File: [local] / src / usr.bin / sudo / auth / Attic / dce.c (download)
Revision 1.1.1.1 (vendor branch), Thu Nov 18 16:29:01 1999 UTC (24 years, 7 months ago) by millert
Branch: COURTESAN
CVS Tags: SUDO_1_6_0, OPENBSD_3_0_BASE, OPENBSD_2_9_BASE, OPENBSD_2_8_BASE, OPENBSD_2_8, OPENBSD_2_7_BASE, OPENBSD_2_7 Branch point for: OPENBSD_3_0, OPENBSD_2_9
Changes since 1.1: +0 -0 lines
sudo 1.6, now with a BSD license
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/*
* Copyright (c) 1996, 1998, 1999 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
* All rights reserved.
*
* This code is derived from software contributed by Jeff Earickson
* of Colby College, Waterville, ME <jaearick@colby.edu>
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
* derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* 4. Products derived from this software may not be called "Sudo" nor
* may "Sudo" appear in their names without specific prior written
* permission from the author.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES,
* INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
* AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
* THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,
* EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
* PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;
* OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
* WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR
* OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
* ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* The code below basically comes from the examples supplied on
* the OSF DCE 1.0.3 manpages for the sec_login routines, with
* enough additional polishing to make the routine work with the
* rest of sudo.
*
* This code is known to work on HP 700 and 800 series systems
* running HP-UX 9.X and 10.X, with either HP's version 1.2.1 of DCE.
* (aka, OSF DCE 1.0.3) or with HP's version 1.4 of DCE (aka, OSF
* DCE 1.1).
*/
#include "config.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef STDC_HEADERS
#include <stdlib.h>
#endif /* STDC_HEADERS */
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
#include <unistd.h>
#endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */
#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
#include <string.h>
#endif /* HAVE_STRING_H */
#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
#include <strings.h>
#endif /* HAVE_STRINGS_H */
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <dce/rpc.h>
#include <dce/sec_login.h>
#include <dce/dce_error.h> /* required to call dce_error_inq_text routine */
#include "sudo.h"
#include "sudo_auth.h"
#ifndef lint
static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: dce.c,v 1.7 1999/08/31 09:39:17 millert Exp $";
#endif /* lint */
static int check_dce_status __P((error_status_t, char *));
int
dce_verify(pw, plain_pw, auth)
struct passwd *pw;
char *plain_pw;
sudo_auth *auth;
{
struct passwd temp_pw;
sec_passwd_rec_t password_rec;
sec_login_handle_t login_context;
boolean32 reset_passwd;
sec_login_auth_src_t auth_src;
error_status_t status;
/*
* Create the local context of the DCE principal necessary
* to perform authenticated network operations. The network
* identity set up by this operation cannot be used until it
* is validated via sec_login_validate_identity().
*/
if (sec_login_setup_identity((unsigned_char_p_t) pw->pw_name,
sec_login_no_flags, &login_context, &status)) {
if (check_dce_status(status, "sec_login_setup_identity(1):"))
return(AUTH_FAILURE);
password_rec.key.key_type = sec_passwd_plain;
password_rec.key.tagged_union.plain = (idl_char *) plain_pw;
password_rec.pepper = NULL;
password_rec.version_number = sec_passwd_c_version_none;
/* Validate the login context with the password */
if (sec_login_validate_identity(login_context, &password_rec,
&reset_passwd, &auth_src, &status)) {
if (check_dce_status(status, "sec_login_validate_identity(1):"))
return(AUTH_FAILURE);
/*
* Certify that the DCE Security Server used to set
* up and validate a login context is legitimate. Makes
* sure that we didn't get spoofed by another DCE server.
*/
if (!sec_login_certify_identity(login_context, &status)) {
(void) fprintf(stderr, "Whoa! Bogus authentication server!\n");
(void) check_dce_status(status,"sec_login_certify_identity(1):");
return(AUTH_FAILURE);
}
if (check_dce_status(status, "sec_login_certify_identity(2):"))
return(AUTH_FAILURE);
/*
* Sets the network credentials to those specified
* by the now validated login context.
*/
sec_login_set_context(login_context, &status);
if (check_dce_status(status, "sec_login_set_context:"))
return(AUTH_FAILURE);
/*
* Oops, your credentials were no good. Possibly
* caused by clock times out of adjustment between
* DCE client and DCE security server...
*/
if (auth_src != sec_login_auth_src_network) {
(void) fprintf(stderr,
"You have no network credentials.\n");
return(AUTH_FAILURE);
}
/* Check if the password has aged and is thus no good */
if (reset_passwd) {
(void) fprintf(stderr,
"Your DCE password needs resetting.\n");
return(AUTH_FAILURE);
}
/*
* We should be a valid user by this point. Pull the
* user's password structure from the DCE security
* server just to make sure. If we get it with no
* problems, then we really are legitimate...
*/
sec_login_get_pwent(login_context, (sec_login_passwd_t) &temp_pw,
&status);
if (check_dce_status(status, "sec_login_get_pwent:"))
return(AUTH_FAILURE);
/*
* If we get to here, then the pwent above properly fetched
* the password structure from the DCE registry, so the user
* must be valid. We don't really care what the user's
* registry password is, just that the user could be
* validated. In fact, if we tried to compare the local
* password to the DCE entry at this point, the operation
* would fail if the hidden password feature is turned on,
* because the password field would contain an asterisk.
* Also go ahead and destroy the user's DCE login context
* before we leave here (and don't bother checking the
* status), in order to clean up credentials files in
* /opt/dcelocal/var/security/creds. By doing this, we are
* assuming that the user will not need DCE authentication
* later in the program, only local authentication. If this
* is not true, then the login_context will have to be
* returned to the calling program, and the context purged
* somewhere later in the program.
*/
sec_login_purge_context(&login_context, &status);
return(AUTH_SUCCESS);
} else {
if(check_dce_status(status, "sec_login_validate_identity(2):"))
return(AUTH_FAILURE);
sec_login_purge_context(&login_context, &status);
if(check_dce_status(status, "sec_login_purge_context:"))
return(AUTH_FAILURE);
}
}
(void) check_dce_status(status, "sec_login_setup_identity(2):");
return(AUTH_FAILURE);
}
/* Returns 0 for DCE "ok" status, 1 otherwise */
static int
check_dce_status(input_status, comment)
error_status_t input_status;
char *comment;
{
int error_stat;
unsigned char error_string[dce_c_error_string_len];
if (input_status == rpc_s_ok)
return(0);
dce_error_inq_text(input_status, error_string, &error_stat);
(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s %s\n", comment, error_string);
return(1);
}