===================================================================
RCS file: /cvsrepo/anoncvs/cvs/www/71.html,v
retrieving revision 1.49
retrieving revision 1.50
diff -c -r1.49 -r1.50
*** www/71.html	2022/04/15 04:57:20	1.49
--- www/71.html	2022/04/15 05:31:17	1.50
***************
*** 1078,1084 ****
    <li>Security
    <ul>
      <!-- OpenSSH 8.9 -->
!     <li>Near miss in sshd(8):
          fix an integer overflow in the user authentication path
          that, in conjunction with other logic errors, could have yielded
          unauthenticated access under difficult to exploit conditions.<br>
--- 1078,1084 ----
    <li>Security
    <ul>
      <!-- OpenSSH 8.9 -->
!     <li>Near miss in <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8>sshd(8)</a>:
          fix an integer overflow in the user authentication path
          that, in conjunction with other logic errors, could have yielded
          unauthenticated access under difficult to exploit conditions.<br>
***************
*** 1097,1139 ****
    <li>New features
    <ul>
      <!-- OpenSSH 8.9 -->
!     <li>ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1): add a system for
!         restricting forwarding and use of keys added to ssh-agent(1)
          A detailed description of the feature is available at
          https://www.openssh.com/agent-restrict.html and the protocol
          extensions are documented in the PROTOCOL and PROTOCOL.agent
          files in the source release.
!     <li>ssh(1), sshd(8): add the sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com hybrid
          ECDH/x25519 + Streamlined NTRU Prime post-quantum KEX to the
          default KEXAlgorithms list (after the ECDH methods but before the
          prime-group DH ones).
!     <li>ssh-keygen(1): when downloading resident keys from a FIDO token,
          pass back the user ID that was used when the key was created and
          append it to the filename the key is written to (if it is not the
          default). Avoids keys being clobbered if the user created multiple
          resident keys with the same application string but different user
          IDs.
!     <li>ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): better handling for FIDO keys
          on tokens that provide user verification (UV) on the device itself,
          including biometric keys, avoiding unnecessary PIN prompts.
!     <li>ssh-keygen(1): add "ssh-keygen -Y match-principals" operation to
          perform matching of principals names against an allowed signers
          file. To be used towards a TOFU model for SSH signatures in git.
!     <li>ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1): allow pin-required FIDO keys to be added
!         to ssh-agent(1). $SSH_ASKPASS will be used to request the PIN at
!         authentication time.
!     <li>ssh-keygen(1): allow selection of hash at sshsig signing time
          (either sha512 (default) or sha256).
!     <li>ssh(1), sshd(8): read network data directly to the packet input
          buffer instead of indirectly via a small stack buffer. Provides a
          modest performance improvement.
!     <li>ssh(1), sshd(8): read data directly to the channel input buffer,
          providing a similar modest performance improvement.
!     <li>ssh(1): extend the PubkeyAuthentication configuration directive to
          accept yes|no|unbound|host-bound to allow control over one of the
          protocol extensions used to implement agent-restricted keys.
      <!-- OpenSSH 9.0 -->
!     <li>ssh(1), sshd(8): use the hybrid Streamlined NTRU Prime + x25519 key
          exchange method by default ("sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com").
          The NTRU algorithm is believed to resist attacks enabled by future
          quantum computers and is paired with the X25519 ECDH key exchange
--- 1097,1159 ----
    <li>New features
    <ul>
      <!-- OpenSSH 8.9 -->
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1>ssh(1)</a>,
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8>sshd(8)</a>,
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-add.1>ssh-add(1)</a>,
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-agent.1>ssh-agent(1)</a>:
!         add a system for restricting forwarding and use of keys added to
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-agent.1>ssh-agent(1)</a>
          A detailed description of the feature is available at
          https://www.openssh.com/agent-restrict.html and the protocol
          extensions are documented in the PROTOCOL and PROTOCOL.agent
          files in the source release.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1>ssh(1)</a>,
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8>sshd(8)</a>:
!         add the sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com hybrid
          ECDH/x25519 + Streamlined NTRU Prime post-quantum KEX to the
          default KEXAlgorithms list (after the ECDH methods but before the
          prime-group DH ones).
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-keygen.1>ssh-keygen(1)</a>:
!         when downloading resident keys from a FIDO token,
          pass back the user ID that was used when the key was created and
          append it to the filename the key is written to (if it is not the
          default). Avoids keys being clobbered if the user created multiple
          resident keys with the same application string but different user
          IDs.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-keygen.1>ssh-keygen(1)</a>,
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1>ssh(1)</a>,
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-agent.1>ssh-agent(1)</a>:
!         better handling for FIDO keys
          on tokens that provide user verification (UV) on the device itself,
          including biometric keys, avoiding unnecessary PIN prompts.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-keygen.1>ssh-keygen(1)</a>: add "ssh-keygen -Y match-principals" operation to
          perform matching of principals names against an allowed signers
          file. To be used towards a TOFU model for SSH signatures in git.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-add.1>ssh-add(1)</a>,
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-agent.1>ssh-agent(1)</a>:
!         allow pin-required FIDO keys to be added
!         to <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-agent.1>ssh-agent(1)</a>.
!         $SSH_ASKPASS will be used to request the PIN at authentication time.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-keygen.1>ssh-keygen(1)</a>:
!         allow selection of hash at sshsig signing time
          (either sha512 (default) or sha256).
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1>ssh(1)</a>,
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8>sshd(8)</a>:
!         read network data directly to the packet input
          buffer instead of indirectly via a small stack buffer. Provides a
          modest performance improvement.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1>ssh(1)</a>,
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8>sshd(8)</a>:
!         read data directly to the channel input buffer,
          providing a similar modest performance improvement.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1>ssh(1)</a>:
!         extend the PubkeyAuthentication configuration directive to
          accept yes|no|unbound|host-bound to allow control over one of the
          protocol extensions used to implement agent-restricted keys.
      <!-- OpenSSH 9.0 -->
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1>ssh(1)</a>,
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8>sshd(8)</a>:
!         use the hybrid Streamlined NTRU Prime + x25519 key
          exchange method by default ("sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com").
          The NTRU algorithm is believed to resist attacks enabled by future
          quantum computers and is paired with the X25519 ECDH key exchange
***************
*** 1146,1248 ****
          later" attacks where an adversary who can record and store SSH
          session ciphertext would be able to decrypt it once a sufficiently
          advanced quantum computer is available.
!     <li>sftp-server(8): support the "copy-data" extension to allow server-
          side copying of files/data, following the design in
          draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-extensions-00.
!     <li>sftp(1): add a "cp" command to allow the sftp client to perform
          server-side file copies.
    </ul>
-   </ul>
- 
    <li>Bugfixes
    <ul>
      <!-- OpenSSH 8.9 -->
!     <li>sshd(8): document that CASignatureAlgorithms, ExposeAuthInfo and
          PubkeyAuthOptions can be used in a Match block.
!     <li>sshd(8): fix possible string truncation when constructing paths to
          .rhosts/.shosts files with very long user home directory names.
      <li>ssh-keysign(1): unbreak for KEX algorithms that use SHA384/512
          exchange hashes
!     <li>ssh(1): don't put the TTY into raw mode when SessionType=none,
          avoids ^C being unable to kill such a session.
!     <li>scp(1): fix some corner-case bugs in SFTP-mode handling of
          ~-prefixed paths.
!     <li>ssh(1): unbreak hostbased auth using RSA keys. Allow ssh(1) to
          select RSA keys when only RSA/SHA2 signature algorithms are
          configured (this is the default case). Previously RSA keys were
          not being considered in the default case.
      <li>ssh-keysign(1): make ssh-keysign use the requested signature
          algorithm and not the default for the key type. Part of unbreaking
          hostbased auth for RSA/SHA2 keys.
!     <li>ssh(1): stricter UpdateHostkey signature verification logic on
          the client- side. Require RSA/SHA2 signatures for RSA hostkeys
          except when RSA/SHA1 was explicitly negotiated during initial
          KEX
!     <li>ssh(1), sshd(8): fix signature algorithm selection logic for
          UpdateHostkeys on the server side. The previous code tried to
          prefer RSA/SHA2 for hostkey proofs of RSA keys, but missed some
          cases. This will use RSA/SHA2 signatures for RSA keys if the
          client proposed these algorithms in initial KEX.
      <li>All: convert all uses of select(2)/pselect(2) to poll(2)/ppoll(2).
!         This includes the mainloops in ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-agent(1)
!         and sftp-server(8), as well as the sshd(8) listen loop and all
          other FD read/writability checks. On platforms with missing or
          broken poll(2)/ppoll(2) syscalls a select(2)-based compat shim is
          available.
!     <li>ssh-keygen(1): the "-Y find-principals" command was verifying key
          validity when using ca certs but not with simple key lifetimes
          within the allowed signers file.
!     <li>ssh-keygen(1): make sshsig verify-time argument parsing optional
!     <li>sshd(8): fix truncation in rhosts/shosts path construction.
!     <li>ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): avoid xmalloc(0) for PKCS#11 keyid for ECDSA
          keys (we already did this for RSA keys). Avoids fatal errors for
          PKCS#11 libraries that return empty keyid, e.g. Microchip ATECC608B
          "cryptoauthlib"
!     <li>ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): improve the testing of credentials against
          inserted FIDO: ask the token whether a particular key belongs to
          it in cases where the token supports on-token user-verification
          (e.g. biometrics) rather than just assuming that it will accept it.<br>
          Will reduce spurious "Confirm user presence" notifications for key
          handles that relate to FIDO keys that are not currently inserted in at
          least some cases.
!     <li>ssh(1), sshd(8): correct value for IPTOS_DSCP_LE. It needs to
          allow for the preceding two ECN bits.
!     <li>ssh-keygen(1): add missing -O option to usage() for the "-Y sign"
!         option.
!     <li>ssh-keygen(1): fix a NULL deref when using the find-principals
          function, when matching an allowed_signers line that contains a
          namespace restriction, but no restriction specified on the
          command-line
!     <li>ssh-agent(1): fix memleak in process_extension(); oss-fuzz
!         issue #42719
!     <li>ssh(1): suppress "Connection to xxx closed" messages when LogLevel
          is set to "error" or above.
!     <li>ssh(1), sshd(8): use correct zlib flags when inflate(3)-ing
!         compressed packet data.
!     <li>scp(1): when recursively transferring files in SFTP mode, create the
!         destination directory if it doesn't already exist to match scp(1) in
          legacy RCP mode behaviour.
!     <li>scp(1): many improvements in error message consistency between scp(1)
          in SFTP mode vs legacy RCP mode.
!     <li>sshd(8): fix potential race in SIGTERM handling
!     <li>ssh(1), ssh(8): since DSA keys are deprecated, move them to the
!         end of the default list of public keys so that they will be tried
!         last.
!     <li>ssh-keygen(1): allow 'ssh-keygen -Y find-principals' to match
          wildcard principals in allowed_signers files
      <!-- OpenSSH 9.0 -->
!     <li>ssh(1), sshd(8): upstream: fix poll(2) spin when a channel's output
          fd closes without data in the channel buffer.
!     <li>sshd(8): pack pollfd array in server listen/accept loop. Could
          cause the server to hang/spin when MaxStartups &gt; RLIMIT_NOFILE
!     <li>ssh-keygen(1): avoid NULL deref via the find-principals and
!         check-novalidate operations.
!     <li>scp(1): fix a memory leak in argument processing.
!     <li>sshd(8): don't try to resolve ListenAddress directives in the sshd
          re-exec path. They are unused after re-exec and parsing errors
          (possible for example if the host's network configuration changed)
          could prevent connections from being accepted.
!     <li>sshd(8): when refusing a public key authentication request from a
          client for using an unapproved or unsupported signature algorithm
          include the algorithm name in the log message to make debugging
          easier.
--- 1166,1307 ----
          later" attacks where an adversary who can record and store SSH
          session ciphertext would be able to decrypt it once a sufficiently
          advanced quantum computer is available.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/sftp-server.8>sftp-server(8)</a>:
!         support the "copy-data" extension to allow server-
          side copying of files/data, following the design in
          draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-extensions-00.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/sftp.1>sftp(1)</a>:
!         add a "cp" command to allow the sftp client to perform
          server-side file copies.
    </ul>
    <li>Bugfixes
    <ul>
      <!-- OpenSSH 8.9 -->
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8>sshd(8)</a>:
!         document that CASignatureAlgorithms, ExposeAuthInfo and
          PubkeyAuthOptions can be used in a Match block.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8>sshd(8)</a>:
!         fix possible string truncation when constructing paths to
          .rhosts/.shosts files with very long user home directory names.
      <li>ssh-keysign(1): unbreak for KEX algorithms that use SHA384/512
          exchange hashes
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1>ssh(1)</a>:
!         don't put the TTY into raw mode when SessionType=none,
          avoids ^C being unable to kill such a session.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/scp.1>scp(1)</a>:
!         fix some corner-case bugs in SFTP-mode handling of
          ~-prefixed paths.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1>ssh(1)</a>:
!         unbreak hostbased auth using RSA keys. Allow
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1>ssh(1)</a> to
          select RSA keys when only RSA/SHA2 signature algorithms are
          configured (this is the default case). Previously RSA keys were
          not being considered in the default case.
      <li>ssh-keysign(1): make ssh-keysign use the requested signature
          algorithm and not the default for the key type. Part of unbreaking
          hostbased auth for RSA/SHA2 keys.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1>ssh(1)</a>:
!         stricter UpdateHostkey signature verification logic on
          the client- side. Require RSA/SHA2 signatures for RSA hostkeys
          except when RSA/SHA1 was explicitly negotiated during initial
          KEX
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1>ssh(1)</a>,
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8>sshd(8)</a>:
!         fix signature algorithm selection logic for
          UpdateHostkeys on the server side. The previous code tried to
          prefer RSA/SHA2 for hostkey proofs of RSA keys, but missed some
          cases. This will use RSA/SHA2 signatures for RSA keys if the
          client proposed these algorithms in initial KEX.
      <li>All: convert all uses of select(2)/pselect(2) to poll(2)/ppoll(2).
!         This includes the mainloops in
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1>ssh(1)</a>,
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-agent.1>ssh-agent(1)</a>,
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-agent.1>ssh-agent(1)</a>
!         and <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/sftp-server.8>sftp-server(8)</a>,
!         as well as the <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8>sshd(8)</a>
!         listen loop and all
          other FD read/writability checks. On platforms with missing or
          broken poll(2)/ppoll(2) syscalls a select(2)-based compat shim is
          available.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-keygen.1>ssh-keygen(1)</a>:
!         the "-Y find-principals" command was verifying key
          validity when using ca certs but not with simple key lifetimes
          within the allowed signers file.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-keygen.1>ssh-keygen(1)</a>:
!         make sshsig verify-time argument parsing optional
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8>sshd(8)</a>:
!         fix truncation in rhosts/shosts path construction.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1>ssh(1)</a>,
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-agent.1>ssh-agent(1)</a>:
!         avoid xmalloc(0) for PKCS#11 keyid for ECDSA
          keys (we already did this for RSA keys). Avoids fatal errors for
          PKCS#11 libraries that return empty keyid, e.g. Microchip ATECC608B
          "cryptoauthlib"
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1>ssh(1)</a>,
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-agent.1>ssh-agent(1)</a>:
!         improve the testing of credentials against
          inserted FIDO: ask the token whether a particular key belongs to
          it in cases where the token supports on-token user-verification
          (e.g. biometrics) rather than just assuming that it will accept it.<br>
          Will reduce spurious "Confirm user presence" notifications for key
          handles that relate to FIDO keys that are not currently inserted in at
          least some cases.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1>ssh(1)</a>,
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8>sshd(8)</a>:
!         correct value for IPTOS_DSCP_LE. It needs to
          allow for the preceding two ECN bits.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-keygen.1>ssh-keygen(1)</a>:
!         add missing -O option to usage() for the "-Y sign" option.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-keygen.1>ssh-keygen(1)</a>:
!         fix a NULL deref when using the find-principals
          function, when matching an allowed_signers line that contains a
          namespace restriction, but no restriction specified on the
          command-line
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-agent.1>ssh-agent(1)</a>:
!         fix memleak in process_extension(); oss-fuzz issue #42719
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1>ssh(1)</a>:
!         suppress "Connection to xxx closed" messages when LogLevel
          is set to "error" or above.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1>ssh(1)</a>,
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8>sshd(8)</a>:
!         use correct zlib flags when inflate(3)-ing compressed packet data.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/scp.1>scp(1)</a>:
!         when recursively transferring files in SFTP mode, create the
!         destination directory if it doesn't already exist to match
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/scp.1>scp(1)</a> in
          legacy RCP mode behaviour.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/scp.1>scp(1)</a>:
!         many improvements in error message consistency between
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/scp.1>scp(1)</a>
          in SFTP mode vs legacy RCP mode.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8>sshd(8)</a>:
!         fix potential race in SIGTERM handling
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1>ssh(1)</a>,
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8>sshd(8))</a>:
!         since DSA keys are deprecated, move them to the end of the default
!         list of public keys so that they will be tried last.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-keygen.1>ssh-keygen(1)</a>:
!         allow 'ssh-keygen -Y find-principals' to match
          wildcard principals in allowed_signers files
      <!-- OpenSSH 9.0 -->
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1>ssh(1)</a>,
!         <a href=https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8>sshd(8)</a>:
!         upstream: fix poll(2) spin when a channel's output
          fd closes without data in the channel buffer.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8>sshd(8)</a>:
!         pack pollfd array in server listen/accept loop. Could
          cause the server to hang/spin when MaxStartups &gt; RLIMIT_NOFILE
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-keygen.1>ssh-keygen(1)</a>:
!         avoid NULL deref via the find-principals and check-novalidate operations.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/scp.1>scp(1)</a>:
!         fix a memory leak in argument processing.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8>sshd(8)</a>:
!         don't try to resolve ListenAddress directives in the sshd
          re-exec path. They are unused after re-exec and parsing errors
          (possible for example if the host's network configuration changed)
          could prevent connections from being accepted.
!     <li><a href=https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8>sshd(8)</a>:
!         when refusing a public key authentication request from a
          client for using an unapproved or unsupported signature algorithm
          include the algorithm name in the log message to make debugging
          easier.