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version 1.25, 2003/04/03 14:41:12 version 1.26, 2003/04/19 08:13:26
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 <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">  p<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
 <html>  <html>
 <head>  <head>
 <title>OpenBSD 3.3 Release</title>  <title>OpenBSD 3.3 Release</title>
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 <ul>  <ul>
 <li>Integration of the  <li>Integration of the
 <a href="http://www.trl.ibm.com/projects/security/ssp">ProPolice</a>  <a href="http://www.trl.ibm.com/projects/security/ssp">ProPolice</a>
 stack protection technology into the system compiler. This protection is  stack protection technology, by Hiroaki Etoh, into the system
 enabled by default.  With this change, function prologues are modified  compiler. This protection is enabled by default.  With this change,
 to rearrange the stack: a random canary is placed before the return  function prologues are modified to rearrange the stack: a random
 address, and buffer variables are moved closer to the canary so that  canary is placed before the return address, and buffer variables are
 regular variables are below, and harder to smash.  The function  moved closer to the canary so that regular variables are below, and
 epilogue then checks if the canary is still intact.  If it is not,  harder to smash.  The function epilogue then checks if the canary is
 the process is terminated.  This change makes it very hard for an  still intact.  If it is not, the process is terminated.  This change
 attacker to modify the return address used when returning from a  makes it very hard for an attacker to modify the return address used
 function.  when returning from a function.
 <p>  <p>
   
 <li>W^X (pronounced: "W xor X") on architectures capable of  <li>W^X (pronounced: "W xor X") on architectures capable of
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 executable at the same time and vice versa.  This raises the bar on  executable at the same time and vice versa.  This raises the bar on
 potential buffer overflows and other attacks: as a result, an attacker  potential buffer overflows and other attacks: as a result, an attacker
 is unable to write code anywhere in memory where it can be executed.  is unable to write code anywhere in memory where it can be executed.
 (NOTE: i386 and powerpc do not support W^X in 3.3; however, 3.4 will  (NOTE: i386 and powerpc do not support W^X in 3.3; however, 3.3-current
 make this change on those architectures as well).  already supports it on i386, and both these processors are expected to
   support this change in 3.4).
 <p>  <p>
   
 <li>Still more reduction in setuid and setgid binaries, and more chroot  <li>Still more reduction in setuid and setgid binaries, and more chroot

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