=================================================================== RCS file: /cvsrepo/anoncvs/cvs/src/usr.bin/sudo/Attic/sudo.8,v retrieving revision 1.5.2.1 retrieving revision 1.6 diff -c -r1.5.2.1 -r1.6 *** src/usr.bin/sudo/Attic/sudo.8 2002/01/18 17:20:23 1.5.2.1 --- src/usr.bin/sudo/Attic/sudo.8 2001/09/17 23:49:21 1.6 *************** *** 1,9 **** ! .\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man version 1.15 ! .\" Wed Jan 16 16:36:09 2002 ! .\" ! .\" Standard preamble: ! .\" ====================================================================== ! .de Sh \" Subsection heading .br .if t .Sp .ne 5 --- 1,28 ---- ! .rn '' }` ! ''' $RCSfile: sudo.8,v $$Revision: 1.6 $$Date: 2001/09/17 23:49:21 $ ! ''' ! ''' $Log: sudo.8,v $ ! ''' Revision 1.6 2001/09/17 23:49:21 pjanzen ! ''' Typo and grammar fixes, one from PR/2058 (Dennis Schwarz); ok millert@ ! ''' ! ''' Revision 1.5 2000/11/21 17:58:44 millert ! ''' A few updates from the sudo developement tree: ! ''' - Add bsd authentication support (currently disabled) ! ''' - Always check setenv() return value ! ''' - Fix umask disabling ! ''' ! ''' Revision 1.4 2000/04/10 02:28:36 millert ! ''' Remove extra backslash, noted by marc@snafu.org ! ''' ! ''' Revision 1.3 2000/03/27 03:44:38 millert ! ''' sudo 1.6.3; see http://www.courtesan.com/sudo/current.html for a list ! ''' of changes. ! ''' ! ''' Revision 1.3 2000/03/27 03:26:23 millert ! ''' Use 8 and 5 in the man page bodies as well. ! ''' ! ''' ! .de Sh .br .if t .Sp .ne 5 *************** *** 11,116 **** \fB\\$1\fR .PP .. ! .de Sp \" Vertical space (when we can't use .PP) .if t .sp .5v .if n .sp .. ! .de Ip \" List item .br .ie \\n(.$>=3 .ne \\$3 .el .ne 3 .IP "\\$1" \\$2 .. ! .de Vb \" Begin verbatim text .ft CW .nf .ne \\$1 .. ! .de Ve \" End verbatim text .ft R .fi .. ! .\" Set up some character translations and predefined strings. \*(-- will ! .\" give an unbreakable dash, \*(PI will give pi, \*(L" will give a left ! .\" double quote, and \*(R" will give a right double quote. | will give a ! .\" real vertical bar. \*(C+ will give a nicer C++. Capital omega is used ! .\" to do unbreakable dashes and therefore won't be available. \*(C` and ! .\" \*(C' expand to `' in nroff, nothing in troff, for use with C<> .tr \(*W-|\(bv\*(Tr - .ds C+ C\v'-.1v'\h'-1p'\s-2+\h'-1p'+\s0\v'.1v'\h'-1p' .ie n \{\ ! . ds -- \(*W- ! . ds PI pi ! . if (\n(.H=4u)&(1m=24u) .ds -- \(*W\h'-12u'\(*W\h'-12u'-\" diablo 10 pitch ! . if (\n(.H=4u)&(1m=20u) .ds -- \(*W\h'-12u'\(*W\h'-8u'-\" diablo 12 pitch ! . ds L" "" ! . ds R" "" ! . ds C` ! . ds C' 'br\} .el\{\ ! . ds -- \|\(em\| ! . ds PI \(*p ! . ds L" `` ! . ds R" '' 'br\} ! .\" ! .\" If the F register is turned on, we'll generate index entries on stderr ! .\" for titles (.TH), headers (.SH), subsections (.Sh), items (.Ip), and ! .\" index entries marked with X<> in POD. Of course, you'll have to process ! .\" the output yourself in some meaningful fashion. ! .if \nF \{\ ! . de IX ! . tm Index:\\$1\t\\n%\t"\\$2" .. ! . nr % 0 ! . rr F .\} ! .\" ! .\" For nroff, turn off justification. Always turn off hyphenation; it ! .\" makes way too many mistakes in technical documents. ! .hy 0 .if n .na ! .\" ! .\" Accent mark definitions (@(#)ms.acc 1.5 88/02/08 SMI; from UCB 4.2). ! .\" Fear. Run. Save yourself. No user-serviceable parts. .bd B 3 ! . \" fudge factors for nroff and troff .if n \{\ ! . ds #H 0 ! . ds #V .8m ! . ds #F .3m ! . ds #[ \f1 ! . ds #] \fP .\} .if t \{\ ! . ds #H ((1u-(\\\\n(.fu%2u))*.13m) ! . ds #V .6m ! . ds #F 0 ! . ds #[ \& ! . ds #] \& .\} ! . \" simple accents for nroff and troff .if n \{\ ! . ds ' \& ! . ds ` \& ! . ds ^ \& ! . ds , \& ! . ds ~ ~ ! . ds / .\} .if t \{\ ! . ds ' \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10-\*(#H)'\'\h"|\\n:u" ! . ds ` \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10-\*(#H)'\`\h'|\\n:u' ! . ds ^ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*10/11-\*(#H)'^\h'|\\n:u' ! . ds , \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10)',\h'|\\n:u' ! . ds ~ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu-\*(#H-.1m)'~\h'|\\n:u' ! . ds / \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10-\*(#H)'\z\(sl\h'|\\n:u' .\} ! . \" troff and (daisy-wheel) nroff accents .ds : \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10-\*(#H+.1m+\*(#F)'\v'-\*(#V'\z.\h'.2m+\*(#F'.\h'|\\n:u'\v'\*(#V' .ds 8 \h'\*(#H'\(*b\h'-\*(#H' .ds o \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu+\w'\(de'u-\*(#H)/2u'\v'-.3n'\*(#[\z\(de\v'.3n'\h'|\\n:u'\*(#] .ds d- \h'\*(#H'\(pd\h'-\w'~'u'\v'-.25m'\f2\(hy\fP\v'.25m'\h'-\*(#H' .ds D- D\\k:\h'-\w'D'u'\v'-.11m'\z\(hy\v'.11m'\h'|\\n:u' --- 30,179 ---- \fB\\$1\fR .PP .. ! .de Sp .if t .sp .5v .if n .sp .. ! .de Ip .br .ie \\n(.$>=3 .ne \\$3 .el .ne 3 .IP "\\$1" \\$2 .. ! .de Vb .ft CW .nf .ne \\$1 .. ! .de Ve .ft R .fi .. ! ''' ! ''' ! ''' Set up \*(-- to give an unbreakable dash; ! ''' string Tr holds user defined translation string. ! ''' Bell System Logo is used as a dummy character. ! ''' .tr \(*W-|\(bv\*(Tr .ie n \{\ ! .ds -- \(*W- ! .ds PI pi ! .if (\n(.H=4u)&(1m=24u) .ds -- \(*W\h'-12u'\(*W\h'-12u'-\" diablo 10 pitch ! .if (\n(.H=4u)&(1m=20u) .ds -- \(*W\h'-12u'\(*W\h'-8u'-\" diablo 12 pitch ! .ds L" "" ! .ds R" "" ! ''' \*(M", \*(S", \*(N" and \*(T" are the equivalent of ! ''' \*(L" and \*(R", except that they are used on ".xx" lines, ! ''' such as .IP and .SH, which do another additional levels of ! ''' double-quote interpretation ! .ds M" """ ! .ds S" """ ! .ds N" """"" ! .ds T" """"" ! .ds L' ' ! .ds R' ' ! .ds M' ' ! .ds S' ' ! .ds N' ' ! .ds T' ' 'br\} .el\{\ ! .ds -- \(em\| ! .tr \*(Tr ! .ds L" `` ! .ds R" '' ! .ds M" `` ! .ds S" '' ! .ds N" `` ! .ds T" '' ! .ds L' ` ! .ds R' ' ! .ds M' ` ! .ds S' ' ! .ds N' ` ! .ds T' ' ! .ds PI \(*p 'br\} ! .\" If the F register is turned on, we'll generate ! .\" index entries out stderr for the following things: ! .\" TH Title ! .\" SH Header ! .\" Sh Subsection ! .\" Ip Item ! .\" X<> Xref (embedded ! .\" Of course, you have to process the output yourself ! .\" in some meaningful fashion. ! .if \nF \{ ! .de IX ! .tm Index:\\$1\t\\n%\t"\\$2" .. ! .nr % 0 ! .rr F .\} ! .TH sudo 8 "1.6.3" "26/Mar/2000" "MAINTENANCE COMMANDS" ! .UC ! .if n .hy 0 .if n .na ! .ds C+ C\v'-.1v'\h'-1p'\s-2+\h'-1p'+\s0\v'.1v'\h'-1p' ! .de CQ \" put $1 in typewriter font ! .ft CW ! 'if n "\c ! 'if t \\&\\$1\c ! 'if n \\&\\$1\c ! 'if n \&" ! \\&\\$2 \\$3 \\$4 \\$5 \\$6 \\$7 ! '.ft R ! .. ! .\" @(#)ms.acc 1.5 88/02/08 SMI; from UCB 4.2 ! . \" AM - accent mark definitions .bd B 3 ! . \" fudge factors for nroff and troff .if n \{\ ! . ds #H 0 ! . ds #V .8m ! . ds #F .3m ! . ds #[ \f1 ! . ds #] \fP .\} .if t \{\ ! . ds #H ((1u-(\\\\n(.fu%2u))*.13m) ! . ds #V .6m ! . ds #F 0 ! . ds #[ \& ! . ds #] \& .\} ! . \" simple accents for nroff and troff .if n \{\ ! . ds ' \& ! . ds ` \& ! . ds ^ \& ! . ds , \& ! . ds ~ ~ ! . ds ? ? ! . ds ! ! ! . ds / ! . ds q .\} .if t \{\ ! . ds ' \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10-\*(#H)'\'\h"|\\n:u" ! . ds ` \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10-\*(#H)'\`\h'|\\n:u' ! . ds ^ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*10/11-\*(#H)'^\h'|\\n:u' ! . ds , \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10)',\h'|\\n:u' ! . ds ~ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu-\*(#H-.1m)'~\h'|\\n:u' ! . ds ? \s-2c\h'-\w'c'u*7/10'\u\h'\*(#H'\zi\d\s+2\h'\w'c'u*8/10' ! . ds ! \s-2\(or\s+2\h'-\w'\(or'u'\v'-.8m'.\v'.8m' ! . ds / \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10-\*(#H)'\z\(sl\h'|\\n:u' ! . ds q o\h'-\w'o'u*8/10'\s-4\v'.4m'\z\(*i\v'-.4m'\s+4\h'\w'o'u*8/10' .\} ! . \" troff and (daisy-wheel) nroff accents .ds : \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10-\*(#H+.1m+\*(#F)'\v'-\*(#V'\z.\h'.2m+\*(#F'.\h'|\\n:u'\v'\*(#V' .ds 8 \h'\*(#H'\(*b\h'-\*(#H' + .ds v \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*9/10-\*(#H)'\v'-\*(#V'\*(#[\s-4v\s0\v'\*(#V'\h'|\\n:u'\*(#] + .ds _ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*9/10-\*(#H+(\*(#F*2/3))'\v'-.4m'\z\(hy\v'.4m'\h'|\\n:u' + .ds . \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*8/10)'\v'\*(#V*4/10'\z.\v'-\*(#V*4/10'\h'|\\n:u' + .ds 3 \*(#[\v'.2m'\s-2\&3\s0\v'-.2m'\*(#] .ds o \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu+\w'\(de'u-\*(#H)/2u'\v'-.3n'\*(#[\z\(de\v'.3n'\h'|\\n:u'\*(#] .ds d- \h'\*(#H'\(pd\h'-\w'~'u'\v'-.25m'\f2\(hy\fP\v'.25m'\h'-\*(#H' .ds D- D\\k:\h'-\w'D'u'\v'-.11m'\z\(hy\v'.11m'\h'|\\n:u' *************** *** 118,235 **** .ds Th \*(#[\s+2I\s-2\h'-\w'I'u*3/5'\v'-.3m'o\v'.3m'\*(#] .ds ae a\h'-(\w'a'u*4/10)'e .ds Ae A\h'-(\w'A'u*4/10)'E ! . \" corrections for vroff .if v .ds ~ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*9/10-\*(#H)'\s-2\u~\d\s+2\h'|\\n:u' .if v .ds ^ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*10/11-\*(#H)'\v'-.4m'^\v'.4m'\h'|\\n:u' ! . \" for low resolution devices (crt and lpr) .if \n(.H>23 .if \n(.V>19 \ \{\ ! . ds : e ! . ds 8 ss ! . ds o a ! . ds d- d\h'-1'\(ga ! . ds D- D\h'-1'\(hy ! . ds th \o'bp' ! . ds Th \o'LP' ! . ds ae ae ! . ds Ae AE .\} .rm #[ #] #H #V #F C - .\" ====================================================================== - .\" - .IX Title "sudo 8" - .TH sudo 8 "1.6.5" "January 16, 2002" "MAINTENANCE COMMANDS" - .UC .SH "NAME" sudo \- execute a command as another user .SH "SYNOPSIS" ! .IX Header "SYNOPSIS" ! \&\fBsudo\fR \fB\-V\fR | \fB\-h\fR | \fB\-l\fR | \fB\-L\fR | \fB\-v\fR | \fB\-k\fR | \fB\-K\fR | \fB\-s\fR | ! [ \fB\-H\fR ] [\fB\-P\fR ] [\fB\-S\fR ] [ \fB\-b\fR ] | [ \fB\-p\fR \fIprompt\fR ] ! [ \fB\-c\fR \fIclass\fR|\fI-\fR ] [ \fB\-a\fR \fIauth_type\fR ] ! [ \fB\-u\fR \fIusername\fR|\fI#uid\fR ] \fIcommand\fR .SH "DESCRIPTION" ! .IX Header "DESCRIPTION" ! \&\fBsudo\fR allows a permitted user to execute a \fIcommand\fR as the ! superuser or another user, as specified in the \fIsudoers\fR file. ! The real and effective uid and gid are set to match those of the ! target user as specified in the passwd file (the group vector is ! also initialized when the target user is not root). By default, ! \&\fBsudo\fR requires that users authenticate themselves with a password ! (\s-1NOTE:\s0 by default this is the user's password, not the root password). ! Once a user has been authenticated, a timestamp is updated and the ! user may then use sudo without a password for a short period of ! time (\f(CW\*(C`5\*(C'\fR minutes unless overridden in \fIsudoers\fR). .PP ! \&\fBsudo\fR determines who is an authorized user by consulting the file ! \&\fI/etc/sudoers\fR. By giving \fBsudo\fR the \fB\-v\fR flag a user ! can update the time stamp without running a \fIcommand.\fR The password ! prompt itself will also time out if the user's password is not ! entered within \f(CW\*(C`5\*(C'\fR minutes (unless overridden via ! \&\fIsudoers\fR). .PP ! If a user who is not listed in the \fIsudoers\fR file tries to run a ! command via \fBsudo\fR, mail is sent to the proper authorities, as ! defined at configure time or the \fIsudoers\fR file (defaults to root). ! Note that the mail will not be sent if an unauthorized user tries ! to run sudo with the \fB\-l\fR or \fB\-v\fR flags. This allows users to ! determine for themselves whether or not they are allowed to use ! \&\fBsudo\fR. .PP ! \&\fBsudo\fR can log both successful and unsuccessful attempts (as well as errors) to \fIsyslog\fR\|(3), a log file, or both. By default \fBsudo\fR ! will log via \fIsyslog\fR\|(3) but this is changeable at configure time ! or via the \fIsudoers\fR file. .SH "OPTIONS" ! .IX Header "OPTIONS" ! \&\fBsudo\fR accepts the following command line options: ! .Ip "\-V" 4 ! .IX Item "-V" ! The \fB\-V\fR (\fIversion\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to print the ! version number and exit. If the invoking user is already root ! the \fB\-V\fR option will print out a list of the defaults \fBsudo\fR ! was compiled with as well as the machine's local network addresses. ! .Ip "\-l" 4 ! .IX Item "-l" ! The \fB\-l\fR (\fIlist\fR) option will list out the allowed (and forbidden) commands for the user on the current host. ! .Ip "\-L" 4 ! .IX Item "-L" ! The \fB\-L\fR (\fIlist\fR defaults) option will list out the parameters that may be set in a \fIDefaults\fR line along with a short description for each. This option is useful in conjunction with \fIgrep\fR\|(1). ! .Ip "\-h" 4 ! .IX Item "-h" ! The \fB\-h\fR (\fIhelp\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to print a usage message and exit. ! .Ip "\-v" 4 ! .IX Item "-v" ! If given the \fB\-v\fR (\fIvalidate\fR) option, \fBsudo\fR will update the user's timestamp, prompting for the user's password if necessary. ! This extends the \fBsudo\fR timeout for another \f(CW\*(C`5\*(C'\fR minutes ! (or whatever the timeout is set to in \fIsudoers\fR) but does not run ! a command. ! .Ip "\-k" 4 ! .IX Item "-k" ! The \fB\-k\fR (\fIkill\fR) option to \fBsudo\fR invalidates the user's timestamp by setting the time on it to the epoch. The next time \fBsudo\fR is run a password will be required. This option does not require a password and was added to allow a user to revoke \fBsudo\fR permissions from a .logout file. ! .Ip "\-K" 4 ! .IX Item "-K" ! The \fB\-K\fR (sure \fIkill\fR) option to \fBsudo\fR removes the user's timestamp ! entirely. Likewise, this option does not require a password. ! .Ip "\-b" 4 ! .IX Item "-b" ! The \fB\-b\fR (\fIbackground\fR) option tells \fBsudo\fR to run the given ! command in the background. Note that if you use the \fB\-b\fR ! option you cannot use shell job control to manipulate the process. ! .Ip "\-p" 4 ! .IX Item "-p" ! The \fB\-p\fR (\fIprompt\fR) option allows you to override the default password prompt and use a custom one. If the password prompt ! contains the \f(CW\*(C`%u\*(C'\fR escape, \f(CW\*(C`%u\*(C'\fR will be replaced with the user's ! login name. Similarly, \f(CW\*(C`%h\*(C'\fR will be replaced with the local hostname. .Ip "\-c" 4 .IX Item "-c" --- 181,285 ---- .ds Th \*(#[\s+2I\s-2\h'-\w'I'u*3/5'\v'-.3m'o\v'.3m'\*(#] .ds ae a\h'-(\w'a'u*4/10)'e .ds Ae A\h'-(\w'A'u*4/10)'E ! .ds oe o\h'-(\w'o'u*4/10)'e ! .ds Oe O\h'-(\w'O'u*4/10)'E ! . \" corrections for vroff .if v .ds ~ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*9/10-\*(#H)'\s-2\u~\d\s+2\h'|\\n:u' .if v .ds ^ \\k:\h'-(\\n(.wu*10/11-\*(#H)'\v'-.4m'^\v'.4m'\h'|\\n:u' ! . \" for low resolution devices (crt and lpr) .if \n(.H>23 .if \n(.V>19 \ \{\ ! . ds : e ! . ds 8 ss ! . ds v \h'-1'\o'\(aa\(ga' ! . ds _ \h'-1'^ ! . ds . \h'-1'. ! . ds 3 3 ! . ds o a ! . ds d- d\h'-1'\(ga ! . ds D- D\h'-1'\(hy ! . ds th \o'bp' ! . ds Th \o'LP' ! . ds ae ae ! . ds Ae AE ! . ds oe oe ! . ds Oe OE .\} .rm #[ #] #H #V #F C .SH "NAME" sudo \- execute a command as another user .SH "SYNOPSIS" ! \fBsudo\fR \fB\-V\fR | \fB\-h\fR | \fB\-l\fR | \fB\-L\fR | \fB\-v\fR | \fB\-k\fR | \fB\-K\fR | \fB\-s\fR | ! [ \fB\-H\fR ] [\fB\-S\fR ] [ \fB\-b\fR ] | [ \fB\-p\fR prompt ] [ \fB\-c\fR \fIclass\fR|\fI-\fR ] ! [ \fB\-a\fR \fIauth_type\fR ] ! [ \fB\-u\fR username/#uid ] \fIcommand\fR .SH "DESCRIPTION" ! \fBsudo\fR allows a permitted user to execute a \fIcommand\fR as the ! superuser or another user, as specified in the sudoers file. The ! real and effective uid and gid are set to match those of the target ! user as specified in the passwd file (the group vector is also ! initialized when the target user is not root). By default, \fBsudo\fR ! requires that users authenticate themselves with a password ! (NOTE: this is the user's password, not the root password). Once ! a user has been authenticated, a timestamp is updated and the ! user may then use sudo without a password for a short period of time ! (five minutes by default). .PP ! \fBsudo\fR determines who is an authorized user by consulting the ! file \fI/etc/sudoers\fR. By giving \fBsudo\fR the \f(CW-v\fR flag a user ! can update the time stamp without running a \fIcommand.\fR ! The password prompt itself will also time out if the user's password is ! not entered with N minutes (again, this is defined at configure ! time and defaults to 5 minutes). .PP ! If a user that is not listed in the \fIsudoers\fR file tries to run ! a command via \fBsudo\fR, mail is sent to the proper authorities, ! as defined at configure time (defaults to root). Note that the ! mail will not be sent if an unauthorized user tries to run sudo ! with the \f(CW-l\fR or \f(CW-v\fR flags. This allows users to determine ! for themselves whether or not they are allowed to use \fBsudo\fR. .PP ! \fBsudo\fR can log both successful and unsuccessful attempts (as well as errors) to \fIsyslog\fR\|(3), a log file, or both. By default \fBsudo\fR ! will log via \fIsyslog\fR\|(3) but this is changeable at configure time. .SH "OPTIONS" ! \fBsudo\fR accepts the following command line options: ! .Ip "-V" 4 ! The \f(CW-V\fR (\fIversion\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to print the ! version number and exit. ! .Ip "-l" 4 ! The \f(CW-l\fR (\fIlist\fR) option will list out the allowed (and forbidden) commands for the user on the current host. ! .Ip "-L" 4 ! The \f(CW-L\fR (\fIlist\fR defaults) option will list out the parameters that may be set in a \fIDefaults\fR line along with a short description for each. This option is useful in conjunction with \fIgrep\fR\|(1). ! .Ip "-h" 4 ! The \f(CW-h\fR (\fIhelp\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to print a usage message and exit. ! .Ip "-v" 4 ! If given the \f(CW-v\fR (\fIvalidate\fR) option, \fBsudo\fR will update the user's timestamp, prompting for the user's password if necessary. ! This extends the \fBsudo\fR timeout to for another N minutes ! (where N is defined at installation time and defaults to 5 ! minutes) but does not run a command. ! .Ip "-k" 4 ! The \f(CW-k\fR (\fIkill\fR) option to \fBsudo\fR invalidates the user's timestamp by setting the time on it to the epoch. The next time \fBsudo\fR is run a password will be required. This option does not require a password and was added to allow a user to revoke \fBsudo\fR permissions from a .logout file. ! .Ip "-K" 4 ! The \f(CW-K\fR (sure \fIkill\fR) option to \fBsudo\fR removes the user's timestamp ! entirely. This option does not require a password. ! .Ip "-b" 4 ! The \f(CW-b\fR (\fIbackground\fR) option tells \fBsudo\fR to run the given ! command in the background. Note that if you use the \f(CW-b\fR ! option you cannot use shell job control to manipulate the command. ! .Ip "-p" 4 ! The \f(CW-p\fR (\fIprompt\fR) option allows you to override the default password prompt and use a custom one. If the password prompt ! contains the \f(CW%u\fR escape, \f(CW%u\fR will be replaced with the user's ! login name. Similarly, \f(CW%h\fR will be replaced with the local hostname. .Ip "\-c" 4 .IX Item "-c" *************** *** 252,340 **** entry in /etc/login.conf. This option is only available on systems that support \s-1BSD\s0 authentication where \fBsudo\fR has been configured with the \-\-with-bsdauth option. ! .Ip "\-u" 4 ! .IX Item "-u" ! The \fB\-u\fR (\fIuser\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to run the specified command as a user other than \fIroot\fR. To specify a \fIuid\fR instead of a ! \&\fIusername\fR, use \fI#uid\fR. ! .Ip "\-s" 4 ! .IX Item "-s" ! The \fB\-s\fR (\fIshell\fR) option runs the shell specified by the \fI\s-1SHELL\s0\fR environment variable if it is set or the shell as specified in \fIpasswd\fR\|(5). ! .Ip "\-H" 4 ! .IX Item "-H" ! The \fB\-H\fR (\fI\s-1HOME\s0\fR) option sets the \f(CW\*(C`HOME\*(C'\fR environment variable to the homedir of the target user (root by default) as specified ! in \fIpasswd\fR\|(5). By default, \fBsudo\fR does not modify \f(CW\*(C`HOME\*(C'\fR. ! .Ip "\-P" 4 ! .IX Item "-P" ! The \fB\-P\fR (\fIpreserve group vector\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to preserve ! the user's group vector unaltered. By default, \fBsudo\fR will initialize ! the group vector to the list of groups the target user is in. ! The real and effective group IDs, however, are still set to match ! the target user. ! .Ip "\-S" 4 ! .IX Item "-S" ! The \fB\-S\fR (\fIstdin\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to read the password from standard input instead of the terminal device. ! .Ip "\-\-" 4 ! The \fB\--\fR flag indicates that \fBsudo\fR should stop processing command ! line arguments. It is most useful in conjunction with the \fB\-s\fR flag. .SH "RETURN VALUES" ! .IX Header "RETURN VALUES" ! Upon successful execution of a program, the return value from \fBsudo\fR ! will simply be the return value of the program that was executed. ! .PP ! Otherwise, \fBsudo\fR quits with an exit value of 1 if there is a configuration/permission problem or if \fBsudo\fR cannot execute the given command. In the latter case the error string is printed to stderr. If \fBsudo\fR cannot \fIstat\fR\|(2) one or more entries in the user's ! \&\f(CW\*(C`PATH\*(C'\fR an error is printed on stderr. (If the directory does not exist or if it is not really a directory, the entry is ignored and no error is printed.) This should not happen under normal circumstances. The most common reason for \fIstat\fR\|(2) to return ! \&\*(L"permission denied\*(R" is if you are running an automounter and one ! of the directories in your \f(CW\*(C`PATH\*(C'\fR is on a machine that is currently unreachable. .SH "SECURITY NOTES" ! .IX Header "SECURITY NOTES" ! \&\fBsudo\fR tries to be safe when executing external commands. Variables that control how dynamic loading and binding is done can be used to subvert the program that \fBsudo\fR runs. To combat this the ! \&\f(CW\*(C`LD_*\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`_RLD_*\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`SHLIB_PATH\*(C'\fR (\s-1HP-UX\s0 only), and \f(CW\*(C`LIBPATH\*(C'\fR (\s-1AIX\s0 only) environment variables are removed from the environment passed ! on to all commands executed. \fBsudo\fR will also remove the \f(CW\*(C`IFS\*(C'\fR, ! \&\f(CW\*(C`ENV\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`BASH_ENV\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`KRB_CONF\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`KRBCONFDIR\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`KRBTKFILE\*(C'\fR, ! \&\f(CW\*(C`KRB5_CONFIG\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`LOCALDOMAIN\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`RES_OPTIONS\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`HOSTALIASES\*(C'\fR, ! \&\f(CW\*(C`NLSPATH\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`PATH_LOCALE\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`TERMINFO\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`TERMINFO_DIRS\*(C'\fR and ! \&\f(CW\*(C`TERMPATH\*(C'\fR variables as they too can pose a threat. If the ! \&\f(CW\*(C`TERMCAP\*(C'\fR variable is set and is a pathname, it too is ignored. ! Additionally, if the \f(CW\*(C`LC_*\*(C'\fR or \f(CW\*(C`LANGUAGE\*(C'\fR variables contain the ! \&\f(CW\*(C`/\*(C'\fR or \f(CW\*(C`%\*(C'\fR characters, they are ignored. If \fBsudo\fR has been ! compiled with SecurID support, the \f(CW\*(C`VAR_ACE\*(C'\fR, \f(CW\*(C`USR_ACE\*(C'\fR and ! \&\f(CW\*(C`DLC_ACE\*(C'\fR variables are cleared as well. The list of environment ! variables that \fBsudo\fR clears is contained in the output of ! \&\f(CW\*(C`sudo \-V\*(C'\fR when run as root. .PP ! To prevent command spoofing, \fBsudo\fR checks \*(L".\*(R" and "" (both denoting current directory) last when searching for a command in the user's ! \&\s-1PATH\s0 (if one or both are in the \s-1PATH\s0). Note, however, that the ! actual \f(CW\*(C`PATH\*(C'\fR environment variable is \fInot\fR modified and is passed unchanged to the program that \fBsudo\fR executes. .PP ! For security reasons, if your \s-1OS\s0 supports shared libraries and does not disable user-defined library search paths for setuid programs (most do), you should either use a linker option that disables this behavior or link \fBsudo\fR statically. .PP ! \&\fBsudo\fR will check the ownership of its timestamp directory (\fI/var/run/sudo\fR by default) and ignore the directory's contents if it is not owned by root and only writable by root. On systems that allow non-root users to give away files via \fIchown\fR\|(2), if the timestamp directory is located in a directory writable by anyone (e.g.: \fI/tmp\fR), it is possible for a user to create the timestamp directory before ! \&\fBsudo\fR is run. However, because \fBsudo\fR checks the ownership and mode of the directory and its contents, the only damage that can be done is to \*(L"hide\*(R" files by putting them in the timestamp dir. This is unlikely to happen since once the timestamp dir is owned --- 302,366 ---- entry in /etc/login.conf. This option is only available on systems that support \s-1BSD\s0 authentication where \fBsudo\fR has been configured with the \-\-with-bsdauth option. ! .Ip "-u" 4 ! The \f(CW-u\fR (\fIuser\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to run the specified command as a user other than \fIroot\fR. To specify a \fIuid\fR instead of a ! \fIusername\fR, use \*(L"#uid\*(R". ! .Ip "-s" 4 ! The \f(CW-s\fR (\fIshell\fR) option runs the shell specified by the \fI\s-1SHELL\s0\fR environment variable if it is set or the shell as specified in \fIpasswd\fR\|(5). ! .Ip "-H" 4 ! The \f(CW-H\fR (\fI\s-1HOME\s0\fR) option sets the \fI\s-1HOME\s0\fR environment variable to the homedir of the target user (root by default) as specified ! in \fIpasswd\fR\|(5). By default, \fBsudo\fR does not modify \fI\s-1HOME\s0\fR. ! .Ip "-S" 4 ! The \f(CW-S\fR (\fIstdin\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to read the password from standard input instead of the terminal device. ! .Ip "--" 4 ! The \f(CW--\fR flag indicates that \fBsudo\fR should stop processing command ! line arguments. It is most useful in conjunction with the \f(CW-s\fR flag. .SH "RETURN VALUES" ! \fBsudo\fR quits with an exit value of 1 if there is a configuration/permission problem or if \fBsudo\fR cannot execute the given command. In the latter case the error string is printed to stderr. If \fBsudo\fR cannot \fIstat\fR\|(2) one or more entries in the user's ! \f(CWPATH\fR an error is printed on stderr. (If the directory does not exist or if it is not really a directory, the entry is ignored and no error is printed.) This should not happen under normal circumstances. The most common reason for \fIstat\fR\|(2) to return ! \*(L"permission denied\*(R" is if you are running an automounter and one ! of the directories in your \f(CWPATH\fR is on a machine that is currently unreachable. .SH "SECURITY NOTES" ! \fBsudo\fR tries to be safe when executing external commands. Variables that control how dynamic loading and binding is done can be used to subvert the program that \fBsudo\fR runs. To combat this the ! \f(CWLD_*\fR, \f(CW_RLD_*\fR, \f(CWSHLIB_PATH\fR (HP\-UX only), and \f(CWLIBPATH\fR (AIX only) environment variables are removed from the environment passed ! on to all commands executed. \fBsudo\fR will also remove the \f(CWIFS\fR, ! \f(CWENV\fR, \f(CWBASH_ENV\fR, \f(CWKRB_CONF\fR, \f(CWKRB5_CONFIG\fR, \f(CWLOCALDOMAIN\fR, ! \f(CWRES_OPTIONS\fR and \f(CWHOSTALIASES\fR variables as they too can pose a ! threat. .PP ! To prevent command spoofing, \fBsudo\fR checks "." and "" (both denoting current directory) last when searching for a command in the user's ! PATH (if one or both are in the PATH). Note, however, that the ! actual \f(CWPATH\fR environment variable is \fInot\fR modified and is passed unchanged to the program that \fBsudo\fR executes. .PP ! For security reasons, if your OS supports shared libraries and does not disable user-defined library search paths for setuid programs (most do), you should either use a linker option that disables this behavior or link \fBsudo\fR statically. .PP ! \fBsudo\fR will check the ownership of its timestamp directory (\fI/var/run/sudo\fR by default) and ignore the directory's contents if it is not owned by root and only writable by root. On systems that allow non-root users to give away files via \fIchown\fR\|(2), if the timestamp directory is located in a directory writable by anyone (e.g.: \fI/tmp\fR), it is possible for a user to create the timestamp directory before ! \fBsudo\fR is run. However, because \fBsudo\fR checks the ownership and mode of the directory and its contents, the only damage that can be done is to \*(L"hide\*(R" files by putting them in the timestamp dir. This is unlikely to happen since once the timestamp dir is owned *************** *** 345,366 **** with the appropriate owner (root) and permissions (0700) in the system startup files. .PP ! \&\fBsudo\fR will not honor timestamps set far in the future. ! Timestamps with a date greater than current_time + 2 * \f(CW\*(C`TIMEOUT\*(C'\fR will be ignored and sudo will log and complain. This is done to keep a user from creating his/her own timestamp with a bogus ! date on systems that allow users to give away files. ! .PP ! Please note that \fBsudo\fR will only log the command it explicitly ! runs. If a user runs a command such as \f(CW\*(C`sudo su\*(C'\fR or \f(CW\*(C`sudo sh\*(C'\fR, ! subsequent commands run from that shell will \fInot\fR be logged, nor ! will \fBsudo\fR's access control affect them. The same is true for ! commands that offer shell escapes (including most editors). Because ! of this, care must be taken when giving users access to commands ! via \fBsudo\fR to verify that the command does not inadvertantly give ! the user an effective root shell. .SH "EXAMPLES" - .IX Header "EXAMPLES" Note: the following examples assume suitable \fIsudoers\fR\|(5) entries. .PP To get a file listing of an unreadable directory: --- 371,382 ---- with the appropriate owner (root) and permissions (0700) in the system startup files. .PP ! \fBsudo\fR will not honor timestamps set far in the future. ! Timestamps with a date greater than current_time + 2 * \f(CWTIMEOUT\fR will be ignored and sudo will log and complain. This is done to keep a user from creating his/her own timestamp with a bogus ! date on system that allow users to give away files. .SH "EXAMPLES" Note: the following examples assume suitable \fIsudoers\fR\|(5) entries. .PP To get a file listing of an unreadable directory: *************** *** 386,399 **** .Ve To make a usage listing of the directories in the /home partition. Note that this runs the commands in a sub-shell ! to make the \f(CW\*(C`cd\*(C'\fR and file redirection work. .PP .Vb 1 \& % sudo sh -c "cd /home ; du -s * | sort -rn > USAGE" .Ve .SH "ENVIRONMENT" ! .IX Header "ENVIRONMENT" ! \&\fBsudo\fR utilizes the following environment variables: .PP .Vb 13 \& PATH Set to a sane value if SECURE_PATH is set --- 402,414 ---- .Ve To make a usage listing of the directories in the /home partition. Note that this runs the commands in a sub-shell ! to make the \f(CWcd\fR and file redirection work. .PP .Vb 1 \& % sudo sh -c "cd /home ; du -s * | sort -rn > USAGE" .Ve .SH "ENVIRONMENT" ! \fBsudo\fR utilizes the following environment variables: .PP .Vb 13 \& PATH Set to a sane value if SECURE_PATH is set *************** *** 411,456 **** \& SUDO_PS1 If set, PS1 will be set to its value .Ve .SH "FILES" ! .IX Header "FILES" .Vb 2 \& /etc/sudoers List of who can run what \& /var/run/sudo Directory containing timestamps .Ve .SH "AUTHORS" ! .IX Header "AUTHORS" ! Many people have worked on \fBsudo\fR over the years; this version consists of code written primarily by: .PP .Vb 2 \& Todd Miller \& Chris Jepeway .Ve ! See the \s-1HISTORY\s0 file in the \fBsudo\fR distribution or visit ! http://www.sudo.ws/sudo/history.html for a short history of \fBsudo\fR. .SH "BUGS" - .IX Header "BUGS" If you feel you have found a bug in sudo, please submit a bug report ! at http://www.sudo.ws/sudo/bugs/ .SH "DISCLAIMER" ! .IX Header "DISCLAIMER" ! \&\fBSudo\fR is provided ``\s-1AS\s0 \s-1IS\s0'' and any express or implied warranties, including, but not limited to, the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose are disclaimed. ! See the \s-1LICENSE\s0 file distributed with \fBsudo\fR for complete details. .SH "CAVEATS" - .IX Header "CAVEATS" There is no easy way to prevent a user from gaining a root shell if that user has access to commands allowing shell escapes. .PP ! If users have sudo \f(CW\*(C`ALL\*(C'\fR there is nothing to prevent them from creating ! their own program that gives them a root shell regardless of any '!' elements in the user specification. .PP Running shell scripts via \fBsudo\fR can expose the same kernel bugs that make setuid shell scripts unsafe on some operating systems ! (if your \s-1OS\s0 supports the /dev/fd/ directory, setuid shell scripts are generally safe). .SH "SEE ALSO" .IX Header "SEE ALSO" ! \&\fIstat\fR\|(2), \fIlogin_cap\fR\|(3), \fIsudoers\fR\|(5), \fIpasswd\fR\|(5), \fIvisudo\fR\|(8), \fIgrep\fR\|(1), \fIsu\fR\|(1). --- 426,526 ---- \& SUDO_PS1 If set, PS1 will be set to its value .Ve .SH "FILES" ! .PP .Vb 2 \& /etc/sudoers List of who can run what \& /var/run/sudo Directory containing timestamps .Ve .SH "AUTHORS" ! Many people have worked on \fBsudo\fR over the years. This version consists of code written primarily by: .PP .Vb 2 \& Todd Miller \& Chris Jepeway .Ve ! See the HISTORY file in the \fBsudo\fR distribution for a short history of \fBsudo\fR. .SH "BUGS" If you feel you have found a bug in sudo, please submit a bug report ! at http://www.courtesan.com/sudo/bugs/ .SH "DISCLAIMER" ! \fBSudo\fR is provided ``AS IS'\*(R' and any express or implied warranties, including, but not limited to, the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose are disclaimed. ! See the LICENSE file distributed with \fBsudo\fR for complete details. .SH "CAVEATS" There is no easy way to prevent a user from gaining a root shell if that user has access to commands allowing shell escapes. .PP ! If users have sudo \f(CWALL\fR there is nothing to prevent them from creating ! their own program that gives them a root shell regardless of any \*(L'!\*(R' elements in the user specification. .PP Running shell scripts via \fBsudo\fR can expose the same kernel bugs that make setuid shell scripts unsafe on some operating systems ! (if your OS supports the /dev/fd/ directory, setuid shell scripts are generally safe). .SH "SEE ALSO" + \fIsudoers\fR\|(5), \fIvisudo\fR\|(8), \fIsu\fR\|(1). + + .rn }` '' + .IX Title "sudo 8" + .IX Name "sudo - execute a command as another user" + + .IX Header "NAME" + + .IX Header "SYNOPSIS" + + .IX Header "DESCRIPTION" + + .IX Header "OPTIONS" + + .IX Item "-V" + + .IX Item "-l" + + .IX Item "-L" + + .IX Item "-h" + + .IX Item "-v" + + .IX Item "-k" + + .IX Item "-K" + + .IX Item "-b" + + .IX Item "-p" + + .IX Item "-u" + + .IX Item "-s" + + .IX Item "-H" + + .IX Item "-S" + + .IX Item "--" + + .IX Header "RETURN VALUES" + + .IX Header "SECURITY NOTES" + + .IX Header "EXAMPLES" + + .IX Header "ENVIRONMENT" + + .IX Header "FILES" + + .IX Header "AUTHORS" + + .IX Header "BUGS" + + .IX Header "DISCLAIMER" + + .IX Header "CAVEATS" + .IX Header "SEE ALSO" !