Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c, Revision 1.238
1.238 ! djm 1: /* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.237 2023/08/16 16:14:11 djm Exp $ */
1.1 provos 2: /*
3: * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
4: * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
5: * All rights reserved.
6: *
7: * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8: * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9: * are met:
10: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12: * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13: * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14: * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15: *
16: * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
17: * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
18: * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
19: * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
20: * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
21: * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
22: * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
23: * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
24: * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
25: * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
26: */
27:
1.67 stevesk 28: #include <sys/types.h>
29: #include <sys/wait.h>
1.79 stevesk 30: #include <sys/socket.h>
1.85 deraadt 31: #include <sys/tree.h>
1.95 djm 32: #include <sys/queue.h>
1.1 provos 33:
1.132 markus 34: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.78 stevesk 35: #include <openssl/dh.h>
1.132 markus 36: #endif
1.78 stevesk 37:
1.81 stevesk 38: #include <errno.h>
1.80 stevesk 39: #include <fcntl.h>
1.159 djm 40: #include <limits.h>
1.65 stevesk 41: #include <paths.h>
1.114 djm 42: #include <poll.h>
1.78 stevesk 43: #include <pwd.h>
1.68 stevesk 44: #include <signal.h>
1.134 djm 45: #include <stdarg.h>
1.142 millert 46: #include <stdint.h>
1.134 djm 47: #include <stdio.h>
1.84 stevesk 48: #include <stdlib.h>
1.82 stevesk 49: #include <string.h>
1.186 djm 50: #include <unistd.h>
1.1 provos 51:
1.114 djm 52: #include "atomicio.h"
1.85 deraadt 53: #include "xmalloc.h"
1.1 provos 54: #include "ssh.h"
1.185 markus 55: #include "sshkey.h"
1.183 markus 56: #include "sshbuf.h"
1.85 deraadt 57: #include "hostfile.h"
1.1 provos 58: #include "auth.h"
1.85 deraadt 59: #include "cipher.h"
1.1 provos 60: #include "kex.h"
61: #include "dh.h"
62: #include "packet.h"
63: #include "auth-options.h"
64: #include "sshpty.h"
65: #include "channels.h"
66: #include "session.h"
67: #include "sshlogin.h"
68: #include "canohost.h"
69: #include "log.h"
1.135 millert 70: #include "misc.h"
1.1 provos 71: #include "servconf.h"
72: #include "monitor.h"
1.85 deraadt 73: #ifdef GSSAPI
74: #include "ssh-gss.h"
75: #endif
1.1 provos 76: #include "monitor_wrap.h"
77: #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
78: #include "compat.h"
79: #include "ssh2.h"
1.127 markus 80: #include "authfd.h"
1.137 djm 81: #include "match.h"
1.138 djm 82: #include "ssherr.h"
1.203 djm 83: #include "sk-api.h"
1.189 djm 84:
1.46 markus 85: #ifdef GSSAPI
86: static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
87: #endif
88:
1.1 provos 89: /* Imports */
90: extern ServerOptions options;
91: extern u_int utmp_len;
1.181 markus 92: extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
1.180 djm 93: extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
1.1 provos 94:
95: /* State exported from the child */
1.139 markus 96: static struct sshbuf *child_state;
1.1 provos 97:
1.43 markus 98: /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
1.1 provos 99:
1.191 djm 100: int mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
101: int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
102: int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
103: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
104: int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
105: int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
106: int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
107: int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
108: int mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
109: int mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
110: int mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
111: int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
112: int mm_answer_term(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
113: int mm_answer_sesskey(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
114: int mm_answer_sessid(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
1.1 provos 115:
1.46 markus 116: #ifdef GSSAPI
1.191 djm 117: int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
118: int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
119: int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
120: int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
1.46 markus 121: #endif
1.25 itojun 122:
1.1 provos 123: static Authctxt *authctxt;
1.132 markus 124:
1.1 provos 125: /* local state for key verify */
126: static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
1.183 markus 127: static size_t key_bloblen = 0;
1.224 djm 128: static u_int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
1.180 djm 129: static struct sshauthopt *key_opts = NULL;
1.26 markus 130: static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
131: static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
1.1 provos 132: static char *auth_method = "unknown";
1.119 djm 133: static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
1.44 markus 134: static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
1.13 markus 135: static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
1.40 markus 136: static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
1.1 provos 137:
138: struct mon_table {
139: enum monitor_reqtype type;
140: int flags;
1.191 djm 141: int (*f)(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
1.1 provos 142: };
143:
144: #define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
145: #define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
146: #define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
1.77 dtucker 147: #define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
1.1 provos 148:
149: #define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
150:
151: #define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
152:
1.191 djm 153: static int monitor_read(struct ssh *, struct monitor *, struct mon_table *,
154: struct mon_table **);
155: static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
156:
1.1 provos 157: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
1.132 markus 158: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 159: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
1.132 markus 160: #endif
1.1 provos 161: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
162: {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
163: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
1.10 djm 164: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
1.1 provos 165: {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
166: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
1.66 stevesk 167: {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
1.1 provos 168: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
169: {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
1.46 markus 170: #ifdef GSSAPI
171: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
1.165 djm 172: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
173: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
174: {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
1.46 markus 175: #endif
1.1 provos 176: {0, 0, NULL}
177: };
178:
179: struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
1.132 markus 180: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 181: {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
1.132 markus 182: #endif
1.1 provos 183: {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
184: {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
185: {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
186: {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
187: {0, 0, NULL}
188: };
189:
190: struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
191:
192: /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
193: static void
194: monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
195: {
196: while (ent->f != NULL) {
197: if (ent->type == type) {
198: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
199: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
200: return;
201: }
202: ent++;
203: }
204: }
205:
206: static void
207: monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
208: {
209: struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
210:
211: while (ent->f != NULL) {
212: if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
213: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
214: ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
215: }
216: ent++;
217: }
218: }
219:
1.50 markus 220: void
1.191 djm 221: monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 222: {
223: struct mon_table *ent;
1.119 djm 224: int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
1.1 provos 225:
226: debug3("preauth child monitor started");
227:
1.179 tb 228: if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
229: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
230: if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0)
231: close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
1.114 djm 232: pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
233:
1.191 djm 234: authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
1.50 markus 235: memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
1.180 djm 236: ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
1.50 markus 237:
1.162 markus 238: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
239: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
240: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
241: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
1.1 provos 242:
243: /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
244: while (!authenticated) {
1.119 djm 245: partial = 0;
1.77 dtucker 246: auth_method = "unknown";
1.119 djm 247: auth_submethod = NULL;
1.172 djm 248: auth2_authctxt_reset_info(authctxt);
249:
1.191 djm 250: authenticated = (monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor,
251: mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
1.118 djm 252:
253: /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
254: if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
255: if (authenticated &&
256: !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
1.122 markus 257: auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
1.217 djm 258: debug3_f("method %s: partial", auth_method);
1.118 djm 259: authenticated = 0;
1.119 djm 260: partial = 1;
1.118 djm 261: }
262: }
263:
1.1 provos 264: if (authenticated) {
265: if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
1.217 djm 266: fatal_f("unexpected authentication from %d",
267: ent->type);
1.1 provos 268: if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
1.180 djm 269: !auth_root_allowed(ssh, auth_method))
1.1 provos 270: authenticated = 0;
271: }
1.77 dtucker 272: if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
1.190 djm 273: auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial,
1.125 djm 274: auth_method, auth_submethod);
1.150 djm 275: if (!partial && !authenticated)
1.1 provos 276: authctxt->failures++;
1.172 djm 277: if (authenticated || partial) {
278: auth2_update_session_info(authctxt,
279: auth_method, auth_submethod);
280: }
1.237 djm 281: }
282: if (authctxt->failures > options.max_authtries) {
283: /* Shouldn't happen */
284: fatal_f("privsep child made too many authentication "
285: "attempts");
1.1 provos 286: }
287: }
288:
289: if (!authctxt->valid)
1.217 djm 290: fatal_f("authenticated invalid user");
1.77 dtucker 291: if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
1.217 djm 292: fatal_f("authentication method name unknown");
1.1 provos 293:
1.217 djm 294: debug_f("user %s authenticated by privileged process", authctxt->user);
1.180 djm 295: ssh->authctxt = NULL;
1.167 djm 296: ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);
1.1 provos 297:
1.192 djm 298: mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
1.120 markus 299:
300: /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
301: while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
302: ;
1.114 djm 303:
1.179 tb 304: if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
305: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
306: if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0)
307: close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
1.114 djm 308: pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
1.1 provos 309: }
310:
1.40 markus 311: static void
312: monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
313: {
314: monitor_child_pid = pid;
315: }
316:
317: static void
1.59 avsm 318: monitor_child_handler(int sig)
1.40 markus 319: {
1.59 avsm 320: kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
1.40 markus 321: }
322:
1.1 provos 323: void
1.191 djm 324: monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 325: {
1.114 djm 326: close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
327: pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
328:
1.40 markus 329: monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
1.207 dtucker 330: ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
331: ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
332: ssh_signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
1.40 markus 333:
1.162 markus 334: mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
335:
336: /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
337: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
338: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
339: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
1.1 provos 340:
1.180 djm 341: if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) {
1.1 provos 342: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
343: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
344: }
345:
346: for (;;)
1.191 djm 347: monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
1.1 provos 348: }
349:
1.114 djm 350: static int
351: monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
352: {
1.183 markus 353: struct sshbuf *logmsg;
1.225 markus 354: u_int len, level, forced;
355: char *msg;
1.183 markus 356: u_char *p;
357: int r;
1.114 djm 358:
1.183 markus 359: if ((logmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1.217 djm 360: fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
1.114 djm 361:
362: /* Read length */
1.183 markus 363: if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, 4, &p)) != 0)
1.217 djm 364: fatal_fr(r, "reserve len");
1.183 markus 365: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, 4) != 4) {
1.114 djm 366: if (errno == EPIPE) {
1.183 markus 367: sshbuf_free(logmsg);
1.217 djm 368: debug_f("child log fd closed");
1.114 djm 369: close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
370: pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
371: return -1;
372: }
1.217 djm 373: fatal_f("log fd read: %s", strerror(errno));
1.114 djm 374: }
1.183 markus 375: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &len)) != 0)
1.217 djm 376: fatal_fr(r, "parse len");
1.114 djm 377: if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
1.217 djm 378: fatal_f("invalid log message length %u", len);
1.114 djm 379:
380: /* Read severity, message */
1.183 markus 381: sshbuf_reset(logmsg);
382: if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, len, &p)) != 0)
1.217 djm 383: fatal_fr(r, "reserve msg");
1.183 markus 384: if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, len) != len)
1.217 djm 385: fatal_f("log fd read: %s", strerror(errno));
1.225 markus 386: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &level)) != 0 ||
387: (r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &forced)) != 0 ||
1.183 markus 388: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(logmsg, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 389: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.114 djm 390:
391: /* Log it */
392: if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
1.216 djm 393: fatal_f("invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", level);
1.225 markus 394: sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [preauth]", msg);
1.114 djm 395:
1.183 markus 396: sshbuf_free(logmsg);
1.124 djm 397: free(msg);
1.114 djm 398:
399: return 0;
400: }
401:
1.191 djm 402: static int
403: monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
1.1 provos 404: struct mon_table **pent)
405: {
1.183 markus 406: struct sshbuf *m;
407: int r, ret;
1.1 provos 408: u_char type;
1.114 djm 409: struct pollfd pfd[2];
410:
411: for (;;) {
1.130 tedu 412: memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
1.114 djm 413: pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
414: pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
415: pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
416: pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
1.115 djm 417: if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
418: if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
419: continue;
1.217 djm 420: fatal_f("poll: %s", strerror(errno));
1.115 djm 421: }
1.114 djm 422: if (pfd[1].revents) {
423: /*
424: * Drain all log messages before processing next
425: * monitor request.
426: */
427: monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
428: continue;
429: }
430: if (pfd[0].revents)
431: break; /* Continues below */
432: }
1.1 provos 433:
1.183 markus 434: if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1.217 djm 435: fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
1.1 provos 436:
1.183 markus 437: mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
438: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &type)) != 0)
1.217 djm 439: fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
1.1 provos 440:
1.217 djm 441: debug3_f("checking request %d", type);
1.1 provos 442:
443: while (ent->f != NULL) {
444: if (ent->type == type)
445: break;
446: ent++;
447: }
448:
449: if (ent->f != NULL) {
450: if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
1.217 djm 451: fatal_f("unpermitted request %d", type);
1.191 djm 452: ret = (*ent->f)(ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
1.183 markus 453: sshbuf_free(m);
1.1 provos 454:
455: /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
456: if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
1.217 djm 457: debug2_f("%d used once, disabling now", type);
1.1 provos 458: ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
459: }
460:
461: if (pent != NULL)
462: *pent = ent;
1.3 markus 463:
1.1 provos 464: return ret;
465: }
466:
1.217 djm 467: fatal_f("unsupported request: %d", type);
1.1 provos 468:
469: /* NOTREACHED */
470: return (-1);
471: }
472:
473: /* allowed key state */
474: static int
1.203 djm 475: monitor_allowed_key(const u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
1.1 provos 476: {
477: /* make sure key is allowed */
478: if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
1.108 djm 479: timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
1.1 provos 480: return (0);
481: return (1);
482: }
483:
484: static void
485: monitor_reset_key_state(void)
486: {
487: /* reset state */
1.124 djm 488: free(key_blob);
489: free(hostbased_cuser);
490: free(hostbased_chost);
1.180 djm 491: sshauthopt_free(key_opts);
1.1 provos 492: key_blob = NULL;
493: key_bloblen = 0;
494: key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
1.180 djm 495: key_opts = NULL;
1.1 provos 496: hostbased_cuser = NULL;
497: hostbased_chost = NULL;
498: }
499:
1.132 markus 500: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.1 provos 501: int
1.191 djm 502: mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 503: {
504: DH *dh;
1.187 djm 505: const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
1.183 markus 506: int r;
507: u_int min, want, max;
1.1 provos 508:
1.183 markus 509: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &min)) != 0 ||
510: (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &want)) != 0 ||
511: (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &max)) != 0)
1.217 djm 512: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.1 provos 513:
1.217 djm 514: debug3_f("got parameters: %d %d %d", min, want, max);
1.1 provos 515: /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
516: if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
1.217 djm 517: fatal_f("bad parameters: %d %d %d", min, want, max);
1.1 provos 518:
1.183 markus 519: sshbuf_reset(m);
1.1 provos 520:
521: dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
522: if (dh == NULL) {
1.183 markus 523: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
1.217 djm 524: fatal_fr(r, "assemble empty");
1.1 provos 525: return (0);
526: } else {
527: /* Send first bignum */
1.187 djm 528: DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
1.183 markus 529: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 ||
1.187 djm 530: (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_p)) != 0 ||
531: (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_g)) != 0)
1.217 djm 532: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.3 markus 533:
1.1 provos 534: DH_free(dh);
535: }
1.59 avsm 536: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
1.1 provos 537: return (0);
538: }
1.132 markus 539: #endif
1.1 provos 540:
541: int
1.191 djm 542: mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 543: {
1.138 djm 544: extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */
545: struct sshkey *key;
1.157 djm 546: struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
547: u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
548: char *alg = NULL;
1.155 markus 549: size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
1.159 djm 550: int r, is_proof = 0;
1.185 markus 551: u_int keyid, compat;
1.145 djm 552: const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
1.3 markus 553:
1.217 djm 554: debug3_f("entering");
1.1 provos 555:
1.138 djm 556: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
1.155 markus 557: (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 ||
1.185 markus 558: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0 ||
559: (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &compat)) != 0)
1.217 djm 560: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.159 djm 561: if (keyid > INT_MAX)
1.217 djm 562: fatal_f("invalid key ID");
1.1 provos 563:
1.69 djm 564: /*
1.110 djm 565: * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
566: * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
1.144 djm 567: *
568: * Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey
569: * proof.
570: *
571: * XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too?
572: * it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather
573: * than the full kex structure...
1.69 djm 574: */
1.144 djm 575: if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) {
576: /*
577: * Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what
578: * the client sent us.
579: */
580: if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */
1.217 djm 581: fatal_f("bad data length: %zu", datlen);
1.144 djm 582: if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL)
1.217 djm 583: fatal_f("no hostkey for index %d", keyid);
1.144 djm 584: if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1.217 djm 585: fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
1.145 djm 586: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
587: (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
1.152 jsg 588: session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
1.144 djm 589: (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
1.217 djm 590: fatal_fr(r, "assemble private key proof");
1.144 djm 591: if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) ||
592: memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0)
1.217 djm 593: fatal_f("bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
594: datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
1.144 djm 595: sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
596: is_proof = 1;
597: }
1.1 provos 598:
1.13 markus 599: /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
600: if (session_id2_len == 0) {
601: session_id2_len = datlen;
602: session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
603: memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
604: }
605:
1.127 markus 606: if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
1.155 markus 607: if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
1.213 djm 608: options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0)
1.217 djm 609: fatal_fr(r, "sign");
1.144 djm 610: } else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
1.138 djm 611: auth_sock > 0) {
612: if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
1.217 djm 613: p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0)
614: fatal_fr(r, "agent sign");
1.127 markus 615: } else
1.217 djm 616: fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid);
1.1 provos 617:
1.228 djm 618: debug3_f("%s %s signature len=%zu", alg,
619: is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen);
1.1 provos 620:
1.138 djm 621: sshbuf_reset(m);
622: if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
1.217 djm 623: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.1 provos 624:
1.157 djm 625: free(alg);
1.124 djm 626: free(p);
627: free(signature);
1.1 provos 628:
1.59 avsm 629: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
1.1 provos 630:
631: /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
632: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
633:
634: return (0);
635: }
636:
1.218 djm 637: #define PUTPW(b, id) \
638: do { \
639: if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, \
640: &pwent->id, sizeof(pwent->id))) != 0) \
641: fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #id); \
642: } while (0)
643:
1.238 ! djm 644: void
! 645: mm_encode_server_options(struct sshbuf *m)
! 646: {
! 647: int r;
! 648: u_int i;
! 649:
! 650: /* XXX this leaks raw pointers to the unpriv child processes */
! 651: if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options))) != 0)
! 652: fatal_fr(r, "assemble options");
! 653:
! 654: #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
! 655: if (options.x != NULL && \
! 656: (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x)) != 0) \
! 657: fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \
! 658: } while (0)
! 659: #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
! 660: for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) { \
! 661: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x[i])) != 0) \
! 662: fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \
! 663: } \
! 664: } while (0)
! 665: /* See comment in servconf.h */
! 666: COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
! 667: #undef M_CP_STROPT
! 668: #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
! 669: }
! 670:
1.1 provos 671: /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
672: int
1.191 djm 673: mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 674: {
675: struct passwd *pwent;
1.183 markus 676: int r, allowed = 0;
1.3 markus 677:
1.217 djm 678: debug3_f("entering");
1.1 provos 679:
680: if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
1.217 djm 681: fatal_f("multiple attempts for getpwnam");
1.1 provos 682:
1.232 djm 683: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->user, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 684: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.1 provos 685:
1.232 djm 686: pwent = getpwnamallow(ssh, authctxt->user);
1.1 provos 687:
1.232 djm 688: setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? authctxt->user : "unknown");
1.1 provos 689:
1.183 markus 690: sshbuf_reset(m);
1.1 provos 691:
692: if (pwent == NULL) {
1.183 markus 693: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
1.217 djm 694: fatal_fr(r, "assemble fakepw");
1.53 djm 695: authctxt->pw = fakepw();
1.1 provos 696: goto out;
697: }
698:
699: allowed = 1;
1.4 markus 700: authctxt->pw = pwent;
1.1 provos 701: authctxt->valid = 1;
702:
1.218 djm 703: /* XXX send fake class/dir/shell, etc. */
704: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0)
705: fatal_fr(r, "assemble ok");
706: PUTPW(m, pw_uid);
707: PUTPW(m, pw_gid);
708: PUTPW(m, pw_change);
709: PUTPW(m, pw_expire);
710: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name)) != 0 ||
1.183 markus 711: (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "*")) != 0 ||
712: (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos)) != 0 ||
713: (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class)) != 0 ||
714: (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir)) != 0 ||
715: (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell)) != 0)
1.217 djm 716: fatal_fr(r, "assemble pw");
1.94 dtucker 717:
718: out:
1.167 djm 719: ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
720: authctxt->valid ? "authenticating" : "invalid ", authctxt->user);
1.112 djm 721:
1.238 ! djm 722: /* Send active options to unpriv */
! 723: mm_encode_server_options(m);
1.118 djm 724:
725: /* Create valid auth method lists */
1.162 markus 726: if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
1.118 djm 727: /*
728: * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
1.231 guenther 729: * run to its packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
1.118 djm 730: * authentication to succeed.
731: */
1.217 djm 732: debug_f("no valid authentication method lists");
1.118 djm 733: }
734:
1.217 djm 735: debug3_f("sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", allowed);
1.59 avsm 736: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
1.1 provos 737:
1.162 markus 738: /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
739: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
740: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
1.10 djm 741:
742: return (0);
743: }
744:
1.191 djm 745: int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.10 djm 746: {
747: char *banner;
1.183 markus 748: int r;
1.10 djm 749:
1.183 markus 750: sshbuf_reset(m);
1.10 djm 751: banner = auth2_read_banner();
1.183 markus 752: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "")) != 0)
1.217 djm 753: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.59 avsm 754: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
1.124 djm 755: free(banner);
1.1 provos 756:
757: return (0);
758: }
759:
760: int
1.191 djm 761: mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 762: {
1.183 markus 763: int r;
764:
1.1 provos 765: monitor_permit_authentications(1);
766:
1.183 markus 767: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->service, NULL)) != 0 ||
768: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->style, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 769: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
770: debug3_f("service=%s, style=%s", authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
1.6 stevesk 771:
1.1 provos 772: if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
1.124 djm 773: free(authctxt->style);
1.1 provos 774: authctxt->style = NULL;
775: }
776:
777: return (0);
778: }
779:
780: int
1.191 djm 781: mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 782: {
783: static int call_count;
784: char *passwd;
1.183 markus 785: int r, authenticated;
786: size_t plen;
1.1 provos 787:
1.164 djm 788: if (!options.password_authentication)
1.217 djm 789: fatal_f("password authentication not enabled");
1.183 markus 790: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &passwd, &plen)) != 0)
1.217 djm 791: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.1 provos 792: /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
1.12 markus 793: authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
1.180 djm 794: auth_password(ssh, passwd);
1.209 jsg 795: freezero(passwd, plen);
1.1 provos 796:
1.183 markus 797: sshbuf_reset(m);
798: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
1.217 djm 799: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.1 provos 800:
1.217 djm 801: debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
1.59 avsm 802: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
1.1 provos 803:
804: call_count++;
805: if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
806: auth_method = "none";
807: else
808: auth_method = "password";
809:
810: /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
811: return (authenticated);
812: }
813:
814: int
1.191 djm 815: mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 816: {
817: char *name, *infotxt;
1.183 markus 818: u_int numprompts, *echo_on, success;
1.1 provos 819: char **prompts;
1.183 markus 820: int r;
1.1 provos 821:
1.164 djm 822: if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
1.217 djm 823: fatal_f("kbd-int authentication not enabled");
1.31 markus 824: success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
825: &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
1.1 provos 826:
1.183 markus 827: sshbuf_reset(m);
828: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, success)) != 0)
1.217 djm 829: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.183 markus 830: if (success) {
831: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[0])) != 0)
1.217 djm 832: fatal_fr(r, "assemble prompt");
1.183 markus 833: }
1.1 provos 834:
1.217 djm 835: debug3_f("sending challenge success: %u", success);
1.59 avsm 836: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
1.1 provos 837:
1.31 markus 838: if (success) {
1.124 djm 839: free(name);
840: free(infotxt);
841: free(prompts);
842: free(echo_on);
1.1 provos 843: }
844:
845: return (0);
846: }
847:
848: int
1.191 djm 849: mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 850: {
851: char *response;
1.183 markus 852: int r, authok;
1.1 provos 853:
1.164 djm 854: if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
1.217 djm 855: fatal_f("kbd-int authentication not enabled");
1.154 mmcc 856: if (authctxt->as == NULL)
1.217 djm 857: fatal_f("no bsd auth session");
1.1 provos 858:
1.183 markus 859: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &response, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 860: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.227 dtucker 861: authok = options.kbd_interactive_authentication &&
1.12 markus 862: auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
1.1 provos 863: authctxt->as = NULL;
1.217 djm 864: debug3_f("<%s> = <%d>", response, authok);
1.124 djm 865: free(response);
1.1 provos 866:
1.183 markus 867: sshbuf_reset(m);
868: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authok)) != 0)
1.217 djm 869: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.1 provos 870:
1.217 djm 871: debug3_f("sending authenticated: %d", authok);
1.59 avsm 872: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
1.1 provos 873:
1.162 markus 874: auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
875: auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
1.1 provos 876:
877: return (authok != 0);
878: }
879:
1.188 djm 880: /*
881: * Check that the key type appears in the supplied pattern list, ignoring
882: * mismatches in the signature algorithm. (Signature algorithm checks are
883: * performed in the unprivileged authentication code).
884: * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
885: */
886: static int
887: key_base_type_match(const char *method, const struct sshkey *key,
888: const char *list)
889: {
890: char *s, *l, *ol = xstrdup(list);
891: int found = 0;
892:
893: l = ol;
894: for ((s = strsep(&l, ",")); s && *s != '\0'; (s = strsep(&l, ","))) {
895: if (sshkey_type_from_name(s) == key->type) {
896: found = 1;
897: break;
898: }
899: }
900: if (!found) {
901: error("%s key type %s is not in permitted list %s", method,
902: sshkey_ssh_name(key), list);
903: }
904:
905: free(ol);
906: return found;
907: }
908:
1.1 provos 909: int
1.191 djm 910: mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 911: {
1.183 markus 912: struct sshkey *key = NULL;
1.26 markus 913: char *cuser, *chost;
1.183 markus 914: u_int pubkey_auth_attempt;
1.224 djm 915: u_int type = 0;
1.180 djm 916: int r, allowed = 0;
917: struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
1.1 provos 918:
1.217 djm 919: debug3_f("entering");
1.183 markus 920: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
921: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 ||
922: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
923: (r = sshkey_froms(m, &key)) != 0 ||
924: (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &pubkey_auth_attempt)) != 0)
1.217 djm 925: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.1 provos 926:
1.51 djm 927: if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
1.63 deraadt 928: switch (type) {
1.1 provos 929: case MM_USERKEY:
1.77 dtucker 930: auth_method = "publickey";
1.180 djm 931: if (!options.pubkey_authentication)
932: break;
933: if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
934: break;
1.188 djm 935: if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
1.220 dtucker 936: options.pubkey_accepted_algos))
1.180 djm 937: break;
1.234 djm 938: allowed = user_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, key,
939: pubkey_auth_attempt, &opts);
1.1 provos 940: break;
941: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1.180 djm 942: auth_method = "hostbased";
943: if (!options.hostbased_authentication)
944: break;
945: if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
946: break;
1.188 djm 947: if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
1.221 dtucker 948: options.hostbased_accepted_algos))
1.180 djm 949: break;
1.192 djm 950: allowed = hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw,
1.1 provos 951: cuser, chost, key);
1.172 djm 952: auth2_record_info(authctxt,
1.126 djm 953: "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
954: cuser, chost);
1.1 provos 955: break;
956: default:
1.224 djm 957: fatal_f("unknown key type %u", type);
1.1 provos 958: break;
959: }
1.33 markus 960: }
1.161 djm 961:
1.217 djm 962: debug3_f("%s authentication%s: %s key is %s", auth_method,
963: pubkey_auth_attempt ? "" : " test",
1.180 djm 964: (key == NULL || !authctxt->valid) ? "invalid" : sshkey_type(key),
965: allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
1.161 djm 966:
1.172 djm 967: auth2_record_key(authctxt, 0, key);
1.1 provos 968:
969: /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
970: monitor_reset_key_state();
971:
972: if (allowed) {
973: /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1.183 markus 974: if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &key_blob, &key_bloblen)) != 0)
1.217 djm 975: fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_to_blob");
1.1 provos 976: key_blobtype = type;
1.180 djm 977: key_opts = opts;
1.1 provos 978: hostbased_cuser = cuser;
979: hostbased_chost = chost;
1.72 djm 980: } else {
1.77 dtucker 981: /* Log failed attempt */
1.190 djm 982: auth_log(ssh, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
1.124 djm 983: free(cuser);
984: free(chost);
1.1 provos 985: }
1.183 markus 986: sshkey_free(key);
1.1 provos 987:
1.183 markus 988: sshbuf_reset(m);
989: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, allowed)) != 0)
1.217 djm 990: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.180 djm 991: if (opts != NULL && (r = sshauthopt_serialise(opts, m, 1)) != 0)
1.217 djm 992: fatal_fr(r, "sshauthopt_serialise");
1.180 djm 993: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
1.1 provos 994:
1.180 djm 995: if (!allowed)
996: sshauthopt_free(opts);
1.1 provos 997:
998: return (0);
999: }
1000:
1001: static int
1.222 djm 1002: monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
1.1 provos 1003: {
1.183 markus 1004: struct sshbuf *b;
1.229 djm 1005: struct sshkey *hostkey = NULL;
1.183 markus 1006: const u_char *p;
1.159 djm 1007: char *userstyle, *cp;
1.183 markus 1008: size_t len;
1009: u_char type;
1.229 djm 1010: int hostbound = 0, r, fail = 0;
1.1 provos 1011:
1.203 djm 1012: if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
1.217 djm 1013: fatal_f("sshbuf_from");
1.3 markus 1014:
1.222 djm 1015: if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
1.183 markus 1016: p = sshbuf_ptr(b);
1017: len = sshbuf_len(b);
1.13 markus 1018: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1019: (len < session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1020: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.13 markus 1021: fail++;
1.183 markus 1022: if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, session_id2_len)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1023: fatal_fr(r, "consume");
1.1 provos 1024: } else {
1.183 markus 1025: if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1026: fatal_fr(r, "parse sessionid");
1.13 markus 1027: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1028: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1029: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 1030: fail++;
1031: }
1.183 markus 1032: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1033: fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
1.183 markus 1034: if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1.1 provos 1035: fail++;
1.183 markus 1036: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1037: fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
1.121 djm 1038: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1039: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1040: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1.159 djm 1041: if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) {
1042: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: "
1043: "expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp);
1.1 provos 1044: fail++;
1045: }
1.124 djm 1046: free(userstyle);
1.159 djm 1047: free(cp);
1.183 markus 1048: if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */
1049: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1050: fatal_fr(r, "parse method");
1.229 djm 1051: if (strcmp("publickey", cp) != 0) {
1052: if (strcmp("publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com", cp) == 0)
1053: hostbound = 1;
1054: else
1055: fail++;
1056: }
1.178 djm 1057: free(cp);
1.183 markus 1058: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1059: fatal_fr(r, "parse pktype");
1.183 markus 1060: if (type == 0)
1.178 djm 1061: fail++;
1.183 markus 1062: if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */
1.229 djm 1063: (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkblob */
1064: (hostbound && (r = sshkey_froms(b, &hostkey)) != 0))
1.217 djm 1065: fatal_fr(r, "parse pk");
1.183 markus 1066: if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
1.1 provos 1067: fail++;
1.183 markus 1068: sshbuf_free(b);
1.229 djm 1069: if (hostkey != NULL) {
1070: /*
1071: * Ensure this is actually one of our hostkeys; unfortunately
1072: * can't check ssh->kex->initial_hostkey directly at this point
1073: * as packet state has not yet been exported to monitor.
1074: */
1075: if (get_hostkey_index(hostkey, 1, ssh) == -1)
1076: fatal_f("hostbound hostkey does not match");
1077: sshkey_free(hostkey);
1078: }
1.1 provos 1079: return (fail == 0);
1080: }
1081:
1082: static int
1.203 djm 1083: monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
1084: const char *cuser, const char *chost)
1.1 provos 1085: {
1.183 markus 1086: struct sshbuf *b;
1087: const u_char *p;
1088: char *cp, *userstyle;
1089: size_t len;
1090: int r, fail = 0;
1091: u_char type;
1.1 provos 1092:
1.203 djm 1093: if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
1.217 djm 1094: fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
1.203 djm 1095: if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1096: fatal_fr(r, "parse sessionid");
1.3 markus 1097:
1.13 markus 1098: if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1099: (len != session_id2_len) ||
1.108 djm 1100: (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1.1 provos 1101: fail++;
1.13 markus 1102:
1.183 markus 1103: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1104: fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
1.183 markus 1105: if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1.1 provos 1106: fail++;
1.183 markus 1107: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1108: fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
1.121 djm 1109: xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1110: authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1111: authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1.183 markus 1112: if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) {
1113: logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: "
1114: "expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp);
1.1 provos 1115: fail++;
1116: }
1.121 djm 1117: free(userstyle);
1.183 markus 1118: free(cp);
1119: if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */
1120: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1121: fatal_fr(r, "parse method");
1.183 markus 1122: if (strcmp(cp, "hostbased") != 0)
1.1 provos 1123: fail++;
1.183 markus 1124: free(cp);
1125: if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */
1126: (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */
1.217 djm 1127: fatal_fr(r, "parse pk");
1.1 provos 1128:
1129: /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
1.183 markus 1130: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1131: fatal_fr(r, "parse host");
1.183 markus 1132: if (((len = strlen(cp)) > 0) && cp[len - 1] == '.')
1133: cp[len - 1] = '\0';
1134: if (strcmp(cp, chost) != 0)
1.1 provos 1135: fail++;
1.183 markus 1136: free(cp);
1.1 provos 1137:
1138: /* verify client user */
1.183 markus 1139: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1140: fatal_fr(r, "parse ruser");
1.183 markus 1141: if (strcmp(cp, cuser) != 0)
1.1 provos 1142: fail++;
1.183 markus 1143: free(cp);
1.1 provos 1144:
1.183 markus 1145: if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
1.1 provos 1146: fail++;
1.183 markus 1147: sshbuf_free(b);
1.1 provos 1148: return (fail == 0);
1149: }
1150:
1151: int
1.191 djm 1152: mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 1153: {
1.168 markus 1154: struct sshkey *key;
1.203 djm 1155: const u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
1156: char *sigalg = NULL, *fp = NULL;
1.169 markus 1157: size_t signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
1.214 djm 1158: int r, ret, req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, valid_data = 0;
1159: int encoded_ret;
1.202 djm 1160: struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
1.1 provos 1161:
1.203 djm 1162: if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 ||
1163: (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 ||
1164: (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 ||
1.176 djm 1165: (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &sigalg, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1166: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.1 provos 1167:
1168: if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
1.8 mouring 1169: !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
1.217 djm 1170: fatal_f("bad key, not previously allowed");
1.1 provos 1171:
1.177 djm 1172: /* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */
1173: if (*sigalg == '\0') {
1174: free(sigalg);
1175: sigalg = NULL;
1176: }
1177:
1.169 markus 1178: /* XXX use sshkey_froms here; need to change key_blob, etc. */
1179: if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, bloblen, &key)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1180: fatal_fr(r, "parse key");
1.1 provos 1181:
1182: switch (key_blobtype) {
1183: case MM_USERKEY:
1.222 djm 1184: valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(ssh, data, datalen);
1.172 djm 1185: auth_method = "publickey";
1.1 provos 1186: break;
1187: case MM_HOSTKEY:
1188: valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
1189: hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
1.172 djm 1190: auth_method = "hostbased";
1.1 provos 1191: break;
1192: default:
1193: valid_data = 0;
1194: break;
1195: }
1196: if (!valid_data)
1.223 djm 1197: fatal_f("bad %s signature data blob",
1198: key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "userkey" :
1199: (key_blobtype == MM_HOSTKEY ? "hostkey" : "unknown"));
1.1 provos 1200:
1.203 djm 1201: if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
1202: SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
1.217 djm 1203: fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
1.203 djm 1204:
1.169 markus 1205: ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
1.202 djm 1206: sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
1.230 djm 1207: debug3_f("%s %s signature using %s %s%s%s", auth_method,
1208: sshkey_type(key), sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg,
1.201 djm 1209: (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified",
1210: (ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : "");
1.203 djm 1211:
1212: if (ret == 0 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY && sig_details != NULL) {
1213: req_presence = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
1.204 djm 1214: PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) ||
1215: !key_opts->no_require_user_presence;
1.203 djm 1216: if (req_presence &&
1217: (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) == 0) {
1218: error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s "
1.208 naddy 1219: "port %d rejected: user presence "
1220: "(authenticator touch) requirement not met ",
1221: sshkey_type(key), fp,
1.214 djm 1222: authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
1223: authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
1224: ssh_remote_port(ssh));
1225: ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
1226: }
1227: req_verify = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
1228: PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED) || key_opts->require_verify;
1229: if (req_verify &&
1230: (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD) == 0) {
1231: error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s "
1232: "port %d rejected: user verification requirement "
1233: "not met ", sshkey_type(key), fp,
1.203 djm 1234: authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
1235: authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
1236: ssh_remote_port(ssh));
1237: ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
1238: }
1239: }
1.172 djm 1240: auth2_record_key(authctxt, ret == 0, key);
1.136 djm 1241:
1.180 djm 1242: if (key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
1243: auth_activate_options(ssh, key_opts);
1.1 provos 1244: monitor_reset_key_state();
1.3 markus 1245:
1.169 markus 1246: sshbuf_reset(m);
1247:
1248: /* encode ret != 0 as positive integer, since we're sending u32 */
1249: encoded_ret = (ret != 0);
1.202 djm 1250: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, encoded_ret)) != 0 ||
1.205 djm 1251: (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details != NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1252: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.202 djm 1253: if (sig_details != NULL) {
1254: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sig_details->sk_counter)) != 0 ||
1255: (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details->sk_flags)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1256: fatal_fr(r, "assemble sk");
1.202 djm 1257: }
1258: sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
1.59 avsm 1259: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
1.203 djm 1260:
1261: free(sigalg);
1262: free(fp);
1263: sshkey_free(key);
1.1 provos 1264:
1.169 markus 1265: return ret == 0;
1.1 provos 1266: }
1267:
1.2 markus 1268: static void
1.191 djm 1269: mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
1.1 provos 1270: {
1271: socklen_t fromlen;
1272: struct sockaddr_storage from;
1273:
1274: /*
1275: * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
1276: * the address be 0.0.0.0.
1277: */
1278: memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
1.24 stevesk 1279: fromlen = sizeof(from);
1.191 djm 1280: if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
1281: if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
1.198 deraadt 1282: (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
1.1 provos 1283: debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1.50 markus 1284: cleanup_exit(255);
1.1 provos 1285: }
1286: }
1287: /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
1288: record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
1.158 djm 1289: session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns),
1.24 stevesk 1290: (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
1.1 provos 1291: }
1292:
1293: static void
1294: mm_session_close(Session *s)
1295: {
1.217 djm 1296: debug3_f("session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
1.1 provos 1297: if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1.217 djm 1298: debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ptyfd);
1.1 provos 1299: session_pty_cleanup2(s);
1300: }
1.96 djm 1301: session_unused(s->self);
1.1 provos 1302: }
1303:
1304: int
1.191 djm 1305: mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 1306: {
1.11 mouring 1307: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1308: Session *s;
1.183 markus 1309: int r, res, fd0;
1.1 provos 1310:
1.217 djm 1311: debug3_f("entering");
1.1 provos 1312:
1.183 markus 1313: sshbuf_reset(m);
1.1 provos 1314: s = session_new();
1315: if (s == NULL)
1316: goto error;
1317: s->authctxt = authctxt;
1318: s->pw = authctxt->pw;
1.11 mouring 1319: s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
1.1 provos 1320: res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
1321: if (res == 0)
1322: goto error;
1323: pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
1324:
1.183 markus 1325: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0 ||
1326: (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1327: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.1 provos 1328:
1329: /* We need to trick ttyslot */
1330: if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
1.217 djm 1331: fatal_f("dup2");
1.1 provos 1332:
1.191 djm 1333: mm_record_login(ssh, s, authctxt->pw);
1.1 provos 1334:
1335: /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
1336: close(0);
1.61 dtucker 1337:
1338: /* send messages generated by record_login */
1.183 markus 1339: if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1340: fatal_fr(r, "assemble loginmsg");
1.183 markus 1341: sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
1.61 dtucker 1342:
1343: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1344:
1.92 djm 1345: if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
1346: mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
1.217 djm 1347: fatal_f("send fds failed");
1.1 provos 1348:
1349: /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
1.198 deraadt 1350: if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
1.217 djm 1351: fatal_f("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
1.1 provos 1352: if (fd0 != 0)
1.217 djm 1353: error_f("fd0 %d != 0", fd0);
1.1 provos 1354:
1.212 deraadt 1355: /* slave side of pty is not needed */
1.1 provos 1356: close(s->ttyfd);
1357: s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
1358: /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
1359: s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
1360:
1.217 djm 1361: debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
1.1 provos 1362:
1363: return (0);
1364:
1365: error:
1366: if (s != NULL)
1367: mm_session_close(s);
1.183 markus 1368: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1369: fatal_fr(r, "assemble 0");
1.59 avsm 1370: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1.1 provos 1371: return (0);
1372: }
1373:
1374: int
1.191 djm 1375: mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.1 provos 1376: {
1377: Session *s;
1378: char *tty;
1.183 markus 1379: int r;
1.1 provos 1380:
1.217 djm 1381: debug3_f("entering");
1.1 provos 1382:
1.183 markus 1383: if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1384: fatal_fr(r, "parse tty");
1.1 provos 1385: if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
1386: mm_session_close(s);
1.183 markus 1387: sshbuf_reset(m);
1.124 djm 1388: free(tty);
1.1 provos 1389: return (0);
1390: }
1391:
1392: int
1.191 djm 1393: mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *req)
1.1 provos 1394: {
1.11 mouring 1395: extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1.1 provos 1396: int res, status;
1397:
1.217 djm 1398: debug3_f("tearing down sessions");
1.1 provos 1399:
1400: /* The child is terminating */
1.173 djm 1401: session_destroy_all(ssh, &mm_session_close);
1.1 provos 1402:
1.11 mouring 1403: while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
1.9 markus 1404: if (errno != EINTR)
1405: exit(1);
1.1 provos 1406:
1407: res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
1408:
1409: /* Terminate process */
1.57 deraadt 1410: exit(res);
1.170 markus 1411: }
1412:
1413: void
1.191 djm 1414: monitor_clear_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.170 markus 1415: {
1416: ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN);
1417: ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
1418: sshbuf_free(child_state);
1419: child_state = NULL;
1.1 provos 1420: }
1421:
1422: void
1.191 djm 1423: monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1424: {
1.139 markus 1425: struct kex *kex;
1426: int r;
1427:
1.217 djm 1428: debug3_f("packet_set_state");
1.139 markus 1429: if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1430: fatal_fr(r, "packet_set_state");
1.139 markus 1431: sshbuf_free(child_state);
1432: child_state = NULL;
1.223 djm 1433: if ((kex = ssh->kex) == NULL)
1434: fatal_f("internal error: ssh->kex == NULL");
1435: if (session_id2_len != sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->session_id)) {
1436: fatal_f("incorrect session id length %zu (expected %u)",
1437: sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->session_id), session_id2_len);
1438: }
1439: if (memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->session_id), session_id2,
1440: session_id2_len) != 0)
1441: fatal_f("session ID mismatch");
1442: /* XXX set callbacks */
1.147 djm 1443: #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1.223 djm 1444: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
1445: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
1446: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
1447: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
1448: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
1449: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1450: kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
1451: kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
1.147 djm 1452: #endif
1.223 djm 1453: kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
1454: kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
1455: kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
1456: kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
1457: kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1458: kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
1.1 provos 1459: }
1460:
1.210 djm 1461: /* This function requires careful sanity checking */
1.1 provos 1462:
1463: void
1.192 djm 1464: mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1.1 provos 1465: {
1.217 djm 1466: debug3_f("Waiting for new keys");
1.1 provos 1467:
1.139 markus 1468: if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1.217 djm 1469: fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
1.139 markus 1470: mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
1471: child_state);
1.217 djm 1472: debug3_f("GOT new keys");
1.1 provos 1473: }
1474:
1475:
1476: /* XXX */
1477:
1478: #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
1.111 djm 1479: if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
1.1 provos 1480: fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
1481: } while (0)
1482:
1.2 markus 1483: static void
1.114 djm 1484: monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
1.3 markus 1485: {
1.114 djm 1486: int pair[2];
1.171 markus 1487: #ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
1488: int on = 1;
1489: #endif
1.114 djm 1490:
1.1 provos 1491: if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
1.217 djm 1492: fatal_f("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
1.171 markus 1493: #ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
1.198 deraadt 1494: if (setsockopt(pair[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
1.171 markus 1495: error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(0): %.100s", strerror(errno));
1.198 deraadt 1496: if (setsockopt(pair[1], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
1.171 markus 1497: error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(1): %.100s", strerror(errno));
1498: #endif
1.1 provos 1499: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1500: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1.114 djm 1501: mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1502: mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1503:
1504: if (do_logfds) {
1505: if (pipe(pair) == -1)
1.217 djm 1506: fatal_f("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
1.114 djm 1507: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1508: FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1509: mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
1510: mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
1511: } else
1512: mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
1.1 provos 1513: }
1514:
1515: #define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
1516:
1517: struct monitor *
1518: monitor_init(void)
1519: {
1520: struct monitor *mon;
1521:
1.75 djm 1522: mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
1.114 djm 1523: monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
1.1 provos 1524:
1525: return mon;
1526: }
1527:
1528: void
1529: monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
1530: {
1.114 djm 1531: monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
1.1 provos 1532: }
1.46 markus 1533:
1534: #ifdef GSSAPI
1535: int
1.191 djm 1536: mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.46 markus 1537: {
1.59 avsm 1538: gss_OID_desc goid;
1.46 markus 1539: OM_uint32 major;
1.183 markus 1540: size_t len;
1.184 djm 1541: u_char *p;
1.183 markus 1542: int r;
1.46 markus 1543:
1.164 djm 1544: if (!options.gss_authentication)
1.217 djm 1545: fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
1.164 djm 1546:
1.184 djm 1547: if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1548: fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1.184 djm 1549: goid.elements = p;
1.59 avsm 1550: goid.length = len;
1.46 markus 1551:
1.59 avsm 1552: major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
1.46 markus 1553:
1.124 djm 1554: free(goid.elements);
1.46 markus 1555:
1.183 markus 1556: sshbuf_reset(m);
1557: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1558: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.46 markus 1559:
1.64 stevesk 1560: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
1.46 markus 1561:
1562: /* Now we have a context, enable the step */
1563: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
1564:
1565: return (0);
1566: }
1567:
1568: int
1.191 djm 1569: mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.46 markus 1570: {
1571: gss_buffer_desc in;
1572: gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1.64 stevesk 1573: OM_uint32 major, minor;
1.46 markus 1574: OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
1.183 markus 1575: int r;
1.46 markus 1576:
1.164 djm 1577: if (!options.gss_authentication)
1.217 djm 1578: fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
1.164 djm 1579:
1.184 djm 1580: if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1581: fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
1.46 markus 1582: major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
1.124 djm 1583: free(in.value);
1.46 markus 1584:
1.183 markus 1585: sshbuf_reset(m);
1586: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 ||
1587: (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, out.value, out.length)) != 0 ||
1588: (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, flags)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1589: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.59 avsm 1590: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
1.46 markus 1591:
1592: gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
1593:
1.64 stevesk 1594: if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1.46 markus 1595: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
1596: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.52 markus 1597: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
1.46 markus 1598: }
1599: return (0);
1600: }
1601:
1602: int
1.191 djm 1603: mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.52 markus 1604: {
1605: gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
1606: OM_uint32 ret;
1.184 djm 1607: int r;
1.54 djm 1608:
1.164 djm 1609: if (!options.gss_authentication)
1.217 djm 1610: fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
1.164 djm 1611:
1.184 djm 1612: if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 ||
1613: (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1614: fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
1.54 djm 1615:
1.52 markus 1616: ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
1.54 djm 1617:
1.124 djm 1618: free(gssbuf.value);
1619: free(mic.value);
1.54 djm 1620:
1.183 markus 1621: sshbuf_reset(m);
1622: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1623: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.54 djm 1624:
1.59 avsm 1625: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
1.54 djm 1626:
1.52 markus 1627: if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
1628: monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1.54 djm 1629:
1.52 markus 1630: return (0);
1631: }
1632:
1633: int
1.191 djm 1634: mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1.46 markus 1635: {
1.184 djm 1636: int r, authenticated;
1.172 djm 1637: const char *displayname;
1.164 djm 1638:
1639: if (!options.gss_authentication)
1.217 djm 1640: fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
1.46 markus 1641:
1642: authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
1643:
1.183 markus 1644: sshbuf_reset(m);
1645: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
1.217 djm 1646: fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1.46 markus 1647:
1.217 djm 1648: debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
1.59 avsm 1649: mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
1.46 markus 1650:
1.64 stevesk 1651: auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
1.172 djm 1652:
1653: if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
1654: auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
1.46 markus 1655:
1656: /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
1657: return (authenticated);
1658: }
1659: #endif /* GSSAPI */
1.100 djm 1660:
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