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--- www/errata55.html	2017/03/28 06:41:18	1.53
***************
*** 72,78 ****
  <p>
  Patches for the OpenBSD base system are distributed as unified diffs.
  Each patch is cryptographically signed with the
! <a href="http://man.openbsd.org/signify">signify(1)</a> tool and contains
  usage instructions.
  All the following patches are also available in one
  <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/5.5.tar.gz">tar.gz file</a>
--- 72,78 ----
  <p>
  Patches for the OpenBSD base system are distributed as unified diffs.
  Each patch is cryptographically signed with the
! <a href="http://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-5.5/signify.1">signify(1)</a> tool and contains
  usage instructions.
  All the following patches are also available in one
  <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/5.5.tar.gz">tar.gz file</a>
***************
*** 86,92 ****
  
  <ul>
  
! <li id="001_icmp">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>001: RELIABILITY FIX: March 15, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Memory corruption happens during
--- 86,92 ----
  
  <ul>
  
! <li id="p001_icmp">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>001: RELIABILITY FIX: March 15, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Memory corruption happens during
***************
*** 96,102 ****
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="002_openssl">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>002: SECURITY FIX: April 8, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Missing bounds checking in OpenSSL's implementation of the TLS/DTLS
--- 96,102 ----
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="p002_openssl">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>002: SECURITY FIX: April 8, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Missing bounds checking in OpenSSL's implementation of the TLS/DTLS
***************
*** 106,123 ****
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="003_ftp">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>003: SECURITY FIX: April 9, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Missing hostname check for HTTPS connections in the
! <a href="http://man.openbsd.org/?query=ftp&manpath=OpenBSD+5.5&sektion=1">ftp(1)</a>
  utility.
  <br>
  <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/5.5/common/003_ftp.patch.sig">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="004_openssl">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>004: SECURITY FIX: April 12, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  A use-after-free race condition in OpenSSL's read buffer may permit an attacker
--- 106,123 ----
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="p003_ftp">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>003: SECURITY FIX: April 9, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Missing hostname check for HTTPS connections in the
! <a href="http://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-5.5/ftp.1">ftp(1)</a>
  utility.
  <br>
  <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/5.5/common/003_ftp.patch.sig">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="p004_openssl">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>004: SECURITY FIX: April 12, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  A use-after-free race condition in OpenSSL's read buffer may permit an attacker
***************
*** 127,133 ****
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="005_openssl">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>005: RELIABILITY FIX: May 1, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  An attacker can trigger generation of an SSL alert which could cause
--- 127,133 ----
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="p005_openssl">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>005: RELIABILITY FIX: May 1, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  An attacker can trigger generation of an SSL alert which could cause
***************
*** 137,143 ****
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="006_libXfont">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>006: SECURITY FIX: May 24, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures with X server</i><br>
  X Font Service Protocol & Font metadata file handling issues in libXfont
--- 137,143 ----
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="p006_libXfont">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>006: SECURITY FIX: May 24, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures with X server</i><br>
  X Font Service Protocol & Font metadata file handling issues in libXfont
***************
*** 152,158 ****
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="007_sendmail">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>007: SECURITY FIX: June 5, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Sendmail was not properly closing file descriptions before executing programs.
--- 152,158 ----
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="p007_sendmail">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>007: SECURITY FIX: June 5, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Sendmail was not properly closing file descriptions before executing programs.
***************
*** 163,169 ****
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="008_openssl">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>008: SECURITY FIX: June 6, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  This patch contains a number of SSL library fixes.
--- 163,169 ----
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="p008_openssl">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>008: SECURITY FIX: June 6, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  This patch contains a number of SSL library fixes.
***************
*** 172,190 ****
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="009_dhcp">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>009: RELIABILITY FIX: July 30, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Packets with illegal DHCP options can lead to memory exhaustion of
! <a href="http://man.openbsd.org/?query=dhclient&amp;sektion=8">dhclient(8)</a>
  and
! <a href="http://man.openbsd.org/?query=dhcpd&amp;sektion=8">dhcpd(8)</a>.
  <br>
  <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/5.5/common/009_dhcp.patch.sig">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="010_openssl">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>010: SECURITY FIX: August 9, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  This patch contains a number of SSL library fixes.
--- 172,190 ----
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="p009_dhcp">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>009: RELIABILITY FIX: July 30, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Packets with illegal DHCP options can lead to memory exhaustion of
! <a href="http://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-5.5/dhclient.8">dhclient(8)</a>
  and
! <a href="http://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-5.5/dhcpd.8">dhcpd(8)</a>.
  <br>
  <a href="https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/5.5/common/009_dhcp.patch.sig">
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="p010_openssl">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>010: SECURITY FIX: August 9, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  This patch contains a number of SSL library fixes.
***************
*** 193,199 ****
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="011_nginx">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>011: SECURITY FIX: October 1, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  nginx can reuse cached SSL sessions in unrelated contexts, allowing virtual
--- 193,199 ----
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="p011_nginx">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>011: SECURITY FIX: October 1, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  nginx can reuse cached SSL sessions in unrelated contexts, allowing virtual
***************
*** 204,210 ****
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="012_openssl">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>012: RELIABILITY FIX: October 20, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Two remotely triggerable memory leaks in OpenSSL can lead to a denial of
--- 204,210 ----
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="p012_openssl">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>012: RELIABILITY FIX: October 20, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Two remotely triggerable memory leaks in OpenSSL can lead to a denial of
***************
*** 214,220 ****
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="013_kernexec">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>013: RELIABILITY FIX: October 20, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Executable headers with an unaligned address will trigger a kernel panic.
--- 214,220 ----
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="p013_kernexec">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>013: RELIABILITY FIX: October 20, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Executable headers with an unaligned address will trigger a kernel panic.
***************
*** 223,229 ****
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="014_pfctl">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>014: RELIABILITY FIX: November 17, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  A PF rule using an IPv4 address
--- 223,229 ----
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="p014_pfctl">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>014: RELIABILITY FIX: November 17, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  A PF rule using an IPv4 address
***************
*** 235,241 ****
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="015_asr">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>015: RELIABILITY FIX: November 17, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Querying an invalid hostname with gethostbyname(3) could cause a NULL deref.
--- 235,241 ----
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="p015_asr">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>015: RELIABILITY FIX: November 17, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Querying an invalid hostname with gethostbyname(3) could cause a NULL deref.
***************
*** 244,250 ****
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="016_pipex">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>016: RELIABILITY FIX: December 5, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Several bugs were fixed that allowed a crash from remote when an active pipex
--- 244,250 ----
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="p016_pipex">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>016: RELIABILITY FIX: December 5, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Several bugs were fixed that allowed a crash from remote when an active pipex
***************
*** 254,260 ****
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="017_pppoe">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>017: RELIABILITY FIX: December 5, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  An incorrect memcpy call would result in corrupted MAC addresses when
--- 254,260 ----
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="p017_pppoe">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>017: RELIABILITY FIX: December 5, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  An incorrect memcpy call would result in corrupted MAC addresses when
***************
*** 264,270 ****
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="018_virtio">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>018: RELIABILITY FIX: December 9, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Several bugs in virtio(4) can lead to hangs with virtio devices,
--- 264,270 ----
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="p018_virtio">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>018: RELIABILITY FIX: December 9, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Several bugs in virtio(4) can lead to hangs with virtio devices,
***************
*** 274,280 ****
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="019_xserver">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>019: SECURITY FIX: December 9, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  One year after Ilja van Sprundel discovered and reported a large number
--- 274,280 ----
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="p019_xserver">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>019: SECURITY FIX: December 9, 2014</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  One year after Ilja van Sprundel discovered and reported a large number
***************
*** 287,293 ****
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="020_libevent">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>020: SECURITY FIX: January 13, 2015</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Fix CVE-2014-6272 in libevent 1.4 event buffer handling.  OpenBSD
--- 287,293 ----
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="p020_libevent">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>020: SECURITY FIX: January 13, 2015</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Fix CVE-2014-6272 in libevent 1.4 event buffer handling.  OpenBSD
***************
*** 300,306 ****
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="021_xserver">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>021: SECURITY FIX: March 3, 2015</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Information leak in the XkbSetGeometry request of X servers.
--- 300,306 ----
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="p021_xserver">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>021: SECURITY FIX: March 3, 2015</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Information leak in the XkbSetGeometry request of X servers.
***************
*** 312,318 ****
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="022_freetype">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>022: SECURITY FIX: March 13, 2015</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Another fix for buffer overflows in malformed fonts.
--- 312,318 ----
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="p022_freetype">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>022: SECURITY FIX: March 13, 2015</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Another fix for buffer overflows in malformed fonts.
***************
*** 321,327 ****
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="023_libxfont">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>023: SECURITY FIX: March 18, 2015</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Buffer overflows in libXfont
--- 321,327 ----
  A source code patch exists which remedies this problem.</a>
  <p>
  
! <li id="p023_libxfont">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>023: SECURITY FIX: March 18, 2015</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Buffer overflows in libXfont
***************
*** 334,340 ****
  <br>Note that the instructions should read <code>cd /usr/xenocara/lib/libXfont</code>.
  <p>
  
! <li id="024_openssl">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>024: SECURITY FIX: March 19, 2015</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Fix two possible crash causing defects.<br>
--- 334,340 ----
  <br>Note that the instructions should read <code>cd /usr/xenocara/lib/libXfont</code>.
  <p>
  
! <li id="p024_openssl">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>024: SECURITY FIX: March 19, 2015</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Fix two possible crash causing defects.<br>
***************
*** 349,355 ****
  <br>Note that instructions should read <code>cd /usr/src/lib/libssl/crypto</code>.
  <p>
  
! <li id="025_smtpd">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>025: RELIABILITY FIX: April 17, 2015</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Fix a logic error in smtpd handling of SNI.
--- 349,355 ----
  <br>Note that instructions should read <code>cd /usr/src/lib/libssl/crypto</code>.
  <p>
  
! <li id="p025_smtpd">
  <font color="#009000"><strong>025: RELIABILITY FIX: April 17, 2015</strong></font>
  &nbsp; <i>All architectures</i><br>
  Fix a logic error in smtpd handling of SNI.