version 1.50, 2017/07/03 22:01:03 |
version 1.51, 2017/07/03 23:47:21 |
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protection against address space discovery attacks. Implemented first by |
protection against address space discovery attacks. Implemented first by |
Damien Miller (<a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-current/man8/sshd.8">sshd(8)</a> 2004), Claudio Jeker (<a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-current/man8/bgpd.8">bgpd(8)</a>, 2015), Eric Faurot (<a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-current/man8/smtpd.8">smtpd(8)</a>, 2016), |
Damien Miller (<a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-current/man8/sshd.8">sshd(8)</a> 2004), Claudio Jeker (<a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-current/man8/bgpd.8">bgpd(8)</a>, 2015), Eric Faurot (<a href="https://man.openbsd.org/OpenBSD-current/man8/smtpd.8">smtpd(8)</a>, 2016), |
Rafael Zalamena (various, 2016), and others. |
Rafael Zalamena (various, 2016), and others. |
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<li>trapsleds: Reduction of incidental nop instructions/sequences in the |
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instruction stream which could be be useful potentially for ROP attack methods |
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to innaccurately target gadgets. These nops sequences are converted into |
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trap sequences where possible. Todd Mortimer and Theo de Raadt, June 2017. |
<li>The .o files of the kernel are relinked in random order from a link-kit, |
<li>The .o files of the kernel are relinked in random order from a link-kit, |
before every reboot. This provides substantial interior randomization in |
before every reboot. This provides substantial interior randomization in |
the kernel's text and data segments for layout and relative branches/calls. |
the kernel's text and data segments for layout and relative branches/calls. |