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version 1.46, 2022/04/14 20:59:01 version 1.47, 2022/04/15 04:36:09
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  <ul>   <ul>
   <li>Security    <li>Security
   <ul>    <ul>
     <li>...      <!-- OpenSSH 8.9 -->
       <li>Near miss in sshd(8):
           fix an integer overflow in the user authentication path
           that, in conjunction with other logic errors, could have yielded
           unauthenticated access under difficult to exploit conditions.<br>
           This situation is not exploitable because of independent checks in
           the privilege separation monitor. Privilege separation has been
           enabled by default in since openssh-3.2.2 (released in 2002) and
           has been mandatory since openssh-7.5 (released in 2017).<br>
           Thanks to Malcolm Stagg for finding and reporting this bug.
   </ul>    </ul>
   <li>Potentially incompatible changes    <li>Potentially incompatible changes
   <ul>    <ul>
     <li>...      <!-- OpenSSH 8.9 -->
       <li>In OpenSSH 8.9 the FIDO security key middleware interface
           changed and increments SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR.
   </ul>    </ul>
   
   <li>New features    <li>New features
   <ul>    <ul>
     <li>...      <!-- OpenSSH 8.9 -->
       <li>ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1): add a system for
           restricting forwarding and use of keys added to ssh-agent(1)
           A detailed description of the feature is available at
           https://www.openssh.com/agent-restrict.html and the protocol
           extensions are documented in the PROTOCOL and PROTOCOL.agent
           files in the source release.
       <li>ssh(1), sshd(8): add the sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com hybrid
           ECDH/x25519 + Streamlined NTRU Prime post-quantum KEX to the
           default KEXAlgorithms list (after the ECDH methods but before the
           prime-group DH ones).
       <li>ssh-keygen(1): when downloading resident keys from a FIDO token,
           pass back the user ID that was used when the key was created and
           append it to the filename the key is written to (if it is not the
           default). Avoids keys being clobbered if the user created multiple
           resident keys with the same application string but different user
           IDs.
       <li>ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): better handling for FIDO keys
           on tokens that provide user verification (UV) on the device itself,
           including biometric keys, avoiding unnecessary PIN prompts.
       <li>ssh-keygen(1): add "ssh-keygen -Y match-principals" operation to
           perform matching of principals names against an allowed signers
           file. To be used towards a TOFU model for SSH signatures in git.
       <li>ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1): allow pin-required FIDO keys to be added
           to ssh-agent(1). $SSH_ASKPASS will be used to request the PIN at
           authentication time.
       <li>ssh-keygen(1): allow selection of hash at sshsig signing time
           (either sha512 (default) or sha256).
       <li>ssh(1), sshd(8): read network data directly to the packet input
           buffer instead of indirectly via a small stack buffer. Provides a
           modest performance improvement.
       <li>ssh(1), sshd(8): read data directly to the channel input buffer,
           providing a similar modest performance improvement.
       <li>ssh(1): extend the PubkeyAuthentication configuration directive to
           accept yes|no|unbound|host-bound to allow control over one of the
           protocol extensions used to implement agent-restricted keys.
       <!-- OpenSSH 9.0 -->
       <li>ssh(1), sshd(8): use the hybrid Streamlined NTRU Prime + x25519 key
           exchange method by default ("sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com").
           The NTRU algorithm is believed to resist attacks enabled by future
           quantum computers and is paired with the X25519 ECDH key exchange
           (the previous default) as a backstop against any weaknesses in
           NTRU Prime that may be discovered in the future. The combination
           ensures that the hybrid exchange offers at least as good security
           as the status quo.<br>
           We are making this change now (i.e. ahead of cryptographically-
           relevant quantum computers) to prevent "capture now, decrypt
           later" attacks where an adversary who can record and store SSH
           session ciphertext would be able to decrypt it once a sufficiently
           advanced quantum computer is available.
       <li>sftp-server(8): support the "copy-data" extension to allow server-
           side copying of files/data, following the design in
           draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-extensions-00.
       <li>sftp(1): add a "cp" command to allow the sftp client to perform
           server-side file copies.
   </ul>    </ul>
     </ul>
   
   <li>Bugfixes    <li>Bugfixes
   <ul>    <ul>
     <li>...      <!-- OpenSSH 8.9 -->
       <li>sshd(8): document that CASignatureAlgorithms, ExposeAuthInfo and
           PubkeyAuthOptions can be used in a Match block.
       <li>sshd(8): fix possible string truncation when constructing paths to
           .rhosts/.shosts files with very long user home directory names.
       <li>ssh-keysign(1): unbreak for KEX algorithms that use SHA384/512
           exchange hashes
       <li>ssh(1): don't put the TTY into raw mode when SessionType=none,
           avoids ^C being unable to kill such a session.
       <li>scp(1): fix some corner-case bugs in SFTP-mode handling of
           ~-prefixed paths.
       <li>ssh(1): unbreak hostbased auth using RSA keys. Allow ssh(1) to
           select RSA keys when only RSA/SHA2 signature algorithms are
           configured (this is the default case). Previously RSA keys were
           not being considered in the default case.
       <li>ssh-keysign(1): make ssh-keysign use the requested signature
           algorithm and not the default for the key type. Part of unbreaking
           hostbased auth for RSA/SHA2 keys.
       <li>ssh(1): stricter UpdateHostkey signature verification logic on
           the client- side. Require RSA/SHA2 signatures for RSA hostkeys
           except when RSA/SHA1 was explicitly negotiated during initial
           KEX
       <li>ssh(1), sshd(8): fix signature algorithm selection logic for
           UpdateHostkeys on the server side. The previous code tried to
           prefer RSA/SHA2 for hostkey proofs of RSA keys, but missed some
           cases. This will use RSA/SHA2 signatures for RSA keys if the
           client proposed these algorithms in initial KEX.
       <li>All: convert all uses of select(2)/pselect(2) to poll(2)/ppoll(2).
           This includes the mainloops in ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-agent(1)
           and sftp-server(8), as well as the sshd(8) listen loop and all
           other FD read/writability checks. On platforms with missing or
           broken poll(2)/ppoll(2) syscalls a select(2)-based compat shim is
           available.
       <li>ssh-keygen(1): the "-Y find-principals" command was verifying key
           validity when using ca certs but not with simple key lifetimes
           within the allowed signers file.
       <li>ssh-keygen(1): make sshsig verify-time argument parsing optional
       <li>sshd(8): fix truncation in rhosts/shosts path construction.
       <li>ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): avoid xmalloc(0) for PKCS#11 keyid for ECDSA
           keys (we already did this for RSA keys). Avoids fatal errors for
           PKCS#11 libraries that return empty keyid, e.g. Microchip ATECC608B
           "cryptoauthlib"
       <li>ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): improve the testing of credentials against
           inserted FIDO: ask the token whether a particular key belongs to
           it in cases where the token supports on-token user-verification
           (e.g. biometrics) rather than just assuming that it will accept it.<br>
           Will reduce spurious "Confirm user presence" notifications for key
           handles that relate to FIDO keys that are not currently inserted in at
           least some cases.
       <li>ssh(1), sshd(8): correct value for IPTOS_DSCP_LE. It needs to
           allow for the preceding two ECN bits.
       <li>ssh-keygen(1): add missing -O option to usage() for the "-Y sign"
           option.
       <li>ssh-keygen(1): fix a NULL deref when using the find-principals
           function, when matching an allowed_signers line that contains a
           namespace restriction, but no restriction specified on the
           command-line
       <li>ssh-agent(1): fix memleak in process_extension(); oss-fuzz
           issue #42719
       <li>ssh(1): suppress "Connection to xxx closed" messages when LogLevel
           is set to "error" or above.
       <li>ssh(1), sshd(8): use correct zlib flags when inflate(3)-ing
           compressed packet data.
       <li>scp(1): when recursively transferring files in SFTP mode, create the
           destination directory if it doesn't already exist to match scp(1) in
           legacy RCP mode behaviour.
       <li>scp(1): many improvements in error message consistency between scp(1)
           in SFTP mode vs legacy RCP mode.
       <li>sshd(8): fix potential race in SIGTERM handling
       <li>ssh(1), ssh(8): since DSA keys are deprecated, move them to the
           end of the default list of public keys so that they will be tried
           last.
       <li>ssh-keygen(1): allow 'ssh-keygen -Y find-principals' to match
           wildcard principals in allowed_signers files
       <!-- OpenSSH 9.0 -->
       <li>ssh(1), sshd(8): upstream: fix poll(2) spin when a channel's output
           fd closes without data in the channel buffer.
       <li>sshd(8): pack pollfd array in server listen/accept loop. Could
           cause the server to hang/spin when MaxStartups &gt; RLIMIT_NOFILE
       <li>ssh-keygen(1): avoid NULL deref via the find-principals and
           check-novalidate operations.
       <li>scp(1): fix a memory leak in argument processing.
       <li>sshd(8): don't try to resolve ListenAddress directives in the sshd
           re-exec path. They are unused after re-exec and parsing errors
           (possible for example if the host's network configuration changed)
           could prevent connections from being accepted.
       <li>sshd(8): when refusing a public key authentication request from a
           client for using an unapproved or unsupported signature algorithm
           include the algorithm name in the log message to make debugging
           easier.
   </ul>    </ul>
  </ul>  </ul>
   
 <li>mandoc 1.14.6 plus several bugfixes, including:  <li>mandoc 1.14.6 plus several bugfixes, including:
     <ul>      <ul>
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