful sanity checking */
1542:
1543: void
1.11 mouring 1544: mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1545: {
1.14 markus 1546: debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
1.1 provos 1547:
1.139 markus 1548: if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1549: fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
1550: mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
1551: child_state);
1552: debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__);
1.1 provos 1553: }
1554:
1555:
1556: /* XXX */
1557:
1558: #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
1.111 djm 1559: if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
1.1 provos 1560: fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
1561: } while (0)
1562:
1.2 markus 1563: static void
1.114 djm 1564: monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
1.3 markus 1565: {
1.114 djm 1566: int pair[2];
1567:
1.1 provos 1568: if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
1.114 djm 1569: fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1570: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1571: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1.114 djm 1572: mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1573: mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1574:
1575: if (do_logfds) {
1576: if (pipe(pair) == -1)
1577: fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1578: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1579: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1580: mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
1581: mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
1582: } else
1583: mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
1.1 provos 1584: }
1585:
1586: #define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
1587:
1588: struct monitor *
1589: monitor_init(void)
1590: {
1.139 markus 1591: struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
1.1 provos 1592: struct monitor *mon;
1593:
1.75 djm 1594: mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
1.1 provos 1595:
1.114 djm 1596: monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
1.1 provos 1597:
1598: /* Used to share zlib space across processes */
1.16 djm 1599: if (options.compression) {
1600: mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
1601: mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
1.1 provos 1602:
1.16 djm 1603: /* Compression needs to share state across borders */
1.139 markus 1604: ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, mon->m_zlib,
1605: (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
1606: (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
1.16 djm 1607: }
1.1 provos 1608:
1609: return mon;
1610: }
1611:
1612: void
1613: monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
1614: {
1.114 djm 1615: monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
1.1 provos 1616: }
1.46 markus 1617:
1618: #ifdef GSSAPI
1619: int
1.59 avsm 1620: mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1621: {
1.59 avsm 1622: gss_OID_desc goid;
1.46 markus 1623: OM_uint32 major;
1624: u_int len;
1625:
1.59 avsm 1626: goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1627: goid.length = len;
1.46 markus 1628:
1.59 avsm 1629: major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
1.46 markus 1630:
1.124 djm 1631: free(goid.elements);
1.46 markus 1632:
1633: buffer_clear(m);
1634: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1635:
1.64 stevesk 1636: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
1.46 markus 1637:
1638: /* Now we have a context, enable the step */
1639: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
1640:
1641: return (0);
1642: }
1643:
1644: int
1.59 avsm 1645: mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1646: {
1647: gss_buffer_desc in;
1648: gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1.64 stevesk 1649: OM_uint32 major, minor;
1.46 markus 1650: OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
1.47 deraadt 1651: u_int len;
1.46 markus 1652:
1.47 deraadt 1653: in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1654: in.length = len;
1.46 markus 1655: major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
1.124 djm 1656: free(in.value);
1.46 markus 1657:
1658: buffer_clear(m);
1659: buffer_put_int(m, major);
1660: buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
1661: buffer_put_int(m, flags);
1.59 avsm 1662: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
1.46 markus 1663:
1664: gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
1665:
1.64 stevesk 1666: if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1.46 markus 1667: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
1668: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.52 markus 1669: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
1.46 markus 1670: }
1671: return (0);
1672: }
1673:
1674: int
1.59 avsm 1675: mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.52 markus 1676: {
1677: gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
1678: OM_uint32 ret;
1679: u_int len;
1.54 djm 1680:
1.52 markus 1681: gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1682: gssbuf.length = len;
1683: mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1684: mic.length = len;
1.54 djm 1685:
1.52 markus 1686: ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
1.54 djm 1687:
1.124 djm 1688: free(gssbuf.value);
1689: free(mic.value);
1.54 djm 1690:
1.52 markus 1691: buffer_clear(m);
1692: buffer_put_int(m, ret);
1.54 djm 1693:
1.59 avsm 1694: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
1.54 djm 1695:
1.52 markus 1696: if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
1697: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.54 djm 1698:
1.52 markus 1699: return (0);
1700: }
1701:
1702: int
1.59 avsm 1703: mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
1.46 markus 1704: {
1705: int authenticated;
1706:
1707: authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
1708:
1709: buffer_clear(m);
1710: buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
1711:
1712: debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1.59 avsm 1713: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
1.46 markus 1714:
1.64 stevesk 1715: auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
1.46 markus 1716:
1717: /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
1718: return (authenticated);
1719: }
1720: #endif /* GSSAPI */
1.100 djm 1721:
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