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  <hr>
  
  <ul>
! <li id="cvs4">
! <strong>033: SECURITY FIX: April 28, 2005</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Fix a buffer overflow, memory leaks, and NULL pointer dereference in
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/cvs.1">cvs(1)</a>
! . None of these issues are known to be exploitable.
! <a href="http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-0753">CAN-2005-0753</a>
! .
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/033_cvs4.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="tcp2">
! <strong>032: RELIABILITY FIX: April 4, 2005</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Handle an edge condition in
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/tcp.4">tcp(4)</a>
! timestamps.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/032_tcp2.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="telnet">
! <strong>031: SECURITY FIX: March 30, 2005</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Due to buffer overflows in
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/telnet.1">telnet(1)</a>
! , a malicious server or man-in-the-middle attack could allow execution of
! arbitrary code with the privileges of the user invoking
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/telnet.1">telnet(1)</a>
! .
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/031_telnet.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="sack">
! <strong>030: RELIABILITY FIX: March 30, 2005</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Bugs in the
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/tcp.4">tcp(4)</a>
! stack can lead to memory exhaustion or processing of TCP segments with
! invalid SACK options and cause a system crash.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/030_sack.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="copy">
! <strong>029: SECURITY FIX: March 16, 2005</strong>
! &nbsp; <i>amd64 only</i><br>
! More stringent checking should be done in the
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/copy.9">copy(9)</a>
! functions to prevent their misuse.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/amd64/029_copy.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="locore">
! <strong>028: SECURITY FIX: February 28, 2005</strong>
! &nbsp; <i>i386 only</i><br>
! More stringent checking should be done in the
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/copy.9">copy(9)</a>
! functions to prevent their misuse.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/i386/028_locore.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="rtt">
! <strong>027: RELIABILITY FIX: January 11, 2005</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! A bug in the
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/tcp.4">tcp(4)</a>
! stack allows an invalid argument to be used in calculating the TCP
! retransmit timeout. By sending packets with specific values in the TCP
! timestamp option, an attacker can cause a system panic.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/027_rtt.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="httpd3">
! <strong>026: SECURITY FIX: January 12, 2005</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/httpd.8">httpd(8)</a>
! 's mod_include module fails to properly validate the length of
! user supplied tag strings prior to copying them to a local buffer,
! causing a buffer overflow.
  <br>
! This would require enabling the XBitHack directive or server-side
! includes and making use of a malicious document.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/026_httpd3.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="getcwd">
! <strong>025: RELIABILITY FIX: January 6, 2005</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! The
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/getcwd.3">getcwd(3)</a>
! library function contains a memory management error, which causes failure
! to retrieve the current working directory if the path is very long.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/025_getcwd.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="pfkey">
! <strong>024: SECURITY FIX: December 14, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! On systems running
  <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/isakmpd.8">isakmpd(8)</a>
! it is possible for a local user to cause kernel memory corruption
! and system panic by setting
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/ipsec.4">ipsec(4)</a>
! credentials on a socket.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/024_pfkey.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! <li id="lynx">
! <strong>023: RELIABILITY FIX: November 10, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Due to a bug in
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/lynx.1">lynx(1)</a>
! it is possible for pages such as
! <a href="http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/mangleme/gallery/lynx_die1.html">this</a>
! to cause
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/lynx.1">lynx(1)</a>
! to exhaust memory and then crash when parsing such pages.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/023_lynx.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! <li id="pppd">
! <strong>022: RELIABILITY FIX: November 10, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/pppd.8">pppd(8)</a>
! contains a bug that allows an attacker to crash his own connection, but it cannot
! be used to deny service to other users.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/022_pppd.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! <li id="bind">
! <strong>021: RELIABILITY FIX: November 10, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! BIND contains a bug which results in BIND trying to contact nameservers via IPv6, even in
! cases where IPv6 connectivity is non-existent. This results in unnecessary timeouts and
! thus slow DNS queries.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/021_bind.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! <li id="radius">
! <strong>020: SECURITY FIX: September 20, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Eilko Bos reported that radius authentication, as implemented by
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/login_radius.8">login_radius(8)</a>,
! was not checking the shared secret used for replies sent by the radius server.
! This could allow an attacker to spoof a reply granting access to the
! attacker.  Note that OpenBSD does not ship with radius authentication enabled.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/020_radius.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! <li id="xpm">
! <strong>019: SECURITY FIX: September 16, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Chris Evans reported several flaws (stack and integer overflows) in the
! <a href="http://www.inria.fr/koala/lehors/xpm.html">Xpm</a>
! library code that parses image files
! (<a href="http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0687">CAN-2004-0687</a>,
! <a href="http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0688">CAN-2004-0688</a>).
! Some of these would be exploitable when parsing malicious image files in
! an application that handles XPM images, if they could escape ProPolice.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/019_xpm.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  <li id="httpd2">
  <strong>018: SECURITY FIX: September 10, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
--- 84,298 ----
  <hr>
  
  <ul>
! 
! <li id="autobook_package">
! <strong>001: BROKEN PACKAGE ON CD: May 4, 2004</strong>&nbsp; <i>macppc only</i><br>
! The powerpc autobook-1.3.tgz package found on CD2 has been found to be corrupt,
! and will not extract.
! A replacement package can be found on the ftp sites.
! <p>
! 
! <li id="cvs">
! <strong>002: SECURITY FIX: May 5, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Pathname validation problems have been found in
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/cvs.1">cvs(1)</a>,
! allowing malicious clients to create files outside the repository, allowing
! malicious servers to overwrite files outside the local CVS tree on
! the client and allowing clients to check out files outside the CVS
! repository.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/002_cvs.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="gdt">
! <strong>003: RELIABILITY FIX: May 5, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Under load "recent model"
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/gdt.4">gdt(4)</a>
! controllers will lock up.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/003_gdt.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="scsi">
! <strong>004: RELIABILITY FIX: May 5, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Restore the ability to negotiate tags/wide/sync with some SCSI controllers ( i.e.
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/siop.4">siop(4)</a>,
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/trm.4">trm(4)</a>,
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/iha.4">iha(4)</a>
! ).
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/004_scsi.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="tcp">
! <strong>005: RELIABILITY FIX: May 6, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Reply to in-window SYN with a rate-limited ACK.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/005_tcp.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="procfs">
! <strong>006: SECURITY FIX: May 13, 2004</strong>
! &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Check for integer overflow in procfs.  Use of procfs is not recommended.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/006_procfs.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="cvs2">
! <strong>007: SECURITY FIX: May 20, 2004</strong>
! &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! A heap overflow in the
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/cvs.1">cvs(1)</a>
! server has been discovered that can be exploited by clients sending
! malformed requests, enabling these clients to run arbitrary code
! with the same privileges as the CVS server program.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/007_cvs2.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="xdm">
! <strong>008: SECURITY FIX: May 26, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! With the introduction of IPv6 code in
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/xdm.1">xdm(1)</a>,
! one test on the 'requestPort' resource was deleted by accident. This
! makes xdm create the chooser socket even if xdmcp is disabled in
! xdm-config, by setting requestPort to 0. See
! <a href="http://bugs.xfree86.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1376">XFree86
! bugzilla</a> for details.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/008_xdm.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="kerberos">
! <strong>009: SECURITY FIX: May 30, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! A flaw in the Kerberos V
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/kdc">kdc(8)</a>
! server could result in the administrator of a Kerberos realm having
! the ability to impersonate any principal in any other realm which
! has established a cross-realm trust with their realm. The flaw is due to
! inadequate checking of the "transited" field in a Kerberos request. For
! more details see <a href="http://www.pdc.kth.se/heimdal/advisory/2004-04-01/">
! Heimdal's announcement</a>.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/009_kerberos.patch">
! A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
! <p>
! 
! <li id="fifofs">
! <strong>010: RELIABILITY FIX: June 9, 2004</strong>
! &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! A FIFO bug was introduced in OpenBSD 3.5 that occurs when a FIFO is opened in
! non-blocking mode for writing when there are no processes reading the FIFO.
! One program affected by this is the <a href="http://www.qmail.org/">qmail</a>
! mail server which could go into an infinite loop and consume all CPU.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/010_fifofs.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="cvs3">
! <strong>011: SECURITY FIX: June 9, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Multiple remote vulnerabilities have been found in the
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/cvs.1">cvs(1)</a>
! server that allow an attacker to crash the server or possibly execute arbitrary
! code with the same privileges as the CVS server program.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/011_cvs3.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="isakmpd">
! <strong>012: SECURITY FIX: June 10, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! As
! <a href="http://seclists.org/lists/fulldisclosure/2004/Jun/0191.html">disclosed</a>
! by Thomas Walpuski
  <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/isakmpd.8">isakmpd(8)</a>
! is still vulnerable to unauthorized SA deletion.  An attacker can delete IPsec
! tunnels at will.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/012_isakmpd.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! 
! <li id="httpd">
! <strong>013: SECURITY FIX: June 12, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/httpd.8">httpd(8)</a>
! / mod_ssl.
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0020">CAN-2003-0020</a>,
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0987">CAN-2003-0987</a>,
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0488">CAN-2004-0488</a>,
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0492">CAN-2004-0492</a>.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/013_httpd.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! 
! <li id="rnd">
! <strong>014: RELIABILITY FIX: July 25, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Under a certain network load the kernel can run out of stack space.  This was
! encountered in an environment using CARP on a VLAN interface.  This issue initially
! manifested itself as a FPU related crash on boot up.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/014_rnd.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! 
! <li id="icmp">
! <strong>015: RELIABILITY FIX: August 25, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Improved verification of ICMP errors in order to minimize the impact of ICMP attacks
! against TCP.
  <br>
! <a href="http://www.gont.com.ar/drafts/icmp-attacks-against-tcp.html">http://www.gont.com.ar/drafts/icmp-attacks-against-tcp.html</a>
! <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/015_icmp.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! 
! <li id="bridge">
! <strong>016: RELIABILITY FIX: August 26, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! As
! <a href="https://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&amp;m=109345131508824&amp;w=2">reported</a>
! by Vafa Izadinia
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/bridge.4">bridge(4)</a>
! with IPsec processing enabled can be crashed remotely by a single ICMP echo traversing the bridge.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/016_bridge.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! 
! <li id="libz">
! <strong>017: RELIABILITY FIX: August 29, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Due to incorrect error handling in zlib an attacker could potentially cause a Denial
! of Service attack.
! <a href="http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0797">CAN-2004-0797</a>
! .
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/017_libz.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
+ 
  <li id="httpd2">
  <strong>018: SECURITY FIX: September 10, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
***************
*** 281,476 ****
  <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/018_httpd2.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! <li id="libz">
! <strong>017: RELIABILITY FIX: August 29, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Due to incorrect error handling in zlib an attacker could potentially cause a Denial
! of Service attack.
! <a href="http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0797">CAN-2004-0797</a>
! .
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/017_libz.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! <li id="bridge">
! <strong>016: RELIABILITY FIX: August 26, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! As
! <a href="https://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&amp;m=109345131508824&amp;w=2">reported</a>
! by Vafa Izadinia
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/bridge.4">bridge(4)</a>
! with IPsec processing enabled can be crashed remotely by a single ICMP echo traversing the bridge.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/016_bridge.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! <li id="icmp">
! <strong>015: RELIABILITY FIX: August 25, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Improved verification of ICMP errors in order to minimize the impact of ICMP attacks
! against TCP.
  <br>
! <a href="http://www.gont.com.ar/drafts/icmp-attacks-against-tcp.html">http://www.gont.com.ar/drafts/icmp-attacks-against-tcp.html</a>
! <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/015_icmp.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! <li id="rnd">
! <strong>014: RELIABILITY FIX: July 25, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Under a certain network load the kernel can run out of stack space.  This was
! encountered in an environment using CARP on a VLAN interface.  This issue initially
! manifested itself as a FPU related crash on boot up.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/014_rnd.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! <li id="httpd">
! <strong>013: SECURITY FIX: June 12, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/httpd.8">httpd(8)</a>
! / mod_ssl.
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0020">CAN-2003-0020</a>,
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0987">CAN-2003-0987</a>,
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0488">CAN-2004-0488</a>,
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0492">CAN-2004-0492</a>.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/013_httpd.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! <li id="isakmpd">
! <strong>012: SECURITY FIX: June 10, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! As
! <a href="http://seclists.org/lists/fulldisclosure/2004/Jun/0191.html">disclosed</a>
! by Thomas Walpuski
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/isakmpd.8">isakmpd(8)</a>
! is still vulnerable to unauthorized SA deletion.  An attacker can delete IPsec
! tunnels at will.
! <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/012_isakmpd.patch">
! A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
! <p>
! <li id="cvs3">
! <strong>011: SECURITY FIX: June 9, 2004</strong>
! &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Multiple remote vulnerabilities have been found in the
  <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/cvs.1">cvs(1)</a>
! server that allow an attacker to crash the server or possibly execute arbitrary
! code with the same privileges as the CVS server program.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/011_cvs3.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! <li id="fifofs">
! <strong>010: RELIABILITY FIX: June 9, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! A FIFO bug was introduced in OpenBSD 3.5 that occurs when a FIFO is opened in
! non-blocking mode for writing when there are no processes reading the FIFO.
! One program affected by this is the <a href="http://www.qmail.org/">qmail</a>
! mail server which could go into an infinite loop and consume all CPU.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/010_fifofs.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! <li id="kerberos">
! <strong>009: SECURITY FIX: May 30, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! A flaw in the Kerberos V
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/kdc">kdc(8)</a>
! server could result in the administrator of a Kerberos realm having
! the ability to impersonate any principal in any other realm which
! has established a cross-realm trust with their realm. The flaw is due to
! inadequate checking of the "transited" field in a Kerberos request. For
! more details see <a href="http://www.pdc.kth.se/heimdal/advisory/2004-04-01/">
! Heimdal's announcement</a>.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/009_kerberos.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! <li id="xdm">
! <strong>008: SECURITY FIX: May 26, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! With the introduction of IPv6 code in
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/xdm.1">xdm(1)</a>,
! one test on the 'requestPort' resource was deleted by accident. This
! makes xdm create the chooser socket even if xdmcp is disabled in
! xdm-config, by setting requestPort to 0. See
! <a href="http://bugs.xfree86.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1376">XFree86
! bugzilla</a> for details.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/008_xdm.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! <li id="cvs2">
! <strong>007: SECURITY FIX: May 20, 2004</strong>
! &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! A heap overflow in the
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/cvs.1">cvs(1)</a>
! server has been discovered that can be exploited by clients sending
! malformed requests, enabling these clients to run arbitrary code
! with the same privileges as the CVS server program.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/007_cvs2.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! <li id="procfs">
! <strong>006: SECURITY FIX: May 13, 2004</strong>
! &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Check for integer overflow in procfs.  Use of procfs is not recommended.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/006_procfs.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! <li id="tcp">
! <strong>005: RELIABILITY FIX: May 6, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Reply to in-window SYN with a rate-limited ACK.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/005_tcp.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! <li id="scsi">
! <strong>004: RELIABILITY FIX: May 5, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Restore the ability to negotiate tags/wide/sync with some SCSI controllers ( i.e.
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/siop.4">siop(4)</a>,
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/trm.4">trm(4)</a>,
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/iha.4">iha(4)</a>
! ).
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/004_scsi.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! <li id="gdt">
! <strong>003: RELIABILITY FIX: May 5, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Under load "recent model"
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/gdt.4">gdt(4)</a>
! controllers will lock up.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/003_gdt.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! <li id="cvs">
! <strong>002: SECURITY FIX: May 5, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Pathname validation problems have been found in
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/cvs.1">cvs(1)</a>,
! allowing malicious clients to create files outside the repository, allowing
! malicious servers to overwrite files outside the local CVS tree on
! the client and allowing clients to check out files outside the CVS
! repository.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/002_cvs.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
- <p>
- <li id="autobook_package">
- <strong>001: BROKEN PACKAGE ON CD: May 4, 2004</strong>&nbsp; <i>macppc only</i><br>
- The powerpc autobook-1.3.tgz package found on CD2 has been found to be corrupt,
- and will not extract.
- A replacement package can be found on the ftp sites.
  <p>
  
  </ul>
--- 305,511 ----
  <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/018_httpd2.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! 
! <li id="xpm">
! <strong>019: SECURITY FIX: September 16, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Chris Evans reported several flaws (stack and integer overflows) in the
! <a href="http://www.inria.fr/koala/lehors/xpm.html">Xpm</a>
! library code that parses image files
! (<a href="http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0687">CAN-2004-0687</a>,
! <a href="http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0688">CAN-2004-0688</a>).
! Some of these would be exploitable when parsing malicious image files in
! an application that handles XPM images, if they could escape ProPolice.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/019_xpm.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! 
! <li id="radius">
! <strong>020: SECURITY FIX: September 20, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Eilko Bos reported that radius authentication, as implemented by
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/login_radius.8">login_radius(8)</a>,
! was not checking the shared secret used for replies sent by the radius server.
! This could allow an attacker to spoof a reply granting access to the
! attacker.  Note that OpenBSD does not ship with radius authentication enabled.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/020_radius.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! 
! <li id="bind">
! <strong>021: RELIABILITY FIX: November 10, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! BIND contains a bug which results in BIND trying to contact nameservers via IPv6, even in
! cases where IPv6 connectivity is non-existent. This results in unnecessary timeouts and
! thus slow DNS queries.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/021_bind.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! 
! <li id="pppd">
! <strong>022: RELIABILITY FIX: November 10, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/pppd.8">pppd(8)</a>
! contains a bug that allows an attacker to crash his own connection, but it cannot
! be used to deny service to other users.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/022_pppd.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! 
! <li id="lynx">
! <strong>023: RELIABILITY FIX: November 10, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Due to a bug in
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/lynx.1">lynx(1)</a>
! it is possible for pages such as
! <a href="http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/mangleme/gallery/lynx_die1.html">this</a>
! to cause
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/lynx.1">lynx(1)</a>
! to exhaust memory and then crash when parsing such pages.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/023_lynx.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! 
! 
! 
! 
! <li id="cvs4">
! <strong>033: SECURITY FIX: April 28, 2005</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Fix a buffer overflow, memory leaks, and NULL pointer dereference in
  <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/cvs.1">cvs(1)</a>
! . None of these issues are known to be exploitable.
! <a href="http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-0753">CAN-2005-0753</a>
! .
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/033_cvs4.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! 
! 
! <li id="tcp2">
! <strong>032: RELIABILITY FIX: April 4, 2005</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Handle an edge condition in
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/tcp.4">tcp(4)</a>
! timestamps.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/032_tcp2.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! 
! 
! <li id="telnet">
! <strong>031: SECURITY FIX: March 30, 2005</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Due to buffer overflows in
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/telnet.1">telnet(1)</a>
! , a malicious server or man-in-the-middle attack could allow execution of
! arbitrary code with the privileges of the user invoking
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/telnet.1">telnet(1)</a>
! .
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/031_telnet.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! 
! 
! <li id="sack">
! <strong>030: RELIABILITY FIX: March 30, 2005</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Bugs in the
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/tcp.4">tcp(4)</a>
! stack can lead to memory exhaustion or processing of TCP segments with
! invalid SACK options and cause a system crash.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/030_sack.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! 
! 
! <li id="copy">
! <strong>029: SECURITY FIX: March 16, 2005</strong>
! &nbsp; <i>amd64 only</i><br>
! More stringent checking should be done in the
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/copy.9">copy(9)</a>
! functions to prevent their misuse.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/amd64/029_copy.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! 
! 
! <li id="locore">
! <strong>028: SECURITY FIX: February 28, 2005</strong>
! &nbsp; <i>i386 only</i><br>
! More stringent checking should be done in the
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/copy.9">copy(9)</a>
! functions to prevent their misuse.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/i386/028_locore.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! 
! 
! <li id="rtt">
! <strong>027: RELIABILITY FIX: January 11, 2005</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! A bug in the
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/tcp.4">tcp(4)</a>
! stack allows an invalid argument to be used in calculating the TCP
! retransmit timeout. By sending packets with specific values in the TCP
! timestamp option, an attacker can cause a system panic.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/027_rtt.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! 
! 
! <li id="httpd3">
! <strong>026: SECURITY FIX: January 12, 2005</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/httpd.8">httpd(8)</a>
! 's mod_include module fails to properly validate the length of
! user supplied tag strings prior to copying them to a local buffer,
! causing a buffer overflow.
  <br>
! This would require enabling the XBitHack directive or server-side
! includes and making use of a malicious document.
! <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/026_httpd3.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! 
! 
! <li id="getcwd">
! <strong>025: RELIABILITY FIX: January 6, 2005</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! The
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/getcwd.3">getcwd(3)</a>
! library function contains a memory management error, which causes failure
! to retrieve the current working directory if the path is very long.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/025_getcwd.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
! 
! <li id="pfkey">
! <strong>024: SECURITY FIX: December 14, 2004</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! On systems running
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/isakmpd.8">isakmpd(8)</a>
! it is possible for a local user to cause kernel memory corruption
! and system panic by setting
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.5/ipsec.4">ipsec(4)</a>
! credentials on a socket.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.5/common/024_pfkey.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
  </ul>