===================================================================
RCS file: /cvsrepo/anoncvs/cvs/www/errata25.html,v
retrieving revision 1.53
retrieving revision 1.54
diff -u -r1.53 -r1.54
--- www/errata25.html	2014/03/31 03:12:47	1.53
+++ www/errata25.html	2014/03/31 03:36:54	1.54
@@ -75,18 +75,16 @@
 
 <hr>
 
-<a name="all"></a>
-<h3><font color="#e00000">All architectures</font></h3>
 <ul>
 <li><a name="cron"></a>
-<font color="#009000"><strong>SECURITY FIX: Aug 30, 1999</strong></font><br>
+<font color="#009000"><strong>SECURITY FIX: Aug 30, 1999</strong></font> &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
 In cron(8), make sure argv[] is NULL terminated in the fake popen() and
 run sendmail as the user, not as root.
 <a href="http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.5/common/012_cron.patch">
 A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
 <p>
 <li><a name="miscfs"></a>
-<font color="#009000"><strong>SECURITY FIX: Aug 12, 1999</strong></font><br>
+<font color="#009000"><strong>SECURITY FIX: Aug 12, 1999</strong></font> &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
 The procfs and fdescfs filesystems had an overrun in their handling
 of uio_offset in their readdir() routines. (These filesystems are not
 enabled by default).
@@ -94,34 +92,34 @@
 A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
 <p>
 <li><a name="profil"></a>
-<font color="#009000"><strong>SECURITY FIX: Aug 9, 1999</strong></font><br>
+<font color="#009000"><strong>SECURITY FIX: Aug 9, 1999</strong></font> &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
 Stop profiling (see profil(2)) when we execve() a new process.
 <a href="http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.5/common/010_profil.patch">
 A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
 <p>
 <li><a name="ipsec_in_use"></a>
-<font color="#009000"><strong>SECURITY FIX: Aug 6, 1999</strong></font><br>
+<font color="#009000"><strong>SECURITY FIX: Aug 6, 1999</strong></font> &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
 Packets that should have been handled by IPsec may be transmitted
 as cleartext. PF_KEY SA expirations may leak kernel resources.
 <a href="http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.5/common/009_ipsec_in_use.patch">
 A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
 <p>
 <li><a name="rc"></a>
-<font color="#009000"><strong>SECURITY FIX: Aug 5, 1999</strong></font><br>
+<font color="#009000"><strong>SECURITY FIX: Aug 5, 1999</strong></font> &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
 In /etc/rc, use mktemp(1) for motd re-writing, and change the find(1)
 to use -execdir.
 <a href="http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.5/common/008_rc.patch">
 A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
 <p>
 <li><a name="chflags"></a>
-<font color="#009000"><strong>SECURITY FIX: Jul 30, 1999</strong></font><br>
+<font color="#009000"><strong>SECURITY FIX: Jul 30, 1999</strong></font> &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
 Do not permit regular users to chflags(2) or fchflags(2) on character or
 block devices which they may currently be the owner of.
 <a href="http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.5/common/007_chflags.patch">
 A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
 <p>
 <li><a name="nroff"></a>
-<font color="#009000"><strong>SECURITY FIX: Jul 27, 1999</strong></font><br>
+<font color="#009000"><strong>SECURITY FIX: Jul 27, 1999</strong></font> &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
 Cause groff(1) to be invoked with the -S flag, when called by nroff(1),
 to avoid various groff features which may be security issues.  On the
 whole, this is not really a security issue, but it was discussed on
@@ -130,35 +128,35 @@
 A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
 <p>
 <li><a name="fts"></a>
-<font color="#009000"><strong>RELIABILITY FIX: May 19, 1999</strong></font><br>
+<font color="#009000"><strong>RELIABILITY FIX: May 19, 1999</strong></font> &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
 Programs using fts(3) could dump core when given a directory structure
 with a very large number of entries.
 <a href="http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.5/common/005_fts.patch">
 A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
 <p>
 <li><a name="tcpsack"></a>
-<font color="#009000"><strong>RELIABILITY FIX: May 19, 1999</strong></font><br>
+<font color="#009000"><strong>RELIABILITY FIX: May 19, 1999</strong></font> &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
 Sequence numbers could wrap with TCP_SACK and TCP_NEWRENO, resulting in
 failure to retransmit correctly.
 <a href="http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.5/common/004_tcpsack.patch">
 A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
 <p>
 <li><a name="ipsec1"></a>
-<font color="#009000"><strong>RELIABILITY FIX</strong></font><br>
+<font color="#009000"><strong>RELIABILITY FIX</strong></font> &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
 Retransmitted TCP packets could get corrupted when flowing over an
 IPSEC ESP tunnel.
 <a href="http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.5/common/003_espdata.patch">
 A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
 <p>
 <li><a name="bmap"></a>
-<font color="#009000"><strong>RELIABILITY FIX</strong></font><br>
+<font color="#009000"><strong>RELIABILITY FIX</strong></font> &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
 A local user can crash the system by reading a file larger than 64meg
 from an ext2fs partition.
 <a href="http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.5/common/002_bmap.patch">
 A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
 <p>
 <li><a name="pfkey"></a>
-<font color="#009000"><strong>RELIABILITY FIX</strong></font><br>
+<font color="#009000"><strong>RELIABILITY FIX</strong></font> &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
 PF_KEY socket operations leak internal kernel resources, so that a
 system running an IPsec key management daemon like photurisd or isakmpd
 will cause the networking subsystem to stop working after a finite amount