Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c, Revision 1.221
1.221 ! dtucker 1: /* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.220 2021/01/22 02:44:58 dtucker Exp $ */
1.1 provos 2: /*
3: * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
4: * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
5: * All rights reserved.
6: *
7: * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8: * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9: * are met:
10: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12: * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14: * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15: *
16: * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
17: * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
18: * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
19: * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
20: * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
21: * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
22: * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
23: * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
24: * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
25: * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
26: */
27:
1.67 stevesk 28: #include <sys/types.h>
29: #include <sys/wait.h>
1.79 stevesk 30: #include <sys/socket.h>
1.85 deraadt 31: #include <sys/tree.h>
1.95 djm 32: #include <sys/queue.h>
1.1 provos 33:
1.132 markus 34: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.78 stevesk 35: #include <openssl/dh.h>
1.132 markus 36: #endif
1.78 stevesk 37:
1.81 stevesk 38: #include <errno.h>
1.80 stevesk 39: #include <fcntl.h>
1.159 djm 40: #include <limits.h>
1.65 stevesk 41: #include <paths.h>
1.114 djm 42: #include <poll.h>
1.78 stevesk 43: #include <pwd.h>
1.68 stevesk 44: #include <signal.h>
1.134 djm 45: #include <stdarg.h>
1.142 millert 46: #include <stdint.h>
1.134 djm 47: #include <stdio.h>
1.84 stevesk 48: #include <stdlib.h>
1.82 stevesk 49: #include <string.h>
1.186 djm 50: #include <unistd.h>
1.1 provos 51:
1.114 djm 52: #include "atomicio.h"
1.85 deraadt 53: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.1 provos 54: #include "ssh.h"
1.185 markus 55: #include "sshkey.h"
1.183 markus 56: #include "sshbuf.h"
1.85 deraadt 57: #include "hostfile.h"
1.1 provos 58: #include "auth.h"
1.85 deraadt 59: #include "cipher.h"
1.1 provos 60: #include "kex.h"
61: #include "dh.h"
62: #include "packet.h"
63: #include "auth-options.h"
64: #include "sshpty.h"
65: #include "channels.h"
66: #include "session.h"
67: #include "sshlogin.h"
68: #include "canohost.h"
69: #include "log.h"
1.135 millert 70: #include "misc.h"
1.1 provos 71: #include "servconf.h"
72: #include "monitor.h"
1.85 deraadt 73: #ifdef GSSAPI
74: #include "ssh-gss.h"
75: #endif
1.1 provos 76: #include "monitor_wrap.h"
77: #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
78: #include "compat.h"
79: #include "ssh2.h"
1.127 markus 80: #include "authfd.h"
1.137 djm 81: #include "match.h"
1.138 djm 82: #include "ssherr.h"
1.203 djm 83: #include "sk-api.h"
1.189 djm 84:
1.46 markus 85: #ifdef GSSAPI
86: static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
87: #endif
88:
1.1 provos 89: /* Imports */
90: extern ServerOptions options;
91: extern u_int utmp_len;
92: extern u_char session_id[];
1.181 markus 93: extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
1.180 djm 94: extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
1.1 provos 95:
96: /* State exported from the child */
1.139 markus 97: static struct sshbuf *child_state;
1.1 provos 98:
1.43 markus 99: /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
1.1 provos 100:
1.191 djm 101: int mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
102: int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
103: int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
104: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
105: int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
106: int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
107: int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
108: int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
109: int mm_answer_skeyquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
110: int mm_answer_skeyrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
111: int mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
112: int mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
113: int mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
114: int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
115: int mm_answer_term(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
116: int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
117: int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
118: int mm_answer_rsa_response(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
119: int mm_answer_sesskey(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
120: int mm_answer_sessid(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
1.1 provos 121:
1.46 markus 122: #ifdef GSSAPI
1.191 djm 123: int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
124: int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
125: int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
126: int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
1.46 markus 127: #endif
1.25 itojun 128:
1.1 provos 129: static Authctxt *authctxt;
1.132 markus 130:
1.1 provos 131: /* local state for key verify */
132: static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
1.183 markus 133: static size_t key_bloblen = 0;
1.1 provos 134: static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
1.180 djm 135: static struct sshauthopt *key_opts = NULL;
1.26 markus 136: static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
137: static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
1.1 provos 138: static char *auth_method = "unknown";
1.119 djm 139: static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
1.44 markus 140: static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
1.13 markus 141: static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
1.40 markus 142: static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
1.1 provos 143:
144: struct mon_table {
145: enum monitor_reqtype type;
146: int flags;
1.191 djm 147: int (*f)(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
1.1 provos 148: };
149:
150: #define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
151: #define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
152: #define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
1.77 dtucker 153: #define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
1.1 provos 154:
155: #define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
156:
157: #define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
158:
1.191 djm 159: static int monitor_read(struct ssh *, struct monitor *, struct mon_table *,
160: struct mon_table **);
161: static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
162:
1.1 provos 163: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
1.132 markus 164: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 165: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
1.132 markus 166: #endif
1.1 provos 167: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
168: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
169: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
1.10 djm 170: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
1.1 provos 171: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
172: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 173: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.1 provos 174: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
175: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
1.46 markus 176: #ifdef GSSAPI
177: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
1.165 djm 178: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
179: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
180: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
1.46 markus 181: #endif
1.1 provos 182: {0, 0, NULL}
183: };
184:
185: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
1.132 markus 186: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 187: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
1.132 markus 188: #endif
1.1 provos 189: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
190: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
191: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
192: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
193: {0, 0, NULL}
194: };
195:
196: struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
197:
198: /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
199: static void
200: monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
201: {
202: while (ent->f != NULL) {
203: if (ent->type == type) {
204: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
205: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
206: return;
207: }
208: ent++;
209: }
210: }
211:
212: static void
213: monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
214: {
215: struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
216:
217: while (ent->f != NULL) {
218: if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
219: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
220: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
221: }
222: ent++;
223: }
224: }
225:
1.50 markus 226: void
1.191 djm 227: monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 228: {
229: struct mon_table *ent;
1.119 djm 230: int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
1.1 provos 231:
232: debug3("preauth child monitor started");
233:
1.179 tb 234: if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
235: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
236: if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0)
237: close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
1.114 djm 238: pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
239:
1.191 djm 240: authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
1.50 markus 241: memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
1.180 djm 242: ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
1.50 markus 243:
1.162 markus 244: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
245: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
246: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
247: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
1.1 provos 248:
249: /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
250: while (!authenticated) {
1.119 djm 251: partial = 0;
1.77 dtucker 252: auth_method = "unknown";
1.119 djm 253: auth_submethod = NULL;
1.172 djm 254: auth2_authctxt_reset_info(authctxt);
255:
1.191 djm 256: authenticated = (monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor,
257: mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
1.118 djm 258:
259: /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
260: if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
261: if (authenticated &&
262: !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
1.122 markus 263: auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
1.217 djm 264: debug3_f("method %s: partial", auth_method);
1.118 djm 265: authenticated = 0;
1.119 djm 266: partial = 1;
1.118 djm 267: }
268: }
269:
1.1 provos 270: if (authenticated) {
271: if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
1.217 djm 272: fatal_f("unexpected authentication from %d",
273: ent->type);
1.1 provos 274: if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
1.180 djm 275: !auth_root_allowed(ssh, auth_method))
1.1 provos 276: authenticated = 0;
277: }
1.77 dtucker 278: if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
1.190 djm 279: auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial,
1.125 djm 280: auth_method, auth_submethod);
1.150 djm 281: if (!partial && !authenticated)
1.1 provos 282: authctxt->failures++;
1.172 djm 283: if (authenticated || partial) {
284: auth2_update_session_info(authctxt,
285: auth_method, auth_submethod);
286: }
1.1 provos 287: }
288: }
289:
290: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.217 djm 291: fatal_f("authenticated invalid user");
1.77 dtucker 292: if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
1.217 djm 293: fatal_f("authentication method name unknown");
1.1 provos 294:
1.217 djm 295: debug_f("user %s authenticated by privileged process", authctxt->user);
1.180 djm 296: ssh->authctxt = NULL;
1.167 djm 297: ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);
1.1 provos 298:
1.192 djm 299: mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
1.120 markus 300:
301: /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
302: while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
303: ;
1.114 djm 304:
1.179 tb 305: if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
306: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
307: if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0)
308: close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
1.114 djm 309: pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
1.1 provos 310: }
311:
1.40 markus 312: static void
313: monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
314: {
315: monitor_child_pid = pid;
316: }
317:
318: static void
1.59 avsm 319: monitor_child_handler(int sig)
1.40 markus 320: {
1.59 avsm 321: kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
1.40 markus 322: }
323:
1.1 provos 324: void
1.191 djm 325: monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 326: {
1.114 djm 327: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
328: pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
329:
1.40 markus 330: monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
1.207 dtucker 331: ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
332: ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
333: ssh_signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
1.40 markus 334:
1.162 markus 335: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
336:
337: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
338: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
339: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
340: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
1.1 provos 341:
1.180 djm 342: if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) {
1.1 provos 343: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
344: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
345: }
346:
347: for (;;)
1.191 djm 348: monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
1.1 provos 349: }
350:
1.114 djm 351: static int
352: monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
353: {
1.183 markus 354: struct sshbuf *logmsg;
1.215 djm 355: u_int len, level, line;
356: char *msg, *file, *func;
1.183 markus 357: u_char *p;
358: int r;
1.114 djm 359:
1.183 markus 360: if ((logmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1.217 djm 361: fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
1.114 djm 362:
363: /* Read length */
1.183 markus 364: if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, 4, &p)) != 0)
1.217 djm 365: fatal_fr(r, "reserve len");
1.183 markus 366: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, 4) != 4) {
1.114 djm 367: if (errno == EPIPE) {
1.183 markus 368: sshbuf_free(logmsg);
1.217 djm 369: debug_f("child log fd closed");
1.114 djm 370: close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
371: pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
372: return -1;
373: }
1.217 djm 374: fatal_f("log fd read: %s", strerror(errno));
1.114 djm 375: }
1.183 markus 376: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &len)) != 0)
1.217 djm 377: fatal_fr(r, "parse len");
1.114 djm 378: if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
1.217 djm 379: fatal_f("invalid log message length %u", len);
1.114 djm 380:
381: /* Read severity, message */
1.183 markus 382: sshbuf_reset(logmsg);
383: if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, len, &p)) != 0)
1.217 djm 384: fatal_fr(r, "reserve msg");
1.183 markus 385: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, len) != len)
1.217 djm 386: fatal_f("log fd read: %s", strerror(errno));
1.215 djm 387: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(logmsg, &file, NULL)) != 0 ||
388: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(logmsg, &func, NULL)) != 0 ||
389: (r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &line)) != 0 ||
390: (r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &level)) != 0 ||
1.183 markus 391: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(logmsg, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 392: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.114 djm 393:
394: /* Log it */
395: if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
1.216 djm 396: fatal_f("invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", level);
397: sshlog(file, func, line, 0, level, NULL, "%s [preauth]", msg);
1.114 djm 398:
1.183 markus 399: sshbuf_free(logmsg);
1.215 djm 400: free(file);
401: free(func);
1.124 djm 402: free(msg);
1.114 djm 403:
404: return 0;
405: }
406:
1.191 djm 407: static int
408: monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
1.1 provos 409: struct mon_table **pent)
410: {
1.183 markus 411: struct sshbuf *m;
412: int r, ret;
1.1 provos 413: u_char type;
1.114 djm 414: struct pollfd pfd[2];
415:
416: for (;;) {
1.130 tedu 417: memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
1.114 djm 418: pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
419: pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
420: pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
421: pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
1.115 djm 422: if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
423: if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
424: continue;
1.217 djm 425: fatal_f("poll: %s", strerror(errno));
1.115 djm 426: }
1.114 djm 427: if (pfd[1].revents) {
428: /*
429: * Drain all log messages before processing next
430: * monitor request.
431: */
432: monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
433: continue;
434: }
435: if (pfd[0].revents)
436: break; /* Continues below */
437: }
1.1 provos 438:
1.183 markus 439: if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1.217 djm 440: fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
1.1 provos 441:
1.183 markus 442: mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
443: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &type)) != 0)
1.217 djm 444: fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
1.1 provos 445:
1.217 djm 446: debug3_f("checking request %d", type);
1.1 provos 447:
448: while (ent->f != NULL) {
449: if (ent->type == type)
450: break;
451: ent++;
452: }
453:
454: if (ent->f != NULL) {
455: if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
1.217 djm 456: fatal_f("unpermitted request %d", type);
1.191 djm 457: ret = (*ent->f)(ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
1.183 markus 458: sshbuf_free(m);
1.1 provos 459:
460: /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
461: if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
1.217 djm 462: debug2_f("%d used once, disabling now", type);
1.1 provos 463: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
464: }
465:
466: if (pent != NULL)
467: *pent = ent;
1.3 markus 468:
1.1 provos 469: return ret;
470: }
471:
1.217 djm 472: fatal_f("unsupported request: %d", type);
1.1 provos 473:
474: /* NOTREACHED */
475: return (-1);
476: }
477:
478: /* allowed key state */
479: static int
1.203 djm 480: monitor_allowed_key(const u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
1.1 provos 481: {
482: /* make sure key is allowed */
483: if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
1.108 djm 484: timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
1.1 provos 485: return (0);
486: return (1);
487: }
488:
489: static void
490: monitor_reset_key_state(void)
491: {
492: /* reset state */
1.124 djm 493: free(key_blob);
494: free(hostbased_cuser);
495: free(hostbased_chost);
1.180 djm 496: sshauthopt_free(key_opts);
1.1 provos 497: key_blob = NULL;
498: key_bloblen = 0;
499: key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
1.180 djm 500: key_opts = NULL;
1.1 provos 501: hostbased_cuser = NULL;
502: hostbased_chost = NULL;
503: }
504:
1.132 markus 505: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 506: int
1.191 djm 507: mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 508: {
509: DH *dh;
1.187 djm 510: const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
1.183 markus 511: int r;
512: u_int min, want, max;
1.1 provos 513:
1.183 markus 514: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &min)) != 0 ||
515: (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &want)) != 0 ||
516: (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &max)) != 0)
1.217 djm 517: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.1 provos 518:
1.217 djm 519: debug3_f("got parameters: %d %d %d", min, want, max);
1.1 provos 520: /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
521: if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
1.217 djm 522: fatal_f("bad parameters: %d %d %d", min, want, max);
1.1 provos 523:
1.183 markus 524: sshbuf_reset(m);
1.1 provos 525:
526: dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
527: if (dh == NULL) {
1.183 markus 528: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
1.217 djm 529: fatal_fr(r, "assemble empty");
1.1 provos 530: return (0);
531: } else {
532: /* Send first bignum */
1.187 djm 533: DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
1.183 markus 534: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 ||
1.187 djm 535: (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_p)) != 0 ||
536: (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_g)) != 0)
1.217 djm 537: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.3 markus 538:
1.1 provos 539: DH_free(dh);
540: }
1.59 avsm 541: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
1.1 provos 542: return (0);
543: }
1.132 markus 544: #endif
1.1 provos 545:
546: int
1.191 djm 547: mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 548: {
1.138 djm 549: extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */
550: struct sshkey *key;
1.157 djm 551: struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
552: u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
553: char *alg = NULL;
1.155 markus 554: size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
1.159 djm 555: int r, is_proof = 0;
1.185 markus 556: u_int keyid, compat;
1.145 djm 557: const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
1.3 markus 558:
1.217 djm 559: debug3_f("entering");
1.1 provos 560:
1.138 djm 561: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
1.155 markus 562: (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 ||
1.185 markus 563: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0 ||
564: (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &compat)) != 0)
1.217 djm 565: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.159 djm 566: if (keyid > INT_MAX)
1.217 djm 567: fatal_f("invalid key ID");
1.1 provos 568:
1.69 djm 569: /*
1.110 djm 570: * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
571: * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
1.144 djm 572: *
573: * Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey
574: * proof.
575: *
576: * XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too?
577: * it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather
578: * than the full kex structure...
1.69 djm 579: */
1.144 djm 580: if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) {
581: /*
582: * Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what
583: * the client sent us.
584: */
585: if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */
1.217 djm 586: fatal_f("bad data length: %zu", datlen);
1.144 djm 587: if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL)
1.217 djm 588: fatal_f("no hostkey for index %d", keyid);
1.144 djm 589: if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1.217 djm 590: fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
1.145 djm 591: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
592: (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
1.152 jsg 593: session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
1.144 djm 594: (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
1.217 djm 595: fatal_fr(r, "assemble private key proof");
1.144 djm 596: if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) ||
597: memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0)
1.217 djm 598: fatal_f("bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
599: datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
1.144 djm 600: sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
601: is_proof = 1;
602: }
1.1 provos 603:
1.13 markus 604: /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
605: if (session_id2_len == 0) {
606: session_id2_len = datlen;
607: session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
608: memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
609: }
610:
1.127 markus 611: if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
1.155 markus 612: if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
1.213 djm 613: options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0)
1.217 djm 614: fatal_fr(r, "sign");
1.144 djm 615: } else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
1.138 djm 616: auth_sock > 0) {
617: if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
1.217 djm 618: p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0)
619: fatal_fr(r, "agent sign");
1.127 markus 620: } else
1.217 djm 621: fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid);
1.1 provos 622:
1.217 djm 623: debug3_f("%s signature %p(%zu)", is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX",
624: signature, siglen);
1.1 provos 625:
1.138 djm 626: sshbuf_reset(m);
627: if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
1.217 djm 628: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.1 provos 629:
1.157 djm 630: free(alg);
1.124 djm 631: free(p);
632: free(signature);
1.1 provos 633:
1.59 avsm 634: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
1.1 provos 635:
636: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
637: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
638:
639: return (0);
640: }
641:
1.218 djm 642: #define PUTPW(b, id) \
643: do { \
644: if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, \
645: &pwent->id, sizeof(pwent->id))) != 0) \
646: fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #id); \
647: } while (0)
648:
1.1 provos 649: /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
650: int
1.191 djm 651: mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 652: {
1.60 dtucker 653: char *username;
1.1 provos 654: struct passwd *pwent;
1.183 markus 655: int r, allowed = 0;
1.113 djm 656: u_int i;
1.3 markus 657:
1.217 djm 658: debug3_f("entering");
1.1 provos 659:
660: if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
1.217 djm 661: fatal_f("multiple attempts for getpwnam");
1.1 provos 662:
1.183 markus 663: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &username, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 664: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.1 provos 665:
1.190 djm 666: pwent = getpwnamallow(ssh, username);
1.1 provos 667:
1.60 dtucker 668: authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
669: setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
1.124 djm 670: free(username);
1.1 provos 671:
1.183 markus 672: sshbuf_reset(m);
1.1 provos 673:
674: if (pwent == NULL) {
1.183 markus 675: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
1.217 djm 676: fatal_fr(r, "assemble fakepw");
1.53 djm 677: authctxt->pw = fakepw();
1.1 provos 678: goto out;
679: }
680:
681: allowed = 1;
1.4 markus 682: authctxt->pw = pwent;
1.1 provos 683: authctxt->valid = 1;
684:
1.218 djm 685: /* XXX send fake class/dir/shell, etc. */
686: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0)
687: fatal_fr(r, "assemble ok");
688: PUTPW(m, pw_uid);
689: PUTPW(m, pw_gid);
690: PUTPW(m, pw_change);
691: PUTPW(m, pw_expire);
692: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name)) != 0 ||
1.183 markus 693: (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "*")) != 0 ||
694: (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos)) != 0 ||
695: (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class)) != 0 ||
696: (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir)) != 0 ||
697: (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell)) != 0)
1.217 djm 698: fatal_fr(r, "assemble pw");
1.94 dtucker 699:
700: out:
1.167 djm 701: ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
702: authctxt->valid ? "authenticating" : "invalid ", authctxt->user);
1.183 markus 703: if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options))) != 0)
1.217 djm 704: fatal_fr(r, "assemble options");
1.112 djm 705:
706: #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
1.217 djm 707: if (options.x != NULL && \
708: (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x)) != 0) \
709: fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \
1.112 djm 710: } while (0)
1.113 djm 711: #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
1.183 markus 712: for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) { \
713: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x[i])) != 0) \
1.217 djm 714: fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \
1.183 markus 715: } \
1.113 djm 716: } while (0)
1.112 djm 717: /* See comment in servconf.h */
718: COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
719: #undef M_CP_STROPT
1.113 djm 720: #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
1.118 djm 721:
722: /* Create valid auth method lists */
1.162 markus 723: if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
1.118 djm 724: /*
725: * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
726: * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
727: * authentication to succeed.
728: */
1.217 djm 729: debug_f("no valid authentication method lists");
1.118 djm 730: }
731:
1.217 djm 732: debug3_f("sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", allowed);
1.59 avsm 733: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
1.1 provos 734:
1.162 markus 735: /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
736: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
737: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
1.10 djm 738:
739: return (0);
740: }
741:
1.191 djm 742: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.10 djm 743: {
744: char *banner;
1.183 markus 745: int r;
1.10 djm 746:
1.183 markus 747: sshbuf_reset(m);
1.10 djm 748: banner = auth2_read_banner();
1.183 markus 749: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "")) != 0)
1.217 djm 750: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.59 avsm 751: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
1.124 djm 752: free(banner);
1.1 provos 753:
754: return (0);
755: }
756:
757: int
1.191 djm 758: mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 759: {
1.183 markus 760: int r;
761:
1.1 provos 762: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
763:
1.183 markus 764: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->service, NULL)) != 0 ||
765: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->style, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 766: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
767: debug3_f("service=%s, style=%s", authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
1.6 stevesk 768:
1.1 provos 769: if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
1.124 djm 770: free(authctxt->style);
1.1 provos 771: authctxt->style = NULL;
772: }
773:
774: return (0);
775: }
776:
777: int
1.191 djm 778: mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 779: {
780: static int call_count;
781: char *passwd;
1.183 markus 782: int r, authenticated;
783: size_t plen;
1.1 provos 784:
1.164 djm 785: if (!options.password_authentication)
1.217 djm 786: fatal_f("password authentication not enabled");
1.183 markus 787: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &passwd, &plen)) != 0)
1.217 djm 788: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.1 provos 789: /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
1.12 markus 790: authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
1.180 djm 791: auth_password(ssh, passwd);
1.209 jsg 792: freezero(passwd, plen);
1.1 provos 793:
1.183 markus 794: sshbuf_reset(m);
795: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
1.217 djm 796: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.1 provos 797:
1.217 djm 798: debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
1.59 avsm 799: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
1.1 provos 800:
801: call_count++;
802: if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
803: auth_method = "none";
804: else
805: auth_method = "password";
806:
807: /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
808: return (authenticated);
809: }
810:
811: int
1.191 djm 812: mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 813: {
814: char *name, *infotxt;
1.183 markus 815: u_int numprompts, *echo_on, success;
1.1 provos 816: char **prompts;
1.183 markus 817: int r;
1.1 provos 818:
1.164 djm 819: if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
1.217 djm 820: fatal_f("kbd-int authentication not enabled");
1.31 markus 821: success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
822: &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
1.1 provos 823:
1.183 markus 824: sshbuf_reset(m);
825: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, success)) != 0)
1.217 djm 826: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.183 markus 827: if (success) {
828: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[0])) != 0)
1.217 djm 829: fatal_fr(r, "assemble prompt");
1.183 markus 830: }
1.1 provos 831:
1.217 djm 832: debug3_f("sending challenge success: %u", success);
1.59 avsm 833: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
1.1 provos 834:
1.31 markus 835: if (success) {
1.124 djm 836: free(name);
837: free(infotxt);
838: free(prompts);
839: free(echo_on);
1.1 provos 840: }
841:
842: return (0);
843: }
844:
845: int
1.191 djm 846: mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 847: {
848: char *response;
1.183 markus 849: int r, authok;
1.1 provos 850:
1.164 djm 851: if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
1.217 djm 852: fatal_f("kbd-int authentication not enabled");
1.154 mmcc 853: if (authctxt->as == NULL)
1.217 djm 854: fatal_f("no bsd auth session");
1.1 provos 855:
1.183 markus 856: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &response, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 857: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.12 markus 858: authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
859: auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
1.1 provos 860: authctxt->as = NULL;
1.217 djm 861: debug3_f("<%s> = <%d>", response, authok);
1.124 djm 862: free(response);
1.1 provos 863:
1.183 markus 864: sshbuf_reset(m);
865: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authok)) != 0)
1.217 djm 866: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.1 provos 867:
1.217 djm 868: debug3_f("sending authenticated: %d", authok);
1.59 avsm 869: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
1.1 provos 870:
1.162 markus 871: auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
872: auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
1.1 provos 873:
874: return (authok != 0);
875: }
876:
1.188 djm 877: /*
878: * Check that the key type appears in the supplied pattern list, ignoring
879: * mismatches in the signature algorithm. (Signature algorithm checks are
880: * performed in the unprivileged authentication code).
881: * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
882: */
883: static int
884: key_base_type_match(const char *method, const struct sshkey *key,
885: const char *list)
886: {
887: char *s, *l, *ol = xstrdup(list);
888: int found = 0;
889:
890: l = ol;
891: for ((s = strsep(&l, ",")); s && *s != '\0'; (s = strsep(&l, ","))) {
892: if (sshkey_type_from_name(s) == key->type) {
893: found = 1;
894: break;
895: }
896: }
897: if (!found) {
898: error("%s key type %s is not in permitted list %s", method,
899: sshkey_ssh_name(key), list);
900: }
901:
902: free(ol);
903: return found;
904: }
905:
1.1 provos 906: int
1.191 djm 907: mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 908: {
1.183 markus 909: struct sshkey *key = NULL;
1.26 markus 910: char *cuser, *chost;
1.183 markus 911: u_int pubkey_auth_attempt;
1.1 provos 912: enum mm_keytype type = 0;
1.180 djm 913: int r, allowed = 0;
914: struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
1.1 provos 915:
1.217 djm 916: debug3_f("entering");
1.183 markus 917: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
918: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 ||
919: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
920: (r = sshkey_froms(m, &key)) != 0 ||
921: (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &pubkey_auth_attempt)) != 0)
1.217 djm 922: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.1 provos 923:
1.217 djm 924: debug3_f("key_from_blob: %p", key);
1.1 provos 925:
1.51 djm 926: if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
1.137 djm 927: /* These should not make it past the privsep child */
1.185 markus 928: if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
1.137 djm 929: (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
1.217 djm 930: fatal_f("passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key");
1.137 djm 931:
1.63 deraadt 932: switch (type) {
1.1 provos 933: case MM_USERKEY:
1.77 dtucker 934: auth_method = "publickey";
1.180 djm 935: if (!options.pubkey_authentication)
936: break;
937: if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
938: break;
1.188 djm 939: if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
1.220 dtucker 940: options.pubkey_accepted_algos))
1.180 djm 941: break;
942: allowed = user_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, key,
943: pubkey_auth_attempt, &opts);
1.1 provos 944: break;
945: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1.180 djm 946: auth_method = "hostbased";
947: if (!options.hostbased_authentication)
948: break;
949: if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
950: break;
1.188 djm 951: if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
1.221 ! dtucker 952: options.hostbased_accepted_algos))
1.180 djm 953: break;
1.192 djm 954: allowed = hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 955: cuser, chost, key);
1.172 djm 956: auth2_record_info(authctxt,
1.126 djm 957: "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
958: cuser, chost);
1.1 provos 959: break;
960: default:
1.217 djm 961: fatal_f("unknown key type %d", type);
1.1 provos 962: break;
963: }
1.33 markus 964: }
1.161 djm 965:
1.217 djm 966: debug3_f("%s authentication%s: %s key is %s", auth_method,
967: pubkey_auth_attempt ? "" : " test",
1.180 djm 968: (key == NULL || !authctxt->valid) ? "invalid" : sshkey_type(key),
969: allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
1.161 djm 970:
1.172 djm 971: auth2_record_key(authctxt, 0, key);
1.1 provos 972:
973: /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
974: monitor_reset_key_state();
975:
976: if (allowed) {
977: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1.183 markus 978: if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &key_blob, &key_bloblen)) != 0)
1.217 djm 979: fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_to_blob");
1.1 provos 980: key_blobtype = type;
1.180 djm 981: key_opts = opts;
1.1 provos 982: hostbased_cuser = cuser;
983: hostbased_chost = chost;
1.72 djm 984: } else {
1.77 dtucker 985: /* Log failed attempt */
1.190 djm 986: auth_log(ssh, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
1.124 djm 987: free(cuser);
988: free(chost);
1.1 provos 989: }
1.183 markus 990: sshkey_free(key);
1.1 provos 991:
1.183 markus 992: sshbuf_reset(m);
993: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, allowed)) != 0)
1.217 djm 994: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.180 djm 995: if (opts != NULL && (r = sshauthopt_serialise(opts, m, 1)) != 0)
1.217 djm 996: fatal_fr(r, "sshauthopt_serialise");
1.180 djm 997: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 998:
1.180 djm 999: if (!allowed)
1000: sshauthopt_free(opts);
1.1 provos 1001:
1002: return (0);
1003: }
1004:
1005: static int
1.203 djm 1006: monitor_valid_userblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
1.1 provos 1007: {
1.183 markus 1008: struct sshbuf *b;
1009: const u_char *p;
1.159 djm 1010: char *userstyle, *cp;
1.183 markus 1011: size_t len;
1012: u_char type;
1013: int r, fail = 0;
1.1 provos 1014:
1.203 djm 1015: if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
1.217 djm 1016: fatal_f("sshbuf_from");
1.3 markus 1017:
1.1 provos 1018: if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
1.183 markus 1019: p = sshbuf_ptr(b);
1020: len = sshbuf_len(b);
1.13 markus 1021: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1022: (len < session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1023: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.13 markus 1024: fail++;
1.183 markus 1025: if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, session_id2_len)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1026: fatal_fr(r, "consume");
1.1 provos 1027: } else {
1.183 markus 1028: if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1029: fatal_fr(r, "parse sessionid");
1.13 markus 1030: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1031: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1032: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 1033: fail++;
1034: }
1.183 markus 1035: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1036: fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
1.183 markus 1037: if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1.1 provos 1038: fail++;
1.183 markus 1039: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1040: fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
1.121 djm 1041: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1042: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1043: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1.159 djm 1044: if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) {
1045: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: "
1046: "expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp);
1.1 provos 1047: fail++;
1048: }
1.124 djm 1049: free(userstyle);
1.159 djm 1050: free(cp);
1.183 markus 1051: if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */
1052: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1053: fatal_fr(r, "parse method");
1.178 djm 1054: if (strcmp("publickey", cp) != 0)
1055: fail++;
1056: free(cp);
1.183 markus 1057: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1058: fatal_fr(r, "parse pktype");
1.183 markus 1059: if (type == 0)
1.178 djm 1060: fail++;
1.183 markus 1061: if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */
1062: (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */
1.217 djm 1063: fatal_fr(r, "parse pk");
1.183 markus 1064: if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
1.1 provos 1065: fail++;
1.183 markus 1066: sshbuf_free(b);
1.1 provos 1067: return (fail == 0);
1068: }
1069:
1070: static int
1.203 djm 1071: monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
1072: const char *cuser, const char *chost)
1.1 provos 1073: {
1.183 markus 1074: struct sshbuf *b;
1075: const u_char *p;
1076: char *cp, *userstyle;
1077: size_t len;
1078: int r, fail = 0;
1079: u_char type;
1.1 provos 1080:
1.203 djm 1081: if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
1.217 djm 1082: fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
1.203 djm 1083: if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1084: fatal_fr(r, "parse sessionid");
1.3 markus 1085:
1.13 markus 1086: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1087: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1088: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 1089: fail++;
1.13 markus 1090:
1.183 markus 1091: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1092: fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
1.183 markus 1093: if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1.1 provos 1094: fail++;
1.183 markus 1095: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1096: fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
1.121 djm 1097: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1098: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1099: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1.183 markus 1100: if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) {
1101: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: "
1102: "expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp);
1.1 provos 1103: fail++;
1104: }
1.121 djm 1105: free(userstyle);
1.183 markus 1106: free(cp);
1107: if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */
1108: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1109: fatal_fr(r, "parse method");
1.183 markus 1110: if (strcmp(cp, "hostbased") != 0)
1.1 provos 1111: fail++;
1.183 markus 1112: free(cp);
1113: if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */
1114: (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */
1.217 djm 1115: fatal_fr(r, "parse pk");
1.1 provos 1116:
1117: /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
1.183 markus 1118: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1119: fatal_fr(r, "parse host");
1.183 markus 1120: if (((len = strlen(cp)) > 0) && cp[len - 1] == '.')
1121: cp[len - 1] = '\0';
1122: if (strcmp(cp, chost) != 0)
1.1 provos 1123: fail++;
1.183 markus 1124: free(cp);
1.1 provos 1125:
1126: /* verify client user */
1.183 markus 1127: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1128: fatal_fr(r, "parse ruser");
1.183 markus 1129: if (strcmp(cp, cuser) != 0)
1.1 provos 1130: fail++;
1.183 markus 1131: free(cp);
1.1 provos 1132:
1.183 markus 1133: if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
1.1 provos 1134: fail++;
1.183 markus 1135: sshbuf_free(b);
1.1 provos 1136: return (fail == 0);
1137: }
1138:
1139: int
1.191 djm 1140: mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 1141: {
1.168 markus 1142: struct sshkey *key;
1.203 djm 1143: const u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
1144: char *sigalg = NULL, *fp = NULL;
1.169 markus 1145: size_t signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
1.214 djm 1146: int r, ret, req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, valid_data = 0;
1147: int encoded_ret;
1.202 djm 1148: struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
1.1 provos 1149:
1.203 djm 1150: if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 ||
1151: (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 ||
1152: (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 ||
1.176 djm 1153: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &sigalg, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1154: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.1 provos 1155:
1156: if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
1.8 mouring 1157: !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
1.217 djm 1158: fatal_f("bad key, not previously allowed");
1.1 provos 1159:
1.177 djm 1160: /* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */
1161: if (*sigalg == '\0') {
1162: free(sigalg);
1163: sigalg = NULL;
1164: }
1165:
1.169 markus 1166: /* XXX use sshkey_froms here; need to change key_blob, etc. */
1167: if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, bloblen, &key)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1168: fatal_fr(r, "parse key");
1.1 provos 1169:
1170: switch (key_blobtype) {
1171: case MM_USERKEY:
1172: valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
1.172 djm 1173: auth_method = "publickey";
1.1 provos 1174: break;
1175: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1176: valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
1177: hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
1.172 djm 1178: auth_method = "hostbased";
1.1 provos 1179: break;
1180: default:
1181: valid_data = 0;
1182: break;
1183: }
1184: if (!valid_data)
1.217 djm 1185: fatal_f("bad signature data blob");
1.1 provos 1186:
1.203 djm 1187: if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
1188: SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
1.217 djm 1189: fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
1.203 djm 1190:
1.169 markus 1191: ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
1.202 djm 1192: sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
1.217 djm 1193: debug3_f("%s %p signature %s%s%s", auth_method, key,
1.201 djm 1194: (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified",
1195: (ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : "");
1.203 djm 1196:
1197: if (ret == 0 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY && sig_details != NULL) {
1198: req_presence = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
1.204 djm 1199: PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) ||
1200: !key_opts->no_require_user_presence;
1.203 djm 1201: if (req_presence &&
1202: (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) == 0) {
1203: error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s "
1.208 naddy 1204: "port %d rejected: user presence "
1205: "(authenticator touch) requirement not met ",
1206: sshkey_type(key), fp,
1.214 djm 1207: authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
1208: authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
1209: ssh_remote_port(ssh));
1210: ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
1211: }
1212: req_verify = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
1213: PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED) || key_opts->require_verify;
1214: if (req_verify &&
1215: (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD) == 0) {
1216: error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s "
1217: "port %d rejected: user verification requirement "
1218: "not met ", sshkey_type(key), fp,
1.203 djm 1219: authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
1220: authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
1221: ssh_remote_port(ssh));
1222: ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
1223: }
1224: }
1.172 djm 1225: auth2_record_key(authctxt, ret == 0, key);
1.136 djm 1226:
1.180 djm 1227: if (key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
1228: auth_activate_options(ssh, key_opts);
1.1 provos 1229: monitor_reset_key_state();
1.3 markus 1230:
1.169 markus 1231: sshbuf_reset(m);
1232:
1233: /* encode ret != 0 as positive integer, since we're sending u32 */
1234: encoded_ret = (ret != 0);
1.202 djm 1235: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, encoded_ret)) != 0 ||
1.205 djm 1236: (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details != NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1237: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.202 djm 1238: if (sig_details != NULL) {
1239: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sig_details->sk_counter)) != 0 ||
1240: (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details->sk_flags)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1241: fatal_fr(r, "assemble sk");
1.202 djm 1242: }
1243: sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
1.59 avsm 1244: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
1.203 djm 1245:
1246: free(sigalg);
1247: free(fp);
1248: sshkey_free(key);
1.1 provos 1249:
1.169 markus 1250: return ret == 0;
1.1 provos 1251: }
1252:
1.2 markus 1253: static void
1.191 djm 1254: mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
1.1 provos 1255: {
1256: socklen_t fromlen;
1257: struct sockaddr_storage from;
1258:
1259: /*
1260: * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
1261: * the address be 0.0.0.0.
1262: */
1263: memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
1.24 stevesk 1264: fromlen = sizeof(from);
1.191 djm 1265: if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
1266: if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
1.198 deraadt 1267: (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
1.1 provos 1268: debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1.50 markus 1269: cleanup_exit(255);
1.1 provos 1270: }
1271: }
1272: /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
1273: record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
1.158 djm 1274: session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns),
1.24 stevesk 1275: (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
1.1 provos 1276: }
1277:
1278: static void
1279: mm_session_close(Session *s)
1280: {
1.217 djm 1281: debug3_f("session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
1.1 provos 1282: if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1.217 djm 1283: debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ptyfd);
1.1 provos 1284: session_pty_cleanup2(s);
1285: }
1.96 djm 1286: session_unused(s->self);
1.1 provos 1287: }
1288:
1289: int
1.191 djm 1290: mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 1291: {
1.11 mouring 1292: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1293: Session *s;
1.183 markus 1294: int r, res, fd0;
1.1 provos 1295:
1.217 djm 1296: debug3_f("entering");
1.1 provos 1297:
1.183 markus 1298: sshbuf_reset(m);
1.1 provos 1299: s = session_new();
1300: if (s == NULL)
1301: goto error;
1302: s->authctxt = authctxt;
1303: s->pw = authctxt->pw;
1.11 mouring 1304: s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
1.1 provos 1305: res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
1306: if (res == 0)
1307: goto error;
1308: pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
1309:
1.183 markus 1310: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0 ||
1311: (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1312: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.1 provos 1313:
1314: /* We need to trick ttyslot */
1315: if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
1.217 djm 1316: fatal_f("dup2");
1.1 provos 1317:
1.191 djm 1318: mm_record_login(ssh, s, authctxt->pw);
1.1 provos 1319:
1320: /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
1321: close(0);
1.61 dtucker 1322:
1323: /* send messages generated by record_login */
1.183 markus 1324: if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1325: fatal_fr(r, "assemble loginmsg");
1.183 markus 1326: sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
1.61 dtucker 1327:
1328: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1329:
1.92 djm 1330: if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
1331: mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
1.217 djm 1332: fatal_f("send fds failed");
1.1 provos 1333:
1334: /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
1.198 deraadt 1335: if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
1.217 djm 1336: fatal_f("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1337: if (fd0 != 0)
1.217 djm 1338: error_f("fd0 %d != 0", fd0);
1.1 provos 1339:
1.212 deraadt 1340: /* slave side of pty is not needed */
1.1 provos 1341: close(s->ttyfd);
1342: s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
1343: /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
1344: s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
1345:
1.217 djm 1346: debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
1.1 provos 1347:
1348: return (0);
1349:
1350: error:
1351: if (s != NULL)
1352: mm_session_close(s);
1.183 markus 1353: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1354: fatal_fr(r, "assemble 0");
1.59 avsm 1355: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1.1 provos 1356: return (0);
1357: }
1358:
1359: int
1.191 djm 1360: mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 1361: {
1362: Session *s;
1363: char *tty;
1.183 markus 1364: int r;
1.1 provos 1365:
1.217 djm 1366: debug3_f("entering");
1.1 provos 1367:
1.183 markus 1368: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1369: fatal_fr(r, "parse tty");
1.1 provos 1370: if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
1371: mm_session_close(s);
1.183 markus 1372: sshbuf_reset(m);
1.124 djm 1373: free(tty);
1.1 provos 1374: return (0);
1375: }
1376:
1377: int
1.191 djm 1378: mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *req)
1.1 provos 1379: {
1.11 mouring 1380: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1381: int res, status;
1382:
1.217 djm 1383: debug3_f("tearing down sessions");
1.1 provos 1384:
1385: /* The child is terminating */
1.173 djm 1386: session_destroy_all(ssh, &mm_session_close);
1.1 provos 1387:
1.11 mouring 1388: while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
1.9 markus 1389: if (errno != EINTR)
1390: exit(1);
1.1 provos 1391:
1392: res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
1393:
1394: /* Terminate process */
1.57 deraadt 1395: exit(res);
1.170 markus 1396: }
1397:
1398: void
1.191 djm 1399: monitor_clear_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.170 markus 1400: {
1401: ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN);
1402: ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
1403: sshbuf_free(child_state);
1404: child_state = NULL;
1.1 provos 1405: }
1406:
1407: void
1.191 djm 1408: monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1409: {
1.139 markus 1410: struct kex *kex;
1411: int r;
1412:
1.217 djm 1413: debug3_f("packet_set_state");
1.139 markus 1414: if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1415: fatal_fr(r, "packet_set_state");
1.139 markus 1416: sshbuf_free(child_state);
1417: child_state = NULL;
1418:
1.154 mmcc 1419: if ((kex = ssh->kex) != NULL) {
1.139 markus 1420: /* XXX set callbacks */
1.147 djm 1421: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.197 djm 1422: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
1423: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
1424: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
1425: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
1426: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
1.139 markus 1427: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1428: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
1.197 djm 1429: kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
1.147 djm 1430: #endif
1.197 djm 1431: kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
1.219 djm 1432: kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
1.139 markus 1433: kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
1434: kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
1435: kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1436: kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
1437: }
1.1 provos 1438: }
1439:
1.210 djm 1440: /* This function requires careful sanity checking */
1.1 provos 1441:
1442: void
1.192 djm 1443: mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1444: {
1.217 djm 1445: debug3_f("Waiting for new keys");
1.1 provos 1446:
1.139 markus 1447: if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1.217 djm 1448: fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
1.139 markus 1449: mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
1450: child_state);
1.217 djm 1451: debug3_f("GOT new keys");
1.1 provos 1452: }
1453:
1454:
1455: /* XXX */
1456:
1457: #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
1.111 djm 1458: if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
1.1 provos 1459: fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
1460: } while (0)
1461:
1.2 markus 1462: static void
1.114 djm 1463: monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
1.3 markus 1464: {
1.114 djm 1465: int pair[2];
1.171 markus 1466: #ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
1467: int on = 1;
1468: #endif
1.114 djm 1469:
1.1 provos 1470: if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
1.217 djm 1471: fatal_f("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
1.171 markus 1472: #ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
1.198 deraadt 1473: if (setsockopt(pair[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
1.171 markus 1474: error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(0): %.100s", strerror(errno));
1.198 deraadt 1475: if (setsockopt(pair[1], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
1.171 markus 1476: error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(1): %.100s", strerror(errno));
1477: #endif
1.1 provos 1478: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1479: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1.114 djm 1480: mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1481: mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1482:
1483: if (do_logfds) {
1484: if (pipe(pair) == -1)
1.217 djm 1485: fatal_f("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
1.114 djm 1486: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1487: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1488: mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
1489: mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
1490: } else
1491: mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
1.1 provos 1492: }
1493:
1494: #define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
1495:
1496: struct monitor *
1497: monitor_init(void)
1498: {
1499: struct monitor *mon;
1500:
1.75 djm 1501: mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
1.114 djm 1502: monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
1.1 provos 1503:
1504: return mon;
1505: }
1506:
1507: void
1508: monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
1509: {
1.114 djm 1510: monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
1.1 provos 1511: }
1.46 markus 1512:
1513: #ifdef GSSAPI
1514: int
1.191 djm 1515: mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.46 markus 1516: {
1.59 avsm 1517: gss_OID_desc goid;
1.46 markus 1518: OM_uint32 major;
1.183 markus 1519: size_t len;
1.184 djm 1520: u_char *p;
1.183 markus 1521: int r;
1.46 markus 1522:
1.164 djm 1523: if (!options.gss_authentication)
1.217 djm 1524: fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
1.164 djm 1525:
1.184 djm 1526: if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1527: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.184 djm 1528: goid.elements = p;
1.59 avsm 1529: goid.length = len;
1.46 markus 1530:
1.59 avsm 1531: major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
1.46 markus 1532:
1.124 djm 1533: free(goid.elements);
1.46 markus 1534:
1.183 markus 1535: sshbuf_reset(m);
1536: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1537: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.46 markus 1538:
1.64 stevesk 1539: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
1.46 markus 1540:
1541: /* Now we have a context, enable the step */
1542: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
1543:
1544: return (0);
1545: }
1546:
1547: int
1.191 djm 1548: mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.46 markus 1549: {
1550: gss_buffer_desc in;
1551: gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1.64 stevesk 1552: OM_uint32 major, minor;
1.46 markus 1553: OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
1.183 markus 1554: int r;
1.46 markus 1555:
1.164 djm 1556: if (!options.gss_authentication)
1.217 djm 1557: fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
1.164 djm 1558:
1.184 djm 1559: if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1560: fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
1.46 markus 1561: major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
1.124 djm 1562: free(in.value);
1.46 markus 1563:
1.183 markus 1564: sshbuf_reset(m);
1565: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 ||
1566: (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, out.value, out.length)) != 0 ||
1567: (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, flags)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1568: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.59 avsm 1569: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
1.46 markus 1570:
1571: gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
1572:
1.64 stevesk 1573: if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1.46 markus 1574: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
1575: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.52 markus 1576: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
1.46 markus 1577: }
1578: return (0);
1579: }
1580:
1581: int
1.191 djm 1582: mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.52 markus 1583: {
1584: gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
1585: OM_uint32 ret;
1.184 djm 1586: int r;
1.54 djm 1587:
1.164 djm 1588: if (!options.gss_authentication)
1.217 djm 1589: fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
1.164 djm 1590:
1.184 djm 1591: if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 ||
1592: (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1593: fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
1.54 djm 1594:
1.52 markus 1595: ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
1.54 djm 1596:
1.124 djm 1597: free(gssbuf.value);
1598: free(mic.value);
1.54 djm 1599:
1.183 markus 1600: sshbuf_reset(m);
1601: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1602: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.54 djm 1603:
1.59 avsm 1604: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
1.54 djm 1605:
1.52 markus 1606: if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
1607: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.54 djm 1608:
1.52 markus 1609: return (0);
1610: }
1611:
1612: int
1.191 djm 1613: mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.46 markus 1614: {
1.184 djm 1615: int r, authenticated;
1.172 djm 1616: const char *displayname;
1.164 djm 1617:
1618: if (!options.gss_authentication)
1.217 djm 1619: fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
1.46 markus 1620:
1621: authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
1622:
1.183 markus 1623: sshbuf_reset(m);
1624: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1625: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.46 markus 1626:
1.217 djm 1627: debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
1.59 avsm 1628: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
1.46 markus 1629:
1.64 stevesk 1630: auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
1.172 djm 1631:
1632: if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
1633: auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
1.46 markus 1634:
1635: /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
1636: return (authenticated);
1637: }
1638: #endif /* GSSAPI */
1.100 djm 1639:
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