012: SECURITY FIX: March 19, 2003
! OpenSSL is vulnerable to an extension of the ``Bleichenbacher'' attack designed
! by Czech researchers Klima, Pokorny and Rosa.
!
! A
! source code patch exists which remedies the problem.
!
010: SECURITY FIX: March 5, 2003
! A fix for an
! lprm(1)
! bug made in 1996 contains an error that could lead to privilege escalation.
! For OpenBSD 3.2 the impact is limited since
! lprm(1)
! is setuid daemon, not setuid root.
!
! A
! source code patch exists which remedies the problem.
!
008: SECURITY FIX: February 25, 2003
! httpd(8) leaks file inode numbers via ETag header as well as child PIDs in multipart MIME boundary generation. This could lead, for example, to NFS exploitation because it uses inode numbers as part of the file handle.
! A source code patch exists which fixes these two issues.
!
!
!
007: SECURITY FIX: February 22, 2003
! In
! ssl(8) an information leak can occur via timing by performing a MAC computation
! even if incorrect block cipher padding has been found, this is a
! countermeasure. Also, check for negative sizes in memory allocation routines.
! A
! source code patch exists which fixes these two issues.
!
!
!
006: SECURITY FIX: January 20, 2003
! A double free in
! cvs(1)
! could allow an attacker to execute code with the privileges of the
! user running cvs. This is only an issue when the cvs command is
! being run on a user's behalf as a different user. This means that,
! in most cases, the issue only exists for cvs configurations that use
! the pserver client/server connection method.
! A
! source code patch exists which remedies the problem.
!
!
!
005: SECURITY FIX: November 14, 2002
! A buffer overflow in
! named(8)
! could allow an attacker to execute code with the privileges of named.
! On OpenBSD, named runs as a non-root user in a chrooted environment
! which mitigates the effects of this bug.
! A
! source code patch exists which remedies the problem.
!
!
!
004: RELIABILITY FIX: November 6, 2002
! A logic error in the
! pool
! kernel memory allocator could cause memory corruption in low-memory situations,
! causing the system to crash.
! A
! source code patch exists which remedies the problem.
!
!
!
003: SECURITY FIX: November 6, 2002
! An attacker can bypass the restrictions imposed by sendmail's restricted shell,
! smrsh(8),
! and execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of his own account.
! A
! source code patch exists which remedies the problem.
!
![[OpenBSD]](images/smalltitle.gif){kind=small}
www@openbsd.org
!