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1.10 pauls 15: <img alt="[OpenBSD]" height=30 width=141 SRC="images/smalltitle.gif">
1.1 deraadt 16: <h2><font color=#0000e0>
1.14 ! espie 17: This is the OpenBSD 2.2 release errata & patch list:
1.1 deraadt 18: </font></h2>
19:
1.2 deraadt 20: <hr>
21: <a href=errata21.html>For 2.1 errata, please refer here</a>.<br>
1.13 deraadt 22: <a href=errata23.html>For 2.3 errata, please refer here</a>.<br>
23: <a href=errata.html>For 2.4 errata, please refer here</a>.<br>
1.2 deraadt 24: <hr>
25:
1.11 deraadt 26: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.3.tar.gz>
27: You can also fetch a tar.gz file containing all the following patches</a>.
28: This file is updated once a day.
29:
30: <hr>
31:
1.1 deraadt 32: <ul>
33: <a name=all></a>
34: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>All architectures</font></h3>
35: <ul>
1.9 deraadt 36: <a name=ipsec></a>
1.5 matthieu 37: <li><font color=#009000><strong>SECURITY FIX</strong></font><br>
1.7 deraadt 38: If IPSEC communication is attempted by starting photurisd(8) (which is
1.8 deraadt 39: disabled by default), a system crash may be evoked from remote if
40: an attacker uses some classes of invalid packets.
1.7 deraadt 41: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.3/common/ipsec.patch>
42: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.9 deraadt 43: <p>
44: <a name=xterm-xaw></a>
1.7 deraadt 45: <li><font color=#009000><strong>SECURITY FIX</strong></font><br>
1.5 matthieu 46: As stated in CERT advisory VB-98.04, there are buffer
1.8 deraadt 47: overrun problems in <strong>xterm</strong> related to the input-Method,
48: preeditType, and *Keymap resources. Additional buffer overruns exist in
49: the <strong>Xaw</strong> library related to the inputMethod and
50: preeditType resources. The xterm(1) problem represents a security
51: vulnerability for any platform where xterm is installed setuid-root
52: (as is the case for all OpenBSD platforms). The Xaw problem represents
53: a security vulnerability for any setuid-root program that uses the Xaw
54: library (including xterm). Patch1 from XFree86 3.3.2 corrects
55: these problems.
1.5 matthieu 56: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/common/xterm-xaw.patch>
1.6 deraadt 57: We provide a version of this patch file specifically for the OpenBSD 2.2 tree</a>.
1.5 matthieu 58: <p>
1.1 deraadt 59: <a name=rmjob></a>
60: <li><font color=#009000><strong>SECURITY FIX</strong></font><br>
61: An exploitable buffer mismanagement exists in a subroutine used by
62: lprm and lpd. The problem is exploitable by users on a particular
63: machine if there is an entry in <strong>/etc/printcap</strong> which
64: points at a remote printer.
65: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/common/rmjob.patch>
66: A patch is available which corrects this behaviour</a>.
67: <p>
68: <a name=uucpd></a>
69: <li><font color=#009000><strong>SECURITY FIX</strong></font><br>
70: A DNS-based vulnerability exists when uucpd is used. By default uucpd
71: is not enabled in the OpenBSD releases, but some sites may have enabled it.
72: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/common/uucpd.patch>
73: A patch is available which corrects this behaviour</a>.
74: <p>
75: <a name=named></a>
76: <li><font color=#009000><strong>SECURITY FIX</strong></font><br>
77: A vulnerability exists when (and only when) /etc/named.conf has the
78: <strong>fake-iquery</strong> option enabled.
79: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/common/named.patch>
80: A patch is available which corrects this behaviour</a>.
81: <p>
82: <a name=ping></a>
83: <li><font color=#009000><strong>SECURITY FIX</strong></font><br>
84: A vulnerability exists in ping(8); if the -R option is used to record
85: routes, an attacker can spoof a reply packet that will overflow inside
86: ping. Preliminary investigation makes it look the worst attack
87: possible is to make ping crash, but one never knows...
88: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/common/ping.patch>
89: A patch is available which corrects this behaviour</a>.
90: <p>
91: <a name=sourceroute></a>
92: <li><strong><font color=#009000>SECURITY FIX</strong></font><br>
93: If the sysctl variable <strong>net.inet.ip.forwarding</strong> is
94: enabled (value 1), but the variable <strong>net.inet.ip.sourceroute</strong>
95: is disabled (value 0), the kernel will block source routed packets from
96: going through, but will still accept source routing packets destined for
97: itself. Our fix changes the <strong>net.inet.ip.sourceroute</strong>
98: variable semantics to mean that all source routed packets should
99: be blocked completely.
100: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/common/sourceroute.patch>
101: A kernel patch is provided</a>.
102: <p>
103: <a name=ruserok></a>
104: <li><font color=#009000><strong>SECURITY FIX</strong></font><br>
105: A combination localhost+remote host security problem exists if a
106: local user running a setuid binary causes a non-existant root .rhosts
107: file to be created via a symbolic link with a specific kind of corefile,
108: and then subsequently uses rsh/rlogin to enter the machine from remote.
109: A similar exploit might also be possible using sshd which lacks any code
110: for checking for deviations from the expected format in the .rhosts or
111: .shosts files, but we have not confirmed this yet. The following two
112: fixes are recommended:
113: <p>
114: <ul>
115: <li>
116: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/common/nosuidcoredump.patch>
117: (1) A kernel patch which adds a new sysctl option which permits the
118: administrator to decide whether setuid corefiles should be written or not</a>.
119: <p>
120: <li><a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/common/rcmd.patch>
121: (2) Replaces the libc ruserok() function with a more paranoid
122: version which detects bogus looking .rhosts files better.</a>
123: </ul>
124: <p>
125: If the
126: first patch is used to stop setuid coredumps, then the second patch is
127: not as important.
128: This problem is fixed much better in OpenBSD-current, where the kernel's
129: symbolic link handling has been improved such that coredumping will not
130: create a file on the other side of a symbolic link. Such a patch is not
131: possible for the 4.4lite1 VFS layer in the OpenBSD 2.2 kernel.<p>
132: The problem with the ruserok() function appears to also exist in
133: ssh 1.2.21 and previous (the ssh people have been alerted).
134: <p>
135: <a name=mmap></a>
136: <li><strong><font color=#009000>SECURITY FIX</strong></font><br>
137: A bug in the vm system permits a file descriptor opened read-only on a
138: device, to later on be mmap(2)'d read-write, and then modified. This
139: does not result in a security hole by itself, but it does violate the
140: safety semantics which securelevels are supposed to provide. If a user
141: manages to gain kmem group permissions, using this problem they can then
142: gain root trivially and/or turn securelevels off.
143: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/common/vm_mmap.patch>
144: A kernel patch is available which corrects this behaviour (this is
145: revision 3 of this patch)</a>.
146: <p>
147: <li><font color=#009000><strong>BUILD PROCESS FIX</strong></font><br>
148: Building an object tree from a read-only source tree (such as off a CDROM)
149: may fail under certain circumstances (e.g. when creating a symlink on sparc
150: whose target name is exactly 33 characters). As a workaround you have to
151: either provide the source tree read/write, or install a newer version of
152: /usr/bin/readlink.
153: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/common/readlink.c>
154: A replacement source file exists</a>.
155: <p>
156: <a name=mountd></a>
157: <li><font color=#009000><strong>SECURITY FIX</strong></font><br>
158: If a line in /etc/exports which contains hostnames results in an empty
159: list because none of the supplied hostnames is known, mountd(8) will
160: accidentally export the filesystem to the world.
161: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/common/mountd.patch>
162: A patch is available which corrects this behaviour</a>.
163: <p>
164: <li><font color=#009000><strong>RELIABILITY FIX</strong></font><br>
165: Setting the MSG_EOR flag on a tcp packet in the send(2) family of
166: system calls could cause a kernel panic.
167: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/common/send.patch>
168: A patch</a> to return EINVAL in this case is available.
169: <p>
170: </ul>
171: <a name=i386></a>
172: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>i386</font></h3>
173: <ul>
174: <a name=f00f></a>
175: <li><font color=#009000><strong>RELIABILITY FIX</strong></font><br>
176: The Intel P5 F00F bug was discovered after the CDR's had already been
177: sent to the manufacturer. This problem permits any user who has an account
178: to lock your machine up using a 4-line program. The problem only affects
179: Intel P5 processors (the i386, i486, P-Pro, and P-II are not vulnerable,
180: nor are processors by other manufacturers).
181: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/i386/f00f.patch>
182: A kernel source-code patch is available</a>.
183: <p>
184: <li><font color=#009000><strong>FUNCTIONALITY FIX</strong></font><br>
185: Some Linux binaries will execute in SVR4 emulation mode, which is
1.12 aaron 186: definitely a problem for people who need Linux emulation to work correctly.
1.1 deraadt 187: To solve this mis-identification problem,
188: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/i386/compat_linux.patch>
189: a patch file is provided</a>.
190: <p>
191: <li><font color=#009000><strong>RELIABILITY FIX</strong></font><br>
192: APM can crash on machines without it.
193: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/i386/apm.patch>
194: A kernel source-code patch is available</a>.
195: <p>
196: <li><font color=#009000><strong>INSTALLATION PROCESS FLAW</strong></font><br>
197: A few people are running into this problem, particularily if they had some
198: other *BSD operating system on their machine before trying OpenBSD: if after
199: installation onto an IDE-based machine, the kernel fails to mount the root
200: partition because it thinks that it should be opening sd0 (0x400), this means
201: you have incorrectly setup your disklabel for the IDE drive -- the disklabel
202: is indicating that the drive is SCSI.
203: To repair this, use the floppy to run "disklabel -E wd0", then using the
204: "edit" command ensure the type field is set to "ST506".
205: <p>
206: </ul>
207: <a name=mac68k></a>
208: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>mac68k</font></h3>
209: <ul>
210: <li><font color=#009000><strong>NEW SOFTWARE</strong></font><br>
211: Unfortunately, X11 binaries for the mac68k did not manage to make it onto the
212: CDROM. However, X11 for the mac68k is immediately available from
213: <a href="ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/2.2/mac68k/X11/X11R6.tar.gz">
214: ftp://ftp.OpenBSD.org/pub/OpenBSD/2.2/mac68k/X11/X11R6.tar.gz</a>. Please
215: be sure to read the <a href="ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/2.2/mac68k/X11/README.X11">README file</a> also in that directory for instructions on installing
216: and setting up X.
217: <p>
218: <li><font color=#009000><strong>INSTALLATION PROCESS FLAW</strong></font><br>
219: As shipped on the CDROM, both the
220: <a href="ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/2.2/mac68k/bsd-generic.tar.gz">
221: generic kernel</a>
222: and the
223: <a href="ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/2.2/bsd-genericbsc.tar.gz">
224: genericsbc kernel</a>
225: extract themselves into the wrong place in the filesystem.
226: Both <strong>should</strong> extract a kernel named <tt>/bsd</tt>, but they extract
227: the kernel into <tt>/usr/src/sys/arch/mac68k/compile</tt> instead.
228: <p>
229: This has been fixed on the ftp release of <a href=22.html>OpenBSD 2.2</a>, and
230: fresh kernels are available from <a href="ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/2.2/mac68k">
231: ftp://ftp.OpenBSD.ORG/pub/OpenBSD/2.2/mac68k/</a>. If at all possible,
232: installing these kernels is recommended.
233: <p>
234: A number of possible workarounds exist if you don't have easy access to ftp
235: the updated kernels. The simplest of these is to use a
236: MacOS program to uncompress and untar the kernel aad use the Installer's
237: mini-shell to "cpin" the kernel. Alternately, you could install the kernel
238: with the Installer and use the mini-shell to move the binary from <tt>/usr/src/...</tt> to <tt>/bsd</tt>.
239: <p>
240: </ul>
241: <a name=sparc></a>
242: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>sparc</font></h3>
243: <ul>
244: <li><font color=#009000><strong>RELIABILITY FIX</strong></font><br>
245: Older 4/xxx systems (particularily the 4/300's) cannot boot
246: with the 2.2 kernel due to bugs in the scsi device driver.
247: <a href=ftp://ftp.OpenBSD.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/sparc/esp.patch>
248: A kernel source patch is available</a>.
249: Replacement kernels are available for:
250: <a href=ftp://ftp.OpenBSD.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/sparc/bsd>bsd</a>,
251: <a href=ftp://ftp.OpenBSD.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/sparc/bsd.scsi3>bsd.scsi3</a>,
252: and a replacement for bsd.rd is coming soon.
253: <p>
254: <a name=sparciommu></a>
255: <li><font color=#009000><strong>RELIABILITY FIX</strong></font><br>
256: SPARCstation 4 and 5 (Microsparc 2) users may see kernel panics when
257: using a custom kernel configured for option sun4m only.
258: <a href=ftp://ftp.OpenBSD.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/sparc/sun4m.patch>
259: A workaround (kernel source patch) is available</a>. Apply the patch and
260: then re-build your kernel.
261: <p>
262: </ul>
263: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>amiga</font></h3>
264: <p>
265: <ul>
266: <li><font color=#009000><strong>FUNCTIONALITY FIX</strong></font><br>
267: Missing Xamiga manual pages. Get
268: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/amiga/Xamiga-manual.tgz>
269: this package</a> and execute, <i>as root</i>:<br>
270: <strong><b># </b>pkg_add Xamiga-manual.tgz</strong><br>
271: The MD5 checksum of this package is:<br>
272: <b>MD5 (Xamiga-manual.tgz) = 2362a7857264b9d17f65cca258b42031</b><p>
273: <li><font color=#009000><strong>FUNCTIONALITY FIX</strong></font><br>
274: The Ariadne ethernet support was broken, there will be both binary and
275: source level fixes available shortly. If you are in a hurry mail
276: <a href=mailto:niklas@openbsd.org>Niklas</a> for a test kernel.<p>
277: </ul>
278: <a name=pmax></a>
279: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>pmax</font></h3>
280: <ul>
281: <li><font color=#009000><strong>FUNCTIONALITY FIX</strong></font><br>
282: There is a Year-1998 problem in the time-setting code (which causes the
283: date and time to be set incorrectly after a reboot in 1998).
284: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/pmax/clock.patch>
285: A source code patch file is available</a> plus replacement installation
286: kernels for the 2.2 release at
287: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/pmax/bsd.NFS>bsd.NFS</a>,
288: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/pmax/bsd>bsd</a>,
289: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/pmax/bsd.rz0>bsd.rz0</a>.
290: <p>
291: <li><font color=#009000><strong>FUNCTIONALITY FIX</strong></font><br>
292: X11 support for the 3min and 3maxplus machines was broken
293: due to a kernel bug.
294: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/pmax/fb.patch>
295: A source code patch is available</a>.
296: <p>
297: <a name=ldso></a>
298: <li><font color=#009000><strong>SECURITY FIX</strong></font><br>
299: A security problem in the shared library linker <strong>ld.so</strong>
300: requires that you replace it with a new binary. The following binary
301: will work on both pmax and arc machines.
302: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/pmax/ld.so>
303: The replacement binary is here</a>.
304: <p>
305: </ul>
306: <a name=arc></a>
307: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>arc</font></h3>
308: <ul>
309: <li><font color=#009000><strong>SECURITY FIX</strong></font><br>
310: A security problem in the shared library linker <strong>ld.so</strong> requires
311: that you replace it with a new binary. The following binary
312: will work on both pmax and arc machines.
313: <a href=ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.2/pmax/ld.so>
314: The replacement binary is here</a>.
315: <p>
316: </ul>
317: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>alpha</font></h3>
318: <p>
319: <ul>
320: <li><font color=#009000><strong>MISSING FUNCTIONALITY</strong></font><br>
1.4 deraadt 321: Network Address Translation and other parts of IP Filtering do not work
1.1 deraadt 322: on the alpha. This will be fixed in the 2.3 release, and perhaps earlier
323: in a snapshot. There is no patch for 2.2.
324: <p>
325: </ul>
326: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>hp300</font></h3>
327: <p>
328: <ul>
329: <li>No problems identified yet.
330: <p>
331: </ul>
332: <li><h3><font color=#e00000>mvme68k</font></h3>
333: <ul>
334: <li>No problems identified yet.
335: <p>
336: </ul>
337: </ul>
338: <br>
339:
340: <hr>
1.3 deraadt 341: <a href=errata21.html>For 2.1 errata, please refer here</a>.<br>
1.13 deraadt 342: <a href=errata23.html>For 2.3 errata, please refer here</a>.<br>
343: <a href=errata.html>For 2.4 errata, please refer here</a>.<br>
1.1 deraadt 344: <hr>
1.2 deraadt 345:
1.10 pauls 346: <a href=orders.html><img height=24 width=24 src=back.gif border=0 alt=OpenBSD></a>
1.1 deraadt 347: <a href=mailto:www@openbsd.org>www@openbsd.org</a>
1.14 ! espie 348: <br><small>$OpenBSD: errata22.html,v 1.13 1998/11/10 19:12:17 deraadt Exp $</small>
1.1 deraadt 349:
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