=================================================================== RCS file: /cvsrepo/anoncvs/cvs/www/62.html,v retrieving revision 1.52 retrieving revision 1.53 diff -c -r1.52 -r1.53 *** www/62.html 2017/10/05 00:26:55 1.52 --- www/62.html 2017/10/05 03:55:02 1.53 *************** *** 18,25 **** 6.2 ! ! Released October 15, 2017
Copyright 1997-2017, Theo de Raadt.

--- 18,25 ---- 6.2 ! ! Released October 15, 2017
Copyright 1997-2017, Theo de Raadt.

*************** *** 61,76 **** to 6.2.

*************** *** 234,244 **** mail(1) were rewritten to cope with the removal.

  • Trapsleds, a new mitigation that significantly reduces the amount of ! nops in the instruction stream, converting them to traps, making it ! harder to target potential gadgets.
  • Kernel Address Randomized Link (KARL), a new "link-kit" allows the .o files of the kernel to be relinked in a random order, creating a unique ! kernel for each boot.
  • Like with libc previously, rc(8) re-links libcrypto on startup, placing the objects in a random order. --- 224,236 ---- mail(1) were rewritten to cope with the removal.
  • Trapsleds, a new mitigation that significantly reduces the amount of ! nops in the instruction stream, replacing them with trap instructions ! or jump-over-trap sequences, thereby requiring greater accuracy for ! targetting potential gadgets.
  • Kernel Address Randomized Link (KARL), a new "link-kit" allows the .o files of the kernel to be relinked in a random order, creating a unique ! kernel for each boot. /bsd is now non-readable to users, to try to ! keep the secret.
  • Like with libc previously, rc(8) re-links libcrypto on startup, placing the objects in a random order. *************** *** 263,268 **** --- 255,271 ----
  • Tighter pledge for at(1).
  • Fixed and simplified pledge logic for nc(1). +
  • More application of recallocarray(3) in userland, and tracked sizes + to free(9) in the kernel. +
  • Achieve higher levels of paranoia regarding structure packing, and + clear many kernel objects before passing to userland. +
  • Disable some optimizations in clang(1) due to incompatibility + with security. +
  • For instance, cope with clang(1)'s assumption that static or const + objects placed in unknown sections (such as .openbsd.randomdata) + are surely always 0, and therefore such memory accesses can be + optimized away.. +
  • In kernel, randomly bias down the top-of-stack per kthread.

    *************** *** 345,350 **** --- 348,358 ----

  • Assorted improvements: *************** *** 512,522 ****