File: [local] / src / usr.bin / sudo / Attic / sudo.c (download)
Revision 1.24, Mon Jan 31 18:53:33 2005 UTC (19 years, 4 months ago) by millert
Branch: MAIN
CVS Tags: OPENBSD_3_7_BASE Branch point for: OPENBSD_3_7
Changes since 1.23: +6 -0 lines
Warn if the user tries to use the -u option w/o running a command.
|
/*
* Copyright (c) 1993-1996,1998-2004 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*
* Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
* Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
* Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
*
* For a brief history of sudo, please see the HISTORY file included
* with this distribution.
*/
#define _SUDO_MAIN
#ifdef __TANDEM
# include <floss.h>
#endif
#include "config.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
# include <sys/time.h>
# include <sys/resource.h>
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef STDC_HEADERS
# include <stdlib.h>
# include <stddef.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H
# include <stdlib.h>
# endif
#endif /* STDC_HEADERS */
#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
# if defined(HAVE_MEMORY_H) && !defined(STDC_HEADERS)
# include <memory.h>
# endif
# include <string.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
# include <strings.h>
# endif
#endif /* HAVE_STRING_H */
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
# include <unistd.h>
#endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */
#ifdef HAVE_ERR_H
# include <err.h>
#else
# include "emul/err.h"
#endif /* HAVE_ERR_H */
#include <pwd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#if defined(HAVE_GETPRPWNAM) && defined(HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS)
# ifdef __hpux
# undef MAXINT
# include <hpsecurity.h>
# else
# include <sys/security.h>
# endif /* __hpux */
# include <prot.h>
#endif /* HAVE_GETPRPWNAM && HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS */
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
# include <login_cap.h>
# ifndef LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS
# define LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS "daemon"
# endif
#endif
#include "sudo.h"
#include "interfaces.h"
#include "version.h"
#ifndef lint
static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: sudo.c,v 1.370 2004/08/24 18:01:13 millert Exp $";
#endif /* lint */
/*
* Prototypes
*/
static int init_vars __P((int));
static int parse_args __P((int, char **));
static void check_sudoers __P((void));
static void initial_setup __P((void));
static void set_loginclass __P((struct passwd *));
static void usage __P((int));
static void usage_excl __P((int));
static struct passwd *get_authpw __P((void));
extern int sudo_edit __P((int, char **));
extern void list_matches __P((void));
extern char **rebuild_env __P((char **, int, int));
extern char **zero_env __P((char **));
extern struct passwd *sudo_getpwnam __P((const char *));
extern struct passwd *sudo_getpwuid __P((uid_t));
extern struct passwd *sudo_pwdup __P((const struct passwd *));
/*
* Globals
*/
int Argc, NewArgc;
char **Argv, **NewArgv;
char *prev_user;
struct sudo_user sudo_user;
struct passwd *auth_pw;
FILE *sudoers_fp;
struct interface *interfaces;
int num_interfaces;
int tgetpass_flags;
uid_t timestamp_uid;
extern int errorlineno;
#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
static struct rlimit corelimit;
#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
login_cap_t *lc;
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
char *login_style;
#endif /* HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H */
sigaction_t saved_sa_int, saved_sa_quit, saved_sa_tstp, saved_sa_chld;
void (*set_perms) __P((int));
int
main(argc, argv, envp)
int argc;
char **argv;
char **envp;
{
int validated;
int fd;
int cmnd_status;
int sudo_mode;
int pwflag;
char **new_environ;
sigaction_t sa;
extern int printmatches;
extern char **environ;
Argv = argv;
if ((Argc = argc) < 1)
usage(1);
/* Must be done as the first thing... */
#if defined(HAVE_GETPRPWNAM) && defined(HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS)
(void) set_auth_parameters(Argc, Argv);
# ifdef HAVE_INITPRIVS
initprivs();
# endif
#endif /* HAVE_GETPRPWNAM && HAVE_SET_AUTH_PARAMETERS */
/* Zero out the environment. */
environ = zero_env(envp);
if (geteuid() != 0)
errx(1, "must be setuid root");
/*
* Signal setup:
* Ignore keyboard-generated signals so the user cannot interrupt
* us at some point and avoid the logging.
* Install handler to wait for children when they exit.
*/
sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
(void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, &saved_sa_int);
(void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, &saved_sa_quit);
(void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, &saved_sa_tstp);
sa.sa_handler = reapchild;
(void) sigaction(SIGCHLD, &sa, &saved_sa_chld);
/*
* Turn off core dumps, close open files and setup set_perms().
*/
initial_setup();
setpwent();
/* Parse our arguments. */
sudo_mode = parse_args(Argc, Argv);
/* Setup defaults data structures. */
init_defaults();
/* Load the list of local ip addresses and netmasks. */
load_interfaces();
pwflag = 0;
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL))
user_cmnd = "shell";
else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT))
user_cmnd = "sudoedit";
else
switch (sudo_mode) {
case MODE_VERSION:
(void) printf("Sudo version %s\n", version);
if (getuid() == 0) {
putchar('\n');
dump_auth_methods();
dump_defaults();
dump_interfaces();
}
exit(0);
break;
case MODE_HELP:
usage(0);
break;
case MODE_VALIDATE:
user_cmnd = "validate";
pwflag = I_VERIFYPW;
break;
case MODE_KILL:
case MODE_INVALIDATE:
user_cmnd = "kill";
pwflag = -1;
break;
case MODE_LISTDEFS:
list_options();
exit(0);
break;
case MODE_LIST:
user_cmnd = "list";
pwflag = I_LISTPW;
printmatches = 1;
break;
}
/* Must have a command to run... */
if (user_cmnd == NULL && NewArgc == 0)
usage(1);
cmnd_status = init_vars(sudo_mode);
#ifdef HAVE_LDAP
validated = sudo_ldap_check(pwflag);
/* Skip reading /etc/sudoers if LDAP told us to */
if (def_ignore_local_sudoers); /* skips */
else if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK) && !printmatches); /* skips */
else if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK) && printmatches)
{
check_sudoers(); /* check mode/owner on _PATH_SUDOERS */
/* User is found in LDAP and we want a list of all sudo commands the
* user can do, so consult sudoers but throw away result.
*/
sudoers_lookup(pwflag);
}
else
#endif
{
check_sudoers(); /* check mode/owner on _PATH_SUDOERS */
/* Validate the user but don't search for pseudo-commands. */
validated = sudoers_lookup(pwflag);
}
/*
* If we are using set_perms_posix() and the stay_setuid flag was not set,
* set the real, effective and saved uids to 0 and use set_perms_nosuid()
* instead of set_perms_posix().
*/
#if !defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) && !defined(HAVE_SETREUID) && \
!defined(NO_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_VERSION)
if (!def_stay_setuid && set_perms == set_perms_posix) {
if (setuid(0)) {
perror("setuid(0)");
exit(1);
}
set_perms = set_perms_nosuid;
}
#endif
/*
* Look up the timestamp dir owner if one is specified.
*/
if (def_timestampowner) {
struct passwd *pw;
if (*def_timestampowner == '#')
pw = getpwuid(atoi(def_timestampowner + 1));
else
pw = getpwnam(def_timestampowner);
if (!pw)
log_error(0, "timestamp owner (%s): No such user",
def_timestampowner);
timestamp_uid = pw->pw_uid;
}
/* This goes after the sudoers parse since we honor sudoers options. */
if (sudo_mode == MODE_KILL || sudo_mode == MODE_INVALIDATE) {
remove_timestamp((sudo_mode == MODE_KILL));
exit(0);
}
if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_ERROR))
log_error(0, "parse error in %s near line %d", _PATH_SUDOERS,
errorlineno);
/* Is root even allowed to run sudo? */
if (user_uid == 0 && !def_root_sudo) {
(void) fprintf(stderr,
"Sorry, %s has been configured to not allow root to run it.\n",
getprogname());
exit(1);
}
/* If given the -P option, set the "preserve_groups" flag. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS))
def_preserve_groups = TRUE;
/* If no command line args and "set_home" is not set, error out. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL) && !def_shell_noargs)
usage(1);
/* May need to set $HOME to target user if we are running a command. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN) && (def_always_set_home ||
(ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL) && def_set_home)))
SET(sudo_mode, MODE_RESET_HOME);
/* Bail if a tty is required and we don't have one. */
if (def_requiretty) {
if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
log_error(NO_MAIL, "sorry, you must have a tty to run sudo");
else
(void) close(fd);
}
/* Fill in passwd struct based on user we are authenticating as. */
auth_pw = get_authpw();
/* Require a password if sudoers says so. */
if (!ISSET(validated, FLAG_NOPASS))
check_user(ISSET(validated, FLAG_CHECK_USER));
/* If run as root with SUDO_USER set, set sudo_user.pw to that user. */
if (user_uid == 0 && prev_user != NULL && strcmp(prev_user, "root") != 0) {
struct passwd *pw;
if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(prev_user)) != NULL) {
free(sudo_user.pw);
sudo_user.pw = pw;
}
}
/* Build a new environment that avoids any nasty bits if we have a cmnd. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN))
new_environ = rebuild_env(envp, sudo_mode, ISSET(validated, FLAG_NOEXEC));
else
new_environ = envp;
if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_OK)) {
/* Finally tell the user if the command did not exist. */
if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT) {
warnx("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
exit(1);
} else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND) {
warnx("%s: command not found", user_cmnd);
exit(1);
}
log_auth(validated, 1);
if (sudo_mode == MODE_VALIDATE)
exit(0);
else if (sudo_mode == MODE_LIST) {
list_matches();
#ifdef HAVE_LDAP
sudo_ldap_list_matches();
#endif
exit(0);
}
/* This *must* have been set if we got a match but... */
if (safe_cmnd == NULL) {
log_error(MSG_ONLY,
"internal error, safe_cmnd never got set for %s; %s",
user_cmnd,
"please report this error at http://courtesan.com/sudo/bugs/");
}
/* Override user's umask if configured to do so. */
if (def_umask != 0777)
(void) umask(def_umask);
/* Restore coredumpsize resource limit. */
#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
(void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit);
#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */
/* Become specified user or root if executing a command. */
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN))
set_perms(PERM_FULL_RUNAS);
/* Close the password and group files */
endpwent();
endgrent();
/* Install the real environment. */
environ = new_environ;
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
char *p;
/* Convert /bin/sh -> -sh so shell knows it is a login shell */
if ((p = strrchr(NewArgv[0], '/')) == NULL)
p = NewArgv[0];
*p = '-';
NewArgv[0] = p;
/* Change to target user's homedir. */
if (chdir(runas_pw->pw_dir) == -1)
warn("unable to change directory to %s", runas_pw->pw_dir);
}
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT))
exit(sudo_edit(NewArgc, NewArgv));
/* Restore signal handlers before we exec. */
(void) sigaction(SIGINT, &saved_sa_int, NULL);
(void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &saved_sa_quit, NULL);
(void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &saved_sa_tstp, NULL);
(void) sigaction(SIGCHLD, &saved_sa_chld, NULL);
#ifndef PROFILING
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_BACKGROUND) && fork() > 0)
exit(0);
else
EXECV(safe_cmnd, NewArgv); /* run the command */
#else
exit(0);
#endif /* PROFILING */
/*
* If we got here then the exec() failed...
*/
warn("unable to execute %s", safe_cmnd);
exit(127);
} else if (ISSET(validated, FLAG_NO_USER) || (validated & FLAG_NO_HOST)) {
log_auth(validated, 1);
exit(1);
} else if (ISSET(validated, VALIDATE_NOT_OK)) {
if (def_path_info) {
/*
* We'd like to not leak path info at all here, but that can
* *really* confuse the users. To really close the leak we'd
* have to say "not allowed to run foo" even when the problem
* is just "no foo in path" since the user can trivially set
* their path to just contain a single dir.
*/
log_auth(validated,
!(cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT || cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND));
if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND)
warnx("%s: command not found", user_cmnd);
else if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT)
warnx("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
} else {
/* Just tell the user they are not allowed to run foo. */
log_auth(validated, 1);
}
exit(1);
} else {
/* should never get here */
log_auth(validated, 1);
exit(1);
}
exit(0); /* not reached */
}
/*
* Initialize timezone, set umask, fill in ``sudo_user'' struct and
* load the ``interfaces'' array.
*/
static int
init_vars(sudo_mode)
int sudo_mode;
{
char *p, thost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
int nohostname, rval;
/* Sanity check command from user. */
if (user_cmnd == NULL && strlen(NewArgv[0]) >= PATH_MAX)
errx(1, "%s: File name too long", NewArgv[0]);
#ifdef HAVE_TZSET
(void) tzset(); /* set the timezone if applicable */
#endif /* HAVE_TZSET */
/* Default value for cmnd and cwd, overridden later. */
if (user_cmnd == NULL)
user_cmnd = NewArgv[0];
(void) strlcpy(user_cwd, "unknown", sizeof(user_cwd));
/*
* We avoid gethostbyname() if possible since we don't want
* sudo to block if DNS or NIS is hosed.
* "host" is the (possibly fully-qualified) hostname and
* "shost" is the unqualified form of the hostname.
*/
nohostname = gethostname(thost, sizeof(thost));
if (nohostname)
user_host = user_shost = "localhost";
else {
user_host = estrdup(thost);
if (def_fqdn) {
/* Defer call to set_fqdn() until log_error() is safe. */
user_shost = user_host;
} else {
if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.'))) {
*p = '\0';
user_shost = estrdup(user_host);
*p = '.';
} else {
user_shost = user_host;
}
}
}
if ((p = ttyname(STDIN_FILENO)) || (p = ttyname(STDOUT_FILENO))) {
if (strncmp(p, _PATH_DEV, sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1) == 0)
p += sizeof(_PATH_DEV) - 1;
user_tty = estrdup(p);
} else
user_tty = "unknown";
/*
* Get a local copy of the user's struct passwd with the shadow password
* if necessary. It is assumed that euid is 0 at this point so we
* can read the shadow passwd file if necessary.
*/
if ((sudo_user.pw = sudo_getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
/* Need to make a fake struct passwd for logging to work. */
struct passwd pw;
char pw_name[MAX_UID_T_LEN + 1];
pw.pw_uid = getuid();
(void) snprintf(pw_name, sizeof(pw_name), "%lu",
(unsigned long) pw.pw_uid);
pw.pw_name = pw_name;
sudo_user.pw = &pw;
/*
* If we are in -k/-K mode, just spew to stderr. It is not unusual for
* users to place "sudo -k" in a .logout file which can cause sudo to
* be run during reboot after the YP/NIS/NIS+/LDAP/etc daemon has died.
*/
if (sudo_mode & (MODE_INVALIDATE|MODE_KILL))
errx(1, "uid %s does not exist in the passwd file!", pw_name);
log_error(0, "uid %s does not exist in the passwd file!", pw_name);
}
if (user_shell == NULL || *user_shell == '\0')
user_shell = sudo_user.pw->pw_shell;
/* It is now safe to use log_error() and set_perms() */
if (def_fqdn)
set_fqdn(); /* may call log_error() */
if (nohostname)
log_error(USE_ERRNO|MSG_ONLY, "can't get hostname");
set_runaspw(*user_runas); /* may call log_error() */
if (*user_runas[0] == '#' && runas_pw->pw_name && runas_pw->pw_name[0])
*user_runas = estrdup(runas_pw->pw_name);
/*
* Get current working directory. Try as user, fall back to root.
*/
set_perms(PERM_USER);
if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) {
set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
if (!getcwd(user_cwd, sizeof(user_cwd))) {
warnx("cannot get working directory");
(void) strlcpy(user_cwd, "unknown", sizeof(user_cwd));
}
} else
set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
/*
* If we were given the '-e', '-i' or '-s' options we need to redo
* NewArgv and NewArgc.
*/
if ((sudo_mode & (MODE_SHELL | MODE_EDIT))) {
char **dst, **src = NewArgv;
NewArgv = (char **) emalloc2((++NewArgc + 1), sizeof(char *));
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_EDIT))
NewArgv[0] = "sudoedit";
else if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_LOGIN_SHELL))
NewArgv[0] = runas_pw->pw_shell;
else if (user_shell && *user_shell)
NewArgv[0] = user_shell;
else
errx(1, "unable to determine shell");
/* copy the args from NewArgv */
for (dst = NewArgv + 1; (*dst = *src) != NULL; ++src, ++dst)
;
}
/* Set login class if applicable. */
set_loginclass(sudo_user.pw);
/* Resolve the path and return. */
rval = FOUND;
user_stat = emalloc(sizeof(struct stat));
if (sudo_mode & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT)) {
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_RUN)) {
/* XXX - default_runas may be modified during parsing of sudoers */
set_perms(PERM_RUNAS);
rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, user_path);
set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
if (rval != FOUND) {
/* Failed as root, try as invoking user. */
set_perms(PERM_USER);
rval = find_path(NewArgv[0], &user_cmnd, user_stat, user_path);
set_perms(PERM_ROOT);
}
}
/* set user_args */
if (NewArgc > 1) {
char *to, **from;
size_t size, n;
/* If we didn't realloc NewArgv it is contiguous so just count. */
if (!(sudo_mode & (MODE_SHELL | MODE_EDIT))) {
size = (size_t) (NewArgv[NewArgc-1] - NewArgv[1]) +
strlen(NewArgv[NewArgc-1]) + 1;
} else {
for (size = 0, from = NewArgv + 1; *from; from++)
size += strlen(*from) + 1;
}
/* Alloc and build up user_args. */
user_args = (char *) emalloc(size);
for (to = user_args, from = NewArgv + 1; *from; from++) {
n = strlcpy(to, *from, size - (to - user_args));
if (n >= size - (to - user_args))
errx(1, "internal error, init_vars() overflow");
to += n;
*to++ = ' ';
}
*--to = '\0';
}
}
if ((user_base = strrchr(user_cmnd, '/')) != NULL)
user_base++;
else
user_base = user_cmnd;
return(rval);
}
/*
* Command line argument parsing, can't use getopt(3).
*/
static int
parse_args(argc, argv)
int argc;
char **argv;
{
int rval = MODE_RUN; /* what mode is sudo to be run in? */
int excl = 0; /* exclusive arg, no others allowed */
NewArgv = argv + 1;
NewArgc = argc - 1;
/* First, check to see if we were invoked as "sudoedit". */
if (strcmp(getprogname(), "sudoedit") == 0) {
rval = MODE_EDIT;
excl = 'e';
} else
rval = MODE_RUN;
if (NewArgc == 0 && rval == MODE_RUN) { /* no options and no command */
SET(rval, (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL));
return(rval);
}
while (NewArgc > 0 && NewArgv[0][0] == '-') {
if (NewArgv[0][1] != '\0' && NewArgv[0][2] != '\0')
warnx("please use single character options");
switch (NewArgv[0][1]) {
case 'p':
/* Must have an associated prompt. */
if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
usage(1);
user_prompt = NewArgv[1];
NewArgc--;
NewArgv++;
break;
case 'u':
/* Must have an associated runas user. */
if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
usage(1);
user_runas = &NewArgv[1];
NewArgc--;
NewArgv++;
break;
#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
case 'a':
/* Must have an associated authentication style. */
if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
usage(1);
login_style = NewArgv[1];
NewArgc--;
NewArgv++;
break;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
case 'c':
/* Must have an associated login class. */
if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
usage(1);
login_class = NewArgv[1];
def_use_loginclass = TRUE;
NewArgc--;
NewArgv++;
break;
#endif
case 'b':
SET(rval, MODE_BACKGROUND);
break;
case 'e':
rval = MODE_EDIT;
if (excl && excl != 'e')
usage_excl(1);
excl = 'e';
break;
case 'v':
rval = MODE_VALIDATE;
if (excl && excl != 'v')
usage_excl(1);
excl = 'v';
break;
case 'i':
SET(rval, (MODE_LOGIN_SHELL | MODE_SHELL));
def_env_reset = TRUE;
if (excl && excl != 'i')
usage_excl(1);
excl = 'i';
break;
case 'k':
rval = MODE_INVALIDATE;
if (excl && excl != 'k')
usage_excl(1);
excl = 'k';
break;
case 'K':
rval = MODE_KILL;
if (excl && excl != 'K')
usage_excl(1);
excl = 'K';
break;
case 'L':
rval = MODE_LISTDEFS;
if (excl && excl != 'L')
usage_excl(1);
excl = 'L';
break;
case 'l':
rval = MODE_LIST;
if (excl && excl != 'l')
usage_excl(1);
excl = 'l';
break;
case 'V':
rval = MODE_VERSION;
if (excl && excl != 'V')
usage_excl(1);
excl = 'V';
break;
case 'h':
rval = MODE_HELP;
if (excl && excl != 'h')
usage_excl(1);
excl = 'h';
break;
case 's':
SET(rval, MODE_SHELL);
if (excl && excl != 's')
usage_excl(1);
excl = 's';
break;
case 'H':
SET(rval, MODE_RESET_HOME);
break;
case 'P':
SET(rval, MODE_PRESERVE_GROUPS);
break;
case 'S':
SET(tgetpass_flags, TGP_STDIN);
break;
case '-':
NewArgc--;
NewArgv++;
if (rval == MODE_RUN)
SET(rval, (MODE_IMPLIED_SHELL | MODE_SHELL));
return(rval);
case '\0':
warnx("'-' requires an argument");
usage(1);
default:
warnx("illegal option `%s'", NewArgv[0]);
usage(1);
}
NewArgc--;
NewArgv++;
}
if (user_runas != NULL && !ISSET(rval, (MODE_EDIT|MODE_RUN))) {
if (excl != '\0')
warnx("the `-u' and '-%c' options may not be used together", excl);
usage(1);
}
if ((NewArgc == 0 && (rval & MODE_EDIT)) ||
(NewArgc > 0 && !(rval & (MODE_RUN | MODE_EDIT))))
usage(1);
return(rval);
}
/*
* Sanity check sudoers mode/owner/type.
* Leaves a file pointer to the sudoers file open in ``fp''.
*/
static void
check_sudoers()
{
struct stat statbuf;
int rootstat, i;
char c;
/*
* Fix the mode and group on sudoers file from old default.
* Only works if file system is readable/writable by root.
*/
if ((rootstat = stat_sudoers(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf)) == 0 &&
SUDOERS_UID == statbuf.st_uid && SUDOERS_MODE != 0400 &&
(statbuf.st_mode & 0007777) == 0400) {
if (chmod(_PATH_SUDOERS, SUDOERS_MODE) == 0) {
warnx("fixed mode on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
SET(statbuf.st_mode, SUDOERS_MODE);
if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID) {
if (!chown(_PATH_SUDOERS,(uid_t) -1,SUDOERS_GID)) {
warnx("set group on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
statbuf.st_gid = SUDOERS_GID;
} else
warn("unable to set group on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
}
} else
warn("unable to fix mode on %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
}
/*
* Sanity checks on sudoers file. Must be done as sudoers
* file owner. We already did a stat as root, so use that
* data if we can't stat as sudoers file owner.
*/
set_perms(PERM_SUDOERS);
if (rootstat != 0 && stat_sudoers(_PATH_SUDOERS, &statbuf) != 0)
log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't stat %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
else if (!S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode))
log_error(0, "%s is not a regular file", _PATH_SUDOERS);
else if (statbuf.st_size == 0)
log_error(0, "%s is zero length", _PATH_SUDOERS);
else if ((statbuf.st_mode & 07777) != SUDOERS_MODE)
log_error(0, "%s is mode 0%o, should be 0%o", _PATH_SUDOERS,
(statbuf.st_mode & 07777), SUDOERS_MODE);
else if (statbuf.st_uid != SUDOERS_UID)
log_error(0, "%s is owned by uid %lu, should be %lu", _PATH_SUDOERS,
(unsigned long) statbuf.st_uid, SUDOERS_UID);
else if (statbuf.st_gid != SUDOERS_GID)
log_error(0, "%s is owned by gid %lu, should be %lu", _PATH_SUDOERS,
(unsigned long) statbuf.st_gid, SUDOERS_GID);
else {
/* Solaris sometimes returns EAGAIN so try 10 times */
for (i = 0; i < 10 ; i++) {
errno = 0;
if ((sudoers_fp = fopen(_PATH_SUDOERS, "r")) == NULL ||
fread(&c, sizeof(c), 1, sudoers_fp) != 1) {
sudoers_fp = NULL;
if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
break;
} else
break;
sleep(1);
}
if (sudoers_fp == NULL)
log_error(USE_ERRNO, "can't open %s", _PATH_SUDOERS);
}
set_perms(PERM_ROOT); /* change back to root */
}
/*
* Close all open files (except std*) and turn off core dumps.
* Also sets the set_perms() pointer to the correct function.
*/
static void
initial_setup()
{
#if defined(RLIMIT_CORE) && !defined(SUDO_DEVEL)
struct rlimit rl;
/*
* Turn off core dumps.
*/
(void) getrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &corelimit);
memcpy(&rl, &corelimit, sizeof(struct rlimit));
rl.rlim_cur = 0;
(void) setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rl);
#endif /* RLIMIT_CORE && !SUDO_DEVEL */
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
/*
* Make set_perms point to the correct function.
* If we are using setresuid() or setreuid() we only need to set this
* once. If we are using POSIX saved uids we will switch to
* set_perms_nosuid after sudoers has been parsed if the "stay_suid"
* option is not set.
*/
#if defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) || defined(HAVE_SETREUID)
set_perms = set_perms_suid;
#else
# if !defined(NO_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_SAVED_IDS) && defined(_SC_VERSION)
if (sysconf(_SC_SAVED_IDS) == 1 && sysconf(_SC_VERSION) >= 199009)
set_perms = set_perms_posix;
else
# endif
set_perms = set_perms_nosuid;
#endif /* HAVE_SETRESUID || HAVE_SETREUID */
}
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
static void
set_loginclass(pw)
struct passwd *pw;
{
int errflags;
/*
* Don't make it a fatal error if the user didn't specify the login
* class themselves. We do this because if login.conf gets
* corrupted we want the admin to be able to use sudo to fix it.
*/
if (login_class)
errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY;
else
errflags = NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT;
if (login_class && strcmp(login_class, "-") != 0) {
if (strcmp(*user_runas, "root") != 0 && user_uid != 0)
errx(1, "only root can use -c %s", login_class);
} else {
login_class = pw->pw_class;
if (!login_class || !*login_class)
login_class =
(pw->pw_uid == 0) ? LOGIN_DEFROOTCLASS : LOGIN_DEFCLASS;
}
lc = login_getclass(login_class);
if (!lc || !lc->lc_class || strcmp(lc->lc_class, login_class) != 0) {
log_error(errflags, "unknown login class: %s", login_class);
if (!lc)
lc = login_getclass(NULL); /* needed for login_getstyle() later */
}
}
#else
static void
set_loginclass(pw)
struct passwd *pw;
{
}
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
/*
* Look up the fully qualified domain name and set user_host and user_shost.
*/
void
set_fqdn()
{
struct hostent *hp;
char *p;
if (!(hp = gethostbyname(user_host))) {
log_error(MSG_ONLY|NO_EXIT,
"unable to lookup %s via gethostbyname()", user_host);
} else {
if (user_shost != user_host)
free(user_shost);
free(user_host);
user_host = estrdup(hp->h_name);
}
if ((p = strchr(user_host, '.'))) {
*p = '\0';
user_shost = estrdup(user_host);
*p = '.';
} else {
user_shost = user_host;
}
}
/*
* Get passwd entry for the user we are going to run commands as.
* By default, this is "root". Updates runas_pw as a side effect.
*/
int
set_runaspw(user)
char *user;
{
if (runas_pw != NULL) {
if (user_runas != &def_runas_default)
return(TRUE); /* don't override -u option */
free(runas_pw);
}
if (*user == '#') {
runas_pw = sudo_getpwuid(atoi(user + 1));
if (runas_pw == NULL) {
runas_pw = emalloc(sizeof(struct passwd));
(void) memset((VOID *)runas_pw, 0, sizeof(struct passwd));
runas_pw->pw_uid = atoi(user + 1);
}
} else {
runas_pw = sudo_getpwnam(user);
if (runas_pw == NULL)
log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "no passwd entry for %s!", user);
}
return(TRUE);
}
/*
* Get passwd entry for the user we are going to authenticate as.
* By default, this is the user invoking sudo. In the most common
* case, this matches sudo_user.pw or runas_pw.
*/
static struct passwd *
get_authpw()
{
struct passwd *pw;
if (def_rootpw) {
if (runas_pw->pw_uid == 0)
pw = runas_pw;
else if ((pw = sudo_getpwuid(0)) == NULL)
log_error(0, "uid 0 does not exist in the passwd file!");
} else if (def_runaspw) {
if (strcmp(def_runas_default, *user_runas) == 0)
pw = runas_pw;
else if ((pw = sudo_getpwnam(def_runas_default)) == NULL)
log_error(0, "user %s does not exist in the passwd file!",
def_runas_default);
} else if (def_targetpw) {
if (runas_pw->pw_name == NULL)
log_error(NO_MAIL|MSG_ONLY, "no passwd entry for %lu!",
runas_pw->pw_uid);
pw = runas_pw;
} else
pw = sudo_user.pw;
return(pw);
}
/*
* Tell which options are mutually exclusive and exit.
*/
static void
usage_excl(exit_val)
int exit_val;
{
warnx("Only one of the -e, -h, -k, -K, -l, -s, -v or -V options may be used");
usage(exit_val);
}
/*
* Give usage message and exit.
*/
static void
usage(exit_val)
int exit_val;
{
char **p;
int linelen, linemax, ulen;
static char *uvec[] = {
" [-HPSb]",
#ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
" [-a auth_type]",
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
" [-c class|-]",
#endif
" [-p prompt]",
" [-u username|#uid]",
" { -e file [...] | -i | -s | <command> }",
NULL
};
/*
* For sudoedit, replace the last entry in the usage vector.
* For sudo, print the secondary usage.
*/
if (strcmp(getprogname(), "sudoedit") == 0) {
/* Replace the last entry in the usage vector. */
for (p = uvec; p[1] != NULL; p++)
continue;
*p = " file [...]";
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s -K | -L | -V | -h | -k | -l | -v\n",
getprogname());
}
/*
* Print the main usage and wrap lines as needed.
* Assumes an 80-character wide terminal, which is kind of bogus...
*/
ulen = (int)strlen(getprogname()) + 7;
linemax = 80;
linelen = linemax - ulen;
printf("usage: %s", getprogname());
for (p = uvec; *p != NULL; p++) {
if (linelen == linemax || (linelen -= strlen(*p)) >= 0) {
fputs(*p, stdout);
} else {
p--;
linelen = linemax;
printf("\n%*s", ulen, "");
}
}
putchar('\n');
exit(exit_val);
}