File: [local] / src / usr.sbin / pwd_mkdb / pwd_mkdb.c (download)
Revision 1.23, Sun Nov 26 19:35:46 2000 UTC (23 years, 6 months ago) by millert
Branch: MAIN
CVS Tags: OPENBSD_2_9_BASE Branch point for: OPENBSD_2_9
Changes since 1.22: +3 -3 lines
*** empty log message ***
|
/* $OpenBSD: pwd_mkdb.c,v 1.23 2000/11/26 19:35:46 millert Exp $ */
/*-
* Copyright (c) 1991, 1993, 1994
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Jason Downs. All rights reserved.
* Portions Copyright (c) 1998, Todd C. Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* This product includes software developed by the University of
* California, Berkeley and its contributors.
* 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef lint
static char copyright[] =
"@(#) Copyright (c) 1991, 1993, 1994\n\
The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.\n";
#endif /* not lint */
#ifndef lint
#if 0
static char sccsid[] = "from: @(#)pwd_mkdb.c 8.5 (Berkeley) 4/20/94";
#else
static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: pwd_mkdb.c,v 1.23 2000/11/26 19:35:46 millert Exp $";
#endif
#endif /* not lint */
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <db.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <util.h>
#define INSECURE 1
#define SECURE 2
#define PERM_INSECURE (S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IROTH)
#define PERM_SECURE (S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR)
#define FILE_SECURE 0x01
#define FILE_INSECURE 0x02
#define FILE_ORIG 0x04
HASHINFO openinfo = {
4096, /* bsize */
32, /* ffactor */
256, /* nelem */
2048 * 1024, /* cachesize */
NULL, /* hash() */
0 /* lorder */
};
static char *pname; /* password file name */
static char *basedir; /* dir holding master.passwd */
static int clean; /* what to remove on cleanup */
static int hasyp; /* are we running YP? */
void cleanup __P((void));
void error __P((char *));
void errorx __P((char *));
void cp __P((char *, char *, mode_t));
void mv __P((char *, char *));
int scan __P((FILE *, struct passwd *, int *));
void usage __P((void));
char *changedir __P((char *path, char *dir));
void db_store __P((FILE *, FILE *, DB *, DB *,struct passwd *, int, char *, uid_t));
int
main(argc, argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
DB *dp, *edp;
DBT data, key;
FILE *fp, *oldfp = NULL;
struct stat st;
struct passwd pwd;
sigset_t set;
uid_t olduid;
int ch, tfd, makeold, flags = 0, checkonly = 0;
char *username, buf[MAX(MAXPATHLEN, LINE_MAX * 2)];
makeold = 0;
username = NULL;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "cd:pu:v")) != -1)
switch(ch) {
case 'c': /* verify only */
checkonly = 1;
break;
case 'd':
basedir = optarg;
if (strlen(basedir) > MAXPATHLEN - 40)
errx(1, "basedir too long");
break;
case 'p': /* create V7 "file.orig" */
makeold = 1;
break;
case 'u': /* only update this record */
username = optarg;
break;
case 'v': /* backward compatible */
break;
case '?':
default:
usage();
}
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
if (argc != 1 || (username && (*username == '+' || *username == '-')))
usage();
/*
* This could be changed to allow the user to interrupt.
* Probably not worth the effort.
*/
sigemptyset(&set);
sigaddset(&set, SIGTSTP);
sigaddset(&set, SIGHUP);
sigaddset(&set, SIGINT);
sigaddset(&set, SIGQUIT);
sigaddset(&set, SIGTERM);
(void)sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &set, (sigset_t *)NULL);
/* We don't care what the user wants. */
(void)umask(0);
if (**argv != '/')
errx(1, "%s must be specified as an absolute path", *argv);
pname = strdup(changedir(*argv, basedir));
/* Open the original password file */
if (!(fp = fopen(pname, "r")))
error(pname);
/* Check only if password database is valid */
if (checkonly) {
u_int cnt;
for (cnt = 1; scan(fp, &pwd, &flags); ++cnt)
;
exit(0);
}
if (fstat(fileno(fp), &st) == -1)
error(pname);
/* Tweak openinfo values for large passwd files. */
if (st.st_size > (off_t)100*1024)
openinfo.cachesize = MIN(st.st_size * 20, (off_t)12*1024*1024);
if (st.st_size / 128 > openinfo.nelem)
openinfo.nelem = st.st_size / 128;
/* If only updating a single record, stash the old uid */
if (username) {
dp = dbopen(_PATH_MP_DB, O_RDONLY, 0, DB_HASH, NULL);
if (dp == NULL)
error(_PATH_MP_DB);
buf[0] = _PW_KEYBYNAME;
strlcpy(buf + 1, username, sizeof(buf) - 1);
key.data = (u_char *)buf;
key.size = strlen(buf + 1) + 1;
if ((dp->get)(dp, &key, &data, 0) == 0) {
char *p = (char *)data.data;
/* Skip to uid field */
while (*p++ != '\0')
while (*p++ != '\0')
;
memcpy(&olduid, p, sizeof(olduid));
} else
olduid = UID_MAX;
(dp->close)(dp);
}
/* Open the temporary encrypted password database. */
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.tmp",
changedir(_PATH_SMP_DB, basedir));
if (username) {
cp(changedir(_PATH_SMP_DB, basedir), buf, PERM_SECURE);
edp = dbopen(buf,
O_RDWR, PERM_SECURE, DB_HASH, &openinfo);
} else {
edp = dbopen(buf,
O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, PERM_SECURE, DB_HASH, &openinfo);
}
if (!edp)
error(buf);
clean |= FILE_SECURE;
/* Open the temporary insecure password database. */
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.tmp",
changedir(_PATH_MP_DB, basedir));
if (username) {
cp(changedir(_PATH_MP_DB, basedir), buf, PERM_INSECURE);
dp = dbopen(buf,
O_RDWR, PERM_INSECURE, DB_HASH, &openinfo);
} else {
dp = dbopen(buf,
O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, PERM_INSECURE, DB_HASH, &openinfo);
}
if (dp == NULL)
error(buf);
clean |= FILE_INSECURE;
/*
* Open file for old password file. Minor trickiness -- don't want to
* chance the file already existing, since someone (stupidly) might
* still be using this for permission checking. So, open it first and
* fdopen the resulting fd. The resulting file should be readable by
* everyone.
*/
if (makeold) {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.orig", pname);
if ((tfd = open(buf,
O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, PERM_INSECURE)) < 0)
error(buf);
if ((oldfp = fdopen(tfd, "w")) == NULL)
error(buf);
clean |= FILE_ORIG;
}
/*
* The databases actually contain three copies of the original data.
* Each password file entry is converted into a rough approximation
* of a ``struct passwd'', with the strings placed inline. This
* object is then stored as the data for three separate keys. The
* first key * is the pw_name field prepended by the _PW_KEYBYNAME
* character. The second key is the pw_uid field prepended by the
* _PW_KEYBYUID character. The third key is the line number in the
* original file prepended by the _PW_KEYBYNUM character. (The special
* characters are prepended to ensure that the keys do not collide.)
*
* If we see something go by that looks like YP, we save a special
* pointer record, which if YP is enabled in the C lib, will speed
* things up.
*/
/*
* Write the .db files.
* We do this three times, one per key type (for getpw{name,uid,ent}).
* The first time through we also check for YP, issue warnings
* and save the V7 format passwd file if necessary.
*/
db_store(fp, oldfp, edp, dp, &pwd, _PW_KEYBYNAME, username, olduid);
db_store(fp, oldfp, edp, dp, &pwd, _PW_KEYBYUID, username, olduid);
db_store(fp, oldfp, edp, dp, &pwd, _PW_KEYBYNUM, username, olduid);
/* Store YP token, if needed. */
if (hasyp && !username) {
key.data = (u_char *)_PW_YPTOKEN;
key.size = strlen(_PW_YPTOKEN);
data.data = (u_char *)NULL;
data.size = 0;
if ((dp->put)(edp, &key, &data, R_NOOVERWRITE) == -1)
error("put");
if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, R_NOOVERWRITE) == -1)
error("put");
}
if ((edp->close)(edp))
error("close edp");
if ((dp->close)(dp))
error("close dp");
if (makeold) {
(void)fflush(oldfp);
if (fclose(oldfp) == EOF)
error("close old");
}
/* Set master.passwd permissions, in case caller forgot. */
(void)fchmod(fileno(fp), S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR);
if (fclose(fp) != 0)
error("fclose");
/* Install as the real password files. */
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.tmp",
changedir(_PATH_MP_DB, basedir));
mv(buf, changedir(_PATH_MP_DB, basedir));
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.tmp",
changedir(_PATH_SMP_DB, basedir));
mv(buf, changedir(_PATH_SMP_DB, basedir));
if (makeold) {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.orig", pname);
mv(buf, changedir(_PATH_PASSWD, basedir));
}
/*
* Move the master password LAST -- chpass(1), passwd(1) and vipw(8)
* all use flock(2) on it to block other incarnations of themselves.
* The rename means that everything is unlocked, as the original file
* can no longer be accessed.
*/
mv(pname, changedir(_PATH_MASTERPASSWD, basedir));
exit(0);
}
int
scan(fp, pw, flags)
FILE *fp;
struct passwd *pw;
int *flags;
{
static int lcnt;
static char line[LINE_MAX];
char *p;
if (fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp) == NULL)
return (0);
++lcnt;
/*
* ``... if I swallow anything evil, put your fingers down my
* throat...''
* -- The Who
*/
p = line;
if (*p != '\0' && *(p += strlen(line) - 1) != '\n') {
warnx("line too long");
goto fmt;
}
*p = '\0';
*flags = 0;
if (!pw_scan(line, pw, flags)) {
warnx("at line #%d", lcnt);
fmt: errno = EFTYPE; /* XXX */
error(pname);
}
return (1);
}
void
cp(from, to, mode)
char *from, *to;
mode_t mode;
{
static char buf[MAXBSIZE];
int from_fd, rcount, to_fd, wcount;
if ((from_fd = open(from, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0)
error(from);
if ((to_fd = open(to, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, mode)) < 0)
error(to);
while ((rcount = read(from_fd, buf, MAXBSIZE)) > 0) {
wcount = write(to_fd, buf, rcount);
if (rcount != wcount || wcount == -1) {
int sverrno = errno;
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s to %s", from, to);
errno = sverrno;
error(buf);
}
}
if (rcount < 0) {
int sverrno = errno;
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s to %s", from, to);
errno = sverrno;
error(buf);
}
}
void
mv(from, to)
char *from, *to;
{
char buf[MAXPATHLEN * 2];
if (rename(from, to)) {
int sverrno = errno;
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s to %s", from, to);
errno = sverrno;
error(buf);
}
}
void
error(name)
char *name;
{
warn("%s", name);
cleanup();
exit(1);
}
void
errorx(name)
char *name;
{
warnx("%s", name);
cleanup();
exit(1);
}
void
cleanup()
{
char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
if (clean & FILE_ORIG) {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.orig", pname);
(void)unlink(buf);
}
if (clean & FILE_SECURE) {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.tmp",
changedir(_PATH_SMP_DB, basedir));
(void)unlink(buf);
}
if (clean & FILE_INSECURE) {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.tmp",
changedir(_PATH_MP_DB, basedir));
(void)unlink(buf);
}
}
void
usage()
{
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"usage: pwd_mkdb [-cp] [-d basedir] [-u username] file\n");
exit(1);
}
char *
changedir(path, dir)
char *path, *dir;
{
static char fixed[MAXPATHLEN];
char *p;
if (!dir)
return (path);
p = strrchr(path, '/');
strcpy(fixed, dir);
if (p) {
strcat(fixed, "/");
strcat(fixed, p + 1);
}
return (fixed);
}
void
db_store(fp, oldfp, edp, dp, pw, keytype, username, olduid)
FILE *fp;
FILE *oldfp;
DB *edp;
DB *dp;
struct passwd *pw;
int keytype;
char *username;
uid_t olduid;
{
int flags = 0;
int dbmode, found = 0;
u_int cnt;
char *p, *t, buf[LINE_MAX * 2], tbuf[1024];
DBT data, key;
size_t len;
static int firsttime = 1;
/* If given a username just add that record to the existing db. */
dbmode = username ? 0 : R_NOOVERWRITE;
rewind(fp);
data.data = (u_char *)buf;
key.data = (u_char *)tbuf;
for (cnt = 1; scan(fp, pw, &flags); ++cnt) {
if (firsttime) {
/* Look like YP? */
if ((pw->pw_name[0] == '+') || (pw->pw_name[0] == '-'))
hasyp++;
/* Warn about potentially unsafe uid/gid overrides. */
if (pw->pw_name[0] == '+') {
if (!(flags & _PASSWORD_NOUID) && !pw->pw_uid)
warnx("line %d: superuser override in "
"YP inclusion", cnt);
if (!(flags & _PASSWORD_NOGID) && !pw->pw_gid)
warnx("line %d: wheel override in "
"YP inclusion", cnt);
}
/* Create V7 format password file entry. */
if (oldfp != NULL)
if (fprintf(oldfp, "%s:*:%u:%u:%s:%s:%s\n",
pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid,
pw->pw_gecos, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_shell)
== EOF)
error("write old");
}
/* Are we updating a specific record? */
if (username) {
if (strcmp(username, pw->pw_name) != 0)
continue;
found = 1;
/* If the uid changed, remove the old record by uid. */
if (olduid != UID_MAX && olduid != pw->pw_uid) {
tbuf[0] = _PW_KEYBYUID;
memcpy(tbuf + 1, &olduid, sizeof(olduid));
key.size = sizeof(olduid) + 1;
(edp->del)(dp, &key, 0);
(dp->del)(dp, &key, 0);
}
/* XXX - should check to see if line number changed. */
}
/* Build the key. */
tbuf[0] = keytype;
switch (keytype) {
case _PW_KEYBYNUM:
memmove(tbuf + 1, &cnt, sizeof(cnt));
key.size = sizeof(cnt) + 1;
break;
case _PW_KEYBYNAME:
len = strlen(pw->pw_name);
memmove(tbuf + 1, pw->pw_name, len);
key.size = len + 1;
break;
case _PW_KEYBYUID:
memmove(tbuf + 1, &pw->pw_uid, sizeof(pw->pw_uid));
key.size = sizeof(pw->pw_uid) + 1;
break;
}
#define COMPACT(e) t = e; while ((*p++ = *t++));
/* Create the secure record. */
p = buf;
COMPACT(pw->pw_name);
COMPACT(pw->pw_passwd);
memmove(p, &pw->pw_uid, sizeof(uid_t));
p += sizeof(uid_t);
memmove(p, &pw->pw_gid, sizeof(gid_t));
p += sizeof(gid_t);
memmove(p, &pw->pw_change, sizeof(time_t));
p += sizeof(time_t);
COMPACT(pw->pw_class);
COMPACT(pw->pw_gecos);
COMPACT(pw->pw_dir);
COMPACT(pw->pw_shell);
memmove(p, &pw->pw_expire, sizeof(time_t));
p += sizeof(time_t);
memmove(p, &flags, sizeof(int));
p += sizeof(int);
data.size = p - buf;
/* Write the secure record. */
if ((dp->put)(edp, &key, &data, dbmode) == -1)
error("put");
/* Star out password to make insecure record. */
p = buf + strlen(pw->pw_name) + 1; /* skip pw_name */
len = strlen(pw->pw_passwd);
memset(p, 0, len); /* zero pw_passwd */
t = p + len + 1; /* skip pw_passwd */
*p++ = '*';
*p++ = '\0';
memmove(p, t, data.size - (t - buf));
data.size -= len - 1;
/* Write the insecure record. */
if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, dbmode) == -1)
error("put");
}
if (firsttime) {
firsttime = 0;
if (username && !found && olduid != UID_MAX)
errorx("can't find user in master.passwd");
}
}