===================================================================
RCS file: /cvsrepo/anoncvs/cvs/src/usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c,v
retrieving revision 1.132
retrieving revision 1.132.2.8
diff -u -r1.132 -r1.132.2.8
--- src/usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c	2000/10/13 18:34:46	1.132
+++ src/usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c	2002/03/08 17:04:43	1.132.2.8
@@ -40,33 +40,38 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.132 2000/10/13 18:34:46 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.132.2.8 2002/03/08 17:04:43 brad Exp $");
 
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh1.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "pty.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "mpaux.h"
+#include "log.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
-
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include "cipher.h"
 #include "kex.h"
-#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
 #include "key.h"
-#include "dsa.h"
 #include "dh.h"
-
-#include "auth.h"
 #include "myproposal.h"
 #include "authfile.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "channels.h"
 
 #ifdef LIBWRAP
 #include <tcpd.h>
@@ -79,11 +84,13 @@
 #define O_NOCTTY	0
 #endif
 
+extern char *__progname;
+
 /* Server configuration options. */
 ServerOptions options;
 
 /* Name of the server configuration file. */
-char *config_file_name = SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
+char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
 
 /*
  * Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6.  This can be set on the command line.
@@ -99,15 +106,18 @@
  */
 int debug_flag = 0;
 
+/* Flag indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. */
+int test_flag = 0;
+
 /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
 int inetd_flag = 0;
 
+/* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
+int no_daemon_flag = 0;
+
 /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
 int log_stderr = 0;
 
-/* argv[0] without path. */
-char *av0;
-
 /* Saved arguments to main(). */
 char **saved_argv;
 
@@ -126,6 +136,9 @@
 char *client_version_string = NULL;
 char *server_version_string = NULL;
 
+/* for rekeying XXX fixme */
+Kex *xxx_kex;
+
 /*
  * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
  * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
@@ -135,45 +148,48 @@
  * not very useful.  Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
  */
 struct {
-	RSA *private_key;	 /* Private part of empheral server key. */
-	RSA *host_key;		 /* Private part of host key. */
-	Key *dsa_host_key;       /* Private DSA host key. */
+	Key	*server_key;		/* ephemeral server key */
+	Key	*ssh1_host_key;		/* ssh1 host key */
+	Key	**host_keys;		/* all private host keys */
+	int	have_ssh1_key;
+	int	have_ssh2_key;
+	u_char	ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
 } sensitive_data;
 
 /*
- * Flag indicating whether the current session key has been used.  This flag
- * is set whenever the key is used, and cleared when the key is regenerated.
+ * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
+ * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
  */
-int key_used = 0;
+static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0;
 
-/* This is set to true when SIGHUP is received. */
-int received_sighup = 0;
+/* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
+static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
 
-/* Public side of the server key.  This value is regenerated regularly with
-   the private key. */
-RSA *public_key;
-
 /* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */
-unsigned char session_id[16];
+u_char session_id[16];
 
 /* same for ssh2 */
-unsigned char *session_id2 = NULL;
+u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
 int session_id2_len = 0;
 
 /* record remote hostname or ip */
-unsigned int utmp_len = MAXHOSTNAMELEN;
+u_int utmp_len = MAXHOSTNAMELEN;
 
+/* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */
+int *startup_pipes = NULL;
+int startup_pipe;		/* in child */
+
 /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
-void do_ssh1_kex();
-void do_ssh2_kex();
+void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
 
-void ssh_dh1_server(Kex *, Buffer *_kexinit, Buffer *);
-void ssh_dhgex_server(Kex *, Buffer *_kexinit, Buffer *);
+static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
+static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
 
 /*
  * Close all listening sockets
  */
-void
+static void
 close_listen_socks(void)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -182,51 +198,60 @@
 	num_listen_socks = -1;
 }
 
+static void
+close_startup_pipes(void)
+{
+	int i;
+	if (startup_pipes)
+		for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
+			if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
+				close(startup_pipes[i]);
+}
+
 /*
  * Signal handler for SIGHUP.  Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP;
  * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate
  * the server key).
  */
-void
+static void
 sighup_handler(int sig)
 {
+	int save_errno = errno;
+
 	received_sighup = 1;
 	signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
+	errno = save_errno;
 }
 
 /*
  * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP.
  * Restarts the server.
  */
-void
-sighup_restart()
+static void
+sighup_restart(void)
 {
 	log("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
 	close_listen_socks();
+	close_startup_pipes();
 	execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
-	log("RESTART FAILED: av0='%s', error: %s.", av0, strerror(errno));
+	log("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0], strerror(errno));
 	exit(1);
 }
 
 /*
  * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon.
- * These close the listen socket; not closing it seems to cause "Address
- * already in use" problems on some machines, which is inconvenient.
  */
-void
+static void
 sigterm_handler(int sig)
 {
-	log("Received signal %d; terminating.", sig);
-	close_listen_socks();
-	unlink(options.pid_file);
-	exit(255);
+	received_sigterm = sig;
 }
 
 /*
  * SIGCHLD handler.  This is called whenever a child dies.  This will then
- * reap any zombies left by exited c.
+ * reap any zombies left by exited children.
  */
-void
+static void
 main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
 {
 	int save_errno = errno;
@@ -242,9 +267,11 @@
 /*
  * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
  */
-void
+static void
 grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
 {
+	/* XXX no idea how fix this signal handler */
+
 	/* Close the connection. */
 	packet_close();
 
@@ -259,38 +286,39 @@
  * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution
  * problems.
  */
-/* XXX do we really want this work to be done in a signal handler ? -m */
-void
-key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
+static void
+generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
 {
-	int save_errno = errno;
+	u_int32_t rand = 0;
+	int i;
 
-	/* Check if we should generate a new key. */
-	if (key_used) {
-		/* This should really be done in the background. */
-		log("Generating new %d bit RSA key.", options.server_key_bits);
+	verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.",
+	    sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits);
+	if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
+		key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
+	sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1,
+	    options.server_key_bits);
+	verbose("RSA key generation complete.");
 
-		if (sensitive_data.private_key != NULL)
-			RSA_free(sensitive_data.private_key);
-		sensitive_data.private_key = RSA_new();
-
-		if (public_key != NULL)
-			RSA_free(public_key);
-		public_key = RSA_new();
-
-		rsa_generate_key(sensitive_data.private_key, public_key,
-				 options.server_key_bits);
-		arc4random_stir();
-		key_used = 0;
-		log("RSA key generation complete.");
+	for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) {
+		if (i % 4 == 0)
+			rand = arc4random();
+		sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie[i] = rand & 0xff;
+		rand >>= 8;
 	}
-	/* Reschedule the alarm. */
-	signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
-	alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
+	arc4random_stir();
+}
+
+static void
+key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
+{
+	int save_errno = errno;
+	signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
 	errno = save_errno;
+	key_do_regen = 1;
 }
 
-void
+static void
 sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
 {
 	int i, mismatch;
@@ -318,19 +346,20 @@
 		/* Send our protocol version identification. */
 		if (atomicio(write, sock_out, server_version_string, strlen(server_version_string))
 		    != strlen(server_version_string)) {
-			log("Could not write ident string to %s.", get_remote_ipaddr());
+			log("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
 			fatal_cleanup();
 		}
 
-		/* Read other side\'s version identification. */
+		/* Read other side's version identification. */
+		memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
 		for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
 			if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
-				log("Did not receive ident string from %s.", get_remote_ipaddr());
+				log("Did not receive identification string from %s",
+				    get_remote_ipaddr());
 				fatal_cleanup();
 			}
 			if (buf[i] == '\r') {
-				buf[i] = '\n';
-				buf[i + 1] = 0;
+				buf[i] = 0;
 				/* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */
 				if (i == 12 &&
 				    strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0)
@@ -338,8 +367,7 @@
 				continue;
 			}
 			if (buf[i] == '\n') {
-				/* buf[i] == '\n' */
-				buf[i + 1] = 0;
+				buf[i] = 0;
 				break;
 			}
 		}
@@ -362,12 +390,18 @@
 		fatal_cleanup();
 	}
 	debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s",
-	      remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
+	    remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
 
 	compat_datafellows(remote_version);
 
+	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) {
+		log("scanned from %s with %s.  Don't panic.",
+		    get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
+		fatal_cleanup();
+	}
+
 	mismatch = 0;
-	switch(remote_major) {
+	switch (remote_major) {
 	case 1:
 		if (remote_minor == 99) {
 			if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)
@@ -399,7 +433,6 @@
 		break;
 	}
 	chop(server_version_string);
-	chop(client_version_string);
 	debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string);
 
 	if (mismatch) {
@@ -412,32 +445,77 @@
 		    server_version_string, client_version_string);
 		fatal_cleanup();
 	}
-	if (compat20)
-		packet_set_ssh2_format();
 }
 
 
+/* Destroy the host and server keys.  They will no longer be needed. */
 void
 destroy_sensitive_data(void)
 {
-	/* Destroy the private and public keys.  They will no longer be needed. */
-	if (public_key)
-		RSA_free(public_key);
-	if (sensitive_data.private_key)
-		RSA_free(sensitive_data.private_key);
-	if (sensitive_data.host_key)
-		RSA_free(sensitive_data.host_key);
-	if (sensitive_data.dsa_host_key != NULL)
-		key_free(sensitive_data.dsa_host_key);
+	int i;
+
+	if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
+		key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
+		sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+		if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
+			key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
+	memset(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 0, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
 }
 
+static char *
+list_hostkey_types(void)
+{
+	Buffer b;
+	char *p;
+	int i;
+
+	buffer_init(&b);
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+		Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
+		if (key == NULL)
+			continue;
+		switch (key->type) {
+		case KEY_RSA:
+		case KEY_DSA:
+			if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
+				buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
+			p = key_ssh_name(key);
+			buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p));
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
+	p = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
+	buffer_free(&b);
+	debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", p);
+	return p;
+}
+
+static Key *
+get_hostkey_by_type(int type)
+{
+	int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+		Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
+		if (key != NULL && key->type == type)
+			return key;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 /*
  * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise.
  * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability
  * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until
  * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups
  */
-int
+static int
 drop_connection(int startups)
 {
 	double p, r;
@@ -460,8 +538,30 @@
 	return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
 }
 
-int *startup_pipes = NULL;	/* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */
-int startup_pipe;		/* in child */
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "sshd version %s\n", SSH_VERSION);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options]\n", __progname);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -f file    Configuration file (default %s)\n", _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE);
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -d         Debugging mode (multiple -d means more debugging)\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -i         Started from inetd\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -D         Do not fork into daemon mode\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -t         Only test configuration file and keys\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -q         Quiet (no logging)\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -p port    Listen on the specified port (default: 22)\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -k seconds Regenerate server key every this many seconds (default: 3600)\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -g seconds Grace period for authentication (default: 600)\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -b bits    Size of server RSA key (default: 768 bits)\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -h file    File from which to read host key (default: %s)\n",
+	    _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE);
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -u len     Maximum hostname length for utmp recording\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -4         Use IPv4 only\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -6         Use IPv6 only\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "  -o option  Process the option as if it was read from a configuration file.\n");
+	exit(1);
+}
 
 /*
  * Main program for the daemon.
@@ -474,7 +574,6 @@
 	int opt, sock_in = 0, sock_out = 0, newsock, j, i, fdsetsz, on = 1;
 	pid_t pid;
 	socklen_t fromlen;
-	int silent = 0;
 	fd_set *fdset;
 	struct sockaddr_storage from;
 	const char *remote_ip;
@@ -486,19 +585,17 @@
 	int listen_sock, maxfd;
 	int startup_p[2];
 	int startups = 0;
+	Key *key;
+	int ret, key_used = 0;
 
-	/* Save argv[0]. */
+	/* Save argv. */
 	saved_argv = av;
-	if (strchr(av[0], '/'))
-		av0 = strrchr(av[0], '/') + 1;
-	else
-		av0 = av[0];
 
 	/* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
 	initialize_server_options(&options);
 
 	/* Parse command-line arguments. */
-	while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:V:u:diqQ46")) != EOF) {
+	while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:V:u:o:dDeiqtQ46")) != -1) {
 		switch (opt) {
 		case '4':
 			IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
@@ -520,11 +617,17 @@
 				exit(1);
 			}
 			break;
+		case 'D':
+			no_daemon_flag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'e':
+			log_stderr = 1;
+			break;
 		case 'i':
 			inetd_flag = 1;
 			break;
 		case 'Q':
-			silent = 1;
+			/* ignored */
 			break;
 		case 'q':
 			options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
@@ -538,55 +641,66 @@
 				fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n");
 				exit(1);
 			}
-			options.ports[options.num_ports++] = atoi(optarg);
+			options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg);
+			if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] == 0) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n");
+				exit(1);
+			}
 			break;
 		case 'g':
-			options.login_grace_time = atoi(optarg);
+			if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n");
+				exit(1);
+			}
 			break;
 		case 'k':
-			options.key_regeneration_time = atoi(optarg);
+			if ((options.key_regeneration_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid key regeneration interval.\n");
+				exit(1);
+			}
 			break;
 		case 'h':
-			options.host_key_file = optarg;
+			if (options.num_host_key_files >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "too many host keys.\n");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			options.host_key_files[options.num_host_key_files++] = optarg;
 			break;
 		case 'V':
 			client_version_string = optarg;
 			/* only makes sense with inetd_flag, i.e. no listen() */
 			inetd_flag = 1;
 			break;
+		case 't':
+			test_flag = 1;
+			break;
 		case 'u':
 			utmp_len = atoi(optarg);
 			break;
+		case 'o':
+			if (process_server_config_line(&options, optarg,
+			    "command-line", 0) != 0)
+				exit(1);
+			break;
 		case '?':
 		default:
-			fprintf(stderr, "sshd version %s\n", SSH_VERSION);
-			fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options]\n", av0);
-			fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
-			fprintf(stderr, "  -f file    Configuration file (default %s)\n", SERVER_CONFIG_FILE);
-			fprintf(stderr, "  -d         Debugging mode (multiple -d means more debugging)\n");
-			fprintf(stderr, "  -i         Started from inetd\n");
-			fprintf(stderr, "  -q         Quiet (no logging)\n");
-			fprintf(stderr, "  -p port    Listen on the specified port (default: 22)\n");
-			fprintf(stderr, "  -k seconds Regenerate server key every this many seconds (default: 3600)\n");
-			fprintf(stderr, "  -g seconds Grace period for authentication (default: 300)\n");
-			fprintf(stderr, "  -b bits    Size of server RSA key (default: 768 bits)\n");
-			fprintf(stderr, "  -h file    File from which to read host key (default: %s)\n",
-			    HOST_KEY_FILE);
-			fprintf(stderr, "  -u len     Maximum hostname length for utmp recording\n");
-			fprintf(stderr, "  -4         Use IPv4 only\n");
-			fprintf(stderr, "  -6         Use IPv6 only\n");
-			exit(1);
+			usage();
+			break;
 		}
 	}
+	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
+	channel_set_af(IPv4or6);
 
 	/*
 	 * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
 	 * key (unless started from inetd)
 	 */
-	log_init(av0,
-	    options.log_level == -1 ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
-	    options.log_facility == -1 ? SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
-	    !silent && !inetd_flag);
+	log_init(__progname,
+	    options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
+	    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
+	    options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
+	    SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
+	    !inetd_flag);
 
 	/* Read server configuration options from the configuration file. */
 	read_server_config(&options, config_file_name);
@@ -602,44 +716,47 @@
 
 	debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_VERSION);
 
-	sensitive_data.dsa_host_key = NULL;
-	sensitive_data.host_key = NULL;
+	/* load private host keys */
+	sensitive_data.host_keys = xmalloc(options.num_host_key_files*sizeof(Key*));
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
+		sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
+	sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
+	sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
+	sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0;
+	sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0;
 
-	/* check if RSA support exists */
-	if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
-	    rsa_alive() == 0) {
-		log("no RSA support in libssl and libcrypto.  See ssl(8)");
-		log("Disabling protocol version 1");
-		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
-	}
-	/* Load the RSA/DSA host key.  It must have empty passphrase. */
-	if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
-		Key k;
-		sensitive_data.host_key = RSA_new();
-		k.type = KEY_RSA;
-		k.rsa = sensitive_data.host_key;
-		errno = 0;
-		if (!load_private_key(options.host_key_file, "", &k, NULL)) {
-			error("Could not load host key: %.200s: %.100s",
-			    options.host_key_file, strerror(errno));
-			log("Disabling protocol version 1");
-			options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+		key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL);
+		sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
+		if (key == NULL) {
+			error("Could not load host key: %s",
+			    options.host_key_files[i]);
+			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
+			continue;
 		}
-		k.rsa = NULL;
-	}
-	if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
-		sensitive_data.dsa_host_key = key_new(KEY_DSA);
-		if (!load_private_key(options.host_dsa_key_file, "", sensitive_data.dsa_host_key, NULL)) {
-
-			error("Could not load DSA host key: %.200s", options.host_dsa_key_file);
-			log("Disabling protocol version 2");
-			options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
+		switch (key->type) {
+		case KEY_RSA1:
+			sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key;
+			sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1;
+			break;
+		case KEY_RSA:
+		case KEY_DSA:
+			sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1;
+			break;
 		}
+		debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, key->type,
+		    key_type(key));
 	}
-	if (! options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2)) {
-		if (silent == 0)
-			fprintf(stderr, "sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.\n");
-		log("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.\n");
+	if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
+		log("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
+		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
+	}
+	if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
+		log("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
+		options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
+	}
+	if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
+		log("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
 		exit(1);
 	}
 
@@ -656,27 +773,31 @@
 		 * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels
 		 */
 		if (options.server_key_bits >
-		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n) - SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED &&
+		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) - SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED &&
 		    options.server_key_bits <
-		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
 			options.server_key_bits =
-			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED;
+			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED;
 			debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.",
 			    options.server_key_bits);
 		}
 	}
 
+	/* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
+	if (test_flag)
+		exit(0);
+
 	/* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
 	if (debug_flag && !inetd_flag)
 		log_stderr = 1;
-	log_init(av0, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
 
 	/*
 	 * If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, disconnect
 	 * from the controlling terminal, and fork.  The original process
 	 * exits.
 	 */
-	if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag) {
+	if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag)) {
 #ifdef TIOCNOTTY
 		int fd;
 #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
@@ -685,7 +806,7 @@
 
 		/* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */
 #ifdef TIOCNOTTY
-		fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+		fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
 		if (fd >= 0) {
 			(void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
 			close(fd);
@@ -693,11 +814,8 @@
 #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
 	}
 	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
-	log_init(av0, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
 
-	/* Do not display messages to stdout in RSA code. */
-	rsa_set_verbose(0);
-
 	/* Initialize the random number generator. */
 	arc4random_stir();
 
@@ -705,11 +823,14 @@
 	   unmounted if desired. */
 	chdir("/");
 
+	/* ignore SIGPIPE */
+	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
 	/* Start listening for a socket, unless started from inetd. */
 	if (inetd_flag) {
-		int s1, s2;
+		int s1;
 		s1 = dup(0);	/* Make sure descriptors 0, 1, and 2 are in use. */
-		s2 = dup(s1);
+		dup(s1);
 		sock_in = dup(0);
 		sock_out = dup(1);
 		startup_pipe = -1;
@@ -719,16 +840,8 @@
 		 * ttyfd happens to be one of those.
 		 */
 		debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", sock_in, sock_out);
-
-		if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
-			public_key = RSA_new();
-			sensitive_data.private_key = RSA_new();
-			log("Generating %d bit RSA key.", options.server_key_bits);
-			rsa_generate_key(sensitive_data.private_key, public_key,
-			    options.server_key_bits);
-			arc4random_stir();
-			log("RSA key generation complete.");
-		}
+		if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
+			generate_ephemeral_server_key();
 	} else {
 		for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
 			if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
@@ -761,11 +874,11 @@
 			 * close.
 			 */
 			setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
-			    (void *) &on, sizeof(on));
+			    &on, sizeof(on));
 			linger.l_onoff = 1;
 			linger.l_linger = 5;
 			setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER,
-			    (void *) &linger, sizeof(linger));
+			    &linger, sizeof(linger));
 
 			debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
 
@@ -790,44 +903,37 @@
 		if (!num_listen_socks)
 			fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
 
+		if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
+			generate_ephemeral_server_key();
+
+		/*
+		 * Arrange to restart on SIGHUP.  The handler needs
+		 * listen_sock.
+		 */
+		signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
+
+		signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
+		signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
+
+		/* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */
+		signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
+
+		/* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler is setup */
 		if (!debug_flag) {
 			/*
-			 * Record our pid in /etc/sshd_pid to make it easier
-			 * to kill the correct sshd.  We don\'t want to do
-			 * this before the bind above because the bind will
+			 * Record our pid in /var/run/sshd.pid to make it
+			 * easier to kill the correct sshd.  We don't want to
+			 * do this before the bind above because the bind will
 			 * fail if there already is a daemon, and this will
 			 * overwrite any old pid in the file.
 			 */
 			f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w");
 			if (f) {
-				fprintf(f, "%u\n", (unsigned int) getpid());
+				fprintf(f, "%u\n", (u_int) getpid());
 				fclose(f);
 			}
 		}
-		if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
-			public_key = RSA_new();
-			sensitive_data.private_key = RSA_new();
 
-			log("Generating %d bit RSA key.", options.server_key_bits);
-			rsa_generate_key(sensitive_data.private_key, public_key,
-			    options.server_key_bits);
-			arc4random_stir();
-			log("RSA key generation complete.");
-
-			/* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */
-			signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
-			alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
-		}
-
-		/* Arrange to restart on SIGHUP.  The handler needs listen_sock. */
-		signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
-
-		signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
-		signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
-
-		/* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */
-		signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
-
 		/* setup fd set for listen */
 		fdset = NULL;
 		maxfd = 0;
@@ -848,7 +954,7 @@
 				sighup_restart();
 			if (fdset != NULL)
 				xfree(fdset);
-			fdsetsz = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
+			fdsetsz = howmany(maxfd+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
 			fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz);
 			memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz);
 
@@ -859,18 +965,31 @@
 					FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset);
 
 			/* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
-			if (select(maxfd + 1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
-				if (errno != EINTR)
-					error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
-				continue;
+			ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+			if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
+				error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			if (received_sigterm) {
+				log("Received signal %d; terminating.",
+				    (int) received_sigterm);
+				close_listen_socks();
+				unlink(options.pid_file);
+				exit(255);
 			}
+			if (key_used && key_do_regen) {
+				generate_ephemeral_server_key();
+				key_used = 0;
+				key_do_regen = 0;
+			}
+			if (ret < 0)
+				continue;
+
 			for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
 				if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 &&
 				    FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) {
 					/*
 					 * the read end of the pipe is ready
 					 * if the child has closed the pipe
-					 * after successfull authentication
+					 * after successful authentication
 					 * or if the child has died
 					 */
 					close(startup_pipes[i]);
@@ -890,6 +1009,7 @@
 				}
 				if (fcntl(newsock, F_SETFL, 0) < 0) {
 					error("newsock del O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno));
+					close(newsock);
 					continue;
 				}
 				if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) {
@@ -910,7 +1030,7 @@
 						startups++;
 						break;
 					}
-				
+
 				/*
 				 * Got connection.  Fork a child to handle it, unless
 				 * we are in debugging mode.
@@ -943,13 +1063,11 @@
 						 * the connection.
 						 */
 						startup_pipe = startup_p[1];
-						for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
-							if (startup_pipes[j] != -1)
-								close(startup_pipes[j]);
+						close_startup_pipes();
 						close_listen_socks();
 						sock_in = newsock;
 						sock_out = newsock;
-						log_init(av0, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+						log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
 						break;
 					}
 				}
@@ -963,7 +1081,13 @@
 				close(startup_p[1]);
 
 				/* Mark that the key has been used (it was "given" to the child). */
-				key_used = 1;
+				if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
+				    key_used == 0) {
+					/* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */
+					signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
+					alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
+					key_used = 1;
+				}
 
 				arc4random_stir();
 
@@ -998,8 +1122,14 @@
 	/* setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)); */
 	linger.l_onoff = 1;
 	linger.l_linger = 5;
-	setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (void *) &linger, sizeof(linger));
+	setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, &linger, sizeof(linger));
 
+	/* Set keepalives if requested. */
+	if (options.keepalives &&
+	    setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on,
+	    sizeof(on)) < 0)
+		error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
 	/*
 	 * Register our connection.  This turns encryption off because we do
 	 * not have a key.
@@ -1009,23 +1139,23 @@
 	remote_port = get_remote_port();
 	remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
 
-	/* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
 #ifdef LIBWRAP
-	/* XXX LIBWRAP noes not know about IPv6 */
+	/* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
 	{
 		struct request_info req;
 
-		request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, av0, RQ_FILE, sock_in, NULL);
+		request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
 		fromhost(&req);
 
 		if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
-			close(sock_in);
-			close(sock_out);
+			debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
 			refuse(&req);
+			/* NOTREACHED */
+			fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
 		}
-/*XXX IPv6 verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", eval_client(&req), remote_port); */
 	}
 #endif /* LIBWRAP */
+
 	/* Log the connection. */
 	verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
 
@@ -1043,24 +1173,33 @@
 
 	sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out);
 	/*
-	 * Check that the connection comes from a privileged port.  Rhosts-
-	 * and Rhosts-RSA-Authentication only make sense from priviledged
+	 * Check that the connection comes from a privileged port.
+	 * Rhosts-Authentication only makes sense from priviledged
 	 * programs.  Of course, if the intruder has root access on his local
 	 * machine, he can connect from any port.  So do not use these
 	 * authentication methods from machines that you do not trust.
 	 */
-	if (remote_port >= IPPORT_RESERVED ||
-	    remote_port < IPPORT_RESERVED / 2) {
+	if (options.rhosts_authentication &&
+	    (remote_port >= IPPORT_RESERVED ||
+	    remote_port < IPPORT_RESERVED / 2)) {
+		debug("Rhosts Authentication disabled, "
+		    "originating port %d not trusted.", remote_port);
 		options.rhosts_authentication = 0;
-		options.rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0;
 	}
-#ifdef KRB4
+#if defined(KRB4) && !defined(KRB5)
 	if (!packet_connection_is_ipv4() &&
 	    options.kerberos_authentication) {
 		debug("Kerberos Authentication disabled, only available for IPv4.");
 		options.kerberos_authentication = 0;
 	}
-#endif /* KRB4 */
+#endif /* KRB4 && !KRB5 */
+#ifdef AFS
+	/* If machine has AFS, set process authentication group. */
+	if (k_hasafs()) {
+		k_setpag();
+		k_unlog();
+	}
+#endif /* AFS */
 
 	packet_set_nonblocking();
 
@@ -1073,13 +1212,6 @@
 		do_ssh1_kex();
 		do_authentication();
 	}
-
-#ifdef KRB4
-	/* Cleanup user's ticket cache file. */
-	if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup)
-		(void) dest_tkt();
-#endif /* KRB4 */
-
 	/* The connection has been terminated. */
 	verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip);
 	packet_close();
@@ -1089,15 +1221,15 @@
 /*
  * SSH1 key exchange
  */
-void
-do_ssh1_kex()
+static void
+do_ssh1_kex(void)
 {
 	int i, len;
-	int plen, slen;
+	int rsafail = 0;
 	BIGNUM *session_key_int;
-	unsigned char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
-	unsigned char cookie[8];
-	unsigned int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags;
+	u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
+	u_char cookie[8];
+	u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags;
 	u_int32_t rand = 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -1126,14 +1258,14 @@
 		packet_put_char(cookie[i]);
 
 	/* Store our public server RSA key. */
-	packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(public_key->n));
-	packet_put_bignum(public_key->e);
-	packet_put_bignum(public_key->n);
+	packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n));
+	packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
+	packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
 
 	/* Store our public host RSA key. */
-	packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n));
-	packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.host_key->e);
-	packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.host_key->n);
+	packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
+	packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e);
+	packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n);
 
 	/* Put protocol flags. */
 	packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN);
@@ -1149,20 +1281,20 @@
 		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA;
 	if (options.rsa_authentication)
 		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA;
-#ifdef KRB4
+#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
 	if (options.kerberos_authentication)
 		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS;
 #endif
-#ifdef AFS
+#if defined(AFS) || defined(KRB5)
 	if (options.kerberos_tgt_passing)
 		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT;
+#endif
+#ifdef AFS
 	if (options.afs_token_passing)
 		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN;
 #endif
-#ifdef SKEY
-	if (options.skey_authentication == 1)
+	if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1)
 		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS;
-#endif
 	if (options.password_authentication)
 		auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD;
 	packet_put_int(auth_mask);
@@ -1171,11 +1303,12 @@
 	packet_send();
 	packet_write_wait();
 
-	debug("Sent %d bit public key and %d bit host key.",
-	      BN_num_bits(public_key->n), BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n));
+	debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.",
+	    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
+	    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
 
 	/* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */
-	packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
+	packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
 
 	/* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */
 	cipher_type = packet_get_char();
@@ -1192,76 +1325,107 @@
 	debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
 
 	/* Get the encrypted integer. */
-	session_key_int = BN_new();
-	packet_get_bignum(session_key_int, &slen);
+	if ((session_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
+	packet_get_bignum(session_key_int);
 
 	protocol_flags = packet_get_int();
 	packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags);
+	packet_check_eom();
 
-	packet_integrity_check(plen, 1 + 8 + slen + 4, SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
-
 	/*
 	 * Decrypt it using our private server key and private host key (key
 	 * with larger modulus first).
 	 */
-	if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.private_key->n, sensitive_data.host_key->n) > 0) {
-		/* Private key has bigger modulus. */
-		if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.private_key->n) <
-		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
-			fatal("do_connection: %s: private_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
-			      get_remote_ipaddr(),
-			      BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.private_key->n),
-			      BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n),
-			      SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
+	if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) {
+		/* Server key has bigger modulus. */
+		if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) <
+		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+			fatal("do_connection: %s: server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
+			    get_remote_ipaddr(),
+			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
+			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
+			    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
 		}
-		rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
-				    sensitive_data.private_key);
-		rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
-				    sensitive_data.host_key);
+		if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+		    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) <= 0)
+			rsafail++;
+		if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+		    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) <= 0)
+			rsafail++;
 	} else {
 		/* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
-		if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n) <
-		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.private_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
-			fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < private_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
-			      get_remote_ipaddr(),
-			      BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n),
-			      BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.private_key->n),
-			      SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
+		if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) <
+		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+			fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
+			    get_remote_ipaddr(),
+			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
+			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
+			    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
 		}
-		rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
-				    sensitive_data.host_key);
-		rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
-				    sensitive_data.private_key);
+		if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+		    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) < 0)
+			rsafail++;
+		if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
+		    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) < 0)
+			rsafail++;
 	}
-
-	compute_session_id(session_id, cookie,
-			   sensitive_data.host_key->n,
-			   sensitive_data.private_key->n);
-
-	/* Destroy the private and public keys.  They will no longer be needed. */
-	destroy_sensitive_data();
-
 	/*
 	 * Extract session key from the decrypted integer.  The key is in the
 	 * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the
 	 * key is in the highest bits.
 	 */
-	BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
-	len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
-	if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(session_key))
-		fatal("do_connection: bad len from %s: session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %d",
-		      get_remote_ipaddr(),
-		      len, sizeof(session_key));
-	memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
-	BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len);
+	if (!rsafail) {
+		BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
+		len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
+		if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(session_key)) {
+			error("do_connection: bad session key len from %s: "
+			    "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu",
+			    get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key));
+			rsafail++;
+		} else {
+			memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
+			BN_bn2bin(session_key_int,
+			    session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len);
 
+			compute_session_id(session_id, cookie,
+			    sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n,
+			    sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
+			/*
+			 * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the
+			 * session id.
+			 */
+			for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+				session_key[i] ^= session_id[i];
+		}
+	}
+	if (rsafail) {
+		int bytes = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
+		u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes);
+		MD5_CTX md;
+
+		log("do_connection: generating a fake encryption key");
+		BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, buf);
+		MD5_Init(&md);
+		MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
+		MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
+		MD5_Final(session_key, &md);
+		MD5_Init(&md);
+		MD5_Update(&md, session_key, 16);
+		MD5_Update(&md, buf, bytes);
+		MD5_Update(&md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
+		MD5_Final(session_key + 16, &md);
+		memset(buf, 0, bytes);
+		xfree(buf);
+		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+			session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16];
+	}
+	/* Destroy the private and public keys.  They will no longer be needed. */
+	destroy_sensitive_data();
+
 	/* Destroy the decrypted integer.  It is no longer needed. */
 	BN_clear_free(session_key_int);
 
-	/* Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the session id. */
-	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
-		session_key[i] ^= session_id[i];
-
 	/* Set the session key.  From this on all communications will be encrypted. */
 	packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type);
 
@@ -1279,53 +1443,40 @@
 /*
  * SSH2 key exchange: diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
  */
-void
-do_ssh2_kex()
+static void
+do_ssh2_kex(void)
 {
-	Buffer *server_kexinit;
-	Buffer *client_kexinit;
-	int payload_len;
-	int i;
 	Kex *kex;
-	char *cprop[PROPOSAL_MAX];
 
-/* KEXINIT */
-
 	if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
 	}
-	server_kexinit = kex_init(myproposal);
-	client_kexinit = xmalloc(sizeof(*client_kexinit));
-	buffer_init(client_kexinit);
+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+	    compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
+	    compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]);
 
-	/* algorithm negotiation */
-	kex_exchange_kexinit(server_kexinit, client_kexinit, cprop);
-	kex = kex_choose_conf(cprop, myproposal, 1);
-	for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
-		xfree(cprop[i]);
-
-	switch (kex->kex_type) {
-	case DH_GRP1_SHA1:
-		ssh_dh1_server(kex, client_kexinit, server_kexinit);
-		break;
-	case DH_GEX_SHA1:
-		ssh_dhgex_server(kex, client_kexinit, server_kexinit);
-		break;
-	default:
-		fatal("Unsupported key exchange %d", kex->kex_type);
+	if (options.macs != NULL) {
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
 	}
+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
 
-	debug("send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.");
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-	debug("done: send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.");
+	/* start key exchange */
+	kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
+	kex->server = 1;
+	kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+	kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+	kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type;
 
-	debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.");
-	packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
-	debug("GOT SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.");
+	xxx_kex = kex;
 
+	dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
+
+	session_id2 = kex->session_id;
+	session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
+
 #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
 	/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
 	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
@@ -1333,269 +1484,5 @@
 	packet_send();
 	packet_write_wait();
 #endif
-
-	debug("done: KEX2.");
+	debug("KEX done");
 }
-
-/*
- * SSH2 key exchange
- */
-
-/* diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 */
-
-void
-ssh_dh1_server(Kex *kex, Buffer *client_kexinit, Buffer *server_kexinit)
-{
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
-	int i;
-#endif
-	int payload_len, dlen;
-	int slen;
-	unsigned char *signature = NULL;
-	unsigned char *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
-	unsigned int sbloblen;
-	unsigned int klen, kout;
-	unsigned char *kbuf;
-	unsigned char *hash;
-	BIGNUM *shared_secret = 0;
-	DH *dh;
-	BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = 0;
-
-/* KEXDH */
-	debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT.");
-	packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT);
-
-	/* key, cert */
-	dh_client_pub = BN_new();
-	if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
-		fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
-	packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub, &dlen);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
-	fprintf(stderr, "\ndh_client_pub= ");
-	BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_client_pub);
-	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-	debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_client_pub));
-#endif
-
-	/* generate DH key */
-	dh = dh_new_group1();			/* XXX depends on 'kex' */
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
-	fprintf(stderr, "\np= ");
-	BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->p);
-	fprintf(stderr, "\ng= ");
-	bn_print(dh->g);
-	fprintf(stderr, "\npub= ");
-	BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key);
-	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-        DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh);
-#endif
-	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
-		packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
-
-	klen = DH_size(dh);
-	kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
-	kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
-	debug("shared secret: len %d/%d", klen, kout);
-	fprintf(stderr, "shared secret == ");
-	for (i = 0; i< kout; i++)
-		fprintf(stderr, "%02x", (kbuf[i])&0xff);
-	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-#endif
-	shared_secret = BN_new();
-
-	BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret);
-	memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
-	xfree(kbuf);
-
-	/* XXX precompute? */
-	dsa_make_key_blob(sensitive_data.dsa_host_key,
-			  &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen);
-
-	/* calc H */			/* XXX depends on 'kex' */
-	hash = kex_hash(
-	    client_version_string,
-	    server_version_string,
-	    buffer_ptr(client_kexinit), buffer_len(client_kexinit),
-	    buffer_ptr(server_kexinit), buffer_len(server_kexinit),
-	    (char *)server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
-	    dh_client_pub,
-	    dh->pub_key,
-	    shared_secret
-	);
-	buffer_free(client_kexinit);
-	buffer_free(server_kexinit);
-	xfree(client_kexinit);
-	xfree(server_kexinit);
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
-	fprintf(stderr, "hash == ");
-	for (i = 0; i< 20; i++)
-		fprintf(stderr, "%02x", (hash[i])&0xff);
-	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-#endif
-	/* save session id := H */
-	/* XXX hashlen depends on KEX */
-	session_id2_len = 20;
-	session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
-	memcpy(session_id2, hash, session_id2_len);
-
-	/* sign H */
-	/* XXX hashlen depends on KEX */
-	dsa_sign(sensitive_data.dsa_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash, 20);
-
-	destroy_sensitive_data();
-
-	/* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY);
-	packet_put_string((char *)server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
-	packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);	/* f */
-	packet_put_string((char *)signature, slen);
-	packet_send();
-	xfree(signature);
-	xfree(server_host_key_blob);
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, shared_secret);
-	packet_set_kex(kex);
-
-	/* have keys, free DH */
-	DH_free(dh);
-}
-
-/* diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 */
-
-void
-ssh_dhgex_server(Kex *kex, Buffer *client_kexinit, Buffer *server_kexinit)
-{
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
-	int i;
-#endif
-	int payload_len, dlen;
-	int slen, nbits;
-	unsigned char *signature = NULL;
-	unsigned char *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
-	unsigned int sbloblen;
-	unsigned int klen, kout;
-	unsigned char *kbuf;
-	unsigned char *hash;
-	BIGNUM *shared_secret = 0;
-	DH *dh;
-	BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = 0;
-
-/* KEXDHGEX */
-	debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST.");
-	packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
-	nbits = packet_get_int();
-	dh = choose_dh(nbits);
-
-	debug("Sending SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP.");
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP);
-	packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
-	packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT.");
-	packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT);
-
-	/* key, cert */
-	dh_client_pub = BN_new();
-	if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
-		fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
-	packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub, &dlen);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
-	fprintf(stderr, "\ndh_client_pub= ");
-	BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_client_pub);
-	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-	debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_client_pub));
-#endif
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
-	fprintf(stderr, "\np= ");
-	BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->p);
-	fprintf(stderr, "\ng= ");
-	bn_print(dh->g);
-	fprintf(stderr, "\npub= ");
-	BN_print_fp(stderr, dh->pub_key);
-	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-        DHparams_print_fp(stderr, dh);
-#endif
-	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
-		packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
-
-	klen = DH_size(dh);
-	kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
-	kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
-	debug("shared secret: len %d/%d", klen, kout);
-	fprintf(stderr, "shared secret == ");
-	for (i = 0; i< kout; i++)
-		fprintf(stderr, "%02x", (kbuf[i])&0xff);
-	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-#endif
-	shared_secret = BN_new();
-
-	BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret);
-	memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
-	xfree(kbuf);
-
-	/* XXX precompute? */
-	dsa_make_key_blob(sensitive_data.dsa_host_key,
-			  &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen);
-
-	/* calc H */			/* XXX depends on 'kex' */
-	hash = kex_hash_gex(
-	    client_version_string,
-	    server_version_string,
-	    buffer_ptr(client_kexinit), buffer_len(client_kexinit),
-	    buffer_ptr(server_kexinit), buffer_len(server_kexinit),
-	    (char *)server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
-	    nbits, dh->p, dh->g,
-	    dh_client_pub,
-	    dh->pub_key,
-	    shared_secret
-	);
-	buffer_free(client_kexinit);
-	buffer_free(server_kexinit);
-	xfree(client_kexinit);
-	xfree(server_kexinit);
-#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
-	fprintf(stderr, "hash == ");
-	for (i = 0; i< 20; i++)
-		fprintf(stderr, "%02x", (hash[i])&0xff);
-	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
-#endif
-	/* save session id := H */
-	/* XXX hashlen depends on KEX */
-	session_id2_len = 20;
-	session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
-	memcpy(session_id2, hash, session_id2_len);
-
-	/* sign H */
-	/* XXX hashlen depends on KEX */
-	dsa_sign(sensitive_data.dsa_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash, 20);
-
-	destroy_sensitive_data();
-
-	/* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY);
-	packet_put_string((char *)server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
-	packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);	/* f */
-	packet_put_string((char *)signature, slen);
-	packet_send();
-	xfree(signature);
-	xfree(server_host_key_blob);
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, shared_secret);
-	packet_set_kex(kex);
-
-	/* have keys, free DH */
-	DH_free(dh);
-}
-