Return to pw_error.txt CVS log

Up to [local] / www / advisories

Put the text for the pw_error() advisory in the www repository.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                
                        OpenBSD Security Advisory
        
                             October 3, 2000

	Format string vulnerability in libutil pw_error(3) function

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

SYNOPSIS

A format string vulnerability present in the pw_error() function of
OpenBSD 2.7's libutil library can yield localhost users root access through
the setuid /usr/bin/chpass utility. This particular vulnerability was
repaired three months ago on June 30th in OpenBSD-current during a complete
source tree audit for format string problems.

OpenBSD developers became aware of an exploit circulating for the chpass(1)
program on the evening of October 2, 2000.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

AFFECTED SYSTEMS

This vulnerability affects OpenBSD versions through 2.7. FreeBSD 4.0 is
vulnerable, but patches have been backported, and FreeBSD versions 4.1 and
4.1.1 are safe. Bill Sommerfield committed a fix to NetBSD today shortly
after we notified him of the problem.

OpenBSD users running -current (2.8-beta) with a system dated July 1st
or thereafter are safe.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

DETAILS

In recent months a myriad of "format string" vulnerabilities have been
discovered in a number of software packages. In response to this threat,
the OpenBSD team immediately began a complete source tree audit, identifying
and fixing dozens of these format bugs. While most of the issues were
harmless, a few such as the bug in xlock and one in the OpenBSD ftpd daemon
raised the red flag and patches were released to correct these problems.
Unfortunately, the severity of the format string bug that was fixed in
pw_error() was not fully realized at the time.

In addition to fixing the bugs, CAVEATS sections were added to all stdarg
function man pages (printf, syslog, setproctitle, err/warn) to warn
programmers that user-supplied strings should never be passed to these
routines without using the "%s" conversion specifier.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

TECHNICAL DETAILS

To understand a format string attack, you need only understand how varargs
(see "man stdarg") functions work. For example, the printf() function
accepts a variable number of arguments depending on the supplied format.
Here is the function prototype:

	int
	printf(const char *format, ...);

The problem occurs when one of these functions is used thusly:

	printf(user_supplied_string);

An attacker can put their own format specifiers in user_supplied_string.
The printf() function does not know where it's arguments stop on the stack.
If you put 100 `%s' format specifiers in the string, but give it no
arguments, the function will happily continue on down the stack blindly.

The problem is magnified by special conversion specifiers such as `%n'
which let you write to memory. Further attack details are beyond the scope
of this advisory. For more information see Guardent's white paper on
"Format String Attacks" by Tim Newsham at the following URL:

	http://www.guardent.com/docs/FormatString.PDF

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

RESOLUTION

/bin/chmod u-s /usr/bin/chpass

Use this command to protect yourself until you are patched. (Note that the
vulnerability is actually in the libutil library, which chpass is linked to,
not the chpass program itself.)

Then, apply the fix below to your OpenBSD 2.7 source tree. The patch is also
available at http://www.openbsd.org/errata.html (025).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

CREDITS

This vulnerability was originally extinguished on June 30th in a mass
format string repair commit by Todd C. Miller of the OpenBSD project. Other
developers who contributed to the audit include Theo de Raadt, Todd Fries,
and Aaron Campbell.

OpenBSD would also like to thank Kyle Hufford and Eric Jackson for their
assistance in creating this advisory.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

OPENBSD 2.7 PATCH

Apply by doing:
	cd /usr/src
	patch -p0 < 025_pw_error.patch

And then rebuild and install libutil.
	cd lib/libutil
	make depend
	make
	make install

Index: lib/libutil/passwd.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libutil/passwd.c,v
retrieving revision 1.20
retrieving revision 1.21
diff -u -r1.20 -r1.21
--- lib/libutil/passwd.c	1998/11/16 07:10:32	1.20
+++ lib/libutil/passwd.c	2000/06/30 16:00:07	1.21
@@ -579,7 +579,7 @@
 	char   *master = pw_file(_PATH_MASTERPASSWD);
 
 	if (err)
-		warn(name);
+		warn("%s", name);
 	if (master)
 		warnx("%s: unchanged", master);
 	pw_abort();