=================================================================== RCS file: /cvsrepo/anoncvs/cvs/src/usr.bin/sudo/Attic/sudo.c,v retrieving revision 1.33 retrieving revision 1.34 diff -u -r1.33 -r1.34 --- src/usr.bin/sudo/Attic/sudo.c 2008/07/31 16:44:03 1.33 +++ src/usr.bin/sudo/Attic/sudo.c 2008/11/14 11:58:08 1.34 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright (c) 1993-1996,1998-2007 Todd C. Miller + * Copyright (c) 1993-1996, 1998-2008 Todd C. Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above @@ -59,11 +59,6 @@ #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H # include #endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */ -#ifdef HAVE_ERR_H -# include -#else -# include "emul/err.h" -#endif /* HAVE_ERR_H */ #include #include #include @@ -101,36 +96,36 @@ #endif #include "sudo.h" +#include "sudo_usage.h" +#include "lbuf.h" #include "interfaces.h" #include "version.h" #ifndef lint -__unused __unused static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: sudo.c,v 1.369.2.43 2008/07/02 10:28:43 millert Exp $"; +__unused static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: sudo.c,v 1.499 2008/11/11 18:28:08 millert Exp $"; #endif /* lint */ /* * Prototypes */ -static int init_vars __P((int, char **)); +static void init_vars __P((int, char **)); +static int set_cmnd __P((int)); static int parse_args __P((int, char **)); -static void check_sudoers __P((void)); static void initial_setup __P((void)); static void set_loginclass __P((struct passwd *)); static void set_project __P((struct passwd *)); +static void set_runasgr __P((char *)); +static void set_runaspw __P((char *)); +static void show_version __P((void)); static void usage __P((int)) __attribute__((__noreturn__)); static void usage_excl __P((int)) __attribute__((__noreturn__)); -static void usage_excl __P((int)); static struct passwd *get_authpw __P((void)); extern int sudo_edit __P((int, char **, char **)); -extern void list_matches __P((void)); -extern char **rebuild_env __P((char **, int, int)); -extern void validate_env_vars __P((struct list_member *)); -extern char **insert_env_vars __P((char **, struct list_member *)); -extern struct passwd *sudo_getpwnam __P((const char *)); -extern struct passwd *sudo_getpwuid __P((uid_t)); -extern struct passwd *sudo_pwdup __P((const struct passwd *)); +extern void rebuild_env __P((int, int)); +void validate_env_vars __P((struct list_member *)); +void insert_env_vars __P((struct list_member *)); /* * Globals @@ -138,14 +133,17 @@ int Argc, NewArgc; char **Argv, **NewArgv; char *prev_user; +static int user_closefrom = -1; struct sudo_user sudo_user; -struct passwd *auth_pw; -FILE *sudoers_fp; +struct passwd *auth_pw, *list_pw; struct interface *interfaces; int num_interfaces; int tgetpass_flags; +int long_list; uid_t timestamp_uid; extern int errorlineno; +extern int parse_error; +extern char *errorfile; #if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL) static struct rlimit corelimit; #endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */ @@ -156,7 +154,13 @@ char *login_style; #endif /* HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H */ sigaction_t saved_sa_int, saved_sa_quit, saved_sa_tstp; +static char *runas_user; +static char *runas_group; +static struct sudo_nss_list *snl; +/* For getopt(3) */ +extern char *optarg; +extern int optind; int main(argc, argv, envp) @@ -164,14 +168,14 @@ char **argv; char **envp; { - int validated; - int fd; - int cmnd_status; - int sudo_mode; - int pwflag; + int sources = 0, validated; + int fd, cmnd_status, sudo_mode, pwflag, rc = 0; sigaction_t sa; - extern int printmatches; - extern char **environ; +#if defined(SUDO_DEVEL) && defined(__OpenBSD__) + extern char *malloc_options; + malloc_options = "AFGJPR"; +#endif + struct sudo_nss *nss; #ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE setlocale(LC_ALL, ""); @@ -190,7 +194,7 @@ #endif /* HAVE_GETPRPWNAM && HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS */ if (geteuid() != 0) - errx(1, "must be setuid root"); + errorx(1, "must be setuid root"); /* * Signal setup: @@ -198,6 +202,7 @@ * us at some point and avoid the logging. * Install handler to wait for children when they exit. */ + zero_bytes(&sa, sizeof(sa)); sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART; sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN; @@ -206,10 +211,11 @@ (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, &saved_sa_tstp); /* - * Turn off core dumps and close open files. + * Turn off core dumps and make sure fds 0-2 are open. */ initial_setup(); - setpwent(); + sudo_setpwent(); + sudo_setgrent(); /* Parse our arguments. */ sudo_mode = parse_args(Argc, Argv); @@ -228,15 +234,7 @@ else switch (sudo_mode) { case MODE_VERSION: - (void) printf("Sudo version %s\n", version); - if (getuid() == 0) { - putchar('\n'); - (void) printf("Sudoers path: %s\n", _PATH_SUDOERS); - dump_auth_methods(); - dump_defaults(); - dump_interfaces(); - } - exit(0); + show_version(); break; case MODE_HELP: usage(0); @@ -257,39 +255,107 @@ case MODE_LIST: user_cmnd = "list"; pwflag = I_LISTPW; - printmatches = 1; break; + case MODE_CHECK: + pwflag = I_LISTPW; + break; } /* Must have a command to run... */ if (user_cmnd == NULL && NewArgc == 0) usage(1); - cmnd_status = init_vars(sudo_mode, environ); + init_vars(sudo_mode, envp); /* XXX - move this later? */ -#ifdef HAVE_LDAP - validated = sudo_ldap_check(pwflag); + /* Parse nsswitch.conf for sudoers order. */ + snl = sudo_read_nss(); - /* Skip reading /etc/sudoers if LDAP told us to */ - if (!def_ignore_local_sudoers) { - int v; + /* Open and parse sudoers, set global defaults */ + tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss) { + if (nss->open(nss) == 0 && nss->parse(nss) == 0) { + sources++; + nss->setdefs(nss); + } + } + if (sources == 0) + log_error(0, "no valid sudoers sources found, quitting"); - check_sudoers(); /* check mode/owner on _PATH_SUDOERS */ + /* XXX - collect post-sudoers parse settings into a function */ - /* Local sudoers file overrides LDAP if we have a match. */ - v = sudoers_lookup(pwflag); - if (validated == VALIDATE_ERROR || ISSET(v, VALIDATE_OK)) - validated = v; + /* + * Set runas passwd/group entries based on command line or sudoers. + * Note that if runas_group was specified without runas_user we + * defer setting runas_pw so the match routines know to ignore it. + */ + if (runas_group != NULL) { + set_runasgr(runas_group); + if (runas_user != NULL) + set_runaspw(runas_user); + } else + set_runaspw(runas_user ? runas_user : def_runas_default); + + if (!update_defaults(SETDEF_RUNAS)) + log_error(NO_STDERR|NO_EXIT, "problem with defaults entries"); + + /* Set login class if applicable. */ + set_loginclass(sudo_user.pw); + + /* Update initial shell now that runas is set. */ + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) + NewArgv[0] = runas_pw->pw_shell; + + /* This goes after sudoers is parsed since it may have timestamp options. */ + if (sudo_mode == MODE_KILL || sudo_mode == MODE_INVALIDATE) { + remove_timestamp((sudo_mode == MODE_KILL)); + cleanup(0); + exit(0); } -#else - check_sudoers(); /* check mode/owner on _PATH_SUDOERS */ - /* Validate the user but don't search for pseudo-commands. */ - validated = sudoers_lookup(pwflag); + /* Is root even allowed to run sudo? */ + if (user_uid == 0 && !def_root_sudo) { + (void) fprintf(stderr, + "Sorry, %s has been configured to not allow root to run it.\n", + getprogname()); + exit(1); + } + + /* Check for -C overriding def_closefrom. */ + if (user_closefrom >= 0 && user_closefrom != def_closefrom) { + if (!def_closefrom_override) + errorx(1, "you are not permitted to use the -C option"); + else + def_closefrom = user_closefrom; + } + + cmnd_status = set_cmnd(sudo_mode); + +#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE + if (!setlocale(LC_ALL, def_sudoers_locale)) { + warningx("unable to set locale to \"%s\", using \"C\"", + def_sudoers_locale); + setlocale(LC_ALL, "C"); + } #endif + + validated = FLAG_NO_USER | FLAG_NO_HOST; + tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss) { + validated = nss->lookup(nss, validated, pwflag); + + /* Handle [NOTFOUND=return] */ + if (!ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK) && nss->ret_notfound) + break; + } if (safe_cmnd == NULL) safe_cmnd = estrdup(user_cmnd); +#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE + setlocale(LC_ALL, ""); +#endif + + /* If only a group was specified, set runas_pw based on invoking user. */ + if (runas_pw == NULL) + set_runaspw(user_name); + /* * Look up the timestamp dir owner if one is specified. */ @@ -297,33 +363,15 @@ struct passwd *pw; if (*def_timestampowner == '#') - pw = getpwuid(atoi(def_timestampowner + 1)); + pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(def_timestampowner + 1)); else - pw = getpwnam(def_timestampowner); + pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_timestampowner); if (!pw) log_error(0, "timestamp owner (%s): No such user", def_timestampowner); timestamp_uid = pw->pw_uid; } - /* This goes after the sudoers parse since we honor sudoers options. */ - if (sudo_mode == MODE_KILL || sudo_mode == MODE_INVALIDATE) { - remove_timestamp((sudo_mode == MODE_KILL)); - exit(0); - } - - if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_ERROR)) - log_error(0, "parse error in %s near line %d", _PATH_SUDOERS, - errorlineno); - - /* Is root even allowed to run sudo? */ - if (user_uid == 0 && !def_root_sudo) { - (void) fprintf(stderr, - "Sorry, %s has been configured to not allow root to run it.\n", - getprogname()); - exit(1); - } - /* If given the -P option, set the "preserve_groups" flag. */ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS)) def_preserve_groups = TRUE; @@ -340,42 +388,44 @@ (void) close(fd); } - /* User may have overriden environment resetting via the -E flag. */ - if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV) && ISSET(validated, FLAG_SETENV)) + /* Use askpass value from sudoers unless user specified their own. */ + if (def_askpass && !user_askpass) + user_askpass = def_askpass; + + /* User may have overridden environment resetting via the -E flag. */ + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV) && def_setenv) def_env_reset = FALSE; /* Build a new environment that avoids any nasty bits. */ - environ = rebuild_env(environ, sudo_mode, ISSET(validated, FLAG_NOEXEC)); + rebuild_env(sudo_mode, def_noexec); /* Fill in passwd struct based on user we are authenticating as. */ auth_pw = get_authpw(); /* Require a password if sudoers says so. */ - if (!ISSET(validated, FLAG_NOPASS)) - check_user(validated); + if (def_authenticate) + check_user(validated, !ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_NONINTERACTIVE)); /* If run as root with SUDO_USER set, set sudo_user.pw to that user. */ - if (user_uid == 0 && prev_user != NULL && strcmp(prev_user, "root") != 0) { + /* XXX - causes confusion when root is not listed in sudoers */ + if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT) && prev_user != NULL) { + if (user_uid == 0 && strcmp(prev_user, "root") != 0) { struct passwd *pw; - if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(prev_user)) != NULL) { - efree(sudo_user.pw); + if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(prev_user)) != NULL) sudo_user.pw = pw; - } + } } if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) { /* Finally tell the user if the command did not exist. */ - if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT) { - warnx("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd); - exit(1); - } else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND) { - warnx("%s: command not found", user_cmnd); - exit(1); - } + if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT) + errorx(1, "ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd); + else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND) + errorx(1, "%s: command not found", user_cmnd); /* If user specified env vars make sure sudoers allows it. */ - if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN) && !ISSET(validated, FLAG_SETENV)) { + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN) && !def_setenv) { if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV)) log_error(NO_MAIL, "sorry, you are not allowed to preserve the environment"); @@ -383,21 +433,32 @@ validate_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars); } - log_auth(validated, 1); - if (sudo_mode == MODE_VALIDATE) - exit(0); - else if (sudo_mode == MODE_LIST) { - list_matches(); -#ifdef HAVE_LDAP - sudo_ldap_list_matches(); -#endif - exit(0); - } + log_allowed(validated); + if (sudo_mode == MODE_CHECK) + rc = display_cmnd(snl, list_pw ? list_pw : sudo_user.pw); + else if (sudo_mode == MODE_LIST) + display_privs(snl, list_pw ? list_pw : sudo_user.pw); - /* Override user's umask if configured to do so. */ - if (def_umask != 0777) - (void) umask(def_umask); + /* Cleanup sudoers sources */ + tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss) + nss->close(nss); + /* Deferred exit due to sudo_ldap_close() */ + if (sudo_mode == MODE_VALIDATE || sudo_mode == MODE_CHECK || + sudo_mode == MODE_LIST) + exit(rc); + + /* + * Override user's umask if configured to do so. + * If user's umask is more restrictive, OR in those bits too. + */ + if (def_umask != 0777) { + mode_t mask = umask(def_umask); + mask |= def_umask; + if (mask != def_umask) + umask(mask); + } + /* Restore coredumpsize resource limit. */ #if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL) (void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit); @@ -407,10 +468,6 @@ if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) set_perms(PERM_FULL_RUNAS); - /* Close the password and group files */ - endpwent(); - endgrent(); - if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) { char *p; @@ -422,49 +479,63 @@ /* Change to target user's homedir. */ if (chdir(runas_pw->pw_dir) == -1) - warn("unable to change directory to %s", runas_pw->pw_dir); + warning("unable to change directory to %s", runas_pw->pw_dir); + +#if defined(__linux__) || defined(_AIX) + /* Insert system-wide environment variables. */ + read_env_file(_PATH_ENVIRONMENT, TRUE); +#endif } if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) exit(sudo_edit(NewArgc, NewArgv, envp)); + /* Insert system-wide environment variables. */ + if (def_env_file) + read_env_file(def_env_file, FALSE); + /* Insert user-specified environment variables. */ - environ = insert_env_vars(environ, sudo_user.env_vars); + insert_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars); /* Restore signal handlers before we exec. */ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &saved_sa_int, NULL); (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &saved_sa_quit, NULL); (void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &saved_sa_tstp, NULL); + /* Close the password and group files and free up memory. */ + sudo_endpwent(); + sudo_endgrent(); + + closefrom(def_closefrom + 1); + #ifndef PROFILING if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_BACKGROUND) && fork() > 0) exit(0); else { #ifdef HAVE_SELINUX if (is_selinux_enabled() > 0 && user_role != NULL) - selinux_exec(user_role, user_type, NewArgv, environ, + selinux_exec(user_role, user_type, NewArgv, ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)); #endif - execve(safe_cmnd, NewArgv, environ); + execv(safe_cmnd, NewArgv); } #else exit(0); #endif /* PROFILING */ /* - * If we got here then the exec() failed... + * If we got here then execve() failed... */ if (errno == ENOEXEC) { NewArgv--; /* at least one extra slot... */ NewArgv[0] = "sh"; NewArgv[1] = safe_cmnd; - execve(_PATH_BSHELL, NewArgv, environ); - } - warn("unable to execute %s", safe_cmnd); + execv(_PATH_BSHELL, NewArgv); + } warning("unable to execute %s", safe_cmnd); exit(127); - } else if (ISSET(validated, FLAG_NO_USER) || (validated & FLAG_NO_HOST)) { - log_auth(validated, 1); + } else if (ISSET(validated, FLAG_NO_USER | FLAG_NO_HOST)) { + log_denial(validated, 1); exit(1); - } else if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_NOT_OK)) { + } else { if (def_path_info) { /* * We'd like to not leak path info at all here, but that can @@ -473,21 +544,17 @@ * is just "no foo in path" since the user can trivially set * their path to just contain a single dir. */ - log_auth(validated, + log_denial(validated, !(cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT || cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND)); if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND) - warnx("%s: command not found", user_cmnd); + warningx("%s: command not found", user_cmnd); else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT) - warnx("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd); + warningx("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd); } else { /* Just tell the user they are not allowed to run foo. */ - log_auth(validated, 1); + log_denial(validated, 1); } exit(1); - } else { - /* should never get here */ - log_auth(validated, 1); - exit(1); } exit(0); /* not reached */ } @@ -496,17 +563,17 @@ * Initialize timezone, set umask, fill in ``sudo_user'' struct and * load the ``interfaces'' array. */ -static int +static void init_vars(sudo_mode, envp) int sudo_mode; char **envp; { - char *p, **ep, thost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; - int nohostname, rval; + char *p, **ep, thost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1]; + int nohostname; /* Sanity check command from user. */ if (user_cmnd == NULL && strlen(NewArgv[0]) >= PATH_MAX) - errx(1, "%s: File name too long", NewArgv[0]); + errorx(1, "%s: File name too long", NewArgv[0]); #ifdef HAVE_TZSET (void) tzset(); /* set the timezone if applicable */ @@ -527,6 +594,7 @@ if (nohostname) user_host = user_shost = "localhost"; else { + thost[sizeof(thost) - 1] = '\0'; user_host = estrdup(thost); if (def_fqdn) { /* Defer call to set_fqdn() until log_error() is safe. */ @@ -550,7 +618,16 @@ user_tty = "unknown"; for (ep = envp; *ep; ep++) { + /* XXX - don't fill in if empty string */ switch (**ep) { + case 'D': + if (strncmp("DISPLAY=", *ep, 8) == 0) + user_display = *ep + 8; + break; + case 'K': + if (strncmp("KRB5CCNAME=", *ep, 11) == 0) + user_ccname = *ep + 11; + break; case 'P': if (strncmp("PATH=", *ep, 5) == 0) user_path = *ep + 5; @@ -562,8 +639,9 @@ user_prompt = *ep + 12; else if (strncmp("SUDO_USER=", *ep, 10) == 0) prev_user = *ep + 10; + else if (strncmp("SUDO_ASKPASS=", *ep, 13) == 0) + user_askpass = *ep + 13; break; - } } @@ -589,11 +667,11 @@ * be run during reboot after the YP/NIS/NIS+/LDAP/etc daemon has died. */ if (sudo_mode & (MODE_INVALIDATE|MODE_KILL)) - errx(1, "uid %s does not exist in the passwd file!", pw_name); - log_error(0, "uid %s does not exist in the passwd file!", pw_name); + errorx(1, "unknown uid: %s", pw_name); + log_error(0, "unknown uid: %s", pw_name); } if (user_shell == NULL || *user_shell == '\0') - user_shell = sudo_user.pw->pw_shell; + user_shell = estrdup(sudo_user.pw->pw_shell); /* It is now safe to use log_error() and set_perms() */ @@ -612,12 +690,6 @@ if (nohostname) log_error(USE_ERRNO|MSG_ONLY, "can't get hostname"); - set_runaspw(*user_runas); /* may call log_error() */ - if (*user_runas[0] == '#') { - if (runas_pw->pw_name != *user_runas && runas_pw->pw_name[0]) - *user_runas = estrdup(runas_pw->pw_name); - } - /* * Get current working directory. Try as user, fall back to root. */ @@ -625,7 +697,7 @@ if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) { set_perms(PERM_ROOT); if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) { - warnx("cannot get working directory"); + warningx("cannot get working directory"); (void) strlcpy(user_cwd, "unknown", sizeof(user_cwd)); } } else @@ -635,28 +707,47 @@ * If we were given the '-e', '-i' or '-s' options we need to redo * NewArgv and NewArgc. */ - if ((sudo_mode & (MODE_SHELL | MODE_EDIT))) { - char **dst, **src = NewArgv; + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) { + NewArgv--; + NewArgc++; + NewArgv[0] = "sudoedit"; + } else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL)) { + char **av; /* Allocate an extra slot for execve() failure (ENOEXEC). */ - NewArgv = (char **) emalloc2((++NewArgc + 2), sizeof(char *)); - NewArgv++; - if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT)) - NewArgv[0] = "sudoedit"; - else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) - NewArgv[0] = runas_pw->pw_shell; - else if (user_shell && *user_shell) - NewArgv[0] = user_shell; - else - errx(1, "unable to determine shell"); + av = (char **) emalloc2(5, sizeof(char *)); + av++; - /* copy the args from NewArgv */ - for (dst = NewArgv + 1; (*dst = *src) != NULL; ++src, ++dst) - continue; + av[0] = user_shell; /* may be updated later */ + if (NewArgc > 0) { + size_t size; + char *cmnd, *src, *dst, *end; + size = (size_t) (NewArgv[NewArgc - 1] - NewArgv[0]) + + strlen(NewArgv[NewArgc - 1]) + 1; + cmnd = emalloc(size); + src = NewArgv[0]; + dst = cmnd; + for (end = src + size - 1; src < end; src++, dst++) + *dst = *src == 0 ? ' ' : *src; + *dst = '\0'; + av[1] = "-c"; + av[2] = cmnd; + NewArgc = 2; + } + av[++NewArgc] = NULL; + NewArgv = av; } +} - /* Set login class if applicable. */ - set_loginclass(sudo_user.pw); +/* + * Fill in user_cmnd, user_args, user_base and user_stat variables + * and apply any command-specific defaults entries. + */ +static int +set_cmnd(sudo_mode) + int sudo_mode; +{ + int rval; /* Set project if applicable. */ set_project(runas_pw); @@ -664,9 +755,8 @@ /* Resolve the path and return. */ rval = FOUND; user_stat = emalloc(sizeof(struct stat)); - if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT)) { - if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) { - /* XXX - default_runas may be modified during parsing of sudoers */ + if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT | MODE_CHECK)) { + if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN | MODE_CHECK)) { set_perms(PERM_RUNAS); rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, user_path); set_perms(PERM_ROOT); @@ -684,7 +774,7 @@ size_t size, n; /* If we didn't realloc NewArgv it is contiguous so just count. */ - if (!(sudo_mode & (MODE_SHELL | MODE_EDIT))) { + if (!ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL)) { size = (size_t) (NewArgv[NewArgc-1] - NewArgv[1]) + strlen(NewArgv[NewArgc-1]) + 1; } else { @@ -697,7 +787,7 @@ for (to = user_args, from = NewArgv + 1; *from; from++) { n = strlcpy(to, *from, size - (to - user_args)); if (n >= size - (to - user_args)) - errx(1, "internal error, init_vars() overflow"); + errorx(1, "internal error, init_vars() overflow"); to += n; *to++ = ' '; } @@ -709,265 +799,259 @@ else user_base = user_cmnd; + if (!update_defaults(SETDEF_CMND)) + log_error(NO_STDERR|NO_EXIT, "problem with defaults entries"); + return(rval); } /* - * Command line argument parsing, can't use getopt(3). + * Command line argument parsing. + * Sets NewArgc and NewArgv which corresponds to the argc/argv we'll use + * for the command to be run (if we are running one). */ static int parse_args(argc, argv) int argc; char **argv; { - int rval = MODE_RUN; /* what mode is sudo to be run in? */ - int excl = 0; /* exclusive arg, no others allowed */ + int mode = 0; /* what mode is sudo to be run in? */ + int flags = 0; /* mode flags */ + int ch; - NewArgv = argv + 1; - NewArgc = argc - 1; - /* First, check to see if we were invoked as "sudoedit". */ - if (strcmp(getprogname(), "sudoedit") == 0) { - rval = MODE_EDIT; - excl = 'e'; - } else - rval = MODE_RUN; + if (strcmp(getprogname(), "sudoedit") == 0) + mode = MODE_EDIT; - while (NewArgc > 0) { - if (NewArgv[0][0] == '-') { - if (NewArgv[0][1] != '\0' && NewArgv[0][2] != '\0') { - warnx("please use single character options"); - usage(1); - } + /* Returns true if the last option string was "--" */ +#define got_end_of_args (optind > 1 && argv[optind - 1][0] == '-' && \ + argv[optind - 1][1] == '-' && argv[optind - 1][2] == '\0') - switch (NewArgv[0][1]) { - case 'p': - /* Must have an associated prompt. */ - if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) - usage(1); + /* Returns true if next option is an environment variable */ +#define is_envar (optind < argc && argv[optind][0] != '/' && \ + strchr(argv[optind], '=') != NULL) - user_prompt = NewArgv[1]; - def_passprompt_override = TRUE; - - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; + for (;;) { + /* + * We disable arg permutation for GNU getopt(). + * Some trickiness is required to allow environment variables + * to be interspersed with command line options. + */ + if ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "+Aa:bC:c:Eeg:HhiKkLlnPp:r:Sst:U:u:Vv")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + case 'A': + SET(tgetpass_flags, TGP_ASKPASS); break; - case 'u': - /* Must have an associated runas user. */ - if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) - usage(1); - - user_runas = &NewArgv[1]; - - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; - break; #ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H case 'a': - /* Must have an associated authentication style. */ - if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) - usage(1); - - login_style = NewArgv[1]; - - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; + login_style = optarg; break; #endif + case 'b': + SET(flags, MODE_BACKGROUND); + break; + case 'C': + if ((user_closefrom = atoi(optarg)) < 3) { + warningx("the argument to -C must be at least 3"); + usage(1); + } + break; #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H case 'c': - /* Must have an associated login class. */ - if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) - usage(1); - - login_class = NewArgv[1]; + login_class = optarg; def_use_loginclass = TRUE; - - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; break; #endif - case 'b': - SET(rval, MODE_BACKGROUND); + case 'E': + SET(flags, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV); break; case 'e': - rval = MODE_EDIT; - if (excl && excl != 'e') + if (mode && mode != MODE_EDIT) usage_excl(1); - excl = 'e'; + mode = MODE_EDIT; break; - case 'v': - rval = MODE_VALIDATE; - if (excl && excl != 'v') + case 'g': + runas_group = optarg; + break; + case 'H': + SET(flags, MODE_RESET_HOME); + break; + case 'h': + if (mode && mode != MODE_HELP) usage_excl(1); - excl = 'v'; + mode = MODE_HELP; break; case 'i': - SET(rval, (MODE_LOGIN_SHELL | MODE_SHELL)); + SET(flags, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL); def_env_reset = TRUE; - if (excl && excl != 'i') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'i'; break; case 'k': - rval = MODE_INVALIDATE; - if (excl && excl != 'k') + if (mode && mode != MODE_INVALIDATE) usage_excl(1); - excl = 'k'; + mode = MODE_INVALIDATE; break; case 'K': - rval = MODE_KILL; - if (excl && excl != 'K') + if (mode && mode != MODE_KILL) usage_excl(1); - excl = 'K'; + mode = MODE_KILL; break; case 'L': - rval = MODE_LISTDEFS; - if (excl && excl != 'L') + if (mode && mode != MODE_LISTDEFS) usage_excl(1); - excl = 'L'; + mode = MODE_LISTDEFS; break; case 'l': - rval = MODE_LIST; - if (excl && excl != 'l') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'l'; + if (mode) { + if (mode == MODE_LIST) + long_list = 1; + else + usage_excl(1); + } + mode = MODE_LIST; break; - case 'V': - rval = MODE_VERSION; - if (excl && excl != 'V') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'V'; + case 'n': + SET(flags, MODE_NONINTERACTIVE); break; - case 'h': - rval = MODE_HELP; - if (excl && excl != 'h') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 'h'; + case 'P': + SET(flags, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS); break; - case 's': - SET(rval, MODE_SHELL); - if (excl && excl != 's') - usage_excl(1); - excl = 's'; + case 'p': + user_prompt = optarg; + def_passprompt_override = TRUE; break; - case 'H': - SET(rval, MODE_RESET_HOME); +#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX + case 'r': + user_role = optarg; break; - case 'P': - SET(rval, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS); + case 't': + user_type = optarg; break; +#endif case 'S': SET(tgetpass_flags, TGP_STDIN); break; - case 'E': - SET(rval, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV); + case 's': + SET(flags, MODE_SHELL); break; -#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX - case 'r': - /* Must have an associated SELinux role. */ - if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) - usage(1); - - user_role = NewArgv[1]; - - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; + case 'U': + if ((list_pw = sudo_getpwnam(optarg)) == NULL) + errorx(1, "unknown user: %s", optarg); break; - case 't': - /* Must have an associated SELinux type. */ - if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) - usage(1); - - user_type = NewArgv[1]; - - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; + case 'u': + runas_user = optarg; break; -#endif - case '-': - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; - goto args_done; - case '\0': - warnx("'-' requires an argument"); - usage(1); + case 'v': + if (mode && mode != MODE_VALIDATE) + usage_excl(1); + mode = MODE_VALIDATE; + break; + case 'V': + if (mode && mode != MODE_VERSION) + usage_excl(1); + mode = MODE_VERSION; + break; default: - warnx("illegal option `%s'", NewArgv[0]); usage(1); } - } else if (NewArgv[0][0] != '/' && strchr(NewArgv[0], '=') != NULL) { - /* Could be an environment variable. */ + } else if (!got_end_of_args && is_envar) { struct list_member *ev; + + /* Store environment variable. */ ev = emalloc(sizeof(*ev)); - ev->value = NewArgv[0]; + ev->value = argv[optind]; ev->next = sudo_user.env_vars; sudo_user.env_vars = ev; + + /* Crank optind and resume getopt. */ + optind++; } else { - /* Not an arg */ + /* Not an option or an environment variable -- we're done. */ break; } - NewArgc--; - NewArgv++; } -args_done: - if (ISSET(rval, MODE_EDIT) && - (ISSET(rval, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV) || sudo_user.env_vars != NULL)) { - if (ISSET(rval, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV)) - warnx("the `-E' option is not valid in edit mode"); + NewArgc = argc - optind; + NewArgv = argv + optind; + + if (!mode) + mode = MODE_RUN; + + if (NewArgc > 0 && mode == MODE_LIST) + mode = MODE_CHECK; + + if (ISSET(flags, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) { + if (ISSET(flags, MODE_SHELL)) { + warningx("you may not specify both the `-i' and `-s' options"); + usage(1); + } + if (ISSET(flags, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV)) { + warningx("you may not specify both the `-i' and `-E' options"); + usage(1); + } + SET(flags, MODE_SHELL); + } + if (mode == MODE_EDIT && + (ISSET(flags, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV) || sudo_user.env_vars != NULL)) { + if (ISSET(mode, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV)) + warningx("the `-E' option is not valid in edit mode"); if (sudo_user.env_vars != NULL) - warnx("you may not specify environment variables in edit mode"); + warningx("you may not specify environment variables in edit mode"); usage(1); } - if (ISSET(rval, MODE_PRESERVE_ENV) && ISSET(rval, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) { - warnx("you may not specify both the `-i' and `-E' options"); + if ((runas_user != NULL || runas_group != NULL) && + !ISSET(mode, MODE_EDIT | MODE_RUN | MODE_CHECK)) { usage(1); } - if (user_runas != NULL && !ISSET(rval, (MODE_EDIT|MODE_RUN))) { - if (excl != '\0') - warnx("the `-u' and '-%c' options may not be used together", excl); + if (list_pw != NULL && mode != MODE_LIST && mode != MODE_CHECK) { + warningx("the `-U' option may only be used with the `-l' option"); usage(1); } - if ((NewArgc == 0 && (rval & MODE_EDIT)) || - (NewArgc > 0 && !(rval & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT)))) + if (ISSET(tgetpass_flags, TGP_STDIN) && ISSET(tgetpass_flags, TGP_ASKPASS)) { + warningx("the `-A' and `-S' options may not be used together"); usage(1); - if (NewArgc == 0 && rval == MODE_RUN) - SET(rval, (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL)); + } + if ((NewArgc == 0 && mode == MODE_EDIT) || + (NewArgc > 0 && !ISSET(mode, MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT | MODE_CHECK))) + usage(1); + if (NewArgc == 0 && mode == MODE_RUN && !ISSET(flags, MODE_SHELL)) + SET(flags, (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL)); - return(rval); + return(mode | flags); } /* - * Sanity check sudoers mode/owner/type. - * Leaves a file pointer to the sudoers file open in ``fp''. + * Open sudoers and sanity check mode/owner/type. + * Returns a handle to the sudoers file or NULL on error. */ -static void -check_sudoers() +FILE * +open_sudoers(sudoers, keepopen) + const char *sudoers; + int *keepopen; { struct stat statbuf; - int rootstat, i; + FILE *fp = NULL; + int rootstat; /* * Fix the mode and group on sudoers file from old default. * Only works if file system is readable/writable by root. */ - if ((rootstat = stat_sudoers(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf)) == 0 && + if ((rootstat = stat_sudoers(sudoers, &statbuf)) == 0 && SUDOERS_UID == statbuf.st_uid && SUDOERS_MODE != 0400 && (statbuf.st_mode & 0007777) == 0400) { - if (chmod(_PATH_SUDOERS, SUDOERS_MODE) == 0) { - warnx("fixed mode on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS); + if (chmod(sudoers, SUDOERS_MODE) == 0) { + warningx("fixed mode on %s", sudoers); SET(statbuf.st_mode, SUDOERS_MODE); if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID) { - if (!chown(_PATH_SUDOERS,(uid_t) -1,SUDOERS_GID)) { - warnx("set group on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS); + if (chown(sudoers, (uid_t) -1, SUDOERS_GID) == 0) { + warningx("set group on %s", sudoers); statbuf.st_gid = SUDOERS_GID; } else - warn("unable to set group on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS); + warning("unable to set group on %s", sudoers); } } else - warn("unable to fix mode on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS); + warning("unable to fix mode on %s", sudoers); } /* @@ -977,46 +1061,40 @@ */ set_perms(PERM_SUDOERS); - if (rootstat != 0 && stat_sudoers(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf) != 0) - log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't stat %s", _PATH_SUDOERS); + if (rootstat != 0 && stat_sudoers(sudoers, &statbuf) != 0) + log_error(USE_ERRNO|NO_EXIT, "can't stat %s", sudoers); else if (!S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode)) - log_error(0, "%s is not a regular file", _PATH_SUDOERS); - else if (statbuf.st_size == 0) - log_error(0, "%s is zero length", _PATH_SUDOERS); + log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is not a regular file", sudoers); else if ((statbuf.st_mode & 07777) != SUDOERS_MODE) - log_error(0, "%s is mode 0%o, should be 0%o", _PATH_SUDOERS, + log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is mode 0%o, should be 0%o", sudoers, (unsigned int) (statbuf.st_mode & 07777), (unsigned int) SUDOERS_MODE); else if (statbuf.st_uid != SUDOERS_UID) - log_error(0, "%s is owned by uid %lu, should be %lu", _PATH_SUDOERS, + log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is owned by uid %lu, should be %lu", sudoers, (unsigned long) statbuf.st_uid, (unsigned long) SUDOERS_UID); else if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID) - log_error(0, "%s is owned by gid %lu, should be %lu", _PATH_SUDOERS, + log_error(NO_EXIT, "%s is owned by gid %lu, should be %lu", sudoers, (unsigned long) statbuf.st_gid, (unsigned long) SUDOERS_GID); - else { - /* Solaris sometimes returns EAGAIN so try 10 times */ - for (i = 0; i < 10 ; i++) { - errno = 0; - if ((sudoers_fp = fopen(_PATH_SUDOERS, "r")) == NULL || - fgetc(sudoers_fp) == EOF) { - if (sudoers_fp != NULL) - fclose(sudoers_fp); - sudoers_fp = NULL; - if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) - break; - } else - break; - sleep(1); - } - if (sudoers_fp == NULL) - log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't open %s", _PATH_SUDOERS); + else if ((fp = fopen(sudoers, "r")) == NULL) + log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't open %s", sudoers); + else if (statbuf.st_size != 0) { + /* + * Make sure we can actually read sudoers so we can present the + * user with a reasonable error message. + */ + if (fgetc(fp) == EOF) + log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't read %s", sudoers); + rewind(fp); } + (void) fcntl(fileno(fp), F_SETFD, 1); set_perms(PERM_ROOT); /* change back to root */ + return(fp); } /* * Close all open files (except std*) and turn off core dumps. + * Also sets the set_perms() pointer to the correct function. */ static void initial_setup() @@ -1065,9 +1143,10 @@ (void) dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO); if (miss[STDERR_FILENO]) (void) dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO); + if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) + close(devnull); } } - closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); } #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H @@ -1088,8 +1167,9 @@ errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT; if (login_class && strcmp(login_class, "-") != 0) { - if (strcmp(*user_runas, "root") != 0 && user_uid != 0) - errx(1, "only root can use -c %s", login_class); + if (user_uid != 0 && + strcmp(runas_user ? runas_user : def_runas_default, "root") != 0) + errorx(1, "only root can use -c %s", login_class); } else { login_class = pw->pw_class; if (!login_class || !*login_class) @@ -1192,7 +1272,7 @@ char *p; #ifdef HAVE_GETADDRINFO - memset(&hint, 0, sizeof(hint)); + zero_bytes(&hint, sizeof(hint)); hint.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; hint.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; if (getaddrinfo(user_host, NULL, &hint, &res0) != 0) { @@ -1225,36 +1305,37 @@ * Get passwd entry for the user we are going to run commands as. * By default, this is "root". Updates runas_pw as a side effect. */ -int +static void set_runaspw(user) char *user; { - if (runas_pw != NULL) { - if (user_runas != &def_runas_default) - return(TRUE); /* don't override -u option */ - efree(runas_pw); - } if (*user == '#') { - runas_pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(user + 1)); - if (runas_pw == NULL) { - runas_pw = emalloc(sizeof(struct passwd)); - (void) memset((VOID *)runas_pw, 0, sizeof(struct passwd)); - runas_pw->pw_uid = atoi(user + 1); - runas_pw->pw_name = user; - runas_pw->pw_passwd = "*"; - runas_pw->pw_gecos = user; - runas_pw->pw_dir = "/"; - runas_pw->pw_shell = estrdup(_PATH_BSHELL); - } + if ((runas_pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(user + 1))) == NULL) + runas_pw = sudo_fakepwnam(user, runas_gr ? runas_gr->gr_gid : 0); } else { - runas_pw = sudo_getpwnam(user); - if (runas_pw == NULL) - log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "no passwd entry for %s!", user); + if ((runas_pw = sudo_getpwnam(user)) == NULL) + log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "unknown user: %s", user); } - return(TRUE); } /* + * Get group entry for the group we are going to run commands as. + * Updates runas_pw as a side effect. + */ +static void +set_runasgr(group) + char *group; +{ + if (*group == '#') { + if ((runas_gr = sudo_getgrgid(atoi(group + 1))) == NULL) + runas_gr = sudo_fakegrnam(group); + } else { + if ((runas_gr = sudo_getgrnam(group)) == NULL) + log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "unknown group: %s", group); + } +} + +/* * Get passwd entry for the user we are going to authenticate as. * By default, this is the user invoking sudo. In the most common * case, this matches sudo_user.pw or runas_pw. @@ -1265,19 +1346,14 @@ struct passwd *pw; if (def_rootpw) { - if (runas_pw->pw_uid == 0) - pw = runas_pw; - else if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(0)) == NULL) - log_error(0, "uid 0 does not exist in the passwd file!"); + if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(0)) == NULL) + log_error(0, "unknown uid: 0"); } else if (def_runaspw) { - if (strcmp(def_runas_default, *user_runas) == 0) - pw = runas_pw; - else if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_runas_default)) == NULL) - log_error(0, "user %s does not exist in the passwd file!", - def_runas_default); + if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_runas_default)) == NULL) + log_error(0, "unknown user: %s", def_runas_default); } else if (def_targetpw) { if (runas_pw->pw_name == NULL) - log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "no passwd entry for %lu!", + log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "unknown uid: %lu", (unsigned long) runas_pw->pw_uid); pw = runas_pw; } else @@ -1287,104 +1363,92 @@ } /* + * Cleanup hook for error()/errorx() + */ +void +cleanup(gotsignal) + int gotsignal; +{ + struct sudo_nss *nss; + + if (!gotsignal) { + if (snl != NULL) { + tq_foreach_fwd(snl, nss) + nss->close(nss); + } + sudo_endpwent(); + sudo_endgrent(); + } +} + +static void +show_version() +{ + (void) printf("Sudo version %s\n", version); + if (getuid() == 0) { + putchar('\n'); + (void) printf("Sudoers path: %s\n", _PATH_SUDOERS); +#ifdef HAVE_LDAP +# ifdef _PATH_NSSWITCH_CONF + (void) printf("nsswitch path: %s\n", _PATH_NSSWITCH_CONF); +# endif + (void) printf("ldap.conf path: %s\n", _PATH_LDAP_CONF); + (void) printf("ldap.secret path: %s\n", _PATH_LDAP_SECRET); +#endif + dump_auth_methods(); + dump_defaults(); + dump_interfaces(); + } + exit(0); +} + +/* * Tell which options are mutually exclusive and exit. */ static void usage_excl(exit_val) int exit_val; { - warnx("Only one of the -e, -h, i, -k, -K, -l, -s, -v or -V options may be used"); + warningx("Only one of the -e, -h, -i, -k, -K, -l, -s, -v or -V options may be specified"); usage(exit_val); } /* * Give usage message and exit. + * The actual usage strings are in sudo_usage.h for configure substitution. */ static void usage(exit_val) int exit_val; { - char **p, **uvec[4]; - int i, linelen, linemax, ulen, plen; - static char *uvec1[] = { - " -h |", - " -K |", - " -k |", - " -L |", - " -l |", - " -V |", - " -v", - NULL - }; - static char *uvec2[] = { - " [-bEHPS]", -#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H - " [-a auth_type]", -#endif -#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H - " [-c class|-]", -#endif -#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX - " [-r role]", -#endif - " [-p prompt]", -#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX - " [-t type]", -#endif - " [-u username|#uid]", - " [VAR=value]", - " {-i | -s | }", - NULL - }; - static char *uvec3[] = { - " -e", - " [-S]", -#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H - " [-a auth_type]", -#endif -#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H - " [-c class|-]", -#endif - " [-p prompt]", - " [-u username|#uid]", - " file ...", - NULL - }; + struct lbuf lbuf; + char *uvec[5]; + int i, ulen; /* * Use usage vectors appropriate to the progname. */ if (strcmp(getprogname(), "sudoedit") == 0) { - uvec[0] = uvec3 + 1; + uvec[0] = SUDO_USAGE4 + 3; uvec[1] = NULL; } else { - uvec[0] = uvec1; - uvec[1] = uvec2; - uvec[2] = uvec3; - uvec[3] = NULL; + uvec[0] = SUDO_USAGE1; + uvec[1] = SUDO_USAGE2; + uvec[2] = SUDO_USAGE3; + uvec[3] = SUDO_USAGE4; + uvec[4] = NULL; } /* - * Print usage and wrap lines as needed. - * Assumes an 80-character wide terminal, which is kind of bogus... + * Print usage and wrap lines as needed, depending on the + * tty width. */ - ulen = (int)strlen(getprogname()) + 7; - linemax = 80; + ulen = (int)strlen(getprogname()) + 8; + lbuf_init(&lbuf, NULL, ulen, 0); for (i = 0; uvec[i] != NULL; i++) { - printf("usage: %s", getprogname()); - linelen = linemax - ulen; - for (p = uvec[i]; *p != NULL; p++) { - plen = (int)strlen(*p); - if (linelen >= plen || linelen == linemax - ulen) { - fputs(*p, stdout); - linelen -= plen; - } else { - p--; - linelen = linemax - ulen; - printf("\n%*s", ulen, ""); - } - } - putchar('\n'); + lbuf_append(&lbuf, "usage: ", getprogname(), uvec[i], NULL); + lbuf_print(&lbuf); } + lbuf_destroy(&lbuf); exit(exit_val); }