Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c, Revision 1.225
1.225 ! markus 1: /* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.224 2021/03/03 22:41:49 djm Exp $ */
1.1 provos 2: /*
3: * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
4: * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
5: * All rights reserved.
6: *
7: * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8: * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9: * are met:
10: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12: * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14: * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15: *
16: * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
17: * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
18: * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
19: * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
20: * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
21: * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
22: * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
23: * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
24: * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
25: * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
26: */
27:
1.67 stevesk 28: #include <sys/types.h>
29: #include <sys/wait.h>
1.79 stevesk 30: #include <sys/socket.h>
1.85 deraadt 31: #include <sys/tree.h>
1.95 djm 32: #include <sys/queue.h>
1.1 provos 33:
1.132 markus 34: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.78 stevesk 35: #include <openssl/dh.h>
1.132 markus 36: #endif
1.78 stevesk 37:
1.81 stevesk 38: #include <errno.h>
1.80 stevesk 39: #include <fcntl.h>
1.159 djm 40: #include <limits.h>
1.65 stevesk 41: #include <paths.h>
1.114 djm 42: #include <poll.h>
1.78 stevesk 43: #include <pwd.h>
1.68 stevesk 44: #include <signal.h>
1.134 djm 45: #include <stdarg.h>
1.142 millert 46: #include <stdint.h>
1.134 djm 47: #include <stdio.h>
1.84 stevesk 48: #include <stdlib.h>
1.82 stevesk 49: #include <string.h>
1.186 djm 50: #include <unistd.h>
1.1 provos 51:
1.114 djm 52: #include "atomicio.h"
1.85 deraadt 53: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.1 provos 54: #include "ssh.h"
1.185 markus 55: #include "sshkey.h"
1.183 markus 56: #include "sshbuf.h"
1.85 deraadt 57: #include "hostfile.h"
1.1 provos 58: #include "auth.h"
1.85 deraadt 59: #include "cipher.h"
1.1 provos 60: #include "kex.h"
61: #include "dh.h"
62: #include "packet.h"
63: #include "auth-options.h"
64: #include "sshpty.h"
65: #include "channels.h"
66: #include "session.h"
67: #include "sshlogin.h"
68: #include "canohost.h"
69: #include "log.h"
1.135 millert 70: #include "misc.h"
1.1 provos 71: #include "servconf.h"
72: #include "monitor.h"
1.85 deraadt 73: #ifdef GSSAPI
74: #include "ssh-gss.h"
75: #endif
1.1 provos 76: #include "monitor_wrap.h"
77: #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
78: #include "compat.h"
79: #include "ssh2.h"
1.127 markus 80: #include "authfd.h"
1.137 djm 81: #include "match.h"
1.138 djm 82: #include "ssherr.h"
1.203 djm 83: #include "sk-api.h"
1.189 djm 84:
1.46 markus 85: #ifdef GSSAPI
86: static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
87: #endif
88:
1.1 provos 89: /* Imports */
90: extern ServerOptions options;
91: extern u_int utmp_len;
1.181 markus 92: extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
1.180 djm 93: extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
1.1 provos 94:
95: /* State exported from the child */
1.139 markus 96: static struct sshbuf *child_state;
1.1 provos 97:
1.43 markus 98: /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
1.1 provos 99:
1.191 djm 100: int mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
101: int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
102: int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
103: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
104: int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
105: int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
106: int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
107: int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
108: int mm_answer_skeyquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
109: int mm_answer_skeyrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
110: int mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
111: int mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
112: int mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
113: int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
114: int mm_answer_term(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
115: int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
116: int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
117: int mm_answer_rsa_response(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
118: int mm_answer_sesskey(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
119: int mm_answer_sessid(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
1.1 provos 120:
1.46 markus 121: #ifdef GSSAPI
1.191 djm 122: int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
123: int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
124: int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
125: int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
1.46 markus 126: #endif
1.25 itojun 127:
1.1 provos 128: static Authctxt *authctxt;
1.132 markus 129:
1.1 provos 130: /* local state for key verify */
131: static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
1.183 markus 132: static size_t key_bloblen = 0;
1.224 djm 133: static u_int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
1.180 djm 134: static struct sshauthopt *key_opts = NULL;
1.26 markus 135: static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
136: static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
1.1 provos 137: static char *auth_method = "unknown";
1.119 djm 138: static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
1.44 markus 139: static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
1.13 markus 140: static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
1.40 markus 141: static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
1.1 provos 142:
143: struct mon_table {
144: enum monitor_reqtype type;
145: int flags;
1.191 djm 146: int (*f)(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
1.1 provos 147: };
148:
149: #define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
150: #define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
151: #define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
1.77 dtucker 152: #define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
1.1 provos 153:
154: #define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
155:
156: #define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
157:
1.191 djm 158: static int monitor_read(struct ssh *, struct monitor *, struct mon_table *,
159: struct mon_table **);
160: static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
161:
1.1 provos 162: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
1.132 markus 163: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 164: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
1.132 markus 165: #endif
1.1 provos 166: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
167: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
168: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
1.10 djm 169: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
1.1 provos 170: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
171: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 172: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.1 provos 173: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
174: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
1.46 markus 175: #ifdef GSSAPI
176: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
1.165 djm 177: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
178: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
179: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
1.46 markus 180: #endif
1.1 provos 181: {0, 0, NULL}
182: };
183:
184: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
1.132 markus 185: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 186: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
1.132 markus 187: #endif
1.1 provos 188: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
189: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
190: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
191: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
192: {0, 0, NULL}
193: };
194:
195: struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
196:
197: /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
198: static void
199: monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
200: {
201: while (ent->f != NULL) {
202: if (ent->type == type) {
203: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
204: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
205: return;
206: }
207: ent++;
208: }
209: }
210:
211: static void
212: monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
213: {
214: struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
215:
216: while (ent->f != NULL) {
217: if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
218: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
219: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
220: }
221: ent++;
222: }
223: }
224:
1.50 markus 225: void
1.191 djm 226: monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 227: {
228: struct mon_table *ent;
1.119 djm 229: int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
1.1 provos 230:
231: debug3("preauth child monitor started");
232:
1.179 tb 233: if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
234: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
235: if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0)
236: close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
1.114 djm 237: pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
238:
1.191 djm 239: authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
1.50 markus 240: memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
1.180 djm 241: ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
1.50 markus 242:
1.162 markus 243: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
244: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
245: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
246: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
1.1 provos 247:
248: /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
249: while (!authenticated) {
1.119 djm 250: partial = 0;
1.77 dtucker 251: auth_method = "unknown";
1.119 djm 252: auth_submethod = NULL;
1.172 djm 253: auth2_authctxt_reset_info(authctxt);
254:
1.191 djm 255: authenticated = (monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor,
256: mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
1.118 djm 257:
258: /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
259: if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
260: if (authenticated &&
261: !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
1.122 markus 262: auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
1.217 djm 263: debug3_f("method %s: partial", auth_method);
1.118 djm 264: authenticated = 0;
1.119 djm 265: partial = 1;
1.118 djm 266: }
267: }
268:
1.1 provos 269: if (authenticated) {
270: if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
1.217 djm 271: fatal_f("unexpected authentication from %d",
272: ent->type);
1.1 provos 273: if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
1.180 djm 274: !auth_root_allowed(ssh, auth_method))
1.1 provos 275: authenticated = 0;
276: }
1.77 dtucker 277: if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
1.190 djm 278: auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial,
1.125 djm 279: auth_method, auth_submethod);
1.150 djm 280: if (!partial && !authenticated)
1.1 provos 281: authctxt->failures++;
1.172 djm 282: if (authenticated || partial) {
283: auth2_update_session_info(authctxt,
284: auth_method, auth_submethod);
285: }
1.1 provos 286: }
287: }
288:
289: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.217 djm 290: fatal_f("authenticated invalid user");
1.77 dtucker 291: if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
1.217 djm 292: fatal_f("authentication method name unknown");
1.1 provos 293:
1.217 djm 294: debug_f("user %s authenticated by privileged process", authctxt->user);
1.180 djm 295: ssh->authctxt = NULL;
1.167 djm 296: ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);
1.1 provos 297:
1.192 djm 298: mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
1.120 markus 299:
300: /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
301: while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
302: ;
1.114 djm 303:
1.179 tb 304: if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
305: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
306: if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0)
307: close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
1.114 djm 308: pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
1.1 provos 309: }
310:
1.40 markus 311: static void
312: monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
313: {
314: monitor_child_pid = pid;
315: }
316:
317: static void
1.59 avsm 318: monitor_child_handler(int sig)
1.40 markus 319: {
1.59 avsm 320: kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
1.40 markus 321: }
322:
1.1 provos 323: void
1.191 djm 324: monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 325: {
1.114 djm 326: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
327: pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
328:
1.40 markus 329: monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
1.207 dtucker 330: ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
331: ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
332: ssh_signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
1.40 markus 333:
1.162 markus 334: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
335:
336: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
337: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
338: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
339: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
1.1 provos 340:
1.180 djm 341: if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) {
1.1 provos 342: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
343: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
344: }
345:
346: for (;;)
1.191 djm 347: monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
1.1 provos 348: }
349:
1.114 djm 350: static int
351: monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
352: {
1.183 markus 353: struct sshbuf *logmsg;
1.225 ! markus 354: u_int len, level, forced;
! 355: char *msg;
1.183 markus 356: u_char *p;
357: int r;
1.114 djm 358:
1.183 markus 359: if ((logmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1.217 djm 360: fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
1.114 djm 361:
362: /* Read length */
1.183 markus 363: if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, 4, &p)) != 0)
1.217 djm 364: fatal_fr(r, "reserve len");
1.183 markus 365: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, 4) != 4) {
1.114 djm 366: if (errno == EPIPE) {
1.183 markus 367: sshbuf_free(logmsg);
1.217 djm 368: debug_f("child log fd closed");
1.114 djm 369: close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
370: pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
371: return -1;
372: }
1.217 djm 373: fatal_f("log fd read: %s", strerror(errno));
1.114 djm 374: }
1.183 markus 375: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &len)) != 0)
1.217 djm 376: fatal_fr(r, "parse len");
1.114 djm 377: if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
1.217 djm 378: fatal_f("invalid log message length %u", len);
1.114 djm 379:
380: /* Read severity, message */
1.183 markus 381: sshbuf_reset(logmsg);
382: if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, len, &p)) != 0)
1.217 djm 383: fatal_fr(r, "reserve msg");
1.183 markus 384: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, len) != len)
1.217 djm 385: fatal_f("log fd read: %s", strerror(errno));
1.225 ! markus 386: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &level)) != 0 ||
! 387: (r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &forced)) != 0 ||
1.183 markus 388: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(logmsg, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 389: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.114 djm 390:
391: /* Log it */
392: if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
1.216 djm 393: fatal_f("invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", level);
1.225 ! markus 394: sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [preauth]", msg);
1.114 djm 395:
1.183 markus 396: sshbuf_free(logmsg);
1.124 djm 397: free(msg);
1.114 djm 398:
399: return 0;
400: }
401:
1.191 djm 402: static int
403: monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
1.1 provos 404: struct mon_table **pent)
405: {
1.183 markus 406: struct sshbuf *m;
407: int r, ret;
1.1 provos 408: u_char type;
1.114 djm 409: struct pollfd pfd[2];
410:
411: for (;;) {
1.130 tedu 412: memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
1.114 djm 413: pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
414: pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
415: pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
416: pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
1.115 djm 417: if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
418: if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
419: continue;
1.217 djm 420: fatal_f("poll: %s", strerror(errno));
1.115 djm 421: }
1.114 djm 422: if (pfd[1].revents) {
423: /*
424: * Drain all log messages before processing next
425: * monitor request.
426: */
427: monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
428: continue;
429: }
430: if (pfd[0].revents)
431: break; /* Continues below */
432: }
1.1 provos 433:
1.183 markus 434: if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1.217 djm 435: fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
1.1 provos 436:
1.183 markus 437: mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
438: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &type)) != 0)
1.217 djm 439: fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
1.1 provos 440:
1.217 djm 441: debug3_f("checking request %d", type);
1.1 provos 442:
443: while (ent->f != NULL) {
444: if (ent->type == type)
445: break;
446: ent++;
447: }
448:
449: if (ent->f != NULL) {
450: if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
1.217 djm 451: fatal_f("unpermitted request %d", type);
1.191 djm 452: ret = (*ent->f)(ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
1.183 markus 453: sshbuf_free(m);
1.1 provos 454:
455: /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
456: if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
1.217 djm 457: debug2_f("%d used once, disabling now", type);
1.1 provos 458: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
459: }
460:
461: if (pent != NULL)
462: *pent = ent;
1.3 markus 463:
1.1 provos 464: return ret;
465: }
466:
1.217 djm 467: fatal_f("unsupported request: %d", type);
1.1 provos 468:
469: /* NOTREACHED */
470: return (-1);
471: }
472:
473: /* allowed key state */
474: static int
1.203 djm 475: monitor_allowed_key(const u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
1.1 provos 476: {
477: /* make sure key is allowed */
478: if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
1.108 djm 479: timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
1.1 provos 480: return (0);
481: return (1);
482: }
483:
484: static void
485: monitor_reset_key_state(void)
486: {
487: /* reset state */
1.124 djm 488: free(key_blob);
489: free(hostbased_cuser);
490: free(hostbased_chost);
1.180 djm 491: sshauthopt_free(key_opts);
1.1 provos 492: key_blob = NULL;
493: key_bloblen = 0;
494: key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
1.180 djm 495: key_opts = NULL;
1.1 provos 496: hostbased_cuser = NULL;
497: hostbased_chost = NULL;
498: }
499:
1.132 markus 500: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 501: int
1.191 djm 502: mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 503: {
504: DH *dh;
1.187 djm 505: const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
1.183 markus 506: int r;
507: u_int min, want, max;
1.1 provos 508:
1.183 markus 509: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &min)) != 0 ||
510: (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &want)) != 0 ||
511: (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &max)) != 0)
1.217 djm 512: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.1 provos 513:
1.217 djm 514: debug3_f("got parameters: %d %d %d", min, want, max);
1.1 provos 515: /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
516: if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
1.217 djm 517: fatal_f("bad parameters: %d %d %d", min, want, max);
1.1 provos 518:
1.183 markus 519: sshbuf_reset(m);
1.1 provos 520:
521: dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
522: if (dh == NULL) {
1.183 markus 523: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
1.217 djm 524: fatal_fr(r, "assemble empty");
1.1 provos 525: return (0);
526: } else {
527: /* Send first bignum */
1.187 djm 528: DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
1.183 markus 529: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 ||
1.187 djm 530: (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_p)) != 0 ||
531: (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_g)) != 0)
1.217 djm 532: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.3 markus 533:
1.1 provos 534: DH_free(dh);
535: }
1.59 avsm 536: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
1.1 provos 537: return (0);
538: }
1.132 markus 539: #endif
1.1 provos 540:
541: int
1.191 djm 542: mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 543: {
1.138 djm 544: extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */
545: struct sshkey *key;
1.157 djm 546: struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
547: u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
548: char *alg = NULL;
1.155 markus 549: size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
1.159 djm 550: int r, is_proof = 0;
1.185 markus 551: u_int keyid, compat;
1.145 djm 552: const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
1.3 markus 553:
1.217 djm 554: debug3_f("entering");
1.1 provos 555:
1.138 djm 556: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
1.155 markus 557: (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 ||
1.185 markus 558: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0 ||
559: (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &compat)) != 0)
1.217 djm 560: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.159 djm 561: if (keyid > INT_MAX)
1.217 djm 562: fatal_f("invalid key ID");
1.1 provos 563:
1.69 djm 564: /*
1.110 djm 565: * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
566: * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
1.144 djm 567: *
568: * Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey
569: * proof.
570: *
571: * XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too?
572: * it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather
573: * than the full kex structure...
1.69 djm 574: */
1.144 djm 575: if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) {
576: /*
577: * Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what
578: * the client sent us.
579: */
580: if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */
1.217 djm 581: fatal_f("bad data length: %zu", datlen);
1.144 djm 582: if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL)
1.217 djm 583: fatal_f("no hostkey for index %d", keyid);
1.144 djm 584: if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1.217 djm 585: fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
1.145 djm 586: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
587: (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
1.152 jsg 588: session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
1.144 djm 589: (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
1.217 djm 590: fatal_fr(r, "assemble private key proof");
1.144 djm 591: if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) ||
592: memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0)
1.217 djm 593: fatal_f("bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
594: datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
1.144 djm 595: sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
596: is_proof = 1;
597: }
1.1 provos 598:
1.13 markus 599: /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
600: if (session_id2_len == 0) {
601: session_id2_len = datlen;
602: session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
603: memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
604: }
605:
1.127 markus 606: if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
1.155 markus 607: if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
1.213 djm 608: options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0)
1.217 djm 609: fatal_fr(r, "sign");
1.144 djm 610: } else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
1.138 djm 611: auth_sock > 0) {
612: if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
1.217 djm 613: p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0)
614: fatal_fr(r, "agent sign");
1.127 markus 615: } else
1.217 djm 616: fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid);
1.1 provos 617:
1.217 djm 618: debug3_f("%s signature %p(%zu)", is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX",
619: signature, siglen);
1.1 provos 620:
1.138 djm 621: sshbuf_reset(m);
622: if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
1.217 djm 623: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.1 provos 624:
1.157 djm 625: free(alg);
1.124 djm 626: free(p);
627: free(signature);
1.1 provos 628:
1.59 avsm 629: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
1.1 provos 630:
631: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
632: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
633:
634: return (0);
635: }
636:
1.218 djm 637: #define PUTPW(b, id) \
638: do { \
639: if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, \
640: &pwent->id, sizeof(pwent->id))) != 0) \
641: fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #id); \
642: } while (0)
643:
1.1 provos 644: /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
645: int
1.191 djm 646: mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 647: {
1.60 dtucker 648: char *username;
1.1 provos 649: struct passwd *pwent;
1.183 markus 650: int r, allowed = 0;
1.113 djm 651: u_int i;
1.3 markus 652:
1.217 djm 653: debug3_f("entering");
1.1 provos 654:
655: if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
1.217 djm 656: fatal_f("multiple attempts for getpwnam");
1.1 provos 657:
1.183 markus 658: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &username, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 659: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.1 provos 660:
1.190 djm 661: pwent = getpwnamallow(ssh, username);
1.1 provos 662:
1.60 dtucker 663: authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
664: setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
1.124 djm 665: free(username);
1.1 provos 666:
1.183 markus 667: sshbuf_reset(m);
1.1 provos 668:
669: if (pwent == NULL) {
1.183 markus 670: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
1.217 djm 671: fatal_fr(r, "assemble fakepw");
1.53 djm 672: authctxt->pw = fakepw();
1.1 provos 673: goto out;
674: }
675:
676: allowed = 1;
1.4 markus 677: authctxt->pw = pwent;
1.1 provos 678: authctxt->valid = 1;
679:
1.218 djm 680: /* XXX send fake class/dir/shell, etc. */
681: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0)
682: fatal_fr(r, "assemble ok");
683: PUTPW(m, pw_uid);
684: PUTPW(m, pw_gid);
685: PUTPW(m, pw_change);
686: PUTPW(m, pw_expire);
687: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name)) != 0 ||
1.183 markus 688: (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "*")) != 0 ||
689: (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos)) != 0 ||
690: (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class)) != 0 ||
691: (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir)) != 0 ||
692: (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell)) != 0)
1.217 djm 693: fatal_fr(r, "assemble pw");
1.94 dtucker 694:
695: out:
1.167 djm 696: ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
697: authctxt->valid ? "authenticating" : "invalid ", authctxt->user);
1.183 markus 698: if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options))) != 0)
1.217 djm 699: fatal_fr(r, "assemble options");
1.112 djm 700:
701: #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
1.217 djm 702: if (options.x != NULL && \
703: (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x)) != 0) \
704: fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \
1.112 djm 705: } while (0)
1.113 djm 706: #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
1.183 markus 707: for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) { \
708: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x[i])) != 0) \
1.217 djm 709: fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \
1.183 markus 710: } \
1.113 djm 711: } while (0)
1.112 djm 712: /* See comment in servconf.h */
713: COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
714: #undef M_CP_STROPT
1.113 djm 715: #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
1.118 djm 716:
717: /* Create valid auth method lists */
1.162 markus 718: if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
1.118 djm 719: /*
720: * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
721: * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
722: * authentication to succeed.
723: */
1.217 djm 724: debug_f("no valid authentication method lists");
1.118 djm 725: }
726:
1.217 djm 727: debug3_f("sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", allowed);
1.59 avsm 728: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
1.1 provos 729:
1.162 markus 730: /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
731: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
732: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
1.10 djm 733:
734: return (0);
735: }
736:
1.191 djm 737: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.10 djm 738: {
739: char *banner;
1.183 markus 740: int r;
1.10 djm 741:
1.183 markus 742: sshbuf_reset(m);
1.10 djm 743: banner = auth2_read_banner();
1.183 markus 744: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "")) != 0)
1.217 djm 745: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.59 avsm 746: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
1.124 djm 747: free(banner);
1.1 provos 748:
749: return (0);
750: }
751:
752: int
1.191 djm 753: mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 754: {
1.183 markus 755: int r;
756:
1.1 provos 757: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
758:
1.183 markus 759: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->service, NULL)) != 0 ||
760: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->style, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 761: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
762: debug3_f("service=%s, style=%s", authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
1.6 stevesk 763:
1.1 provos 764: if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
1.124 djm 765: free(authctxt->style);
1.1 provos 766: authctxt->style = NULL;
767: }
768:
769: return (0);
770: }
771:
772: int
1.191 djm 773: mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 774: {
775: static int call_count;
776: char *passwd;
1.183 markus 777: int r, authenticated;
778: size_t plen;
1.1 provos 779:
1.164 djm 780: if (!options.password_authentication)
1.217 djm 781: fatal_f("password authentication not enabled");
1.183 markus 782: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &passwd, &plen)) != 0)
1.217 djm 783: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.1 provos 784: /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
1.12 markus 785: authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
1.180 djm 786: auth_password(ssh, passwd);
1.209 jsg 787: freezero(passwd, plen);
1.1 provos 788:
1.183 markus 789: sshbuf_reset(m);
790: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
1.217 djm 791: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.1 provos 792:
1.217 djm 793: debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
1.59 avsm 794: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
1.1 provos 795:
796: call_count++;
797: if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
798: auth_method = "none";
799: else
800: auth_method = "password";
801:
802: /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
803: return (authenticated);
804: }
805:
806: int
1.191 djm 807: mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 808: {
809: char *name, *infotxt;
1.183 markus 810: u_int numprompts, *echo_on, success;
1.1 provos 811: char **prompts;
1.183 markus 812: int r;
1.1 provos 813:
1.164 djm 814: if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
1.217 djm 815: fatal_f("kbd-int authentication not enabled");
1.31 markus 816: success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
817: &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
1.1 provos 818:
1.183 markus 819: sshbuf_reset(m);
820: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, success)) != 0)
1.217 djm 821: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.183 markus 822: if (success) {
823: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[0])) != 0)
1.217 djm 824: fatal_fr(r, "assemble prompt");
1.183 markus 825: }
1.1 provos 826:
1.217 djm 827: debug3_f("sending challenge success: %u", success);
1.59 avsm 828: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
1.1 provos 829:
1.31 markus 830: if (success) {
1.124 djm 831: free(name);
832: free(infotxt);
833: free(prompts);
834: free(echo_on);
1.1 provos 835: }
836:
837: return (0);
838: }
839:
840: int
1.191 djm 841: mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 842: {
843: char *response;
1.183 markus 844: int r, authok;
1.1 provos 845:
1.164 djm 846: if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
1.217 djm 847: fatal_f("kbd-int authentication not enabled");
1.154 mmcc 848: if (authctxt->as == NULL)
1.217 djm 849: fatal_f("no bsd auth session");
1.1 provos 850:
1.183 markus 851: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &response, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 852: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.12 markus 853: authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
854: auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
1.1 provos 855: authctxt->as = NULL;
1.217 djm 856: debug3_f("<%s> = <%d>", response, authok);
1.124 djm 857: free(response);
1.1 provos 858:
1.183 markus 859: sshbuf_reset(m);
860: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authok)) != 0)
1.217 djm 861: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.1 provos 862:
1.217 djm 863: debug3_f("sending authenticated: %d", authok);
1.59 avsm 864: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
1.1 provos 865:
1.162 markus 866: auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
867: auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
1.1 provos 868:
869: return (authok != 0);
870: }
871:
1.188 djm 872: /*
873: * Check that the key type appears in the supplied pattern list, ignoring
874: * mismatches in the signature algorithm. (Signature algorithm checks are
875: * performed in the unprivileged authentication code).
876: * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
877: */
878: static int
879: key_base_type_match(const char *method, const struct sshkey *key,
880: const char *list)
881: {
882: char *s, *l, *ol = xstrdup(list);
883: int found = 0;
884:
885: l = ol;
886: for ((s = strsep(&l, ",")); s && *s != '\0'; (s = strsep(&l, ","))) {
887: if (sshkey_type_from_name(s) == key->type) {
888: found = 1;
889: break;
890: }
891: }
892: if (!found) {
893: error("%s key type %s is not in permitted list %s", method,
894: sshkey_ssh_name(key), list);
895: }
896:
897: free(ol);
898: return found;
899: }
900:
1.1 provos 901: int
1.191 djm 902: mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 903: {
1.183 markus 904: struct sshkey *key = NULL;
1.26 markus 905: char *cuser, *chost;
1.183 markus 906: u_int pubkey_auth_attempt;
1.224 djm 907: u_int type = 0;
1.180 djm 908: int r, allowed = 0;
909: struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
1.1 provos 910:
1.217 djm 911: debug3_f("entering");
1.183 markus 912: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
913: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 ||
914: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
915: (r = sshkey_froms(m, &key)) != 0 ||
916: (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &pubkey_auth_attempt)) != 0)
1.217 djm 917: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.1 provos 918:
1.217 djm 919: debug3_f("key_from_blob: %p", key);
1.1 provos 920:
1.51 djm 921: if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
1.137 djm 922: /* These should not make it past the privsep child */
1.185 markus 923: if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
1.222 djm 924: (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
1.217 djm 925: fatal_f("passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key");
1.137 djm 926:
1.63 deraadt 927: switch (type) {
1.1 provos 928: case MM_USERKEY:
1.77 dtucker 929: auth_method = "publickey";
1.180 djm 930: if (!options.pubkey_authentication)
931: break;
932: if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
933: break;
1.188 djm 934: if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
1.220 dtucker 935: options.pubkey_accepted_algos))
1.180 djm 936: break;
937: allowed = user_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, key,
938: pubkey_auth_attempt, &opts);
1.1 provos 939: break;
940: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1.180 djm 941: auth_method = "hostbased";
942: if (!options.hostbased_authentication)
943: break;
944: if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
945: break;
1.188 djm 946: if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
1.221 dtucker 947: options.hostbased_accepted_algos))
1.180 djm 948: break;
1.192 djm 949: allowed = hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 950: cuser, chost, key);
1.172 djm 951: auth2_record_info(authctxt,
1.126 djm 952: "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
953: cuser, chost);
1.1 provos 954: break;
955: default:
1.224 djm 956: fatal_f("unknown key type %u", type);
1.1 provos 957: break;
958: }
1.33 markus 959: }
1.161 djm 960:
1.217 djm 961: debug3_f("%s authentication%s: %s key is %s", auth_method,
962: pubkey_auth_attempt ? "" : " test",
1.180 djm 963: (key == NULL || !authctxt->valid) ? "invalid" : sshkey_type(key),
964: allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
1.161 djm 965:
1.172 djm 966: auth2_record_key(authctxt, 0, key);
1.1 provos 967:
968: /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
969: monitor_reset_key_state();
970:
971: if (allowed) {
972: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1.183 markus 973: if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &key_blob, &key_bloblen)) != 0)
1.217 djm 974: fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_to_blob");
1.1 provos 975: key_blobtype = type;
1.180 djm 976: key_opts = opts;
1.1 provos 977: hostbased_cuser = cuser;
978: hostbased_chost = chost;
1.72 djm 979: } else {
1.77 dtucker 980: /* Log failed attempt */
1.190 djm 981: auth_log(ssh, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
1.124 djm 982: free(cuser);
983: free(chost);
1.1 provos 984: }
1.183 markus 985: sshkey_free(key);
1.1 provos 986:
1.183 markus 987: sshbuf_reset(m);
988: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, allowed)) != 0)
1.217 djm 989: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.180 djm 990: if (opts != NULL && (r = sshauthopt_serialise(opts, m, 1)) != 0)
1.217 djm 991: fatal_fr(r, "sshauthopt_serialise");
1.180 djm 992: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 993:
1.180 djm 994: if (!allowed)
995: sshauthopt_free(opts);
1.1 provos 996:
997: return (0);
998: }
999:
1000: static int
1.222 djm 1001: monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
1.1 provos 1002: {
1.183 markus 1003: struct sshbuf *b;
1004: const u_char *p;
1.159 djm 1005: char *userstyle, *cp;
1.183 markus 1006: size_t len;
1007: u_char type;
1008: int r, fail = 0;
1.1 provos 1009:
1.203 djm 1010: if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
1.217 djm 1011: fatal_f("sshbuf_from");
1.3 markus 1012:
1.222 djm 1013: if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
1.183 markus 1014: p = sshbuf_ptr(b);
1015: len = sshbuf_len(b);
1.13 markus 1016: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1017: (len < session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1018: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.13 markus 1019: fail++;
1.183 markus 1020: if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, session_id2_len)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1021: fatal_fr(r, "consume");
1.1 provos 1022: } else {
1.183 markus 1023: if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1024: fatal_fr(r, "parse sessionid");
1.13 markus 1025: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1026: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1027: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 1028: fail++;
1029: }
1.183 markus 1030: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1031: fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
1.183 markus 1032: if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1.1 provos 1033: fail++;
1.183 markus 1034: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1035: fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
1.121 djm 1036: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1037: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1038: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1.159 djm 1039: if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) {
1040: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: "
1041: "expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp);
1.1 provos 1042: fail++;
1043: }
1.124 djm 1044: free(userstyle);
1.159 djm 1045: free(cp);
1.183 markus 1046: if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */
1047: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1048: fatal_fr(r, "parse method");
1.178 djm 1049: if (strcmp("publickey", cp) != 0)
1050: fail++;
1051: free(cp);
1.183 markus 1052: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1053: fatal_fr(r, "parse pktype");
1.183 markus 1054: if (type == 0)
1.178 djm 1055: fail++;
1.183 markus 1056: if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */
1057: (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */
1.217 djm 1058: fatal_fr(r, "parse pk");
1.183 markus 1059: if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
1.1 provos 1060: fail++;
1.183 markus 1061: sshbuf_free(b);
1.1 provos 1062: return (fail == 0);
1063: }
1064:
1065: static int
1.203 djm 1066: monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
1067: const char *cuser, const char *chost)
1.1 provos 1068: {
1.183 markus 1069: struct sshbuf *b;
1070: const u_char *p;
1071: char *cp, *userstyle;
1072: size_t len;
1073: int r, fail = 0;
1074: u_char type;
1.1 provos 1075:
1.203 djm 1076: if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
1.217 djm 1077: fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
1.203 djm 1078: if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1079: fatal_fr(r, "parse sessionid");
1.3 markus 1080:
1.13 markus 1081: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1082: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1083: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 1084: fail++;
1.13 markus 1085:
1.183 markus 1086: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1087: fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
1.183 markus 1088: if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1.1 provos 1089: fail++;
1.183 markus 1090: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1091: fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
1.121 djm 1092: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1093: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1094: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1.183 markus 1095: if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) {
1096: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: "
1097: "expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp);
1.1 provos 1098: fail++;
1099: }
1.121 djm 1100: free(userstyle);
1.183 markus 1101: free(cp);
1102: if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */
1103: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1104: fatal_fr(r, "parse method");
1.183 markus 1105: if (strcmp(cp, "hostbased") != 0)
1.1 provos 1106: fail++;
1.183 markus 1107: free(cp);
1108: if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */
1109: (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */
1.217 djm 1110: fatal_fr(r, "parse pk");
1.1 provos 1111:
1112: /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
1.183 markus 1113: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1114: fatal_fr(r, "parse host");
1.183 markus 1115: if (((len = strlen(cp)) > 0) && cp[len - 1] == '.')
1116: cp[len - 1] = '\0';
1117: if (strcmp(cp, chost) != 0)
1.1 provos 1118: fail++;
1.183 markus 1119: free(cp);
1.1 provos 1120:
1121: /* verify client user */
1.183 markus 1122: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1123: fatal_fr(r, "parse ruser");
1.183 markus 1124: if (strcmp(cp, cuser) != 0)
1.1 provos 1125: fail++;
1.183 markus 1126: free(cp);
1.1 provos 1127:
1.183 markus 1128: if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
1.1 provos 1129: fail++;
1.183 markus 1130: sshbuf_free(b);
1.1 provos 1131: return (fail == 0);
1132: }
1133:
1134: int
1.191 djm 1135: mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 1136: {
1.168 markus 1137: struct sshkey *key;
1.203 djm 1138: const u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
1139: char *sigalg = NULL, *fp = NULL;
1.169 markus 1140: size_t signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
1.214 djm 1141: int r, ret, req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, valid_data = 0;
1142: int encoded_ret;
1.202 djm 1143: struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
1.1 provos 1144:
1.203 djm 1145: if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 ||
1146: (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 ||
1147: (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 ||
1.176 djm 1148: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &sigalg, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1149: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.1 provos 1150:
1151: if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
1.8 mouring 1152: !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
1.217 djm 1153: fatal_f("bad key, not previously allowed");
1.1 provos 1154:
1.177 djm 1155: /* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */
1156: if (*sigalg == '\0') {
1157: free(sigalg);
1158: sigalg = NULL;
1159: }
1160:
1.169 markus 1161: /* XXX use sshkey_froms here; need to change key_blob, etc. */
1162: if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, bloblen, &key)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1163: fatal_fr(r, "parse key");
1.1 provos 1164:
1165: switch (key_blobtype) {
1166: case MM_USERKEY:
1.222 djm 1167: valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(ssh, data, datalen);
1.172 djm 1168: auth_method = "publickey";
1.1 provos 1169: break;
1170: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1171: valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
1172: hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
1.172 djm 1173: auth_method = "hostbased";
1.1 provos 1174: break;
1175: default:
1176: valid_data = 0;
1177: break;
1178: }
1179: if (!valid_data)
1.223 djm 1180: fatal_f("bad %s signature data blob",
1181: key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "userkey" :
1182: (key_blobtype == MM_HOSTKEY ? "hostkey" : "unknown"));
1.1 provos 1183:
1.203 djm 1184: if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
1185: SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
1.217 djm 1186: fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
1.203 djm 1187:
1.169 markus 1188: ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
1.202 djm 1189: sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
1.217 djm 1190: debug3_f("%s %p signature %s%s%s", auth_method, key,
1.201 djm 1191: (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified",
1192: (ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : "");
1.203 djm 1193:
1194: if (ret == 0 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY && sig_details != NULL) {
1195: req_presence = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
1.204 djm 1196: PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) ||
1197: !key_opts->no_require_user_presence;
1.203 djm 1198: if (req_presence &&
1199: (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) == 0) {
1200: error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s "
1.208 naddy 1201: "port %d rejected: user presence "
1202: "(authenticator touch) requirement not met ",
1203: sshkey_type(key), fp,
1.214 djm 1204: authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
1205: authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
1206: ssh_remote_port(ssh));
1207: ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
1208: }
1209: req_verify = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
1210: PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED) || key_opts->require_verify;
1211: if (req_verify &&
1212: (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD) == 0) {
1213: error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s "
1214: "port %d rejected: user verification requirement "
1215: "not met ", sshkey_type(key), fp,
1.203 djm 1216: authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
1217: authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
1218: ssh_remote_port(ssh));
1219: ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
1220: }
1221: }
1.172 djm 1222: auth2_record_key(authctxt, ret == 0, key);
1.136 djm 1223:
1.180 djm 1224: if (key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
1225: auth_activate_options(ssh, key_opts);
1.1 provos 1226: monitor_reset_key_state();
1.3 markus 1227:
1.169 markus 1228: sshbuf_reset(m);
1229:
1230: /* encode ret != 0 as positive integer, since we're sending u32 */
1231: encoded_ret = (ret != 0);
1.202 djm 1232: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, encoded_ret)) != 0 ||
1.205 djm 1233: (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details != NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1234: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.202 djm 1235: if (sig_details != NULL) {
1236: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sig_details->sk_counter)) != 0 ||
1237: (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details->sk_flags)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1238: fatal_fr(r, "assemble sk");
1.202 djm 1239: }
1240: sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
1.59 avsm 1241: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
1.203 djm 1242:
1243: free(sigalg);
1244: free(fp);
1245: sshkey_free(key);
1.1 provos 1246:
1.169 markus 1247: return ret == 0;
1.1 provos 1248: }
1249:
1.2 markus 1250: static void
1.191 djm 1251: mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
1.1 provos 1252: {
1253: socklen_t fromlen;
1254: struct sockaddr_storage from;
1255:
1256: /*
1257: * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
1258: * the address be 0.0.0.0.
1259: */
1260: memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
1.24 stevesk 1261: fromlen = sizeof(from);
1.191 djm 1262: if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
1263: if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
1.198 deraadt 1264: (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
1.1 provos 1265: debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1.50 markus 1266: cleanup_exit(255);
1.1 provos 1267: }
1268: }
1269: /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
1270: record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
1.158 djm 1271: session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns),
1.24 stevesk 1272: (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
1.1 provos 1273: }
1274:
1275: static void
1276: mm_session_close(Session *s)
1277: {
1.217 djm 1278: debug3_f("session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
1.1 provos 1279: if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1.217 djm 1280: debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ptyfd);
1.1 provos 1281: session_pty_cleanup2(s);
1282: }
1.96 djm 1283: session_unused(s->self);
1.1 provos 1284: }
1285:
1286: int
1.191 djm 1287: mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 1288: {
1.11 mouring 1289: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1290: Session *s;
1.183 markus 1291: int r, res, fd0;
1.1 provos 1292:
1.217 djm 1293: debug3_f("entering");
1.1 provos 1294:
1.183 markus 1295: sshbuf_reset(m);
1.1 provos 1296: s = session_new();
1297: if (s == NULL)
1298: goto error;
1299: s->authctxt = authctxt;
1300: s->pw = authctxt->pw;
1.11 mouring 1301: s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
1.1 provos 1302: res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
1303: if (res == 0)
1304: goto error;
1305: pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
1306:
1.183 markus 1307: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0 ||
1308: (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1309: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.1 provos 1310:
1311: /* We need to trick ttyslot */
1312: if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
1.217 djm 1313: fatal_f("dup2");
1.1 provos 1314:
1.191 djm 1315: mm_record_login(ssh, s, authctxt->pw);
1.1 provos 1316:
1317: /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
1318: close(0);
1.61 dtucker 1319:
1320: /* send messages generated by record_login */
1.183 markus 1321: if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1322: fatal_fr(r, "assemble loginmsg");
1.183 markus 1323: sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
1.61 dtucker 1324:
1325: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1326:
1.92 djm 1327: if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
1328: mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
1.217 djm 1329: fatal_f("send fds failed");
1.1 provos 1330:
1331: /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
1.198 deraadt 1332: if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
1.217 djm 1333: fatal_f("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1334: if (fd0 != 0)
1.217 djm 1335: error_f("fd0 %d != 0", fd0);
1.1 provos 1336:
1.212 deraadt 1337: /* slave side of pty is not needed */
1.1 provos 1338: close(s->ttyfd);
1339: s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
1340: /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
1341: s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
1342:
1.217 djm 1343: debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
1.1 provos 1344:
1345: return (0);
1346:
1347: error:
1348: if (s != NULL)
1349: mm_session_close(s);
1.183 markus 1350: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1351: fatal_fr(r, "assemble 0");
1.59 avsm 1352: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1.1 provos 1353: return (0);
1354: }
1355:
1356: int
1.191 djm 1357: mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 1358: {
1359: Session *s;
1360: char *tty;
1.183 markus 1361: int r;
1.1 provos 1362:
1.217 djm 1363: debug3_f("entering");
1.1 provos 1364:
1.183 markus 1365: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1366: fatal_fr(r, "parse tty");
1.1 provos 1367: if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
1368: mm_session_close(s);
1.183 markus 1369: sshbuf_reset(m);
1.124 djm 1370: free(tty);
1.1 provos 1371: return (0);
1372: }
1373:
1374: int
1.191 djm 1375: mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *req)
1.1 provos 1376: {
1.11 mouring 1377: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1378: int res, status;
1379:
1.217 djm 1380: debug3_f("tearing down sessions");
1.1 provos 1381:
1382: /* The child is terminating */
1.173 djm 1383: session_destroy_all(ssh, &mm_session_close);
1.1 provos 1384:
1.11 mouring 1385: while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
1.9 markus 1386: if (errno != EINTR)
1387: exit(1);
1.1 provos 1388:
1389: res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
1390:
1391: /* Terminate process */
1.57 deraadt 1392: exit(res);
1.170 markus 1393: }
1394:
1395: void
1.191 djm 1396: monitor_clear_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.170 markus 1397: {
1398: ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN);
1399: ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
1400: sshbuf_free(child_state);
1401: child_state = NULL;
1.1 provos 1402: }
1403:
1404: void
1.191 djm 1405: monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1406: {
1.139 markus 1407: struct kex *kex;
1408: int r;
1409:
1.217 djm 1410: debug3_f("packet_set_state");
1.139 markus 1411: if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1412: fatal_fr(r, "packet_set_state");
1.139 markus 1413: sshbuf_free(child_state);
1414: child_state = NULL;
1.223 djm 1415: if ((kex = ssh->kex) == NULL)
1416: fatal_f("internal error: ssh->kex == NULL");
1417: if (session_id2_len != sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->session_id)) {
1418: fatal_f("incorrect session id length %zu (expected %u)",
1419: sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->session_id), session_id2_len);
1420: }
1421: if (memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->session_id), session_id2,
1422: session_id2_len) != 0)
1423: fatal_f("session ID mismatch");
1424: /* XXX set callbacks */
1.147 djm 1425: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.223 djm 1426: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
1427: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
1428: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
1429: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
1430: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
1431: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1432: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
1433: kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
1.147 djm 1434: #endif
1.223 djm 1435: kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
1436: kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
1437: kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
1438: kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
1439: kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1440: kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
1.1 provos 1441: }
1442:
1.210 djm 1443: /* This function requires careful sanity checking */
1.1 provos 1444:
1445: void
1.192 djm 1446: mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1447: {
1.217 djm 1448: debug3_f("Waiting for new keys");
1.1 provos 1449:
1.139 markus 1450: if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1.217 djm 1451: fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
1.139 markus 1452: mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
1453: child_state);
1.217 djm 1454: debug3_f("GOT new keys");
1.1 provos 1455: }
1456:
1457:
1458: /* XXX */
1459:
1460: #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
1.111 djm 1461: if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
1.1 provos 1462: fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
1463: } while (0)
1464:
1.2 markus 1465: static void
1.114 djm 1466: monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
1.3 markus 1467: {
1.114 djm 1468: int pair[2];
1.171 markus 1469: #ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
1470: int on = 1;
1471: #endif
1.114 djm 1472:
1.1 provos 1473: if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
1.217 djm 1474: fatal_f("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
1.171 markus 1475: #ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
1.198 deraadt 1476: if (setsockopt(pair[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
1.171 markus 1477: error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(0): %.100s", strerror(errno));
1.198 deraadt 1478: if (setsockopt(pair[1], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
1.171 markus 1479: error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(1): %.100s", strerror(errno));
1480: #endif
1.1 provos 1481: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1482: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1.114 djm 1483: mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1484: mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1485:
1486: if (do_logfds) {
1487: if (pipe(pair) == -1)
1.217 djm 1488: fatal_f("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
1.114 djm 1489: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1490: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1491: mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
1492: mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
1493: } else
1494: mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
1.1 provos 1495: }
1496:
1497: #define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
1498:
1499: struct monitor *
1500: monitor_init(void)
1501: {
1502: struct monitor *mon;
1503:
1.75 djm 1504: mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
1.114 djm 1505: monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
1.1 provos 1506:
1507: return mon;
1508: }
1509:
1510: void
1511: monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
1512: {
1.114 djm 1513: monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
1.1 provos 1514: }
1.46 markus 1515:
1516: #ifdef GSSAPI
1517: int
1.191 djm 1518: mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.46 markus 1519: {
1.59 avsm 1520: gss_OID_desc goid;
1.46 markus 1521: OM_uint32 major;
1.183 markus 1522: size_t len;
1.184 djm 1523: u_char *p;
1.183 markus 1524: int r;
1.46 markus 1525:
1.164 djm 1526: if (!options.gss_authentication)
1.217 djm 1527: fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
1.164 djm 1528:
1.184 djm 1529: if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1530: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.184 djm 1531: goid.elements = p;
1.59 avsm 1532: goid.length = len;
1.46 markus 1533:
1.59 avsm 1534: major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
1.46 markus 1535:
1.124 djm 1536: free(goid.elements);
1.46 markus 1537:
1.183 markus 1538: sshbuf_reset(m);
1539: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1540: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.46 markus 1541:
1.64 stevesk 1542: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
1.46 markus 1543:
1544: /* Now we have a context, enable the step */
1545: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
1546:
1547: return (0);
1548: }
1549:
1550: int
1.191 djm 1551: mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.46 markus 1552: {
1553: gss_buffer_desc in;
1554: gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1.64 stevesk 1555: OM_uint32 major, minor;
1.46 markus 1556: OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
1.183 markus 1557: int r;
1.46 markus 1558:
1.164 djm 1559: if (!options.gss_authentication)
1.217 djm 1560: fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
1.164 djm 1561:
1.184 djm 1562: if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1563: fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
1.46 markus 1564: major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
1.124 djm 1565: free(in.value);
1.46 markus 1566:
1.183 markus 1567: sshbuf_reset(m);
1568: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 ||
1569: (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, out.value, out.length)) != 0 ||
1570: (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, flags)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1571: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.59 avsm 1572: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
1.46 markus 1573:
1574: gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
1575:
1.64 stevesk 1576: if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1.46 markus 1577: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
1578: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.52 markus 1579: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
1.46 markus 1580: }
1581: return (0);
1582: }
1583:
1584: int
1.191 djm 1585: mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.52 markus 1586: {
1587: gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
1588: OM_uint32 ret;
1.184 djm 1589: int r;
1.54 djm 1590:
1.164 djm 1591: if (!options.gss_authentication)
1.217 djm 1592: fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
1.164 djm 1593:
1.184 djm 1594: if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 ||
1595: (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1596: fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
1.54 djm 1597:
1.52 markus 1598: ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
1.54 djm 1599:
1.124 djm 1600: free(gssbuf.value);
1601: free(mic.value);
1.54 djm 1602:
1.183 markus 1603: sshbuf_reset(m);
1604: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1605: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.54 djm 1606:
1.59 avsm 1607: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
1.54 djm 1608:
1.52 markus 1609: if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
1610: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.54 djm 1611:
1.52 markus 1612: return (0);
1613: }
1614:
1615: int
1.191 djm 1616: mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.46 markus 1617: {
1.184 djm 1618: int r, authenticated;
1.172 djm 1619: const char *displayname;
1.164 djm 1620:
1621: if (!options.gss_authentication)
1.217 djm 1622: fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
1.46 markus 1623:
1624: authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
1625:
1.183 markus 1626: sshbuf_reset(m);
1627: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1628: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.46 markus 1629:
1.217 djm 1630: debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
1.59 avsm 1631: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
1.46 markus 1632:
1.64 stevesk 1633: auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
1.172 djm 1634:
1635: if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
1636: auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
1.46 markus 1637:
1638: /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
1639: return (authenticated);
1640: }
1641: #endif /* GSSAPI */
1.100 djm 1642:
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