Annotation of src/usr.bin/ssh/sshd.c, Revision 1.99
1.86 markus 1: /*
1.65 deraadt 2: * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
3: * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
4: * All rights reserved
5: * Created: Fri Mar 17 17:09:28 1995 ylo
6: * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients, and
7: * performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards
8: * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted
9: * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and authentication
10: * agent connections.
1.98 markus 11: *
12: * SSH2 implementation,
13: * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
1.65 deraadt 14: */
1.1 deraadt 15:
16: #include "includes.h"
1.99 ! markus 17: RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.98 2000/04/06 08:55:22 markus Exp $");
1.1 deraadt 18:
19: #include "xmalloc.h"
20: #include "rsa.h"
21: #include "ssh.h"
22: #include "pty.h"
23: #include "packet.h"
24: #include "cipher.h"
25: #include "mpaux.h"
26: #include "servconf.h"
27: #include "uidswap.h"
1.33 markus 28: #include "compat.h"
1.96 markus 29: #include "buffer.h"
30:
1.98 markus 31: #include "ssh2.h"
1.96 markus 32: #include <ssl/dh.h>
33: #include <ssl/bn.h>
34: #include <ssl/hmac.h>
1.98 markus 35: #include "kex.h"
1.96 markus 36: #include <ssl/dsa.h>
37: #include <ssl/rsa.h>
38: #include "key.h"
1.98 markus 39: #include "dsa.h"
1.96 markus 40:
41: #include "auth.h"
1.98 markus 42: #include "myproposal.h"
1.1 deraadt 43:
44: #ifdef LIBWRAP
45: #include <tcpd.h>
46: #include <syslog.h>
47: int allow_severity = LOG_INFO;
48: int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING;
49: #endif /* LIBWRAP */
50:
51: #ifndef O_NOCTTY
52: #define O_NOCTTY 0
53: #endif
54:
55: /* Server configuration options. */
56: ServerOptions options;
57:
58: /* Name of the server configuration file. */
59: char *config_file_name = SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
60:
1.75 markus 61: /*
62: * Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line.
63: * Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6.
64: */
65: int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
66:
1.98 markus 67: /* Flag indicating whether SSH2 is enabled */
68: int allow_ssh2 = 0;
69:
1.65 deraadt 70: /*
71: * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug
72: * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
73: * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing
74: * the first connection.
75: */
1.1 deraadt 76: int debug_flag = 0;
77:
78: /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
79: int inetd_flag = 0;
80:
1.47 markus 81: /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
82: int log_stderr = 0;
83:
1.1 deraadt 84: /* argv[0] without path. */
85: char *av0;
86:
87: /* Saved arguments to main(). */
88: char **saved_argv;
89:
1.66 markus 90: /*
1.75 markus 91: * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP
92: * signal handler.
1.66 markus 93: */
1.75 markus 94: #define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16
95: int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS];
96: int num_listen_socks = 0;
1.1 deraadt 97:
1.66 markus 98: /*
99: * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL,
100: * sshd will skip the version-number exchange
101: */
1.61 markus 102: char *client_version_string = NULL;
1.96 markus 103: char *server_version_string = NULL;
1.1 deraadt 104:
1.66 markus 105: /*
106: * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
107: * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
108: * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some
109: * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle)
110: * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is
111: * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
112: */
1.64 markus 113: struct {
114: RSA *private_key; /* Private part of server key. */
115: RSA *host_key; /* Private part of host key. */
1.1 deraadt 116: } sensitive_data;
117:
1.66 markus 118: /*
119: * Flag indicating whether the current session key has been used. This flag
120: * is set whenever the key is used, and cleared when the key is regenerated.
121: */
1.1 deraadt 122: int key_used = 0;
123:
124: /* This is set to true when SIGHUP is received. */
125: int received_sighup = 0;
126:
127: /* Public side of the server key. This value is regenerated regularly with
128: the private key. */
1.2 provos 129: RSA *public_key;
1.1 deraadt 130:
1.96 markus 131: /* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */
132: unsigned char session_id[16];
133:
1.1 deraadt 134: /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
1.96 markus 135: void do_ssh1_kex();
1.98 markus 136: void do_ssh2_kex();
1.87 markus 137:
138: /*
1.75 markus 139: * Close all listening sockets
140: */
141: void
142: close_listen_socks(void)
143: {
144: int i;
145: for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
146: close(listen_socks[i]);
147: num_listen_socks = -1;
148: }
149:
150: /*
1.65 deraadt 151: * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP;
152: * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate
153: * the server key).
154: */
1.64 markus 155: void
156: sighup_handler(int sig)
1.1 deraadt 157: {
1.64 markus 158: received_sighup = 1;
159: signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
1.1 deraadt 160: }
161:
1.65 deraadt 162: /*
163: * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP.
164: * Restarts the server.
165: */
1.64 markus 166: void
167: sighup_restart()
1.1 deraadt 168: {
1.64 markus 169: log("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
1.75 markus 170: close_listen_socks();
1.64 markus 171: execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
172: log("RESTART FAILED: av0='%s', error: %s.", av0, strerror(errno));
173: exit(1);
1.1 deraadt 174: }
175:
1.65 deraadt 176: /*
177: * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon.
178: * These close the listen socket; not closing it seems to cause "Address
179: * already in use" problems on some machines, which is inconvenient.
180: */
1.64 markus 181: void
182: sigterm_handler(int sig)
1.1 deraadt 183: {
1.64 markus 184: log("Received signal %d; terminating.", sig);
1.75 markus 185: close_listen_socks();
1.64 markus 186: exit(255);
1.1 deraadt 187: }
188:
1.65 deraadt 189: /*
190: * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then
191: * reap any zombies left by exited c.
192: */
1.64 markus 193: void
194: main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
1.1 deraadt 195: {
1.64 markus 196: int save_errno = errno;
197: int status;
1.60 deraadt 198:
1.64 markus 199: while (waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG) > 0)
200: ;
1.60 deraadt 201:
1.64 markus 202: signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
203: errno = save_errno;
1.1 deraadt 204: }
205:
1.65 deraadt 206: /*
207: * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
208: */
1.64 markus 209: void
210: grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
1.1 deraadt 211: {
1.64 markus 212: /* Close the connection. */
213: packet_close();
214:
215: /* Log error and exit. */
216: fatal("Timeout before authentication for %s.", get_remote_ipaddr());
1.62 markus 217: }
218:
1.65 deraadt 219: /*
220: * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm. Note that this
221: * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not
222: * do anything with the private key or random state before forking.
223: * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution
224: * problems.
225: */
1.64 markus 226: void
227: key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
1.1 deraadt 228: {
1.64 markus 229: int save_errno = errno;
1.18 deraadt 230:
1.64 markus 231: /* Check if we should generate a new key. */
232: if (key_used) {
233: /* This should really be done in the background. */
234: log("Generating new %d bit RSA key.", options.server_key_bits);
235:
236: if (sensitive_data.private_key != NULL)
237: RSA_free(sensitive_data.private_key);
238: sensitive_data.private_key = RSA_new();
239:
240: if (public_key != NULL)
241: RSA_free(public_key);
242: public_key = RSA_new();
243:
244: rsa_generate_key(sensitive_data.private_key, public_key,
245: options.server_key_bits);
246: arc4random_stir();
247: key_used = 0;
248: log("RSA key generation complete.");
249: }
250: /* Reschedule the alarm. */
251: signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
252: alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
253: errno = save_errno;
1.1 deraadt 254: }
255:
1.98 markus 256: char *
257: chop(char *s)
258: {
259: char *t = s;
260: while (*t) {
261: if(*t == '\n' || *t == '\r') {
262: *t = '\0';
263: return s;
264: }
265: t++;
266: }
267: return s;
268:
269: }
270:
1.96 markus 271: void
272: sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
273: {
274: int i;
275: int remote_major, remote_minor;
276: char *s;
277: char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */
278: char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
279:
280: snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n",
1.98 markus 281: allow_ssh2 ? 1 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR,
282: allow_ssh2 ? 99 : PROTOCOL_MINOR,
283: SSH_VERSION);
1.96 markus 284: server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
285:
286: if (client_version_string == NULL) {
287: /* Send our protocol version identification. */
288: if (atomicio(write, sock_out, server_version_string, strlen(server_version_string))
289: != strlen(server_version_string)) {
290: log("Could not write ident string to %s.", get_remote_ipaddr());
291: fatal_cleanup();
292: }
293:
294: /* Read other side\'s version identification. */
295: for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
296: if (read(sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
297: log("Did not receive ident string from %s.", get_remote_ipaddr());
298: fatal_cleanup();
299: }
300: if (buf[i] == '\r') {
301: buf[i] = '\n';
302: buf[i + 1] = 0;
303: continue;
1.98 markus 304: //break;
1.96 markus 305: }
306: if (buf[i] == '\n') {
307: /* buf[i] == '\n' */
308: buf[i + 1] = 0;
309: break;
310: }
311: }
312: buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
313: client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
314: }
315:
316: /*
317: * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
318: * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
319: */
320: if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
321: &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
322: s = "Protocol mismatch.\n";
323: (void) atomicio(write, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
324: close(sock_in);
325: close(sock_out);
326: log("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' from %s",
327: client_version_string, get_remote_ipaddr());
328: fatal_cleanup();
329: }
330: debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s",
331: remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
332:
1.98 markus 333: compat_datafellows(remote_version);
334:
1.96 markus 335: switch(remote_major) {
336: case 1:
337: if (remote_minor < 3) {
338: packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and"
339: "is no longer supported. Please install a newer version.");
340: } else if (remote_minor == 3) {
341: /* note that this disables agent-forwarding */
342: enable_compat13();
343: }
1.99 ! markus 344: if (remote_minor != 99)
! 345: break;
! 346: /* FALLTHROUGH */
1.98 markus 347: case 2:
348: if (allow_ssh2) {
349: enable_compat20();
350: break;
351: }
1.99 ! markus 352: /* FALLTHROUGH */
1.96 markus 353: default:
354: s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n";
355: (void) atomicio(write, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
356: close(sock_in);
357: close(sock_out);
358: log("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %d vs. %d",
359: get_remote_ipaddr(), PROTOCOL_MAJOR, remote_major);
360: fatal_cleanup();
361: break;
362: }
1.98 markus 363: chop(server_version_string);
364: chop(client_version_string);
1.96 markus 365: }
366:
1.65 deraadt 367: /*
368: * Main program for the daemon.
369: */
1.2 provos 370: int
371: main(int ac, char **av)
1.1 deraadt 372: {
1.64 markus 373: extern char *optarg;
374: extern int optind;
1.75 markus 375: int opt, sock_in = 0, sock_out = 0, newsock, i, fdsetsz, pid, on = 1;
376: socklen_t fromlen;
1.64 markus 377: int silentrsa = 0;
1.75 markus 378: fd_set *fdset;
379: struct sockaddr_storage from;
1.64 markus 380: const char *remote_ip;
381: int remote_port;
382: char *comment;
383: FILE *f;
384: struct linger linger;
1.75 markus 385: struct addrinfo *ai;
386: char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
387: int listen_sock, maxfd;
1.64 markus 388:
389: /* Save argv[0]. */
390: saved_argv = av;
391: if (strchr(av[0], '/'))
392: av0 = strrchr(av[0], '/') + 1;
393: else
394: av0 = av[0];
395:
396: /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
397: initialize_server_options(&options);
398:
399: /* Parse command-line arguments. */
1.98 markus 400: while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:V:diqQ246")) != EOF) {
1.64 markus 401: switch (opt) {
1.98 markus 402: case '2':
403: allow_ssh2 = 1;
404: break;
1.75 markus 405: case '4':
406: IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
407: break;
408: case '6':
409: IPv4or6 = AF_INET6;
410: break;
1.64 markus 411: case 'f':
412: config_file_name = optarg;
413: break;
414: case 'd':
415: debug_flag = 1;
416: options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG;
417: break;
418: case 'i':
419: inetd_flag = 1;
420: break;
421: case 'Q':
422: silentrsa = 1;
423: break;
424: case 'q':
425: options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
426: break;
427: case 'b':
428: options.server_key_bits = atoi(optarg);
429: break;
430: case 'p':
1.75 markus 431: options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
432: if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS)
433: fatal("too many ports.\n");
434: options.ports[options.num_ports++] = atoi(optarg);
1.64 markus 435: break;
436: case 'g':
437: options.login_grace_time = atoi(optarg);
438: break;
439: case 'k':
440: options.key_regeneration_time = atoi(optarg);
441: break;
442: case 'h':
443: options.host_key_file = optarg;
444: break;
445: case 'V':
446: client_version_string = optarg;
447: /* only makes sense with inetd_flag, i.e. no listen() */
448: inetd_flag = 1;
449: break;
450: case '?':
451: default:
452: fprintf(stderr, "sshd version %s\n", SSH_VERSION);
453: fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options]\n", av0);
454: fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
1.66 markus 455: fprintf(stderr, " -f file Configuration file (default %s)\n", SERVER_CONFIG_FILE);
1.64 markus 456: fprintf(stderr, " -d Debugging mode\n");
457: fprintf(stderr, " -i Started from inetd\n");
458: fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet (no logging)\n");
459: fprintf(stderr, " -p port Listen on the specified port (default: 22)\n");
460: fprintf(stderr, " -k seconds Regenerate server key every this many seconds (default: 3600)\n");
461: fprintf(stderr, " -g seconds Grace period for authentication (default: 300)\n");
462: fprintf(stderr, " -b bits Size of server RSA key (default: 768 bits)\n");
463: fprintf(stderr, " -h file File from which to read host key (default: %s)\n",
1.75 markus 464: HOST_KEY_FILE);
465: fprintf(stderr, " -4 Use IPv4 only\n");
466: fprintf(stderr, " -6 Use IPv6 only\n");
1.64 markus 467: exit(1);
468: }
469: }
470:
1.75 markus 471: /*
472: * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
473: * key (unless started from inetd)
474: */
475: log_init(av0,
476: options.log_level == -1 ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
477: options.log_facility == -1 ? SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
478: !inetd_flag);
479:
1.64 markus 480: /* check if RSA support exists */
481: if (rsa_alive() == 0) {
482: if (silentrsa == 0)
483: printf("sshd: no RSA support in libssl and libcrypto -- exiting. See ssl(8)\n");
484: log("no RSA support in libssl and libcrypto -- exiting. See ssl(8)");
485: exit(1);
486: }
487: /* Read server configuration options from the configuration file. */
488: read_server_config(&options, config_file_name);
489:
490: /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
491: fill_default_server_options(&options);
492:
493: /* Check certain values for sanity. */
494: if (options.server_key_bits < 512 ||
495: options.server_key_bits > 32768) {
496: fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n");
497: exit(1);
498: }
499: /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
500: if (optind < ac) {
501: fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]);
502: exit(1);
503: }
504:
505: debug("sshd version %.100s", SSH_VERSION);
506:
507: sensitive_data.host_key = RSA_new();
508: errno = 0;
509: /* Load the host key. It must have empty passphrase. */
510: if (!load_private_key(options.host_key_file, "",
511: sensitive_data.host_key, &comment)) {
512: error("Could not load host key: %.200s: %.100s",
513: options.host_key_file, strerror(errno));
514: exit(1);
515: }
516: xfree(comment);
517:
518: /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we
519: forked). */
520: if (debug_flag && !inetd_flag)
521: log_stderr = 1;
522: log_init(av0, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
523:
524: /* If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd,
525: disconnect from the controlling terminal, and fork. The
526: original process exits. */
527: if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag) {
1.1 deraadt 528: #ifdef TIOCNOTTY
1.64 markus 529: int fd;
1.1 deraadt 530: #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
1.64 markus 531: if (daemon(0, 0) < 0)
532: fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
533:
534: /* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */
1.1 deraadt 535: #ifdef TIOCNOTTY
1.64 markus 536: fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
537: if (fd >= 0) {
538: (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
539: close(fd);
540: }
541: #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
542: }
543: /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
544: log_init(av0, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
545:
546: /* Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently.
547: This is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref.
548: Oh, I hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels */
549: if (options.server_key_bits >
550: BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n) - SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED &&
551: options.server_key_bits <
552: BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
553: options.server_key_bits =
554: BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED;
555: debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.",
556: options.server_key_bits);
1.1 deraadt 557: }
1.64 markus 558: /* Do not display messages to stdout in RSA code. */
559: rsa_set_verbose(0);
560:
561: /* Initialize the random number generator. */
562: arc4random_stir();
563:
564: /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
565: unmounted if desired. */
566: chdir("/");
567:
568: /* Start listening for a socket, unless started from inetd. */
569: if (inetd_flag) {
570: int s1, s2;
571: s1 = dup(0); /* Make sure descriptors 0, 1, and 2 are in use. */
572: s2 = dup(s1);
573: sock_in = dup(0);
574: sock_out = dup(1);
575: /* We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
576: as our code for setting the descriptors won\'t work
577: if ttyfd happens to be one of those. */
578: debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", sock_in, sock_out);
579:
580: public_key = RSA_new();
581: sensitive_data.private_key = RSA_new();
582:
583: log("Generating %d bit RSA key.", options.server_key_bits);
584: rsa_generate_key(sensitive_data.private_key, public_key,
585: options.server_key_bits);
586: arc4random_stir();
587: log("RSA key generation complete.");
588: } else {
1.75 markus 589: for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
590: if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
591: continue;
592: if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
593: fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
594: "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
595: if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
596: ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
597: NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
598: error("getnameinfo failed");
599: continue;
600: }
601: /* Create socket for listening. */
602: listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
603: if (listen_sock < 0) {
604: /* kernel may not support ipv6 */
605: verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
606: continue;
607: }
608: if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0) {
609: error("listen_sock O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno));
610: close(listen_sock);
611: continue;
612: }
613: /*
614: * Set socket options. We try to make the port
615: * reusable and have it close as fast as possible
616: * without waiting in unnecessary wait states on
617: * close.
618: */
619: setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
620: (void *) &on, sizeof(on));
621: linger.l_onoff = 1;
622: linger.l_linger = 5;
623: setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER,
624: (void *) &linger, sizeof(linger));
625:
626: debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
627:
628: /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
629: if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
630: error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
631: strport, ntop, strerror(errno));
632: close(listen_sock);
633: continue;
634: }
635: listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock;
636: num_listen_socks++;
637:
638: /* Start listening on the port. */
639: log("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
640: if (listen(listen_sock, 5) < 0)
641: fatal("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
642:
1.64 markus 643: }
1.75 markus 644: freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs);
645:
646: if (!num_listen_socks)
647: fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
648:
1.64 markus 649: if (!debug_flag) {
1.66 markus 650: /*
651: * Record our pid in /etc/sshd_pid to make it easier
652: * to kill the correct sshd. We don\'t want to do
653: * this before the bind above because the bind will
654: * fail if there already is a daemon, and this will
655: * overwrite any old pid in the file.
656: */
1.64 markus 657: f = fopen(SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE, "w");
658: if (f) {
659: fprintf(f, "%u\n", (unsigned int) getpid());
660: fclose(f);
661: }
662: }
663:
664: public_key = RSA_new();
665: sensitive_data.private_key = RSA_new();
666:
667: log("Generating %d bit RSA key.", options.server_key_bits);
668: rsa_generate_key(sensitive_data.private_key, public_key,
669: options.server_key_bits);
670: arc4random_stir();
671: log("RSA key generation complete.");
672:
673: /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */
674: signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
675: alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
676:
677: /* Arrange to restart on SIGHUP. The handler needs listen_sock. */
678: signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
679: signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
680: signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
681:
682: /* Arrange SIGCHLD to be caught. */
683: signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
684:
1.75 markus 685: /* setup fd set for listen */
686: maxfd = 0;
687: for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
688: if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd)
689: maxfd = listen_socks[i];
690: fdsetsz = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
691: fdset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(fdsetsz);
692:
1.66 markus 693: /*
694: * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or
695: * the daemon is killed with a signal.
696: */
1.64 markus 697: for (;;) {
698: if (received_sighup)
699: sighup_restart();
1.75 markus 700: /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
701: memset(fdset, 0, fdsetsz);
702: for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
703: FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset);
704: if (select(maxfd + 1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
705: if (errno != EINTR)
706: error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
707: continue;
708: }
709: for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) {
710: if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset))
1.70 provos 711: continue;
1.75 markus 712: fromlen = sizeof(from);
713: newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], (struct sockaddr *)&from,
714: &fromlen);
715: if (newsock < 0) {
716: if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
717: error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
718: continue;
1.70 provos 719: }
1.75 markus 720: if (fcntl(newsock, F_SETFL, 0) < 0) {
721: error("newsock del O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno));
1.64 markus 722: continue;
723: }
1.66 markus 724: /*
725: * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless
726: * we are in debugging mode.
727: */
1.64 markus 728: if (debug_flag) {
1.66 markus 729: /*
730: * In debugging mode. Close the listening
731: * socket, and start processing the
732: * connection without forking.
733: */
1.64 markus 734: debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode.");
1.75 markus 735: close_listen_socks();
1.64 markus 736: sock_in = newsock;
737: sock_out = newsock;
738: pid = getpid();
739: break;
740: } else {
1.66 markus 741: /*
742: * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have
743: * the child process the connection. The
744: * parent continues listening.
745: */
1.64 markus 746: if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
1.66 markus 747: /*
748: * Child. Close the listening socket, and start using the
749: * accepted socket. Reinitialize logging (since our pid has
750: * changed). We break out of the loop to handle the connection.
751: */
1.75 markus 752: close_listen_socks();
1.64 markus 753: sock_in = newsock;
754: sock_out = newsock;
755: log_init(av0, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
756: break;
757: }
758: }
759:
760: /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */
761: if (pid < 0)
762: error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
763: else
764: debug("Forked child %d.", pid);
1.1 deraadt 765:
1.64 markus 766: /* Mark that the key has been used (it was "given" to the child). */
767: key_used = 1;
1.1 deraadt 768:
1.64 markus 769: arc4random_stir();
1.1 deraadt 770:
1.64 markus 771: /* Close the new socket (the child is now taking care of it). */
772: close(newsock);
1.75 markus 773: } /* for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) */
774: /* child process check (or debug mode) */
775: if (num_listen_socks < 0)
776: break;
1.64 markus 777: }
1.1 deraadt 778: }
779:
1.64 markus 780: /* This is the child processing a new connection. */
781:
1.66 markus 782: /*
783: * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the
784: * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We
785: * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense.
786: */
1.64 markus 787: alarm(0);
788: signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
789: signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
790: signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
791: signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
792: signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
793:
1.66 markus 794: /*
795: * Set socket options for the connection. We want the socket to
796: * close as fast as possible without waiting for anything. If the
797: * connection is not a socket, these will do nothing.
798: */
799: /* setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)); */
1.64 markus 800: linger.l_onoff = 1;
801: linger.l_linger = 5;
802: setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (void *) &linger, sizeof(linger));
803:
1.66 markus 804: /*
805: * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do
806: * not have a key.
807: */
1.64 markus 808: packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out);
1.1 deraadt 809:
1.64 markus 810: remote_port = get_remote_port();
811: remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
1.52 markus 812:
1.64 markus 813: /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
1.37 dugsong 814: #ifdef LIBWRAP
1.75 markus 815: /* XXX LIBWRAP noes not know about IPv6 */
1.64 markus 816: {
817: struct request_info req;
1.37 dugsong 818:
1.64 markus 819: request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, av0, RQ_FILE, sock_in, NULL);
820: fromhost(&req);
1.37 dugsong 821:
1.64 markus 822: if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
823: close(sock_in);
824: close(sock_out);
825: refuse(&req);
826: }
1.75 markus 827: /*XXX IPv6 verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", eval_client(&req), remote_port); */
1.64 markus 828: }
1.75 markus 829: #endif /* LIBWRAP */
1.64 markus 830: /* Log the connection. */
831: verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
1.1 deraadt 832:
1.66 markus 833: /*
834: * We don\'t want to listen forever unless the other side
835: * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
836: * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero
837: * indicates no limit. Note that we don\'t set the alarm in debugging
838: * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
839: * are about to discover the bug.
840: */
1.64 markus 841: signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
842: if (!debug_flag)
843: alarm(options.login_grace_time);
844:
1.96 markus 845: sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out);
1.66 markus 846: /*
847: * Check that the connection comes from a privileged port. Rhosts-
848: * and Rhosts-RSA-Authentication only make sense from priviledged
849: * programs. Of course, if the intruder has root access on his local
850: * machine, he can connect from any port. So do not use these
851: * authentication methods from machines that you do not trust.
852: */
1.64 markus 853: if (remote_port >= IPPORT_RESERVED ||
854: remote_port < IPPORT_RESERVED / 2) {
855: options.rhosts_authentication = 0;
856: options.rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0;
857: }
1.76 markus 858: #ifdef KRB4
859: if (!packet_connection_is_ipv4() &&
860: options.kerberos_authentication) {
861: debug("Kerberos Authentication disabled, only available for IPv4.");
862: options.kerberos_authentication = 0;
863: }
864: #endif /* KRB4 */
865:
1.64 markus 866: packet_set_nonblocking();
1.1 deraadt 867:
1.77 markus 868: /* perform the key exchange */
869: /* authenticate user and start session */
1.98 markus 870: if (compat20) {
871: do_ssh2_kex();
872: do_authentication2();
873: } else {
874: do_ssh1_kex();
875: do_authentication();
876: }
1.1 deraadt 877:
878: #ifdef KRB4
1.64 markus 879: /* Cleanup user's ticket cache file. */
880: if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup)
881: (void) dest_tkt();
1.1 deraadt 882: #endif /* KRB4 */
883:
1.64 markus 884: /* The connection has been terminated. */
885: verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip);
886: packet_close();
887: exit(0);
1.1 deraadt 888: }
889:
1.65 deraadt 890: /*
1.77 markus 891: * SSH1 key exchange
1.65 deraadt 892: */
1.52 markus 893: void
1.96 markus 894: do_ssh1_kex()
1.1 deraadt 895: {
1.64 markus 896: int i, len;
1.77 markus 897: int plen, slen;
1.64 markus 898: BIGNUM *session_key_int;
899: unsigned char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
1.77 markus 900: unsigned char cookie[8];
1.64 markus 901: unsigned int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags;
902: u_int32_t rand = 0;
903:
1.66 markus 904: /*
905: * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user
906: * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip
907: * spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody
908: * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local
909: * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random
910: * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one
911: * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure.
912: */
1.64 markus 913: for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
914: if (i % 4 == 0)
915: rand = arc4random();
1.77 markus 916: cookie[i] = rand & 0xff;
1.64 markus 917: rand >>= 8;
918: }
919:
1.66 markus 920: /*
921: * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random
922: * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP
923: * spoofing.
924: */
1.64 markus 925: packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
926: for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
1.77 markus 927: packet_put_char(cookie[i]);
1.64 markus 928:
929: /* Store our public server RSA key. */
930: packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(public_key->n));
931: packet_put_bignum(public_key->e);
932: packet_put_bignum(public_key->n);
933:
934: /* Store our public host RSA key. */
935: packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n));
936: packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.host_key->e);
937: packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.host_key->n);
938:
939: /* Put protocol flags. */
940: packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN);
941:
942: /* Declare which ciphers we support. */
1.97 markus 943: packet_put_int(cipher_mask1());
1.64 markus 944:
945: /* Declare supported authentication types. */
946: auth_mask = 0;
947: if (options.rhosts_authentication)
948: auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS;
949: if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication)
950: auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA;
951: if (options.rsa_authentication)
952: auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA;
1.1 deraadt 953: #ifdef KRB4
1.64 markus 954: if (options.kerberos_authentication)
955: auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_KERBEROS;
1.1 deraadt 956: #endif
1.5 dugsong 957: #ifdef AFS
1.64 markus 958: if (options.kerberos_tgt_passing)
959: auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_KERBEROS_TGT;
960: if (options.afs_token_passing)
961: auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_PASS_AFS_TOKEN;
1.1 deraadt 962: #endif
1.63 markus 963: #ifdef SKEY
1.64 markus 964: if (options.skey_authentication == 1)
965: auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS;
1.63 markus 966: #endif
1.64 markus 967: if (options.password_authentication)
968: auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD;
969: packet_put_int(auth_mask);
970:
971: /* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */
972: packet_send();
973: packet_write_wait();
974:
975: debug("Sent %d bit public key and %d bit host key.",
976: BN_num_bits(public_key->n), BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n));
977:
978: /* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */
979: packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
980:
1.69 markus 981: /* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */
1.64 markus 982: cipher_type = packet_get_char();
1.69 markus 983:
984: if (!(cipher_mask() & (1 << cipher_type)))
985: packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher.");
1.64 markus 986:
987: /* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we
988: sent earlier with the public key packet. */
989: for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
1.77 markus 990: if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char())
1.64 markus 991: packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
992:
993: debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
994:
995: /* Get the encrypted integer. */
996: session_key_int = BN_new();
997: packet_get_bignum(session_key_int, &slen);
998:
999: protocol_flags = packet_get_int();
1000: packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags);
1001:
1002: packet_integrity_check(plen, 1 + 8 + slen + 4, SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
1003:
1.66 markus 1004: /*
1005: * Decrypt it using our private server key and private host key (key
1006: * with larger modulus first).
1007: */
1.64 markus 1008: if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.private_key->n, sensitive_data.host_key->n) > 0) {
1009: /* Private key has bigger modulus. */
1010: if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.private_key->n) <
1011: BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
1012: fatal("do_connection: %s: private_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
1013: get_remote_ipaddr(),
1014: BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.private_key->n),
1015: BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n),
1016: SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
1017: }
1018: rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1019: sensitive_data.private_key);
1020: rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1021: sensitive_data.host_key);
1022: } else {
1023: /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
1024: if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n) <
1025: BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.private_key->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
1026: fatal("do_connection: %s: host_key %d < private_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
1027: get_remote_ipaddr(),
1028: BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.host_key->n),
1029: BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.private_key->n),
1030: SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
1031: }
1032: rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1033: sensitive_data.host_key);
1034: rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
1035: sensitive_data.private_key);
1036: }
1037:
1.77 markus 1038: compute_session_id(session_id, cookie,
1.64 markus 1039: sensitive_data.host_key->n,
1040: sensitive_data.private_key->n);
1041:
1.77 markus 1042: /* Destroy the private and public keys. They will no longer be needed. */
1043: RSA_free(public_key);
1044: RSA_free(sensitive_data.private_key);
1045: RSA_free(sensitive_data.host_key);
1046:
1.66 markus 1047: /*
1048: * Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the
1049: * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the
1050: * key is in the highest bits.
1051: */
1.64 markus 1052: BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
1053: len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
1054: if (len < 0 || len > sizeof(session_key))
1055: fatal("do_connection: bad len from %s: session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %d",
1056: get_remote_ipaddr(),
1057: len, sizeof(session_key));
1058: memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
1059: BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len);
1060:
1.77 markus 1061: /* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */
1062: BN_clear_free(session_key_int);
1063:
1.64 markus 1064: /* Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the session id. */
1065: for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1066: session_key[i] ^= session_id[i];
1067:
1068: /* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be encrypted. */
1069: packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type);
1070:
1071: /* Destroy our copy of the session key. It is no longer needed. */
1072: memset(session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
1073:
1074: debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
1075:
1076: /* Send an acknowledgement packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
1077: packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
1078: packet_send();
1079: packet_write_wait();
1.98 markus 1080: }
1081:
1082: /*
1083: * SSH2 key exchange: diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
1084: */
1085: void
1086: do_ssh2_kex()
1087: {
1088: Buffer *server_kexinit;
1089: Buffer *client_kexinit;
1090: int payload_len, dlen;
1091: int slen;
1092: unsigned int klen, kout;
1093: char *ptr;
1094: unsigned char *signature = NULL;
1095: unsigned char *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
1096: unsigned int sbloblen;
1097: DH *dh;
1098: BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = 0;
1099: BIGNUM *shared_secret = 0;
1100: int i;
1101: unsigned char *kbuf;
1102: unsigned char *hash;
1103: Kex *kex;
1104: Key *server_host_key;
1105: char *cprop[PROPOSAL_MAX];
1106: char *sprop[PROPOSAL_MAX];
1107:
1108: /* KEXINIT */
1109:
1110: debug("Sending KEX init.");
1111:
1112: for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
1113: sprop[i] = xstrdup(myproposal[i]);
1114: server_kexinit = kex_init(sprop);
1115: packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
1116: packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(server_kexinit), buffer_len(server_kexinit));
1117: packet_send();
1118: packet_write_wait();
1119:
1120: debug("done");
1121:
1122: packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
1123:
1124: /*
1125: * save raw KEXINIT payload in buffer. this is used during
1126: * computation of the session_id and the session keys.
1127: */
1128: client_kexinit = xmalloc(sizeof(*client_kexinit));
1129: buffer_init(client_kexinit);
1130: ptr = packet_get_raw(&payload_len);
1131: buffer_append(client_kexinit, ptr, payload_len);
1132:
1133: /* skip cookie */
1134: for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1135: (void) packet_get_char();
1136: /* save kex init proposal strings */
1137: for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
1138: cprop[i] = packet_get_string(NULL);
1139: debug("got kexinit string: %s", cprop[i]);
1140: }
1141:
1142: i = (int) packet_get_char();
1143: debug("first kex follow == %d", i);
1144: i = packet_get_int();
1145: debug("reserved == %d", i);
1146:
1147: debug("done read kexinit");
1148: kex = kex_choose_conf(cprop, sprop, 1);
1149:
1150: /* KEXDH */
1151:
1152: debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT.");
1153: packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT);
1154:
1155: /* key, cert */
1156: dh_client_pub = BN_new();
1157: if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
1158: fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
1159: packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub, &dlen);
1160:
1161: #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
1162: fprintf(stderr, "\ndh_client_pub= ");
1163: bignum_print(dh_client_pub);
1164: fprintf(stderr, "\n");
1165: debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_client_pub));
1166: #endif
1167:
1168: /* generate DH key */
1169: dh = new_dh_group1(); /* XXX depends on 'kex' */
1170:
1171: #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
1172: fprintf(stderr, "\np= ");
1173: bignum_print(dh->p);
1174: fprintf(stderr, "\ng= ");
1175: bignum_print(dh->g);
1176: fprintf(stderr, "\npub= ");
1177: bignum_print(dh->pub_key);
1178: fprintf(stderr, "\n");
1179: #endif
1180:
1181: klen = DH_size(dh);
1182: kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
1183: kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
1184:
1185: #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
1186: debug("shared secret: len %d/%d", klen, kout);
1187: fprintf(stderr, "shared secret == ");
1188: for (i = 0; i< kout; i++)
1189: fprintf(stderr, "%02x", (kbuf[i])&0xff);
1190: fprintf(stderr, "\n");
1191: #endif
1192: shared_secret = BN_new();
1193:
1194: BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret);
1195: memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
1196: xfree(kbuf);
1197:
1198: server_host_key = dsa_get_serverkey(options.dsa_key_file);
1199: dsa_make_serverkey_blob(server_host_key, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen);
1200:
1201: /* calc H */ /* XXX depends on 'kex' */
1202: hash = kex_hash(
1203: client_version_string,
1204: server_version_string,
1205: buffer_ptr(client_kexinit), buffer_len(client_kexinit),
1206: buffer_ptr(server_kexinit), buffer_len(server_kexinit),
1207: (char *)server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
1208: dh_client_pub,
1209: dh->pub_key,
1210: shared_secret
1211: );
1212: buffer_free(client_kexinit);
1213: buffer_free(server_kexinit);
1214: xfree(client_kexinit);
1215: xfree(server_kexinit);
1216: #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
1217: fprintf(stderr, "hash == ");
1218: for (i = 0; i< 20; i++)
1219: fprintf(stderr, "%02x", (hash[i])&0xff);
1220: fprintf(stderr, "\n");
1221: #endif
1222: /* sign H */
1223: dsa_sign(server_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash, 20);
1224: /* hashlen depends on KEX */
1225: key_free(server_host_key);
1226:
1227: /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
1228: packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY);
1229: packet_put_string((char *)server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
1230: packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); // f
1231: packet_put_string((char *)signature, slen);
1232: packet_send();
1233: packet_write_wait();
1234:
1235: kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, shared_secret);
1236: packet_set_kex(kex);
1237:
1238: /* have keys, free DH */
1239: DH_free(dh);
1240:
1241: debug("send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.");
1242: packet_start(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
1243: packet_send();
1244: packet_write_wait();
1245: debug("done: send SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.");
1246:
1247: debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.");
1248: packet_read_expect(&payload_len, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS);
1249: debug("GOT SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS.");
1250:
1251: /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
1252: packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
1253: packet_put_cstring("markus");
1254: packet_send();
1255: packet_write_wait();
1256:
1257: debug("done: KEX2.");
1.1 deraadt 1258: }
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