Annotation of www/errata28.html, Revision 1.95
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1.81 tj 5: <title>OpenBSD 2.8 Errata</title>
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1.1 deraadt 10:
1.69 deraadt 11: <!--
12: IMPORTANT REMINDER
13: IF YOU ADD A NEW ERRATUM, MAIL THE PATCH TO TECH AND ANNOUNCE
14: -->
15:
1.1 deraadt 16:
1.94 bentley 17: <h2 id=OpenBSD>
1.79 deraadt 18: <a href="index.html">
1.94 bentley 19: <i>Open</i><b>BSD</b></a>
20: 2.8 Errata
1.81 tj 21: </h2>
1.79 deraadt 22: <hr>
1.1 deraadt 23:
1.28 deraadt 24: For errata on a certain release, click below:<br>
1.27 deraadt 25: <a href="errata21.html">2.1</a>,
26: <a href="errata22.html">2.2</a>,
27: <a href="errata23.html">2.3</a>,
28: <a href="errata24.html">2.4</a>,
29: <a href="errata25.html">2.5</a>,
30: <a href="errata26.html">2.6</a>,
31: <a href="errata27.html">2.7</a>,
32: <a href="errata29.html">2.9</a>,
33: <a href="errata30.html">3.0</a>,
34: <a href="errata31.html">3.1</a>,
1.31 deraadt 35: <a href="errata32.html">3.2</a>,
1.32 david 36: <a href="errata33.html">3.3</a>,
1.37 david 37: <a href="errata34.html">3.4</a>,
1.38 miod 38: <a href="errata35.html">3.5</a>,
1.39 deraadt 39: <a href="errata36.html">3.6</a>,
1.62 deraadt 40: <a href="errata37.html">3.7</a>,
1.47 deraadt 41: <br>
1.41 deraadt 42: <a href="errata38.html">3.8</a>,
1.42 deraadt 43: <a href="errata39.html">3.9</a>,
1.43 deraadt 44: <a href="errata40.html">4.0</a>,
1.45 merdely 45: <a href="errata41.html">4.1</a>,
1.46 deraadt 46: <a href="errata42.html">4.2</a>,
1.47 deraadt 47: <a href="errata43.html">4.3</a>,
1.49 deraadt 48: <a href="errata44.html">4.4</a>,
1.50 deraadt 49: <a href="errata45.html">4.5</a>,
1.51 deraadt 50: <a href="errata46.html">4.6</a>,
1.53 deraadt 51: <a href="errata47.html">4.7</a>,
1.54 miod 52: <a href="errata48.html">4.8</a>,
1.55 nick 53: <a href="errata49.html">4.9</a>,
1.56 sthen 54: <a href="errata50.html">5.0</a>,
1.57 deraadt 55: <a href="errata51.html">5.1</a>,
1.58 deraadt 56: <a href="errata52.html">5.2</a>,
1.59 deraadt 57: <a href="errata53.html">5.3</a>,
1.62 deraadt 58: <br>
1.60 deraadt 59: <a href="errata54.html">5.4</a>,
1.68 jsg 60: <a href="errata55.html">5.5</a>,
1.72 deraadt 61: <a href="errata56.html">5.6</a>,
1.75 deraadt 62: <a href="errata57.html">5.7</a>,
1.76 deraadt 63: <a href="errata58.html">5.8</a>,
1.82 deraadt 64: <a href="errata59.html">5.9</a>,
1.85 tj 65: <a href="errata60.html">6.0</a>,
1.89 deraadt 66: <a href="errata61.html">6.1</a>,
1.91 deraadt 67: <a href="errata62.html">6.2</a>,
1.92 deraadt 68: <a href="errata63.html">6.3</a>,
1.93 deraadt 69: <a href="errata64.html">6.4</a>,
70: <a href="errata65.html">6.5</a>.
1.1 deraadt 71: <hr>
72:
1.63 deraadt 73: <p>
1.85 tj 74: Patches for the OpenBSD base system are distributed as unified diffs.
75: Each patch contains usage instructions.
76: All the following patches are also available in one
77: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8.tar.gz">tar.gz file</a>
78: for convenience.
1.1 deraadt 79:
80: <p>
1.85 tj 81: Patches for supported releases are also incorporated into the
1.86 tj 82: <a href="stable.html">-stable branch</a>.
1.63 deraadt 83:
1.1 deraadt 84: <hr>
85:
86: <ul>
1.95 ! deraadt 87:
! 88: <li id="zsconsole">
! 89: <strong>001: RELIABILITY FIX: Nov 10, 2000</strong><br>
! 90: When running a sparc with a serial console, certain types of interrupts would
! 91: cause great grief.<br>
! 92: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/sparc/001_zsconsole.patch">
! 93: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
! 94: <p>
! 95:
! 96: <li id="skey">
! 97: <strong>002: IMPLEMENTATION FIX: Nov 10, 2000</strong>
1.66 deraadt 98: <i>All architectures</i><br>
1.95 ! deraadt 99: In ssh(1), skey support for SSH1 protocol was broken. Some people might consider
! 100: that kind of important.<br>
! 101: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/002_sshskey.patch">
1.63 deraadt 102: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.18 millert 103: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 104:
! 105: <li id="qe">
! 106: <strong>003: RELIABILITY FIX: Nov 17, 2000</strong><br>
! 107: Configuring a qec+qe causes a NMI panic.<br>
! 108: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/sparc/003_qe.patch">
1.63 deraadt 109: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.17 millert 110: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 111:
! 112: <li id="rijndael">
! 113: <strong>004: RELIABILITY FIX: Nov 17, 2000</strong>
1.66 deraadt 114: <i>All architectures</i><br>
1.95 ! deraadt 115: First off, AES (Rijndael) encryption and decryption were broken for IPsec
! 116: and swap encryption.<br>
! 117: Secondly, the AES code did not work properly on big endian machines.<br>
! 118: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/004_rijndael.patch">
1.63 deraadt 119: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.95 ! deraadt 120: This is the second revision of the patch.
1.14 millert 121: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 122:
! 123: <li id="ftpd">
! 124: <strong>005: SECURITY FIX: Dec 4, 2000</strong>
1.66 deraadt 125: <i>All architectures</i><br>
1.95 ! deraadt 126: OpenBSD 2.8's ftpd contains a one-byte overflow in the replydirname() function.<br>
! 127: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/005_ftpd.patch">
1.63 deraadt 128: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.95 ! deraadt 129: You can view the <a href="advisories/ftpd_replydirname.txt">OpenBSD Advisory</a> here.
! 130: <p>
! 131:
! 132: <li id="pcibios">
! 133: <strong>006: STABILITY FIX: Dec 4, 2000</strong><br>
! 134: On some machines, a PCIBIOS device driver interrupt allocation bug can cause a
! 135: kernel hang while probing PCI devices. If you have this symptom, you can disable
! 136: PCIBIOS as a workaround. To do this,
! 137: <ul>
! 138: <li>Enter the User Kernel Configuration by booting with the
! 139: option "boot -c".
! 140: <li>Once at the <i>UKC></i> prompt, enter
! 141: <blockquote><pre>
! 142: UKC> disable pcibios
! 143: UKC> quit<!--
! 144: --></pre></blockquote>
! 145: <li>See <a href="./faq/faq5.html#5.6">this page</a> after a successful
! 146: boot for instructions on how to re-write your kernel to disable PCIBIOS
! 147: permanently.
! 148: </ul>
1.10 aaron 149: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 150:
! 151: <li id="x_sun3">
! 152: <strong>007: INSTALL PROBLEM: Dec 4, 2000</strong><br>
! 153: The X packages
! 154: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/2.8/sun3/xshare28.tgz">share28.tgz</a>
! 155: and
! 156: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/2.8/sun3/xfont28.tgz">font28.tgz</a>
! 157: were not on the CD, and only available via FTP install. These packages can be
! 158: added post-install by using the following command:
! 159: <pre>
! 160: # cd /; tar xvfpz xshare28.tgz
! 161: # cd /; tar xvfpz xfont28.tgz
! 162: </pre>
! 163: <p>
! 164:
! 165: <li id="kerberos">
! 166: <strong>008: SECURITY FIX: Dec 7, 2000</strong>
1.66 deraadt 167: <i>All architectures</i><br>
1.95 ! deraadt 168: Two problems have recently been discovered in the KerberosIV code.<p>
! 169: 1. A symlink problem was discovered in the KerberosIV password checking
! 170: routines /usr/bin/su and /usr/bin/login, which makes it possible for a
! 171: local user to overwrite any file on the local machine.<p>
! 172: 2. It is possible to specify environment variables in telnet
! 173: which will be passed over the to the remote host. This makes it
! 174: possible to set environment variables on the remote side, including
! 175: ones that have special meaning on the server. It is not clear at this
! 176: time what the impact is, but we recommend everyone to upgrade their
! 177: machines immediately.<p>
! 178: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/008_kerberos.patch">
1.63 deraadt 179: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.4 millert 180: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 181:
! 182: <li id="kerberos2">
! 183: <strong>009: SECURITY FIX: Dec 10, 2000</strong>
1.66 deraadt 184: <i>All architectures</i><br>
1.95 ! deraadt 185: Another problem exists in the Kerberos libraries.<br>
! 186: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/009_kerberos2.patch">
1.63 deraadt 187: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.3 millert 188: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 189:
! 190: <li id="fastroute">
! 191: <strong>010: RELIABILITY FIX: Dec 11, 2000</strong>
1.66 deraadt 192: <i>All architectures</i><br>
1.95 ! deraadt 193: A crash could occur during fast routing, if IPSEC was enabled.<br>
! 194: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/010_fastroute.patch">
1.63 deraadt 195: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.1 deraadt 196: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 197:
! 198: <li id="hwcrypto">
! 199: <strong>011: RELIABILITY FIX: Dec 13, 2000</strong>
1.66 deraadt 200: <i>All architectures</i><br>
1.95 ! deraadt 201: The crypto subsystem could incorrectly fail to run certain software ciphers,
! 202: if a hardware card existed in the machine.<br>
! 203: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/011_hwcrypto.patch">
1.63 deraadt 204: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.1 deraadt 205: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 206:
! 207: <li id="imacdv">
! 208: <strong>012: INSTALL PROBLEM: Dec 14, 2000</strong><br>
! 209: The IMac DV+ (and probably some other machines) incorrectly identify their video
! 210: hardware, but it is possible to work around the problem.<br>
! 211: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/powerpc/012_imacdv.patch">
1.63 deraadt 212: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.1 deraadt 213: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 214:
! 215: <li id="procfs">
! 216: <strong>013: SECURITY FIX: Dec 18, 2000</strong>
1.66 deraadt 217: <i>All architectures</i><br>
1.95 ! deraadt 218: <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-2.8/mount_procfs.8">Procfs</a> contained numerous overflows, which could lead an intruder to root permissions. Procfs is NOT enabled by default in OpenBSD. <br>
! 219: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/013_procfs.patch">
1.63 deraadt 220: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.1 deraadt 221: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 222:
! 223: <li id="xlock">
! 224: <strong>014: SECURITY FIX: Dec 22, 2000</strong>
1.66 deraadt 225: <i>All architectures</i><br>
1.95 ! deraadt 226: Improve xlock(1)'s authentication by authenticating via a pipe in an early forked process. No known vulnerability exists, this is just a precautionary patch.<br>
! 227: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/014_xlock.patch">
1.63 deraadt 228: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.1 deraadt 229: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 230: In addition to a source code patch, new xlock binaries have been created for each architecture listed below. Place these binaries at <i>/usr/X11R6/bin/xlock</i>
! 231: and <i>chmod 4755 /usr/X11R6/bin/xlock</i>.
! 232: <p>
! 233: <ul>
! 234: <li><a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/i386/xlock">Xlock - i386</a>
! 235: <li><a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/sparc/xlock">Xlock - sparc</a>
! 236: <li><a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/mac68k/xlock">Xlock - mac68k</a>
! 237: <li><a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/powerpc/xlock">Xlock - powerpc</a>
! 238: <li><a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/amiga/xlock">Xlock - amiga</a>
! 239: <li><a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/hp300/xlock">Xlock - hp300</a>
! 240: <li><a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/mvme68k/xlock">Xlock - mvme68k</a>
! 241: </ul>
1.65 deraadt 242: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 243:
! 244: <li id="pms">
! 245: <strong>015: STABILITY FIX: Dec 22, 2000</strong><br>
! 246: Some machines locked up while trying to use the mouse in console mode. This patch solves that problem.<br>
! 247: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/i386/015_pms.patch">
1.63 deraadt 248: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.1 deraadt 249: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 250:
! 251: <li id="tl">
! 252: <strong>016: RELIABILITY FIX: Jan 4, 2001</strong>
1.66 deraadt 253: <i>All architectures</i><br>
1.95 ! deraadt 254: Allow ThunderLAN cards to share interrupts nicely.<br>
! 255: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/016_tl.patch">
1.63 deraadt 256: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.1 deraadt 257: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 258:
! 259: <li id="rnd">
! 260: <strong>017: SECURITY FIX: Jan 22, 2001</strong>
1.66 deraadt 261: <i>All architectures</i><br>
1.95 ! deraadt 262: The <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-2.8/random.4">rnd(4)</a> device does not use all of its input when data is written to it.<br>
! 263: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/017_rnd.patch">
1.63 deraadt 264: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.1 deraadt 265: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 266:
1.70 bentley 267: <li id="named">
1.94 bentley 268: <strong>018: SECURITY FIX: Jan 29, 2001</strong>
1.66 deraadt 269: <i>All architectures</i><br>
1.88 tb 270: Merge <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-2.8/named.8">named</a>
1.1 deraadt 271: with ISC BIND 4.9.8-REL, which fixes some buffer vulnerabilities (actually it appears
1.13 jsyn 272: that these were already impossible to exploit beforehand).<br>
1.84 tb 273: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/018_named.patch">
1.63 deraadt 274: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.1 deraadt 275: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 276:
! 277: <li id="lepci">
! 278: <strong>019: IMPLEMENTATION FIX: Jan 31, 2001</strong>
1.66 deraadt 279: <i>All architectures</i><br>
1.95 ! deraadt 280: Fix memory allocation in the PCI LANCE driver, <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-2.8/le.4">le</a>. A side effect of this is that OpenBSD under VMWare now works again.<br>
! 281: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/019_lepci.patch">
1.63 deraadt 282: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.1 deraadt 283: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 284:
! 285: <li id="libwrap">
! 286: <strong>020: IMPLEMENTATION FIX: Feb 15, 2001</strong>
1.66 deraadt 287: <i>All architectures</i><br>
1.95 ! deraadt 288: Client side ident protocol was broken in libwrap, affecting anything using libwrap including <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-2.8/tcpd.8">tcpd</a>. The effect of this was that libwrap would never retrieve and log ident values from remote hosts on connections.<br>
! 289: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/020_libwrap.patch">
1.63 deraadt 290: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.1 deraadt 291: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 292:
! 293: <li id="sudo">
! 294: <strong>021: SECURITY FIX: Feb 22, 2001</strong>
! 295: <i>All architectures</i><br>
! 296: There is an exploitable heap corruption bug in
! 297: <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-2.8/sudo.8">sudo</a>.
! 298: <br>
! 299: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/021_sudo.patch">
1.65 deraadt 300: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
301: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 302:
! 303: <li id="userldt">
! 304: <strong>022: SECURITY FIX: Mar 2, 2001</strong><br>
! 305: The <b>USER_LDT</b> kernel option allows an attacker to gain access to privileged areas of kernel memory. This option is not on by default.
! 306: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/i386/022_userltd.patch">
1.63 deraadt 307: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.1 deraadt 308: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 309:
! 310: <li id="ipsec_ah">
! 311: <strong>023: SECURITY FIX: Mar 2, 2001</strong>
1.66 deraadt 312: <i>All architectures</i><br>
1.95 ! deraadt 313: Insufficient checks in the IPSEC AH IPv4 option handling code can lead to a buffer overrun leading to a remote DoS. This option is not on by default.<br>
! 314: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/023_ip_ah.patch">
1.63 deraadt 315: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.1 deraadt 316: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 317:
! 318: <li id="readline">
! 319: <strong>024: SECURITY FIX: Mar 18, 2001</strong>
! 320: <i>All architectures</i><br>
! 321: The readline library shipped with OpenBSD allows history files creation
! 322: with a permissive
! 323: <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-2.8/umask.2">umask(2)</a>.
! 324: This can lead to the leakage of sensitive information in applications
! 325: that use passwords and the like during user interaction (one such
! 326: application is mysql).<br>
! 327: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/024_readline.patch">
1.65 deraadt 328: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
329: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 330:
! 331: <li id="glob">
! 332: <strong>025: SECURITY FIX: Apr 10, 2001</strong>
1.66 deraadt 333: <i>All architectures</i><br>
1.95 ! deraadt 334: <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-2.8/glob.3">glob(3)</a> contains multiple buffer overflows. <br>
! 335: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/025_glob.patch">
1.63 deraadt 336: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.1 deraadt 337: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 338:
! 339: <li id="glob_limit">
! 340: <strong>026: SECURITY FIX: Apr 23, 2001</strong>
1.66 deraadt 341: <i>All architectures</i><br>
1.95 ! deraadt 342: <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-2.8/glob.3">ftpd(8)</a> has a potential DoS related to <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-2.8/glob.3">glob(3)</a>. This patch introduces a GLOB_LIMIT, eliminating the DoS. You must have <a href="#glob">025_glob.patch</a> installed before installing this patch.<br>
! 343: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/026_globlimit.patch">
1.63 deraadt 344: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.1 deraadt 345: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 346:
! 347: <li id="ipf_frag">
! 348: <strong>027: SECURITY FIX: Apr 23, 2001</strong>
1.66 deraadt 349: <i>All architectures</i><br>
1.95 ! deraadt 350: IPF has a serious problem with fragment caching, the bug is triggered if you use the ipf(5) syntax "keep state".<br>
! 351: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/027_ipf-frag.patch">
1.63 deraadt 352: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.1 deraadt 353: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 354:
! 355: <li id="sendmail">
! 356: <strong>028: SECURITY FIX: May 29, 2001</strong>
1.66 deraadt 357: <i>All architectures</i><br>
1.95 ! deraadt 358: The signal handlers in <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-2.8/sendmail.8">sendmail(8)</a> contain code that is unsafe in the
! 359: context of a signal handler. This leads to potentially serious
! 360: race conditions. At the moment this is a theoretical attack only
! 361: and can only be exploited on the local host (if at all).<br>
! 362: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/028_sendmail.patch">
1.63 deraadt 363: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.95 ! deraadt 364: It updates sendmail to version 8.11.4.
1.1 deraadt 365: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 366:
! 367: <li id="fts">
! 368: <strong>029: SECURITY FIX: May 30, 2001</strong>
1.66 deraadt 369: <i>All architectures</i><br>
1.95 ! deraadt 370: Programs using the <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-2.8/fts.3">fts(3)</a>
! 371: routines (such as rm, find, and most programs that take a <b>-R</b>
! 372: flag) can be tricked into changing into the wrong directory if the
! 373: parent dir is changed out from underneath it. This is similar to
! 374: the old fts bug but happens when popping out of directories, as
! 375: opposed to descending into them.
! 376: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/029_fts.patch">
1.65 deraadt 377: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.95 ! deraadt 378: This is the second version of the patch.
1.1 deraadt 379: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 380:
! 381: <li id="kernexec">
! 382: <strong>030: SECURITY FIX: June 15, 2001</strong>
1.66 deraadt 383: <i>All architectures</i><br>
1.95 ! deraadt 384: A race condition exists in the kernel <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-2.8/execve.2">execve(2)</a> implementation that opens a small window of vulnerability for a non-privileged user to <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-2.8/ptrace.2">ptrace(2)</a> attach to a suid/sgid process.
! 385: <br>
! 386: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/030_kernexec.patch">
1.65 deraadt 387: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
1.1 deraadt 388: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 389:
! 390: <li id="sendmail2">
! 391: <strong>031: SECURITY FIX: August 21, 2001</strong>
! 392: <i>All architectures</i><br>
! 393: A security hole exists in <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-2.8/sendmail.8">sendmail(8)</a>
! 394: that may allow an attacker on the local host to gain root privileges by
! 395: specifying out-of-bounds debug parameters.
! 396: <br>
! 397: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/031_sendmail.patch">
1.1 deraadt 398: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
399: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 400:
! 401: <li id="lpd">
! 402: <strong>032: SECURITY FIX: August 29, 2001</strong>
1.66 deraadt 403: <i>All architectures</i><br>
1.95 ! deraadt 404: A security hole exists in <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-2.8/lpd.8">lpd(8)</a>
! 405: that may allow an attacker with line printer access to gain root
! 406: privileges. A machine must be running lpd to be vulnerable (OpenBSD
! 407: does not start lpd by default). Only machines with line printer
! 408: access (ie: listed in either /etc/hosts.lpd or /etc/hosts.equiv)
! 409: may be used to mount an attack.
! 410: <br>
! 411: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/032_lpd.patch">
1.65 deraadt 412: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
413: <p>
1.95 ! deraadt 414:
! 415: <li id="uucp">
! 416: <strong>033: SECURITY FIX: September 11, 2001</strong>
! 417: <i>All architectures</i><br>
! 418: A security hole exists in <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-2.8/uuxqt.8">uuxqt(8)</a>
! 419: that may allow an attacker to run arbitrary commands as user uucp and
! 420: use this to gain root access.
! 421: The UUCP execution daemon, uuxqt(8), has a bug in its command line
! 422: parsing routine may allow arbitrary commands to be run. Because
! 423: some UUCP commands are run as root (and daemon) from cron it is possible
! 424: to leverage compromise of the UUCP user to gain root.
! 425: <br>
! 426: <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/2.8/common/033_uucp.patch">
1.1 deraadt 427: A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
428: <p>
1.82 deraadt 429:
1.1 deraadt 430: </ul>
1.61 deraadt 431:
1.71 tedu 432: <hr>