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Add support for an experimental zero-knowledge password authentication
method using the J-PAKE protocol described in F. Hao, P. Ryan,
"Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling", 16th Workshop on
Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008.

This method allows password-based authentication without exposing
the password to the server. Instead, the client and server exchange
cryptographic proofs to demonstrate of knowledge of the password while
revealing nothing useful to an attacker or compromised endpoint.

This is experimental, work-in-progress code and is presently
compiled-time disabled (turn on -DJPAKE in Makefile.inc).

"just commit it.  It isn't too intrusive." deraadt@

/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.21 2008/11/04 08:22:13 djm Exp $ */

/*
 * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
 * All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */

#ifndef _MM_WRAP_H_
#define _MM_WRAP_H_

extern int use_privsep;
#define PRIVSEP(x)	(use_privsep ? mm_##x : x)

enum mm_keytype {MM_NOKEY, MM_HOSTKEY, MM_USERKEY, MM_RSAHOSTKEY, MM_RSAUSERKEY};

struct monitor;
struct mm_master;
struct Authctxt;

int mm_is_monitor(void);
DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char *, char *, Key *);
int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *);
BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);

#ifdef GSSAPI
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
   gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
#endif

struct Session;
void mm_terminate(void);
int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);

/* SSHv1 interfaces */
void mm_ssh1_session_id(u_char *);
int mm_ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);

/* Key export functions */
struct Newkeys *mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *, int);
int mm_newkeys_to_blob(int, u_char **, u_int *);

void monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *);
void mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *);
void mm_send_keystate(struct monitor*);

/* bsdauth */
int mm_bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);

/* skey */
int mm_skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
int mm_skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **);

/* jpake */
struct jpake_group;
void mm_auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(struct Authctxt *, BIGNUM **, char **, char **);
void mm_jpake_step1(struct jpake_group *, u_char **, u_int *,
    BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **, BIGNUM **,
    u_char **, u_int *, u_char **, u_int *);
void mm_jpake_step2(struct jpake_group *, BIGNUM *,
    BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
    BIGNUM **, u_char **, u_int *);
void mm_jpake_key_confirm(struct jpake_group *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
    BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int,
    BIGNUM **, u_char **, u_int *);
int mm_jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *,
    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);


/* zlib allocation hooks */

void *mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *, u_int, u_int);
void mm_zfree(struct mm_master *, void *);
void mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *);

#endif /* _MM_WRAP_H_ */