===================================================================
RCS file: /cvsrepo/anoncvs/cvs/www/errata38.html,v
retrieving revision 1.71
retrieving revision 1.72
diff -c -r1.71 -r1.72
*** www/errata38.html	2019/05/27 22:55:19	1.71
--- www/errata38.html	2019/05/28 16:32:42	1.72
***************
*** 85,214 ****
  
  <ul>
  
! <li id="ssh2">
! <strong>020: SECURITY FIX: October 12, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Fix 2 security bugs found in OpenSSH. A pre-authentication denial of service (found
! by Tavis Ormandy) that would cause
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/sshd.8">sshd(8)</a>
! to spin until the login grace time expired.
! An unsafe signal handler (found by Mark Dowd) that is vulnerable to a race condition
! that could be exploited to perform a pre-authentication denial of service.
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-4924">CVE-2006-4924</a>,
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-5051">CVE-2006-5051</a>
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/020_ssh2.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="systrace">
! <strong>019: SECURITY FIX: October 7, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Fix for an integer overflow in
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/systrace.4">systrace(4)</a>'s
! STRIOCREPLACE support, found by
! Chris Evans. This could be exploited for DoS, limited kmem reads or local
! privilege escalation.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/019_systrace.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="openssl2">
! <strong>018: SECURITY FIX: October 7, 2006</strong>
! &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Several problems have been found in OpenSSL. While parsing certain invalid ASN.1
! structures an error condition is mishandled, possibly resulting in an infinite
! loop. A buffer overflow exists in the SSL_get_shared_ciphers function. A NULL
! pointer may be dereferenced in the SSL version 2 client code. In addition, many
! applications using OpenSSL do not perform any validation of the lengths of
! public keys being used.
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-2937">CVE-2006-2937</a>,
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-3738">CVE-2006-3738</a>,
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-4343">CVE-2006-4343</a>,
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-2940">CVE-2006-2940</a>
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/018_openssl2.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="httpd2">
! <strong>017: SECURITY FIX: October 7, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/httpd.8">httpd(8)</a>
! does not sanitize the Expect header from an HTTP request when it is
! reflected back in an error message, which might allow cross-site scripting (XSS)
! style attacks.
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-3918">CVE-2006-3918</a>
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/017_httpd2.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="openssl">
! <strong>016: SECURITY FIX: September 8, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Due to incorrect PKCS#1 v1.5 padding validation in OpenSSL, it is possible for
! an attacker to construct an invalid signature which OpenSSL would accept as a
! valid PKCS#1 v1.5 signature.
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-4339">CVE-2006-4339</a>
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/016_openssl.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="bind">
! <strong>015: SECURITY FIX: September 8, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Two Denial of Service issues have been found with BIND.
! An attacker who can perform recursive lookups on a DNS server and is able
! to send a sufficiently large number of recursive queries, or is able to
! get the DNS server to return more than one SIG(covered) RRsets can stop
! the functionality of the DNS service.
! An attacker querying an authoritative DNS server serving a RFC 2535
! DNSSEC zone may be able to crash the DNS server.
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-4095">CVE-2006-4095</a>
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-4096">CVE-2006-4096</a>
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/015_bind.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="sppp">
! <strong>014: SECURITY FIX: September 2, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Due to the failure to correctly validate LCP configuration option lengths,
! it is possible for an attacker to send LCP packets via an
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/sppp.4">sppp(4)</a>
! connection causing the kernel to panic.
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-4304">CVE-2006-4304</a>
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/014_sppp.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="isakmpd">
! <strong>013: SECURITY FIX: August 25, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! A problem in
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/isakmpd.8">isakmpd(8)</a>
! caused IPsec to run partly without replay protection. If
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/isakmpd.8">isakmpd(8)</a>
! was acting as responder during SA negotiation, SA's with a replay window of size 0 were created.
! An attacker could reinject sniffed IPsec packets, which will be accepted without checking the
! replay counter.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/013_isakmpd.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="sem">
! <strong>012: SECURITY FIX: August 25, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! It is possible to cause the kernel to panic when more than the default number of
! sempahores have been allocated.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/012_sem.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
--- 85,211 ----
  
  <ul>
  
! <li id="perl">
! <strong>001: SECURITY FIX: January 5, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! A buffer overflow has been found in the Perl interpreter with the sprintf function which
! may be exploitable under certain conditions.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/001_perl.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="fd">
! <strong>002: SECURITY FIX: January 5, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Do not allow users to trick suid programs into re-opening files via /dev/fd.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/002_fd.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="i386pmap">
! <strong>003: RELIABILITY FIX: January 13, 2006</strong>
! &nbsp; <i>i386 architecture</i><br>
! Change the implementation of i386 W^X so that the "execute line" can move around.
! Before it was limited to being either at 512MB (below which all code normally
! lands) or at the top of the stack. Now the line can float as
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/mprotect.2">mprotect(2)</a>
! and
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/mmap.2">mmap(2)</a>
! requests need it to. This is now implemented using only GDT selectors
! instead of the LDT so that it is more robust as well.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/i386/003_i386pmap.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="i386machdep">
! <strong>004: RELIABILITY FIX: January 13, 2006</strong>
! &nbsp; <i>i386 architecture</i><br>
! Constrain
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/i386/i386_set_ioperm.2">i386_set_ioperm(2)</a>
! so even root is blocked from accessing the ioports
! unless the machine is running at lower securelevels or with an open X11 aperture.
! <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/i386/004_i386machdep.patch">
! A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
! <p>
! 
! <li id="ssh">
! <strong>005: SECURITY FIX: February 12, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Josh Bressers has reported a weakness in OpenSSH caused due to the insecure use of the
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/system.3">system(3)</a>
! function in
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/scp.1">scp(1)</a>
! when performing copy operations using filenames that are supplied by the user from the command line.
! This can be exploited to execute shell commands with privileges of the user running
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/scp.1">scp(1)</a>.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/005_ssh.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="sendmail">
! <strong>006: SECURITY FIX: March 25, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! A race condition has been reported to exist in the handling by sendmail of
! asynchronous signals. A remote attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code with the
! privileges of the user running sendmail, typically root.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/006_sendmail.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="xorg">
! <strong>007: SECURITY FIX: May 2, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! A security vulnerability has been found in the X.Org server --
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-1526">CVE-2006-1526</a>.
! Clients authorized to connect to the X server are able to crash it and to execute
! malicious code within the X server.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/007_xorg.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="sendmail2">
! <strong>008: SECURITY FIX: June 15, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! A potential denial of service problem has been found in sendmail. A malformed MIME
! message could trigger excessive recursion which will lead to stack exhaustion.
! This denial of service attack only affects delivery of mail from the queue and
! delivery of a malformed message. Other incoming mail is still accepted and
! delivered. However, mail messages in the queue may not be reattempted if a
! malformed MIME message exists.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/008_sendmail2.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="httpd">
! <strong>009: SECURITY FIX: July 30, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/httpd.8">httpd(8)</a>'s
! mod_rewrite has a potentially exploitable off-by-one buffer overflow.
! The buffer overflow may result in a vulnerability which, in combination
! with certain types of Rewrite rules in the web server configuration files,
! could be triggered remotely. The default install is not affected by the
! buffer overflow. CVE-2006-3747
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/009_httpd.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="sendmail3">
! <strong>010: SECURITY FIX: August 25, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! A potential denial of service problem has been found in sendmail. A message
! with really long header lines could trigger a use-after-free bug causing
! sendmail to crash.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/010_sendmail3.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
***************
*** 226,352 ****
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="sendmail3">
! <strong>010: SECURITY FIX: August 25, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! A potential denial of service problem has been found in sendmail. A message
! with really long header lines could trigger a use-after-free bug causing
! sendmail to crash.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/010_sendmail3.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="httpd">
! <strong>009: SECURITY FIX: July 30, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/httpd.8">httpd(8)</a>'s
! mod_rewrite has a potentially exploitable off-by-one buffer overflow.
! The buffer overflow may result in a vulnerability which, in combination
! with certain types of Rewrite rules in the web server configuration files,
! could be triggered remotely. The default install is not affected by the
! buffer overflow. CVE-2006-3747
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/009_httpd.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="sendmail2">
! <strong>008: SECURITY FIX: June 15, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! A potential denial of service problem has been found in sendmail. A malformed MIME
! message could trigger excessive recursion which will lead to stack exhaustion.
! This denial of service attack only affects delivery of mail from the queue and
! delivery of a malformed message. Other incoming mail is still accepted and
! delivered. However, mail messages in the queue may not be reattempted if a
! malformed MIME message exists.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/008_sendmail2.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="xorg">
! <strong>007: SECURITY FIX: May 2, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! A security vulnerability has been found in the X.Org server --
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-1526">CVE-2006-1526</a>.
! Clients authorized to connect to the X server are able to crash it and to execute
! malicious code within the X server.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/007_xorg.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="sendmail">
! <strong>006: SECURITY FIX: March 25, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! A race condition has been reported to exist in the handling by sendmail of
! asynchronous signals. A remote attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code with the
! privileges of the user running sendmail, typically root.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/006_sendmail.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="ssh">
! <strong>005: SECURITY FIX: February 12, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Josh Bressers has reported a weakness in OpenSSH caused due to the insecure use of the
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/system.3">system(3)</a>
! function in
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/scp.1">scp(1)</a>
! when performing copy operations using filenames that are supplied by the user from the command line.
! This can be exploited to execute shell commands with privileges of the user running
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/scp.1">scp(1)</a>.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/005_ssh.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="i386machdep">
! <strong>004: RELIABILITY FIX: January 13, 2006</strong>
! &nbsp; <i>i386 architecture</i><br>
! Constrain
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/i386/i386_set_ioperm.2">i386_set_ioperm(2)</a>
! so even root is blocked from accessing the ioports
! unless the machine is running at lower securelevels or with an open X11 aperture.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/i386/004_i386machdep.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="i386pmap">
! <strong>003: RELIABILITY FIX: January 13, 2006</strong>
! &nbsp; <i>i386 architecture</i><br>
! Change the implementation of i386 W^X so that the "execute line" can move around.
! Before it was limited to being either at 512MB (below which all code normally
! lands) or at the top of the stack. Now the line can float as
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/mprotect.2">mprotect(2)</a>
! and
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/mmap.2">mmap(2)</a>
! requests need it to. This is now implemented using only GDT selectors
! instead of the LDT so that it is more robust as well.
! <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/i386/003_i386pmap.patch">
! A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
! <p>
! 
! <li id="fd">
! <strong>002: SECURITY FIX: January 5, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Do not allow users to trick suid programs into re-opening files via /dev/fd.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/002_fd.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="perl">
! <strong>001: SECURITY FIX: January 5, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! A buffer overflow has been found in the Perl interpreter with the sprintf function which
! may be exploitable under certain conditions.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/001_perl.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
--- 223,352 ----
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="sem">
! <strong>012: SECURITY FIX: August 25, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! It is possible to cause the kernel to panic when more than the default number of
! sempahores have been allocated.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/012_sem.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="isakmpd">
! <strong>013: SECURITY FIX: August 25, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! A problem in
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/isakmpd.8">isakmpd(8)</a>
! caused IPsec to run partly without replay protection. If
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/isakmpd.8">isakmpd(8)</a>
! was acting as responder during SA negotiation, SA's with a replay window of size 0 were created.
! An attacker could reinject sniffed IPsec packets, which will be accepted without checking the
! replay counter.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/013_isakmpd.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="sppp">
! <strong>014: SECURITY FIX: September 2, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Due to the failure to correctly validate LCP configuration option lengths,
! it is possible for an attacker to send LCP packets via an
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/sppp.4">sppp(4)</a>
! connection causing the kernel to panic.
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-4304">CVE-2006-4304</a>
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/014_sppp.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="bind">
! <strong>015: SECURITY FIX: September 8, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Two Denial of Service issues have been found with BIND.
! An attacker who can perform recursive lookups on a DNS server and is able
! to send a sufficiently large number of recursive queries, or is able to
! get the DNS server to return more than one SIG(covered) RRsets can stop
! the functionality of the DNS service.
! An attacker querying an authoritative DNS server serving a RFC 2535
! DNSSEC zone may be able to crash the DNS server.
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-4095">CVE-2006-4095</a>
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-4096">CVE-2006-4096</a>
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/015_bind.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="openssl">
! <strong>016: SECURITY FIX: September 8, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Due to incorrect PKCS#1 v1.5 padding validation in OpenSSL, it is possible for
! an attacker to construct an invalid signature which OpenSSL would accept as a
! valid PKCS#1 v1.5 signature.
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-4339">CVE-2006-4339</a>
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/016_openssl.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="httpd2">
! <strong>017: SECURITY FIX: October 7, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/httpd.8">httpd(8)</a>
! does not sanitize the Expect header from an HTTP request when it is
! reflected back in an error message, which might allow cross-site scripting (XSS)
! style attacks.
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-3918">CVE-2006-3918</a>
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/017_httpd2.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="openssl2">
! <strong>018: SECURITY FIX: October 7, 2006</strong>
! &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Several problems have been found in OpenSSL. While parsing certain invalid ASN.1
! structures an error condition is mishandled, possibly resulting in an infinite
! loop. A buffer overflow exists in the SSL_get_shared_ciphers function. A NULL
! pointer may be dereferenced in the SSL version 2 client code. In addition, many
! applications using OpenSSL do not perform any validation of the lengths of
! public keys being used.
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-2937">CVE-2006-2937</a>,
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-3738">CVE-2006-3738</a>,
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-4343">CVE-2006-4343</a>,
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-2940">CVE-2006-2940</a>
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/018_openssl2.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="systrace">
! <strong>019: SECURITY FIX: October 7, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Fix for an integer overflow in
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/systrace.4">systrace(4)</a>'s
! STRIOCREPLACE support, found by
! Chris Evans. This could be exploited for DoS, limited kmem reads or local
! privilege escalation.
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/019_systrace.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="ssh2">
! <strong>020: SECURITY FIX: October 12, 2006</strong>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
! Fix 2 security bugs found in OpenSSH. A pre-authentication denial of service (found
! by Tavis Ormandy) that would cause
! <a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-3.8/sshd.8">sshd(8)</a>
! to spin until the login grace time expired.
! An unsafe signal handler (found by Mark Dowd) that is vulnerable to a race condition
! that could be exploited to perform a pre-authentication denial of service.
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-4924">CVE-2006-4924</a>,
! <a href="http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-5051">CVE-2006-5051</a>
  <br>
! <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/3.8/common/020_ssh2.patch">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>