File: [local] / src / usr.sbin / pwd_mkdb / pwd_mkdb.c (download)
Revision 1.38, Sun Aug 8 00:05:09 2004 UTC (19 years, 10 months ago) by deraadt
Branch: MAIN
CVS Tags: OPENBSD_4_3_BASE, OPENBSD_4_3, OPENBSD_4_2_BASE, OPENBSD_4_2, OPENBSD_4_1_BASE, OPENBSD_4_1, OPENBSD_4_0_BASE, OPENBSD_4_0, OPENBSD_3_9_BASE, OPENBSD_3_9, OPENBSD_3_8_BASE, OPENBSD_3_8, OPENBSD_3_7_BASE, OPENBSD_3_7, OPENBSD_3_6_BASE, OPENBSD_3_6 Changes since 1.37: +13 -19 lines
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/* $OpenBSD: pwd_mkdb.c,v 1.38 2004/08/08 00:05:09 deraadt Exp $ */
/*-
* Copyright (c) 1991, 1993, 1994
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Jason Downs. All rights reserved.
* Portions Copyright (c) 1998, Todd C. Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef lint
static const char copyright[] =
"@(#) Copyright (c) 1991, 1993, 1994\n\
The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.\n";
#endif /* not lint */
#ifndef lint
#if 0
static const char sccsid[] = "from: @(#)pwd_mkdb.c 8.5 (Berkeley) 4/20/94";
#else
static const char rcsid[] = "$OpenBSD: pwd_mkdb.c,v 1.38 2004/08/08 00:05:09 deraadt Exp $";
#endif
#endif /* not lint */
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <db.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <util.h>
#define INSECURE 1
#define SECURE 2
#define PERM_INSECURE (S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IROTH)
#define PERM_SECURE (S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR)
#define FILE_SECURE 0x01
#define FILE_INSECURE 0x02
#define FILE_ORIG 0x04
#define SHADOW_GROUP "_shadow"
HASHINFO openinfo = {
4096, /* bsize */
32, /* ffactor */
256, /* nelem */
2048 * 1024, /* cachesize */
NULL, /* hash() */
0 /* lorder */
};
static char *pname; /* password file name */
static char *basedir; /* dir holding master.passwd */
static int clean; /* what to remove on cleanup */
static int hasyp; /* are we running YP? */
void cleanup(void);
void error(char *);
void errorx(char *);
void cp(char *, char *, mode_t);
void mv(char *, char *);
int scan(FILE *, struct passwd *, int *);
void usage(void);
char *changedir(char *path, char *dir);
void db_store(FILE *, FILE *, DB *, DB *,struct passwd *, int, char *, uid_t);
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
DB *dp, *edp;
DBT data, key;
FILE *fp, *oldfp = NULL;
struct stat st;
struct passwd pwd;
struct group *grp;
sigset_t set;
uid_t olduid;
gid_t shadow;
int ch, tfd, makeold, secureonly, flags, checkonly;
char *username, buf[MAX(MAXPATHLEN, LINE_MAX * 2)];
flags = checkonly = makeold = secureonly = 0;
username = NULL;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "cd:psu:v")) != -1)
switch (ch) {
case 'c': /* verify only */
checkonly = 1;
break;
case 'd':
basedir = optarg;
if (strlen(basedir) > MAXPATHLEN - 40)
errx(1, "basedir too long");
break;
case 'p': /* create V7 "file.orig" */
makeold = 1;
break;
case 's': /* only update spwd.db */
secureonly = 1;
break;
case 'u': /* only update this record */
username = optarg;
if (strlen(username) > _PW_NAME_LEN)
errx(1, "username too long");
break;
case 'v': /* backward compatible */
break;
case '?':
default:
usage();
}
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
if (argc != 1 || (makeold && secureonly) ||
(username && (*username == '+' || *username == '-')))
usage();
if ((grp = getgrnam(SHADOW_GROUP)) == NULL)
errx(1, "cannot find `%s' in the group database, aborting",
SHADOW_GROUP);
shadow = grp->gr_gid;
/*
* This could be changed to allow the user to interrupt.
* Probably not worth the effort.
*/
sigemptyset(&set);
sigaddset(&set, SIGTSTP);
sigaddset(&set, SIGHUP);
sigaddset(&set, SIGINT);
sigaddset(&set, SIGQUIT);
sigaddset(&set, SIGTERM);
(void)sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &set, (sigset_t *)NULL);
/* We don't care what the user wants. */
(void)umask(0);
if (**argv != '/' && basedir == NULL)
errx(1, "%s must be specified as an absolute path", *argv);
if ((pname = strdup(changedir(*argv, basedir))) == NULL)
err(1, NULL);
/* Open the original password file */
if (!(fp = fopen(pname, "r")))
error(pname);
/* Check only if password database is valid */
if (checkonly) {
u_int cnt;
for (cnt = 1; scan(fp, &pwd, &flags); ++cnt)
;
exit(0);
}
if (fstat(fileno(fp), &st) == -1)
error(pname);
/* Tweak openinfo values for large passwd files. */
if (st.st_size > (off_t)100*1024)
openinfo.cachesize = MIN(st.st_size * 20, (off_t)12*1024*1024);
if (st.st_size / 128 > openinfo.nelem)
openinfo.nelem = st.st_size / 128;
/* If only updating a single record, stash the old uid */
if (username) {
dp = dbopen(_PATH_MP_DB, O_RDONLY, 0, DB_HASH, NULL);
if (dp == NULL)
error(_PATH_MP_DB);
buf[0] = _PW_KEYBYNAME;
strlcpy(buf + 1, username, sizeof(buf) - 1);
key.data = (u_char *)buf;
key.size = strlen(buf + 1) + 1;
if ((dp->get)(dp, &key, &data, 0) == 0) {
char *p = (char *)data.data;
/* Skip to uid field */
while (*p++ != '\0')
;
while (*p++ != '\0')
;
memcpy(&olduid, p, sizeof(olduid));
} else
olduid = UID_MAX;
(dp->close)(dp);
}
/* Open the temporary encrypted password database. */
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.tmp",
changedir(_PATH_SMP_DB, basedir));
if (username) {
cp(changedir(_PATH_SMP_DB, basedir), buf, PERM_SECURE);
edp = dbopen(buf,
O_RDWR, PERM_SECURE, DB_HASH, &openinfo);
} else {
edp = dbopen(buf,
O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, PERM_SECURE, DB_HASH, &openinfo);
}
if (!edp)
error(buf);
if (fchown(edp->fd(edp), (uid_t)-1, shadow) != 0)
warn("%s: unable to set group to %s", _PATH_SMP_DB,
SHADOW_GROUP);
else if (fchmod(edp->fd(edp), PERM_SECURE|S_IRGRP) != 0)
warn("%s: unable to make group readable", _PATH_SMP_DB);
clean |= FILE_SECURE;
/* Open the temporary insecure password database. */
if (!secureonly) {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.tmp",
changedir(_PATH_MP_DB, basedir));
if (username) {
cp(changedir(_PATH_MP_DB, basedir), buf, PERM_INSECURE);
dp = dbopen(buf, O_RDWR, PERM_INSECURE, DB_HASH,
&openinfo);
} else {
dp = dbopen(buf, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, PERM_INSECURE,
DB_HASH, &openinfo);
}
if (dp == NULL)
error(buf);
clean |= FILE_INSECURE;
} else
dp = NULL;
/*
* Open file for old password file. Minor trickiness -- don't want to
* chance the file already existing, since someone (stupidly) might
* still be using this for permission checking. So, open it first and
* fdopen the resulting fd. The resulting file should be readable by
* everyone.
*/
if (makeold) {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.orig", pname);
if ((tfd = open(buf,
O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, PERM_INSECURE)) < 0)
error(buf);
if ((oldfp = fdopen(tfd, "w")) == NULL)
error(buf);
clean |= FILE_ORIG;
}
/*
* The databases actually contain three copies of the original data.
* Each password file entry is converted into a rough approximation
* of a ``struct passwd'', with the strings placed inline. This
* object is then stored as the data for three separate keys. The
* first key * is the pw_name field prepended by the _PW_KEYBYNAME
* character. The second key is the pw_uid field prepended by the
* _PW_KEYBYUID character. The third key is the line number in the
* original file prepended by the _PW_KEYBYNUM character. (The special
* characters are prepended to ensure that the keys do not collide.)
*
* If we see something go by that looks like YP, we save a special
* pointer record, which if YP is enabled in the C lib, will speed
* things up.
*/
/*
* Write the .db files.
* We do this three times, one per key type (for getpw{nam,uid,ent}).
* The first time through we also check for YP, issue warnings
* and save the V7 format passwd file if necessary.
*/
db_store(fp, oldfp, edp, dp, &pwd, _PW_KEYBYNAME, username, olduid);
db_store(fp, oldfp, edp, dp, &pwd, _PW_KEYBYUID, username, olduid);
db_store(fp, oldfp, edp, dp, &pwd, _PW_KEYBYNUM, username, olduid);
/* Store YP token, if needed. */
if (hasyp && !username) {
key.data = (u_char *)_PW_YPTOKEN;
key.size = strlen(_PW_YPTOKEN);
data.data = (u_char *)NULL;
data.size = 0;
if ((edp->put)(edp, &key, &data, R_NOOVERWRITE) == -1)
error("put");
if (dp && (dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, R_NOOVERWRITE) == -1)
error("put");
}
if ((edp->close)(edp))
error("close edp");
if (dp && (dp->close)(dp))
error("close dp");
if (makeold) {
if (fclose(oldfp) == EOF)
error("close old");
}
/* Set master.passwd permissions, in case caller forgot. */
(void)fchmod(fileno(fp), S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR);
if (fclose(fp) != 0)
error("fclose");
/* Install as the real password files. */
if (!secureonly) {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.tmp",
changedir(_PATH_MP_DB, basedir));
mv(buf, changedir(_PATH_MP_DB, basedir));
}
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.tmp",
changedir(_PATH_SMP_DB, basedir));
mv(buf, changedir(_PATH_SMP_DB, basedir));
if (makeold) {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.orig", pname);
mv(buf, changedir(_PATH_PASSWD, basedir));
}
/*
* Move the master password LAST -- chpass(1), passwd(1) and vipw(8)
* all use flock(2) on it to block other incarnations of themselves.
* The rename means that everything is unlocked, as the original file
* can no longer be accessed.
*/
mv(pname, changedir(_PATH_MASTERPASSWD, basedir));
exit(0);
}
int
scan(FILE *fp, struct passwd *pw, int *flags)
{
static int lcnt;
static char line[LINE_MAX];
char *p;
if (fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp) == NULL)
return (0);
++lcnt;
/*
* ``... if I swallow anything evil, put your fingers down my
* throat...''
* -- The Who
*/
p = line;
if (*p != '\0' && *(p += strlen(line) - 1) != '\n') {
warnx("line too long");
goto fmt;
}
*p = '\0';
*flags = 0;
if (!pw_scan(line, pw, flags)) {
warnx("at line #%d", lcnt);
fmt: errno = EFTYPE; /* XXX */
error(pname);
}
return (1);
}
void
cp(char *from, char *to, mode_t mode)
{
static char buf[MAXBSIZE];
int from_fd, rcount, to_fd, wcount;
if ((from_fd = open(from, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0)
error(from);
if ((to_fd = open(to, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, mode)) < 0)
error(to);
while ((rcount = read(from_fd, buf, MAXBSIZE)) > 0) {
wcount = write(to_fd, buf, rcount);
if (rcount != wcount || wcount == -1) {
int sverrno = errno;
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s to %s", from, to);
errno = sverrno;
error(buf);
}
}
if (rcount < 0) {
int sverrno = errno;
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s to %s", from, to);
errno = sverrno;
error(buf);
}
}
void
mv(char *from, char *to)
{
char buf[MAXPATHLEN * 2];
if (rename(from, to)) {
int sverrno = errno;
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s to %s", from, to);
errno = sverrno;
error(buf);
}
}
void
error(char *name)
{
warn("%s", name);
cleanup();
exit(1);
}
void
errorx(char *name)
{
warnx("%s", name);
cleanup();
exit(1);
}
void
cleanup(void)
{
char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
if (clean & FILE_ORIG) {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.orig", pname);
(void)unlink(buf);
}
if (clean & FILE_SECURE) {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.tmp",
changedir(_PATH_SMP_DB, basedir));
(void)unlink(buf);
}
if (clean & FILE_INSECURE) {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.tmp",
changedir(_PATH_MP_DB, basedir));
(void)unlink(buf);
}
}
void
usage(void)
{
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"usage: pwd_mkdb [-c] [-p | -s] [-d basedir] [-u username] file\n");
exit(1);
}
char *
changedir(char *path, char *dir)
{
static char fixed[MAXPATHLEN];
char *p;
if (!dir)
return (path);
if ((p = strrchr(path, '/')) != NULL)
path = p + 1;
snprintf(fixed, sizeof(fixed), "%s/%s", dir, path);
return (fixed);
}
void
db_store(FILE *fp, FILE *oldfp, DB *edp, DB *dp, struct passwd *pw,
int keytype, char *username, uid_t olduid)
{
char *p, *t, buf[LINE_MAX * 2], tbuf[1024];
int flags = 0, dbmode, found = 0;
static int firsttime = 1;
DBT data, key;
size_t len;
u_int cnt;
/* If given a username just add that record to the existing db. */
dbmode = username ? 0 : R_NOOVERWRITE;
rewind(fp);
data.data = (u_char *)buf;
key.data = (u_char *)tbuf;
for (cnt = 1; scan(fp, pw, &flags); ++cnt) {
if (firsttime) {
/* Look like YP? */
if ((pw->pw_name[0] == '+') || (pw->pw_name[0] == '-'))
hasyp++;
/* Warn about potentially unsafe uid/gid overrides. */
if (pw->pw_name[0] == '+') {
if (!(flags & _PASSWORD_NOUID) && !pw->pw_uid)
warnx("line %d: superuser override in "
"YP inclusion", cnt);
if (!(flags & _PASSWORD_NOGID) && !pw->pw_gid)
warnx("line %d: wheel override in "
"YP inclusion", cnt);
}
/* Create V7 format password file entry. */
if (oldfp != NULL)
if (fprintf(oldfp, "%s:*:%u:%u:%s:%s:%s\n",
pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid,
pw->pw_gecos, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_shell)
== EOF)
error("write old");
}
/* Are we updating a specific record? */
if (username) {
if (strcmp(username, pw->pw_name) != 0)
continue;
found = 1;
/* If the uid changed, remove the old record by uid. */
if (olduid != UID_MAX && olduid != pw->pw_uid) {
tbuf[0] = _PW_KEYBYUID;
memcpy(tbuf + 1, &olduid, sizeof(olduid));
key.size = sizeof(olduid) + 1;
(edp->del)(edp, &key, 0);
if (dp)
(dp->del)(dp, &key, 0);
}
/* XXX - should check to see if line number changed. */
}
/* Build the key. */
tbuf[0] = keytype;
switch (keytype) {
case _PW_KEYBYNUM:
memmove(tbuf + 1, &cnt, sizeof(cnt));
key.size = sizeof(cnt) + 1;
break;
case _PW_KEYBYNAME:
len = strlen(pw->pw_name);
memmove(tbuf + 1, pw->pw_name, len);
key.size = len + 1;
break;
case _PW_KEYBYUID:
memmove(tbuf + 1, &pw->pw_uid, sizeof(pw->pw_uid));
key.size = sizeof(pw->pw_uid) + 1;
break;
}
#define COMPACT(e) t = e; while ((*p++ = *t++));
/* Create the secure record. */
p = buf;
COMPACT(pw->pw_name);
COMPACT(pw->pw_passwd);
memmove(p, &pw->pw_uid, sizeof(uid_t));
p += sizeof(uid_t);
memmove(p, &pw->pw_gid, sizeof(gid_t));
p += sizeof(gid_t);
memmove(p, &pw->pw_change, sizeof(time_t));
p += sizeof(time_t);
COMPACT(pw->pw_class);
COMPACT(pw->pw_gecos);
COMPACT(pw->pw_dir);
COMPACT(pw->pw_shell);
memmove(p, &pw->pw_expire, sizeof(time_t));
p += sizeof(time_t);
memmove(p, &flags, sizeof(int));
p += sizeof(int);
data.size = p - buf;
/* Write the secure record. */
if ((edp->put)(edp, &key, &data, dbmode) == -1)
error("put");
if (dp == NULL)
continue;
/* Star out password to make insecure record. */
p = buf + strlen(pw->pw_name) + 1; /* skip pw_name */
len = strlen(pw->pw_passwd);
memset(p, 0, len); /* zero pw_passwd */
t = p + len + 1; /* skip pw_passwd */
if (len != 0)
*p++ = '*';
*p++ = '\0';
memmove(p, t, data.size - (t - buf));
data.size -= len - 1;
/* Write the insecure record. */
if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, dbmode) == -1)
error("put");
}
if (firsttime) {
firsttime = 0;
if (username && !found && olduid != UID_MAX)
errorx("can't find user in master.passwd");
}
}